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Jesuit thalassology reconsidered: the Mediterranean and the geopolitics of Jesuit missionary aims in seventeenth-century Ethiopia

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During the second half of the sixteenth century, the Society of Jesus relied heavily on Portuguese trade routes in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans in order to reach Ethiopia. However, geopolitical shifts, particularly the rise of Ottoman sea power in the Indian Ocean and the Spanish conquest of Portugal in 1580, ended this route's viability for the Jesuits. In order to sustain Jesuit connections with Ethiopia, Father General Mutio Vitelleschi decided in 1627 to abandon the Portuguese and send four Jesuits with French passports through Ottoman territory and up the Nile, whence they would travel overland into Ethiopia. After arriving in Egypt, however, the Jesuits were arrested, interrogated and expelled by the Ottoman governor, who suspected that they were Habsburg spies. The course of this failed Jesuit effort to reach Ethiopia has three important implications for our understanding of the Mediterranean and its relationship with other sea spaces in terms of early modern empire building and Catholic evangelization. First, the decision to abandon the Portuguese in favour of the French illuminates how the Mediterranean remained at the fore of the Society of Jesus's missionary efforts. Second, French willingness to protect the Jesuits demonstrates that Louis XIII of France saw the Mediterranean as an important theatre for achieving his political, religious and economic goals. Third, the Ottoman decision to arrest and expel the Jesuits due to fears that they were in Egypt to assist in a Coptic rebellion and concomitant Hapsburg invasion demonstrates both Ottoman anxiety concerning the rise of European religio-imperial ambitions and the Ottomans' ability to control foreigners travelling through their lands. In sum, these developments illuminate a larger thalassological picture of the Mediterranean, which, like other sea spaces, obtained as an important contact zone where early modern powers competed to build empires and save souls.

Keywords: Ethiopia; Egypt; Ottoman Empire; Society of Jesus; early modern Catholicism; Indian Ocean; Catholic missions; empire building

I

In the wake of Vasco da Gama's circumnavigation of the Cape of Good Hope and the opening of the new sea route to India and East Asia, Portugal seemingly thwarted the traditional ties between Western Europe and the Spice Islands, which until then had been solely through the Mediterranean – via the Ottomans and Venetians.[1] Likewise, the explorations of da Gama and others facilitated the Portuguese crown's ability to orchestrate missionary activity in the East, particularly for the Society of Jesus in Portuguese outposts such as Goa and Macao.[2] The Jesuits also found themselves in Ethiopia, their presence stemming from these sporadic overtures of alliance between Portugal and Ethiopia beginning in the late fifteenth century.[3] By the 1550s Jesuit

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missionaries were regularly sent there via Portuguese Goa, their mandate being to persuade the Ethiopian emperors to convert to Catholicism.[4] The hope was that a Luso-Ethiopian political alliance grounded in Catholicism would serve to counterbalance the Ottomans to the north and the Safavids to the east;[5] such a confederacy would also raise Portugal's credit with the papacy, since the Portuguese monarchs' two major European rivals – the kings of Spain and France – both saw themselves as defenders of the faith.[6]

However, after several indecisive wars against Suleiman the Magnificent, and the eventual realization that the Holy League's victory at Lepanto in 1571 did little to curb Ottoman sea power, the Portuguese crown's ability to maintain its ties to Ethiopia began to deteriorate.[7] Then, in 1578, the heirless King Sebastian I was killed in the Battle of Alcácer Quibir in Morocco, which eventually led to the Duke of Alba's march into Portugal and conquest of Lisbon, allowing Philip II of Spain to declare himself Philip I of Portugal. The Iberian Union could have potentially aided in reopening the Arabian and Red Seas, as Philip's resources far surpassed his Manueline predecessors. However, it had the opposite effect, as Portugal and its possessions became parcels of the Spanish Empire and thus became embroiled in the bitter Habsburg–Ottoman rivalry.[8]

These geopolitical shifts negatively impacted the Jesuits and their relationship with Ethiopia, given that dispatching their missionaries to Ethiopia from Lisbon via Atlantic-Indian shipping lanes became increasingly untenable. Father General Mutio Vitelleschi decided that, if he were to sustain a missionary presence in Ethiopia, he would have to find a new ally. In turn, he sought protection from the French, a rising political and commercial power in the Mediterranean and the Ottomans' main European ally.[9] While the Jesuits still worked with the Habsburgs in their American colonies and possessions in Asia, Vitelleschi recognized that, if the Jesuits were to reach Ethiopia, they would have to turn away from the Habsburg–Ottoman conflict in the Indian Ocean and reach out to the French in the Mediterranean, redirecting the Jesuits southward up the Nile and thence via caravan overland to Ethiopia. For a religious order that made a vow of obedience to the pope and was founded by 'seven Spanish devils' (as the nineteenth-century English historian John Addington Symonds so eloquently put it), the Jesuits' volte-face from Iberia toward France was a change of considerable import.[10]

This shift in the Jesuits' efforts to reach Ethiopia has three important implications for our understanding of the Mediterranean and its relationship with other sea spaces in terms of early modern empire building and Catholic evangelization. First, the decision to abandon the Portuguese in favour of the French illuminates how, despite the fact that the Atlantic and Indian Ocean worlds – and beyond – were teeming with Jesuit missions, the Mediterranean remained at the fore of the Society of Jesus's missionary efforts. Originating with Ignatius of Loyola's desire to evangelize in Jerusalem, the Jesuit dream of winning the Christian Orient for Rome was alive and well in the seventeenth century, and the Jesuits were willing to deviate from traditional alliances in order to maintain their presence there.[11] Vitelleschi's decision also exposed tensions between the Society's own missionary rhetoric used to train novices and the pragmatics of missionary endeavours, as Vitelleschi had to curb individual Jesuits' desires to reach Ethiopia until French protection was secured.

Second, the shift away from Portugal as well as the Atlantic and Indian Oceans likewise demonstrates that the Jesuits and the papacy increasingly saw French ministers and merchants as viable agents in reaching the Christian Orient.[12] While few scholars still claim that the Atlantic and Indian Ocean worlds had completely displaced the Mediterranean, it nevertheless remains a historiographical truism that the Mediterranean

was on the decline as a major centre of European activity, and ceased to be central to European empire building and evangelizing efforts by the seventeenth century.[13] However, Louis XIII's willingness to provide the Jesuits with safe passage through the Ottoman Empire – as well as to finance the Jesuit residence in Aleppo – demonstrates that the French king saw the Mediterranean as an important theatre for achieving his political, religious and economic goals.[14] I am not suggesting that this is the evidentiary base for the Braudelian 'Northern Invasion' that ushered in a period of European hegemony.[15] Rather, as it is not until the reign of Louis XIV that we can begin to talk about a thoroughly developed crown-controlled Franco-Mediterranean mercantilism,[16] Louis XIII often had to rely heavily on semi-autonomous French merchants and diplomats as well as his Ottoman allies to ensure that the Jesuits were able to serve his interests. As a result, his desire to exert influence in the Mediterranean and his ability to do it were not always in sync. Nevertheless, the Mediterranean remained, along with other seas spaces, within Louis's purview in terms of how he desired to raise his international profile.[17]

Third, it has long been assumed that the geopolitical equilibrium of the early modern period was beginning to lean more toward European dominance in the Atlantic and Indian basins, much to the detriment of the Ottomans and the Mediterranean.[18] The eventual Ottoman decision to arrest and expel the Jesuits does indeed suggest a level of anxiety concerning Europeans' potential abilities to exert influence in the Mediterranean and to incite rebellions among the Ottoman Empire's Christian populations.[19] The Habsburgs and their allies, especially the papacy, were viewed with great suspicion in Ottoman lands[20] and, when it was discovered that the Jesuits were in fact not French merchants, the Jesuits were accused of being papal-Spanish spies, imprisoned and expelled.[21] But since the Ottomans ended the mission despite French protests, the course of the mission suggests anything but European hegemony on the one hand or European disinterest in Mediterranean affairs on the other. In sum, the geopolitical developments that played out on Jesuit missions in the Mediterranean are quite similar to Jesuit experiences elsewhere. This allows for investigating Catholic evangelization in the Mediterranean thalassologically,[22] that is to say investigating the ways in which the Mediterranean, like other sea spaces, remained an important contact zone in which realms and their subjects competed to build empires and save souls.[23]

II

The man responsible for the decision to turn away from the Atlantic-Indian sea routes – the sixth Superior General of the Society of Jesus, Mutio Vitelleschi – hailed from a prominent Roman family and was the first father general not born a subject of the king of Spain.[24] He likewise came of age during the earliest decades of the Society and its efforts to reach a religious accord with the Christian Orient.[25] Despite protests from his family, who wished he would enter the high-ranking Italian episcopacy like numerous Vitelleschi before him, Mutio opted instead in 1583 to enter the Society of Jesus. He engaged with the Christian Orient almost immediately once he began his teaching career in 1588: for the better part of 15 years, he taught logic, scripture, and scholastic theology to Lebanese students at the Maronite College, which had opened under the leadership of Pope Gregory XIII in 1584.[26] Then, after several years of professorial and administrative posts under Superior General Claudio Acquaviva, he was elected Superior General of the Society of Jesus on 15 November 1615, holding the post until his death in 1645.

In his 30-year generalate, Vitelleschi pushed for the expansion of Jesuit colleges, seminaries, and residences, and his generalate initiated a period of exponential growth for the Society. By the 1620s, the first generation of Jesuits had passed on, and cults in their name sprang up wherever they had left their marks.[27] This provided the Society with a past generation that set an ideal model of emulation for the swell of new novices. Vitelleschi likewise oversaw the canonization of Ignatius Loyola in 1626, as well as the beatifications of Aloysius Gonzaga, Francisco Borja and the martyrs of Japan. Activities within Europe grew, and the construction of churches such as the new Church of St Ignatius in Rome – built to commemorate Ignatius's canonization – demonstrated the extent to which the Society had expanded. Most importantly, overseas missionary activity in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean worlds exploded under Vitelleschi. New missions to Tibet, China, Angola, Canada and Maryland showed the breadth of the Jesuits' reach. And the expansion of old missions to New Spain and Goa proved that the Jesuits' roots stayed firm where they had already laid them down.[28] At Vitelleschi's death in 1645, there were over 16,000 Jesuits manning 521 colleges, 49 seminaries, and more than 360 residences worldwide.[29]

But all this does not indicate that the Society under Vitelleschi did not face obstacles, external and internal. Coinciding almost exactly with Vitelleschi's generalate was the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), which tore apart central Europe, one of the Jesuits' main theatres of activity. It exposed the social tensions caused by the Protestant and Catholic Reformations, as well as the growing political strife between princes and their subjects.[30] Regarding the Jesuits, the war exposed for Vitelleschi the problems of governing a large, multi-national organization whose members had political as well as personal interests that did not always conform with the official stance of the Society.[31] At the same time, Vitelleschi saw it as his duty to unify the mission of the Society and to maintain its institutional independence in its effort to save souls, despite the growing push from European monarchs to wed missionary activity to national interests.[32] He was forced to navigate the intricacies of loyalty and political allegiances, and to see how factors such as the relative cooperation of Europe's Catholic monarchs impacted the success of the Society. Calling new missions as well as continuing the successes of old ones centred less on finding skilled evangelizers than on navigating the mounting religious and political tensions of the early seventeenth century that stemmed from the Franco–Habsburg rivalry that was playing itself out across the globe; in the context of the Christian Orient, Ethiopia included, this also encompassed how European powers related to one another vis-à-vis the Ottomans.

With regard to Ethiopia, Vitelleschi had to face the reality that the Society's traditional reliance on the Portuguese – now under Spanish dominion – was no longer plausible. During Vitelleschi's early years as a Jesuit, the Society was becoming more transnational and cosmopolitan: many within the Society began to resist the preponderance of Spaniards, and there was a drive to limit their influence within the governance of the Society.[33] Since he was an Italian with no ties to either the Spanish or the Habsburgs, the decision to shift alliances was perhaps not as great a leap for Vitelleschi as it would have been for his predecessors. He nevertheless had to ensure that a new reliance on France in a traditionally Iberian theatre did not alienate the Habsburgs when their patronage was still needed elsewhere (e.g., in New Spain and Goa), that members within the Society of Jesus – particularly Spaniards – were not openly resistant to relying on non-Spanish patronage, and that the French were willing to protect non-French Jesuits while not micromanaging their evangelizing efforts to the point of hindering the

mission. Compounding these issues further was, of course, the fact that France and the Habsburgs found themselves on opposite sides in the Thirty Years' War.

The other issue that Vitelleschi faced was internal pressure from novices, who wished to be sent to Ethiopia to save souls. Since the first decades of the Society, Jesuit novices were trained to prepare themselves to die for Christ in distant lands, and were taught from the beginning of their education to embrace the call to save souls.[34] As pedagogical tools in this regard, narratives of early-church martyrdoms proliferated in the seminaries of the Society. Print series such as Giovanni Battista Cavallieri's *Ecclesiae militantis triumphi* (1583) circulated widely and promoted the aims of the post-Tridentine Church and the way early Christians conformed to those ideals. Combined with lectures on personal piety and dedication to the faith, these narratives offered an archetype against which novices could compare themselves. The result was an educational programme that turned novices into proto-missionaries who saw themselves in the same light as early-church martyrs. By reinforcing connections between images of martyrs and the practice of the true faith, *Ecclesiae militantis triumphi* pushed students to see themselves as a potential martyr-missionary in the same vein as the early Christian martyrs who died while spreading the Word.[35]

Vitelleschi, while pleased to have such eager seminarians ready to evangelize the world, was nevertheless aware that missions did not succeed solely because of eagerness to carry them out. Having a ready pool of missionaries was an asset, but could cause tensions between Vitelleschi and the Society's members who desired to fulfil their duties. Vitelleschi, on one hand, had to explain to seminarians that the time for a mission to Ethiopia was not right; on the other hand, he had to be supportive and not discourage those who wanted to go on mission. Vitelleschi had to balance their eagerness against the true nature of missionary activity, which centred not on zeal but on political pragmatism and alliance building. Given that the new protector for the Ethiopia mission was to be France, the missionaries he eventually selected could cause tensions because of their provenance: the Habsburg-controlled Naples and Sicily.[36] This presented an obvious problem, as it would mean sending subjects of the king of Spain on a mission backed by the French.[37]

For their part, these precocious students wrote countless letters to Rome asking to be assigned to highly coveted overseas missions, Ethiopia included.[38] One such novice was Giuseppe Pomo. Born in 1601 in Palermo, Sicily, he entered the Jesuit college in his hometown at the age of 14. He studied philosophy and theology, and was ordained priest in 1627.[39] Pomo's eagerness to go on mission manifested itself as early as 1621: while enthusiastic, and from all accounts an excellent student, Pomo was headstrong and wrote directly to Vitelleschi on numerous occasions. Pomo explained that he strove to be sent on mission, as he had dedicated so much of his life to defending the faith, and wished to find the lost sheep that needed to be shepherded back to God. He told Vitelleschi that he felt that saving souls in foreign lands would be pleasing to God, and that although he knew that Vitelleschi believed he was too young, his youth, dedication and desire would compensate for any potential skills or savvy he lacked through inexperience.[40]

Vitelleschi was torn. While he appreciated Pomo's desire to be sent overseas, he remained unconvinced; likewise, French protection was not yet secured. On 4 November, Vitelleschi wrote to the Sicilian provincial, Girolamo Tagliavia, explaining that he felt 'much consolation and edification' in hearing of Pomo's desires, but as there was no mission at that moment, he asked Tagliavia to send blessings to Pomo in his name and bid the novice to focus on his studies.[41] Two weeks later, in response to

another of Pomo's letters, Vitelleschi explained to Tagliavia that not only was there no mission, but also that Pomo should focus on his vocation and studies rather than on future missions of which he might be a part. While Vitelleschi promised to keep Pomo in mind, the moment was not right.[42] Besides the overwhelming factor that there was no mission, at this point Pomo was very young and still at the beginning of his studies. While Pomo was eager to serve God, Vitelleschi and Tagliavia were not prepared to let him go.

Pomo was relentless, however. Convinced that Tagliavia had failed to temper Pomo's eagerness, in 1624 Vitelleschi wrote directly to Pomo, hoping to convince him to quiet his desires and focus on his studies, explaining that there was no mission in the offing and that, while Pomo's eagerness was commendable, his time had not yet arrived. Further, Vitelleschi explained that there was no certainty about when a mission would happen, but affirmed that 'when it comes to sending people to the Indies, which will be shortly, in divine favour, I will remember you'.[43] By May 1624, it became evident that Pomo would not yield, so Vitelleschi sent him a more thorough reply in which he began by expressing his admiration for Pomo's continued eagerness, and said that he was now inclined to take the young man's requests more seriously: rather than dismiss them, the father general explained quite pointedly what being a missionary entailed, making it clear that this was not a mere transfer to another province, but more akin to being cast into another world entirely. For this reason, he implored Pomo to

> think very hard [about the matter] because those who are sent to the Indies must have it at heart to sacrifice themselves completely to God, even in their own blood when that occasion may come, and to not think of a return here. Ready yourself to this and do not forget about me in your prayers.[44]

By January 1625, however, impressed with Pomo's intellectual growth and maturity, Vitelleschi embraced the idea of Pomo going on mission. He was encouraged by the novice's progress and the tone of his letters, and believed that he was close to ready. But again Vitelleschi implored the youth to question his desires and continue to work toward understanding his vocation. And, as there was no mission yet, there was plenty of time left for this.[45] By the summer of 1626, Pomo had written a total of 19 letters to Vitelleschi, and this seemed to be enough to convince the father general that Pomo was ready to be sent on mission. He explained to the young novice that the latest of his long string of letters had 'brightened and edified me greatly in the fervency of your vocation to the Indies', and that Pomo should prepare himself for an upcoming mission; Pomo soon found out that he was heading to Ethiopia.[46]

Pomo's eventual companions on his mission to Ethiopia had also been petitioning Vitelleschi for several years about their chances of being selected to go on mission. Giacomo Marcellaia, a novice in Messina, asked several times to be sent on mission. While most of his letters are now lost, one from 28 September 1625 named the exact missionary theatre to which he hoped to be sent: Ethiopia.[47] In reply, Vitelleschi explained that he was so moved by Marcellaia's desires and so encouraged by seeing such eagerness to save souls that he put the novice on the shortlist of candidates whom he would consider for a future mission to Ethiopia.[48] Vitelleschi also had to temper the spirits of Biaggio Chiappesi, Marcellaia's peer in Messina, who had been writing to the father general since at least 1620. As with Pomo and Marcellaia, Vitelleschi commended Chiappesi for his zeal and devotion and explained that, while there was no mission at that time, once one was called, the eager young novice would be notified. In the meantime, he should pray for guidance and tranquillity.[49] A fourth student, Aymar

Guérin, from the Dauphiné, who was studying in Provence, had also written to Vitelleschi as early as 1622. Vitelleschi explained to him, just as he had to Pomo and the others, that there was no mission and hence there was little he could do. He likewise told Guérin to focus on his studies, and that the youth should put his faith in divine providence; should he be destined to serve on a mission, he would be called upon to do so.[50] And, like the others, his time would indeed eventually come. As the lone Frenchman, Guérin was an outlier in terms of the provenance of the missionaries that Vitelleschi eventually sent to Ethiopia; but his clamouring for a missionary assignment shows how pervasive these bottom-up pressures for missionary work could be.

Vitelleschi's correspondences with novices suggest a level of dissonance within the Society. While their eagerness to be called to missionize and spread the faith was welcomed, and was the result of a specific aspect of the Jesuit educational programme, it nevertheless remained the idealized path that perhaps naïve missionary apprentices believed they were expected to take as they matured in their studies. Vitelleschi embraced the interests that they showed in venturing off to faraway lands in the hope of converting the infidel or saving the apostate, as he knew that these young novices would eventually be poised to carry forth the missionary objectives of the Society. But he also knew that they were not ready; he pushed them to become missionaries, but was sure to remind them to mull over exactly what such a vocation meant. Likewise, Vitelleschi had to ensure that the missionaries would be protected on their travels to Ethiopia, and this required diplomatic posturing and persuading the French to assist in the father general's designs to have missionaries travel through Ottoman territory.

While the martyr-missionary narrative was an essential component of a novice's vocational training, its idealization caused tensions between the Jesuit educational mission and the geopolitical realities of saving souls. For Vitelleschi's part, he needed to ensure that he had secured French protection, and that this in turn did not alienate his tenuous relationship with the Habsburgs. In the end, all four of these novices wound up together, bound for Ethiopia under French protection. However, as the next section shows, Vitelleschi's apprehensions were not wholly about the missionaries' inexperience; rather, despite French protection, the Jesuits were still at the mercy of the Ottomans' willingness to let them pass through their territory. And when the Ottomans grew suspicious of the foreigners, French protection mattered very little, as the Jesuits were detained and the mission unravelled.

III

All the while that Vitelleschi was attempting to curb the eagerness of his young novices, he had been planning a French-backed mission to Ethiopia, in the firm belief that he had found the means to do so. This involved relying on his old ally, Philippe de Harlay, the Comte de Césy, who was then the French ambassador in Constantinople and had helped Vitelleschi with founding the fledgling Aleppo residence.[51] Seeing this mission as a means to improve the standing of his sovereign, Louis XIII, Césy requested royal passports for the four Jesuits to aid Vitelleschi's cause.[52] By 28 February 1627, Césy sent news to Rome that the king had issued the passports, and that the Jesuits were to disguise themselves as French merchants travelling up the Nile, whereupon they could leave Ottoman lands and proceed overland to Ethiopia. Césy further explained to Vitelleschi that he would continue to provide assistance in any way that he could, and that the French consul in Alexandria – a priest named Gabriel

Fernoulx – was aware of the missionaries' imminent arrival and would help the Jesuits pass through Egypt without issue.[53]

On 1 July 1627, Vitelleschi notified Pomo, Marcellaia, Chiappesi and Guérin of his decision to send them to Ethiopia,[54] and that Marcellaia, the eldest of the quartet, was to serve as the superior of the mission: the father general explained to Marcellaia that he expected unity among the foursome, and that this appointment did 'not consist in commanding, so much as in exercising care, serving, and sympathizing to everyone with the greatest affection of a true Father'.[55] Nonetheless, concerned about the imprudent Pomo, Vitelleschi entreated him to seek peace and union with his companions, and above all to obey Marcellaia. Under Marcellaia's leadership, the group set off for Alexandria, arriving there in mid-August. Although the mission had French as well as papal support, not everyone was so enthusiastic, especially the Jesuits' Venetian rivals.[56] Shortly after the Jesuits' arrival, Alvise Correr, the Venetian consul in Alexandria, sent an anguished missive to Doge Giovanni Corner. It is unclear how their assumed identities were exposed, but Correr somehow knew that the four newly arrived merchants were in fact Jesuits under the protection of the French.[57] He also explained that the Franciscans – always uneasy about a Jesuit presence in Ottoman lands – believed that the group of Jesuits were headed to Jerusalem in a bid to re-establish a Jesuit residence there.[58]

But this was not their goal: while Correr was lamenting the Jesuits' supposed plans to embark for Jerusalem, the quartet instead was headed south from Cairo for the city of Girga on the upper Nile, some 500 kilometres away. After a 25-day trek, they finally arrived in Girga around 21 January 1628. In great detail, Marcellaia explained that this part of Egypt was a 'land of Copts, in which no Muslim may live an entire year'. He went on to praise the Copts for their monasteries and other ancient monuments that testified to their piety.[59] While in Girga, the missionaries were expected to pay their respects to the bey, the local Ottoman governor. But since the bey was absent from the city at the time, they determined his whereabouts and went forth to greet him – under the protection of a janissary and a Maltese surgeon named Giacomo Chidoni, who was to serve as dragoman.[60] When they finally located the bey, Marcellaia spoke with him about their mission. He received Marcellaia warmly, and advised him how the foursome might proceed safely to Ethiopia. After leaving the bey with his blessing for a safe voyage, Marcellaia noted that everything seemed to be going well: with French passports and Ottoman protection, he was confident that they would reach the outer edges of the Ottoman Empire and pass safely into Ethiopian territory, eluding the threats and machinations of their many enemies.[61]

But events took a different turn. Just as Marcellaia was ingratiating himself with the bey, someone informed Bayram Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Egypt, that the four travellers were not who they appeared to be. Not only were they not French merchants, but one of the four was alleged to be the son of some great Spanish prince, no less, and another was a nephew of the pope. To make matters worse, they were suspected of being Habsburg spies seeking to foment a Coptic rebellion that would supposedly bring down Ottoman power in Egypt.[62] On 26 January 1628, the four Jesuits were apprehended, summarily escorted to jail and interrogated, and the papers they carried were scoured for evidence of the alleged plot. Asked where they were from, Guérin declared that he was from Romans, in France.[63] Knowing very little of European geography, the inquisitors opined that this 'Romans' sounded an awful lot like Rome, which could only mean that Guérin was an agent of the pope.[64] So, the four were then sent off to Cairo to be presented before Bayram Pasha.[65]

Upon arrival in Cairo on 11 February, they were met by the pasha's guards, who escorted them to a dark and damp prison, where they joined countless other incarcerated souls. With no money for ransom and little hope of being released, they reckoned they would have to 'sleep that night on the bare earth, without covers and without food', and perhaps this was the very place where they might become protagonists in the type of martyr-missionary sagas they had read about in their studies.[66] Bayram Pasha ordered them to be interrogated again, and demanded the letters proving that they were Habsburg spies, at which Marcellaia insisted that they were only doing what Christians were permitted to do in Ottoman lands, namely 'seek alms and help Christians in their faith'.[67] At this point, the governor asked Guérin if prior to this trip he had ever been to Constantinople or Cairo, and questioned him once more about his nationality, since the purported spy from 'Rome' was still suspected of wrongdoing. After a spell in custody, they were brought again before the governor, and it was Pomo's turn to be cross-examined, having been accused of being a Spaniard by a janissary. Ordered to read out a Portuguese letter that had been intercepted from Ethiopia, the Sicilian protested that he did not know Portuguese – and he certainly was no Spaniard. The Jesuits tried to reason with the governor: 'Knowing one [language] does not suppose the understanding of all the others, and that, although we know the characters similar to Italian, Latin, French, etc., we however do not understand the force and significance of Portuguese words.'[68] After further questioning on their origins – to no avail – Bayram Pasha remained unconvinced and had them thrown back to their cells.

After 40 days in prison, the four were finally set free thanks to a hefty ransom of 6,000 *reals* paid by the French consul Fernoulx. Some of the money was a loan from a merchant, Fernoulx's compatriot César Lambert, but the majority of it came from Jewish money-lenders, who had demanded interest rates between 20 and 24 per cent.[69] The captive Jesuits themselves had tried to dissuade the consul from the transaction, advising him to wait for word from Césy; but the missionaries' poor state of health and their treatment in prison worried Fernoulx gravely.[70] After their liberation, the consul and the Jesuits began piecing together exactly how the mission had gone awry. As they had French protection and the paperwork to prove it, someone must have persuaded Bayram Pasha to seize them under false pretences. The Jesuits' usual enemies were excluded as suspects almost immediately: although the Venetians and Franciscans were indeed apprehensive about the Jesuits' presence, once it became clear that the group was not bound for the Holy Land, all their qualms subsided. While Alvise Correr had kept the doge and the Senate informed about the group's goings on, he had nothing to do with their arrest.[71] And as the Dutch and English did not have political clout in Egypt or influence over the governor, they too were unlikely to have instigated the missionaries' arrest.

Paradoxically, it was the Jesuits' French patron in Egypt himself, Gabriel Fernoulx, who was indirectly responsible for their detention: in his effort to compete with the Venetian consulate – which fashioned itself as the official representative not only of the Serenissima but of all Europeans in Egypt – Fernoulx went to great lengths to protect the interests of European merchants in Egypt, especially their right to practise their trades unimpeded.[72] But he was also a priest with serious moral qualms concerning the slave trade in Alexandria, and did little to protect the business interests of slavers who traded Christian chattel. One of these men who despised Fernoulx for this reason was Giovanni Battista Ortone, a Greek slaver out of Malta.[73] Ortone had decided to seek revenge on Fernoulx by telling the Ottomans that the Jesuits were Spanish spies who sought to incite a rebellion among Egypt's Christians, which was to coincide with a Spanish invasion.[74] While the truth was that Jesuits were uninvolved in any such plot,

the seventeenth century had already seen numerous rebellions and wars that unsettled Ottoman control in the provinces, so it is little wonder that such threats, even if unfounded, were not taken lightly.[75]

The incident meanwhile offered a golden opportunity to extort a large amount of money from the French – still very much the junior partner in their alliance with the Ottomans. In addition to the ransom, the Jesuits were to leave Egypt immediately and to abandon their plans to proceed to Ethiopia, showing that Bayram Pasha's anxieties about European missionaries were partly the reason why the slaver Ortone was able to convince the governor of the Jesuits' alleged plans in the first place.[76] One man who lost no sleep over these intrigues was Alvise Correr. Although he had distanced himself from the situation lest he become ensnared in these intrigues, he wrote to Venice in relief that the Jesuits had been sent back to Alexandria and summarily deported in late May, much to the chagrin of Vitelleschi and the French. By mid-July, the Jesuit missionaries were back in Europe.[77]

IV

As for Vitelleschi, he now had quite a mess on his hands: in addition to sorting out what had happened to the Jesuits in Egypt, he also owed Fernoulx a small fortune and feared that a delay in payment could cause tensions with his new French patrons. Given that Fernoulx himself was a priest with a paltry annual stipend, it would take him years to pay off the debt.[78] Therefore, the financial obligation fell on the Society itself. Vitelleschi also had to reassure his four missionaries, and wrote to all four explaining that the debt was not theirs and that they should not trouble themselves with it. In a letter to Guérin, who was back in Lyon, Vitelleschi expressed his relief that the Jesuits were well out of danger – thanks to Fernoulx – and added that he was thankful for Guérin's efforts on the mission, but for now any plans of returning to Ethiopia should be abandoned.[79] He had the same advice for Pomo: ever the eager missionary, he had already written to Vitelleschi shortly after his return, insisting that he be sent back to Ethiopia to try again. The father general explained that this was unfortunately not possible, and enjoined Pomo to 'attend to your studies, and pray to the Lord that he instil in you his divine will'.[80]

The next step for Vitelleschi was to assure Fernoulx that he too should not worry about the debt, and that the father general himself would ensure that it was paid off. But he needed help, so he wrote to the new provincial of Sicily, Giordano Cascino, asking him if he could help the French provincial with the debt. Given the provenance of three of the missionaries, Vitelleschi considered it logical that the Sicilian province should bear some of the burden, and explained to Cascino that he would greatly appreciate 'whatever sum your reverence might advance to help pay the outstanding debt for the rescue of ours in Cairo'.[81] In another letter to Guérin, he ordered the youth to write to Fernoulx to assure him that the French Jesuits would be supporting him financially for his efforts to rescue the Jesuits from prison, and that he should not worry about debts that were not truly his.[82]

By February 1629, however, Fernoulx had yet to hear from Vitelleschi about when the money would arrive: his creditors had not received payment and were becoming rather impatient. Furthermore, with such high interest rates, he needed Vitelleschi to pay off the debt as quickly as possible lest he alienate the French.[83] Fernoulx was understandably anxious: after all, the failed mission and its debts had fallen upon him, and the creditors were knocking on his door, not Vitelleschi's:

> I ask nothing, only that the reverend father general of the Society of Jesus and all other prelates send to me the same charity and affection that I have shown these fathers and relieve me of my commitment, in order that the usurers not multiply and that I not suffer some great hardship for having rescued the fathers of their Society.[84]

By September 1629, when the money had still not arrived, Fernoulx's tone with Vitelleschi grew increasingly tense. He explain that he lived in 'the land of the infidel' and had done Vitelleschi a personal favour in freeing the Jesuits, but urged that if he did not receive recompense soon, he would have no choice but to petition the king himself: it would then no longer be a personal debt, but an issue between the king and the Society. For his part, Vitelleschi knew full well that such a situation could jeopardize the Society's standing before Louis XIII, the main supporter of the new Jesuit residence in Aleppo.[85]

In the end, Vitelleschi managed to find the money and the debt was paid. In the meantime, however, many events had occurred: the culprit in the 'conspiracy', Giovanni Battista Ortone, had died in Malta in 1628;[86] Aymar Guérin had succumbed to the plague in Lyons on 29 November of that same year;[87] the other three missionaries had dedicated themselves to other vocations in Sicily. By 1630, the thwarted mission to Ethiopia via the Nile was a thing of the past; yet the dreams of a return did not fade entirely: Marcellaia continued to preoccupy himself with a potential reprise of the mission, and in light of his experiences wrote a long treatise giving practical information concerning travel to Ethiopia via Egypt. Despite the original mission's failure, he remained convinced that by sailing up the Nile with French protection the mission could be successful – an indication that some Jesuits saw the Mediterranean as the best means to reach Ethiopia. Whether it was by obtaining documents from the French ambassador in Constantinople to ensure unimpeded passage, or by visiting the consul in Alexandria to obtain approval to travel to the edges of the Ottoman Empire, Marcellaia was convinced that the Jesuits should ally themselves with the French and rely on their diplomatic and mercantile networks, which had been growing more influential in the Ottoman Empire. For Marcellaia, future missionaries should sail for Alexandria on a French ship with a letter of approval from the king of France himself, and reside with the French whenever possible. But Marcellaia believed in particular that it was essential that they should always dress as pilgrims, they should not hide the fact that they were priests, and they should celebrate Mass for those who desired spiritual aid. He suspected that it was the element of deception that had most alarmed Bayram Pasha: had they been honest about their intentions from the start, they may not have wound up in prison.[88] From now on, Jesuits were to be open about their intentions in the Ottoman Empire – as well as draw closer to the French – if they were ever to reach Ethiopia.

Despite Marcellaia's optimism and Vitelleschi's support for the young missionary's ideas, the Jesuits never succeeded in sending missionaries to Ethiopia via Egypt. In 1634, just as Vitelleschi was planning another mission via Egypt, the Ethiopian Emperor Fasilides banished the Catholic Patriarch Afonso Mendes (a Portuguese Jesuit), expelled all the Catholics, and restored the traditional Orthodox Church as the only accepted Christian faith.[89]

V

While ultimately the Jesuits failed to reach Ethiopia via the Nile, the Jesuits' shift in allegiance from Portugal to France tells us a great deal about the thalassological

geopolitics that informed Vitelleschi's decision-making. With the Hapsburgs no longer viable as allies in the Jesuits' efforts to maintain their presence in Ethiopia, Vitelleschi recognized Louis XIII's desire to use the Mediterranean for his own political and religious interests, and he happily wedded the Society with France. Vitelleschi's decision to abandon the Habsburgs and ally with the French likewise demonstrates how the Mediterranean remained at the fore of the Jesuits' global missionary vision: whether it was the Jesuits' continual work with the Maronites in Lebanon, the residence in Aleppo, or the dream of converting the Copts of Egypt, the Christian Orient held a special place in the Jesuits' designs. Traditionally, the literature has not portrayed this aspect, owing largely to the relative failures of these missions in comparison with the more successful ones conducted in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean worlds. This notion also stems from several residual – though no longer universally held – beliefs: Europeans turned outward toward the Atlantic and Indian Ocean worlds, all but ignoring the Mediterranean after late fifteenth-century Iberian exploration; subsequently, the Mediterranean became nothing more than a secondary sphere of European activity; and, more pointedly, the French crown conceived of its northern and southern shores in very different terms.[90] As New World gold and silver ran out and Spain bankrupted itself, while Germany and England tore themselves apart in protracted civil wars, France came out of the Peace of Westphalia under Louis XIV as the dominant power of Europe. But this process had begun in the sixteenth-century Mediterranean under Francis I: as the Ottoman Empire's main European ally with a mounting presence in the Levant, France was bettering its ability to assist the Jesuits in the Christian Orient.[91]

It was not an easy choice for Vitelleschi, however. He recognized that the Habsburgs remained the Ottomans' and France's fiercest mutual enemy, and that the two powers aligned themselves in an unholy bond against the Austro-Iberian Habsburgs. Hence, siding with France against Spain could potentially undermine the Society's missions in other areas. When the decidedly pro-French Urban VIII was elected pope in 1623, however, the French could finally wrestle Rome from Habsburg influence, and claim that France too was defending the interests of the Church.[92] Helping the Jesuits circumvent Habsburg power while protecting them as they sailed down the Nile both allowed Louis XIII to prove how serious he was about Catholic statecraft, and also potentially enabled him to supplant the Iberians as the Ethiopians' preferred European ally. Although ultimately no Franco-Ethiopian alliance was formed, Louis's patronage of the mission showed how he both fashioned himself as defender of the interests of Christians everywhere and,was also a pragmatic head of state who actively sought to engage with the Mediterranean in an effort to augment France's position on the global scale. And this continued with his son, Louis XIV.[93]

There were obvious limits to this, as evidenced by the relatively weak position of Louis and his diplomatic network vis-à-vis the Ottomans. Relying overwhelmingly on the French meant that the Jesuits' position in the Christian Orient was only as secure as their patrons', that is to say, not very. In nearly every instance – even with French assistance – in order to stay afloat the Jesuits relied on the Ottomans' approval and their mercantile networks, which allowed people and wealth to move about the Ottoman Empire. All it took to unravel the Jesuits' efforts was to convince the right Ottoman official that the Jesuits were not who they said they were, and that they threatened to unsettle the delicate equilibrium of empire that the Ottomans were trying to maintain. This both belies the notion of a French invasion of the Mediterranean on the one hand, and affirms the complex relationship of religion, statecraft and commerce on the other.[94]

The Ottoman reaction to the Jesuits' presence also exposes the anxieties of the Ottomans concerning the maintenance of their empire. Because French diplomats like Césy and Fernoulx relied heavily on the Ottoman officials' benevolence to allow those whom they represented – the Jesuits included – to live freely and unmolested in the Ottoman Empire, those privileges were quickly revoked if one's presence was perceived as a threat. While it is unlikely that the Pasha believed that four men with French passports could potentially overthrow Ottoman authority in an entire province, such apprehension illustrates just how uneasy the Ottomans had become concerning Europeans. Of course, the French paid dearly for this, as Fernoulx had to take on a massive debt and was subsequently hounded by creditors. But Bayram Pasha was not just posturing: he was legitimately concerned for the stability of his province. Despite the fact that France was the sultan's junior ally, Ottoman anxieties about to the consequences of rebellions and the presence of Europeans for the health of the empire suggests the opposite of what has often been assumed: that by the dawn of the seventeenth century Europeans had begun turning away from the Mediterranean, only to return once their extra-Mediterranean empires provided them with superior technical capacities to dominate the inferior Ottomans.[95] On the contrary, the actions of the Pasha and the helplessness of the French and the Jesuits demonstrate that not only was this *not* the case, but that the Mediterranean remained integral to the geopolitical equilibrium of confession- and empire-building in the early modern world.[96]

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Notes

1. Lane, *Venice: A Maritime Republic*, 274–334. Lane coined this transition as the 'Oceanic Challenge'.
2. Boxer, *Church Militant and Iberian Expansion*; Alden, *Making of an Enterprise*; Zupanov, *Disputed Mission*; Brockey, "'A Vinha Do Senhor'"; Fontana, *Matteo Ricci,* 28–31.
3. Pennec, "Ignace de Loyola," 204; Martínez d'Alòs-Moner, "Birth of a Mission"; Disney, *History of Portugal*, vol. 2, 127.
4. On the Jesuit presence in Ethiopia more generally, see Cohen, *Missionary Strategies*; Martínez d'Alòs-Moner, *Envoys of a Human God.*
5. For more on Portugal's triangular relationship with the Ottomans and Safavids, see Couto and Loureiro, *Revisiting Hormuz*; Floor and Herzig, *Iran and the World*.
6. For more on Portuguese expansion and the role of Catholicism in constructing its empire, see Newitt, "Formal and Informal Empire"; Newitt, *Portugal in European and World*

History, 67–81. For the Red Sea in particular, see Martínez d'Alòs-Moner, "Conquistadores, Mercenaries, and Missionaries."

7. On the significance of Lepanto, see Hess, "Battle of Lepanto." For more on the maritime rivalry between the Ottomans and Portuguese, see Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleys*; Guilmartin, "Ideology and Conflict"; Casale, *Ottoman Age of Exploration.*
8. Disney, *History of Portugal*, vol. 1, 198–220; Newitt, *Portugal in European and World History*, 82–96. This view is by no means universal. See Herzog, *Frontiers of Possession*.
9. For the sixteenth-century roots of this alliance, see Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel.*
10. Symonds, *Renaissance in Italy*, vol. 1, 65.
11. O'Malley, *The First Jesuits*, 23–50; Medina, "Ignacio de Loyola y el mar."
12. For more on Jesuit efforts in the seventeenth century vis-à-vis the French, see Fougueray, "La mission de France à Constantinople"; Frazee, *Catholics and Sultans*, 67–87; Heyberger, *Les chrétiens du Proche-Orient*; Ruiu, "Conflicting Visions." Likewise, the French became increasingly needed since the Venetians, after the interdict crisis of 1607, were no longer willing to assist the Jesuits. On this tension, see Bouwsma, *Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberty*; Frajese, "Regno ecclesiastico e stato moderno"; Oakley, "Complexities of Context"; Sangalli, *Università, accademie, gesuiti*; Tutino, *Empire of Souls*, 81–116.
13. On this westward shift, see Armitage and Braddick, *British Atlantic World*; Bertrand and Planas, *Les sociétés de frontière*; Armstrong, "Transatlantic Catholicism." Studies that belie this notion of a westward movement abound, especially in the context of the English in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. See Vitkus, *Turning Turk*; Stanivukovic, *Remapping the Mediterranean World*; McJannet, *The Sultan Speaks*.
14. On the residence in Aleppo, see Clines, "Fighting Enemies and Finding Friends."
15. Braudel, *The Mediterranean*; Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony*; Greene, "Beyond the Northern Invasion."
16. Takeda, *Between Crown and Commerce*. For an informative exploration of recent historiography on the French in the Mediterranean, see the recent forum in *French History* 29:1 (2015).
17. There is clearly a difference between the rhetoric behind this and the ability to carry it out. This is no more evident than in the role of the semi-autonomous Mediterranean port of Marseilles in securing manumission of French slaves. See Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs*, and, for later, Takeda, *Between Crown and Commerce*. On French expansion in the Atlantic, see Jaenan, *Friend and Foe*; Greer, "Colonial Saints"; Greer, *Mohawk Saint*; Noel, *Along a River*; Boucher, *France and the American Tropics*. On the French in the Indian Ocean from Francis I to Louis XIII, see Linon-Chipon, *Gallia Orientalis*; McCabe, *Orientalism in Early Modern France*, 77–86.
18. Masters, *Origins of Western Economic Dominance.*
19. Goffman, *Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe*; Aksan and Goffman, *Early Modern Ottomans*.
20. This worked both ways, as the Habsburgs were equally fearful of the Ottomans, especially in Habsburg Austria. See Fichtner, *Terror and Toleration.*
21. For more on Spanish power in early modern Italy, see Dandelet, *Spanish Rome*; Dandelet and Marino, *Spain in Italy.*
22. Driessen, "Mediterranean Port Cities"; Horden and Purcell, "The Mediterranean and 'the New Thalassology'"; Vink, "Indian Ocean Studies"; Green, "Maritime Worlds and Global History"; Miller, *The Sea*.
23. Scholars have employed many terms to define these individuals: tricksters, renegades, aliens and trans-imperial subjects, to name a few. See Davis, *Trickster Travels*; Dursteler, *Renegade Women*; Subrahmanyam, *Three Ways to Be Alien*; Rothman, *Brokering Empire*. On the cultural impact of these global connections in sea spaces, see Sebek and Deng, *Global Traffic*. The idea of the early modern world as grounded in an equilibrium of powers is central to recent historiographical investigations of empire building. See Parker, *Global Interactions*.
24. The first three fathers general (Ignatius Loyola, Diego Laínez and Francisco Borja) were Spanish. The fourth father general, Everard Mercurian, was born in the Spanish Netherlands. The fifth father general, Claudio Acquaviva, was born in Abruzzo, Kingdom of Naples, which was also a Spanish possession.

25. Two years prior to Vitelleschi's birth, in 1561, the Jesuits Giovanni Battista Eliano and Cristóbal Rodríguez had travelled to Egypt. Eliano was later in Lebanon (1577–1582) and Egypt again (1582–1585). See Clines, "Confessional Politics," 16–226.
26. Gemayel, *Les échanges culturels*.
27. This is most true with Francis Xavier. See Pinch, 'Corpse and Cult"; Gupta, *The Relic State*.
28. The historiography on Jesuit overseas missionary activity is of course expansive. For starters, see Bailey, *Art on the Jesuit Missions*; Broggio, *Evangelizzare il mondo*; Clossey, *Salvation and Globalization*; Donato, Lüsebrink and Bernier, *Jesuit Accounts of the Colonial Americas*.
29. Kuri, *Monumenta Proximi-Orientis*, vol. 3, 357.
30. For more information on the Thirty Years' War and its impact on German society as well as its root causes, see Brady, *German Histories*. Cf. Parker and Adams, *The Thirty Years' War*; Wilson, *The Thirty Years War*.
31. Bireley, *Jesuits and the Thirty Years War*.
32. This is particularly true with Portugal. See Alden, *Making of an Enterprise*. There was also a growing drive to curb the Habsburgs' control of overseas mission, especially in the foundation of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith (Propaganda Fide). For an overview on the tensions between the papacy's goals for overseas missionary work and the French monarchy's desire to wrestle away the Habsburg's perceived control of it, see Wright, "Institutional Relations of Church and State"; and Wright, "French Policy in Italy."
33. See McCoog, *Mercurian Project*, in particular Padburg, "Third General Congregation"; Nuno da Silva Gonçalves, "Jesuits in Portugal"; Francisco de Borja Medina, "Everard Mercurian and Spain." The issue of the preponderance of Castilians in particular, especially within the Kingdom of Spain, is the subject of Millán, "La crisis del 'partido castellano'."
34. One such text that was key to the Jesuits' educational formation was Jerome Nadal's *Adnotationes et Meditationes in Evangelia*, replete with devotional images that were an integral part of the Jesuit educational experience. For more on the instructive nature of imagery in Jesuit schools, see Buser, "Jerome Nadal." Cf. Melion, "Ex libera meditatione."
35. Noreen, "Ecclesiae Militantis Triumphi."
36. For more on Spanish Naples, see Musi, "Kingdom of Naples"; Marino, *Becoming Neapolitan*.
37. The kings of Spain had an active role in the church in Spanish Italy, which could present problems for the Jesuits relying on the French when using Spanish subjects in their evangelizing efforts. See Borromeo, "The Crown and the Church."
38. This was often the case in Naples proper. See Selwyn, *Paradise Inhabited by Devils*. On Jesuit education in the Mezzogiorno, see Lewis, "Preachers of Sound Doctrine."
39. Libois, *Monumenta Proximi-Orientis*, vol. 5, 569 (hereafter MPOV).
40. Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu (hereafter ARSI), *Fondo Gesuitico 735/5* no. 287/ MPOV.25–7: 'Molt'anni sono che io sfacciatamente m'ho fatto del sordo alla voce di Dio Sre Nostro il qle m'ha chiamato a patir per lui in paesi stranieri, e per amor suo andar cercando la pecorella smarrita del peccatore et infedele in parti lontane, nelle qli mi dice continuamente che vi è gran carestia d'huomini che la cerchino… Il fine che mi muove d'andar in paesi lontani ad aggiutar l'anime dell'infedeli e peccatori non è altro se non perché in qo credo di certo dar gusto e far cosa grata al nostro Dio, al qle mi sento obligato di farci col offerta di me stesso per molto raggioni e titoli…'
41. ARSI, *Sic. 8 I*, fol. 222v/MPOV.27. The majority of the source base for this article has also appeared in Beccari, *Rerum aethiopicarum scriptores occidentales*, vol. 12. I have provided citations for the archival inventory as well as the most recent printed versions of these sources in the *Monumenta Proximi-Orientis*. Full citations from Beccari can be found in the MPOV.
42. ARSI, *Sic 8 I*, fol. 225r./MPOV.28.
43. ARSI, *Sic. 8 II,* fol. 493v./MPOV.30–1.
44. ARSI, *Sic. 8 II,* fol. 497v./MPOV.31: 'La vostra del pº di Aprile ha accresciuto la mia inclinazione di mandarvi all'Indie, e forse seguirà con l'occasione da voi accennata. La risoluzione e grave, per che non si tratta dalla mutatione di una provincia all'altre, ma di andare ad un altro mondo per dir così. Et però prima di prenderla è necessario che ci raccomandiamo al Signore, e che voi pensiate molto bene perche quelli che si mandando all'Indie,

devono haver animo di sacrificarsi in tutto a Dio benedetto, et nel proprio sangue quando venisse l'occasione, e di non pensare al ritorno in queste parti. Preparatevi a questo et non vi scordate di me nelle orationi vestre.'

45. ARSI, *Sic. 9 I*, fol. 2rv./MPOV.33.
46. ARSI, *Sic. 9 I*, fol. 150v./MPOV.37.
47. ARSI, *Fondo Gesuitico 737/306*./MPOV.34.
48. ARSI, *Sic. 9 I*, fol. 125v, no. 850./MPOV.35.
49. ARSI, *Sic. 9 II*, fol. 270v./MPOV.36–7.
50. ARSI, *Lugd. 4*, fol. 420r./MPOV.29–30.
51. For more on the establishment of the Jesuit residence in Aleppo, see Clines, "Fighting Enemies and Finding Friends."
52. Rabbath, *Documents inédits*, vol. 1, 5–6 n. 1.
53. ARSI, *Gall. 102*, fol. 86r–87v./MPOV.46–7.
54. Originally, Chiappesi was to be sent to Japan, and Marco Stella was to go to Ethiopia. However, Vitelleschi ordered Chiappesi to replace Stella when the mission to Japan fell through. See ARSI, *Sic 9 II*, fols. 316v–317r./MPOV.48–9. See also ARSI, *Sic 9 II*, fol. 325v./MPOV.55–6.
55. ARSI, *Sic 9 II*, fol. 325r./MPOV.56–7: 'Scrivo al P. Pumo essortandolo all'unione, et subordinazione, ma è necessario che V.R. ancora aiuti dal canto suo, considerando, che la sua superiorità non consiste tanto nel commandare, quanto in esser citar la carità servendo et compatendo à tutti con grandissimo affetto di vero Padre, et intorno alle licenze del P. Pumo, V.R. lo le faccia mostrare.'
56. After Paul V had placed the Republic of Venice under interdict in 1606, the Jesuits were expelled from Venetian territories. See Bouwsma, *Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberty.*
57. In the Ottoman Empire the Venetians often sought to undo the Jesuits' efforts, as was the case in Jerusalem in 1624, when the Venetian Bailo Zorzi Giustiniani successfully convinced the grand mufti that the Jesuits were attempting to upset the religious equilibrium of the city. See Archivio di Stato di Venezia (hereafter ASVe), *Cospoli*, F. 97 fols 239r–240v.
58. ASVe, *Dispacci Consoli Alessandria e Cairo*, fasc. no. 2, letter no. 9./MPOV.59. The Jesuits had unsuccessfully attempted to establish a residence in Jerusalem earlier in the 1620s. See Clines, "Fighting Enemies and Finding Friends."
59. ARSI, *Sic 184 I,* fol. 18r./MPOV.76. 'Vi è fra l'altre una terra tutta di Christiani del paese (cioè Cofti), dentro la quale niuno Mahumettano può vivere un'anno intiero. Oltre i monasteri che si veggono et altri Christiani in grosso numero, vi è anco abbondanza di vivere e varie cose da vedere di notabile memoria e antichità.' On the Copts and their long-standing ties to Rome, see Hamilton, *Copts and the West.* See also Armanios, *Coptic Christianity in Ottoman Egypt.*
60. It is unclear whether Chidoni was a convert to Islam or not. Nevertheless, his ability to communicate in Arabic as a Maltese denotes the possibility that he had traversed these cultural waters before. See Rothman, "Interpreting Dragomans."
61. ARSI, *Sic 184 I,* fol. 18rv./MPOV.78.
62. ARSI, *Sic 184 I*, fol. 18v./MPOV.78–9.
63. This is most likely Romans-sur-Isère.
64. MPOV.144.
65. ARSI, *Sic 184 I,* fols. 18v–19r./MPOV.79–81.
66. ARSI, *Sic 184 I,* fol. 19r./MPOV.82.
67. ARSI, *Sic 184 I,* fol. 19r./MPOV.83: 'Dissimo noi che lettere del Papa non havevamo, sebene conform l'uso loro Dervisi (o religiosi) e di altri nostri frati che vengono e vanno ai Luoghi Santi, andavamo ancor noi caminando per il mondo mandati da nostri superiori per cercare il vivere d'elemosine et agiutare li christiani nella fede…'
68. ARSI, *Sic 184 I,* fol. 19v./MPOV.84: 'Si che, chiariti di me, chiamorno l'altri miei compagni e presero il padre Pomo a farlo leggere, e cominciando lui a pronunciare alcune cose, disse il ginaizzero (di cui sopra) al Bascià: Sigore, questo qui è spagnuolo. Allora, voltandomi a lui: Perché ardisci di dire una falsità tale al principe: vuoi che vi vada la mia o la tua testa, se egli non è spagnuolo? Subito arrossitosi e posto in colera, si voltò in dietro, ributtandolo anco per il braccio il nostro Agà. Vedendo dopo questo che ne pure il padre Pomo sapeva leggerle, disse certo Granatino: Come non sanno leggere queste lettere, persone come siete voi, theologi e prattici dell'evangelo. Gli fu detto che il sapere una cosa

non supponeva la scienza di tutte l'altre, e che, sebene conoscevamo li caratteri simili all'italiano, latino, francese, etc., non però sentivamo la forza et il significato delle parole portoghese. Vollero sapere dopo li paesi di ciascuno, e chi avesse presso certo horologetto espresso nelle nostre lettere: e fatto ciò ci rimandò in carcere…'

69. The attestation of Fernoulx's debts explains that 2,000 *reals* were borrowed at 24%, 3,000 at 20%, both from Jewish bankers. The remainder was borrowed from Lambert. ARSI, *Sic 184 I*, fols. 16r–17v./MPOV.98–100.
70. ARSI, *Sic 184 I,* fol. 14v./MPOV.91.
71. ASVe, *Dispacci Consoli Alessandria e Cairo*, fasc. no. 2, letter no. 11./MPOV.64.
72. On this rivalry, see Miller, *Peiresc's Mediterranean World*, 362–66.
73. For more on the ties between pirates, Malta and Greeks, and their position in the Mediterranean world, see Greene, *Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants*.
74. ARSI, *Sic 184 I,* fol. 14r./MPOV.89.
75. White, *Climate of Rebellion*.
76. MPOV.155.
77. ASVe, *Dispacci Consoli Alessandria e Cairo*, fasc. no. 2, letter no. 13./MPOV.104.
78. ARSI, *Sic 184 I,* fol. 14v./MPOV.91.
79. ARSI, *Lugd. 5*, fol. 555v./MPOV.105.
80. ARSI, *Sic 9 I,* fol. 14v./MPOV.249: 'Ho la lettera di V.R. delli 25 di Giugno, e grandemente me edicifo della sua perseveranza nel pensiero d'andar all'Indie. Resta solo, che ne lasci a me la cura, et ella, senza pensare ad altro, attenda alli suoi studii, e pregare il Signore che si faccia in lui la sua santa volontà.'
81. ARSI, *Sic. 9 I* fol. 248v./MPOV.106: 'Quanto V.R. potrà fare per aiuto à pagare il debito che habbiamo per il riscatto de nostri […] nel Cairo, tutto sarà sua molta carità, e potrà tenerlo da parte, sin che da me sarà avisata; per che saremo necessitati a pagare se non riuscirà il partito che si […] in francia. In tanto V.R. non dia licenza al P. Pumo di cercare per questa causa senza ricommand […] a V.R. come ancor io gli ho scritto, accioche non dia fastidio a parenti.'
82. ARSI, *Lugd. 5 Ep. Generalium* 1623–1632 fol. 561r./MPOV.109.
83. ARSI, *Gall. 98 II* fol. 522r./MPOV.116.
84. ARSI, *Gall 98 II* fol. 524r./MPOV.119: '…je ne demande rien, sulement je prie le reverend pere general de la Compagnie de Jesus et tout autres prelates dicelle duser envers moy de la mesme charite et affection que jaj usee envers les peres et de me delibvrir au plustost de mon Engagement, affin que les usures ne multiplient et que je ne soufre quelque grand travailh pour en avoir delibvre des peres de leur Compagnie.'
85. ARSI, *Gall 98 II* fol. 517r./MPOV.120.
86. ARSI, *Gall. 98 II* fol. 522r./MPOV.116.
87. ARSI, *Lugd 39 Necrol. 1620–1760* fol. 36r./MPOV.113.
88. ARSI*, Goa 39 I*, fol. 42r–44v./MPOV.156–65.
89. Marcus, *History of Ethiopia*, 40.
90. On the critique of these notions, see Harris, *Rethinking the Mediterranean*; Tabak, *Waning of the Mediterranean*.
91. Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel*; Bérenger, "La politique française."
92. Dandelet, *Spanish Rome*, 105–8.
93. Mukerji, "Cartography, Entrepreneurialism, and Power"; Takeda, *Between Crown and Commerce*.
94. This is a shift that is demarcated as clearly Braudelian, as the names of recent essay collections on the topic attest: Ruiz, Symcox and Piterberg, *Braudel Revisited*; Fusaro, Heywood and Omri, *Trade and Cultural Exchange*.
95. On Europeans and their relationships with the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Mediterranean, see Masters, *Origins of Western Economic Dominance*; Heyberger, *Les chrétiens du Proche-Orient*; McCabe, *Orientalism in Early Modern France*; Berridge, *British Diplomacy in Turkey.*
96. On the continual importance of the Mediterranean in the larger geopolitical and confessional balance between empires in the age of discovery, see Barkey, *Empire of Difference*; Brummett, *Ottoman Seapower*; Goffman, *Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe*; Greene, *Shared World*; Hess, "Evolution of the Ottoman Seaborne Empire"; Kunt and Woodhead, *Süleyman the Magnificent*; Lewis, *Cultures in Conflict*; Ortega, *Negotiating Transcultural Relations*; Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs*; Williams, *Empire and Holy War.*

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