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SYNCHRONICITY AND POSTSTRUCTURALISM: C. G. JUNG'S

SECULARIZATION OF THE SUPRAMUNDANE

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*For your orientation: I am a psychiatrist and not a philosopher, merely an
empiricist who ponders on certain experiences.*

—**C. G. Jung**

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**Part (1) Introduction to C. G. Jung's Concept of Synchronicity: Issues of Theory,
Method and Historical Location**

**1(a) Jung's Exposition of Synchronicity and the Poststructuralist Notion of Social
Knowledge as Truth Creation**

This thesis is an analysis of the discourse that Carl Gustav Jung uses to present his ideas about the concept of synchronicity. As such, the thesis falls within a genre of thought which pertains to current methodological styles within poststructural theory. Although there are several passages within my work that are sharply critical of Jung's rhetorical methods, I want to assure my readers at the outset that my critical statements are not meant to question the merit and importance of Jung's contribution to 20th century thought. I believe Jung's theory as a whole can incorporate all of these specific inconsistencies to which I point.

Carl Jung's formulation and legitimization of the concept of synchronicity prefigures several of the ideas embodied within poststructuralist theory, and within postmodern thought in general. . I will argue that many of the theoretical principles implied by synchronicity and the entire manner by which Jung presents those principles demonstrate that Jung's work on synchronicity prefigures (1) important aspects of postmodern theory, and (2) a postmodern attitude towards the presentation of theory. To make my thesis more manageable, I will restrict myself to a comparison of Jung's work with only one writer who is considered to fall within a poststructuralist and postmodern classification. That writer is Michel Foucault.

Please see pp. 14-18 for a discussion of the terms poststructural and postmodern.

In Part 4 of the thesis I will compare Jung's and Foucault's views among the analytical categories of knowledge, power and subjectivity. This reveals that synchronicity and postmodernism share the tenets of discontinuity, acausality, and a belief in the intimate connection between internal and external realms of experience. Moreover, Jung's exposition of synchronicity (in contrast to the ideas implied by synchronicity itself) reveals an acceptance of contradiction within theory and a belief in the social relativity of truth. These two theoretical components - the acceptability of contradiction and the view that truth is relative to culture and history - are explicit to the postmodern ethos.

I will also suggest that Jung's defence for synchronicity is a highly self-conscious, cleverly constructed, ever-changing body of argumentation, specifically aimed at legitimizing a concept which potentially could have been regarded as nonsensical. Because Jung's notion of synchronicity advances esoteric, *avant garde*, and "mystical" ideas as truth claims within a social environment which is not entirely receptive to those claims, it is my belief that Jung was compelled to invent a prefigurative type of postmodernism—if not exactly in the form of a complete and coherent articulation of poststructural ideas, most definitely in his manner of presenting the difficult concept of synchronicity to a western audience situated in the time

*Peter A. Angeles notes that the philosophical theory of metaphysical solipsism argues that so-called "external" reality is in fact a creation of the "internal" psyche. According to solipsism, "'Other' things do not have any independent existence, they are states of, and are reducible to, one's consciousness." Peter A. Angeles, *Dictionary of Philosophy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), p. 265.

period of 1930 - 1961. To sum thus far, I will argue that Jung's conceptualization and introduction of synchronicity may be viewed as containing some - although certainly not all - of the ideas that characterize a poststructural perspective.

The use of the term "poststructuralism" in this thesis will generally refer to Michel Foucault's notion that 'truth' is a relative, socially created construct instead of an absolute fact. As outlined in Part 4 of the thesis, Foucault views truth as something embedded within discursive practices located within matrices of social power. That is, truth is something that arises from and is created by language, which itself is located within a social system that is premised upon relations of power among the agents who use that language. Thus a concept such as synchronicity, which conveys a transcendental, suprasocial factor, may be argued from a poststructuralist perspective to exist within a particular social system that demands specific semiotic codes in order to make possible the communication of the concept of synchronicity within society; moreover, the poststructuralist would argue that certain *ways* of communicating are necessary in order to engender that concept with a sense of conventionality or 'normality' within the *status quo*.

A good example of Jung's postmodern approach is found in his use of science. In Part 3 I argue that Jung self-consciously distorts the traditional ideals of science in order to serve his hidden agenda of creating and valorizing a new concept. He thoroughly critiques the scientific method and ethos; nevertheless, he upholds his status as a scientist - and conducts a scientific astrological experiment - in order to legitimize synchronicity. But his actual use of the scientific method is partial and incomplete, which conforms to Jean Baudrillard's view that elements of the ideological and cultural past recirculate in the postmodern world as "simulacra," which themselves are metamorphosed and expressed as novel ideological and cultural forms. Because of this continual reinvention of ideas and methods, Baudrillard argues: "It is impossible to think that theory can be nothing more than fiction." Jean Baudrillard, *Forget Foucault, Forget Baudrillard* (New York: Semiotext, 1987), p. 108.

While the problem of what constitutes a general consensus of socially accepted knowledge, or even *if* a unified *status quo* truly exists has been approached differently by various sociologists, this thesis will examine Foucault's views pertaining to the birth and sustenance of dominant forms of social knowledge. Fully outlined in Part 4, Foucault relates items of social knowledge - that is, particular truth claims such as the concept of synchronicity - to the idea of social power. Essentially, Foucault contends that those who possess the adequate resources to create social knowledge will do so in order to increase their own individual, social or political advantage. That is, social knowledge rests upon social power. Moreover, the converse is also said to be in effect - social power is facilitated by the creation of social knowledge.

The thesis will not, however, argue that the quest for social power represents Jung's sole intention for introducing the concept of synchronicity. Nor will I suggest that social power is the sole creative force behind the idea of synchronicity. These views seem too simplistic. Yet it would also be simplistic to assume that Jung's construction and moreover, presentation of the idea of synchronicity occurs outside of the realm of social power, and furthermore, that Jung is unaware of the reality of social power. Throughout the thesis, then, I will argue that Jung appears to be quite conscious of the relation between social power and the concomitant need to tailor the concept of synchronicity to the social environment in which it is introduced.

1(b) Theoretical Issues in Analyzing Synchronicity

Before analyzing Jung's presentation of synchronicity, it should be stated that the study of any aspect of Jung's work - let alone synchronicity -

is problematic for three main reasons. The first difficulty in studying Jung is noted by Victor Fane D'Lugin, who points out Jung's constant tendency to revise, a trait that results in numerous modifications of material for various publications.

In addition to the scope of his work, another difficulty faced by the student is Jung's continual revision of many of his major works. While these revisions permit one to gain insight into the developmental phases of Jung's psychology, it simultaneously creates the necessity for multiple reading of works in two or three chronological periods. A single work which is revised two or three times may have to be read within the context of the writings that preceded and followed it and then read in the context of the revisions.

This problem is especially relevant to Jung's three formal works about synchronicity ("On Synchronicity,"³ *The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche**, and *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle*⁵) as each succeeding one builds upon the previous one. D'Lugin's concern is also relevant to Jung's presentation of synchronicity from the years 1930-1951, before his three formal discourses on synchronicity. In this span, Jung often

Victor Fane D'Lugin, "C. G. Jung and Political Theory: An Examination of the Ideas of Carl Gustav Jung Showing Their Relationship to Political Theory" (London: University Microfilms International, 1982) p. 61.

²Ibid., p. 62.

³C. G. Jung, "On Synchronicity" in *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche in The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, ed. William McGuire et al., trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954-79) Vol. 8, pp. 520-531.

⁴C. G. Jung and W. Pauli, *The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche* (trans. R. F. C. Hull) Bollingen Series LI (New York: Pantheon Books, 1955).

⁵C. G. Jung, *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle* in *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 418-519.

⁶See Parts 3(a), 3(b), and 3(c) of this thesis.

makes small additions pertaining to synchronicity, usually in the form of footnotes to previously existing material that alludes to synchronicity but does not mention it directly. To counteract the problem of Jung's multiple revisions, then, a survey method will be applied to Jung's treatment of synchronicity. That is, the concept and its implementation will be assessed from all of the available written and spoken data Jung provides on synchronicity.

The second difficulty in studying synchronicity is related to the first. In addition to Jung's inclination to constantly revise, statements he offers towards the end of his career make it difficult to take his theoretical work at face value. In his apparently autobiographical *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Jung admits a life of duplicity in which various aspects of his personal and professional experience are cloaked in scientific discourse for the sake of legitimacy.¹ As Naomi Goldenberg writes:

Like Plato's famous physician (*Laws* II, 660), Jung had to be concerned with public acceptance of his ideas and thus did, from time to time, coat them in the more acceptable metaphors of the day so that they could be swallowed__ scientific comparisons are often cited by later Jungians concerned with popularizing archetypal theory.

Likewise, Victor Fane D'Lugin critiques Jung's scientism - the use of a psuedo scientific method that reveals some of the attitudes and methods of science, but which lacks a strict adherence to them - by saying that Jung often attempts to justify his own views with an invalid use of historical data.

For Jung this search for a historical connection was successful in assisting him in formulating a number of ideas. While historical

¹C. G. Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, revised, ed. Aniela Jaffe, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), p. 336-354.

²Naomi R. Goldenberg, "Archetypal Theory After Jung." *Spring*, 1975: 199-220, p. 201.

precedent, by itself does not give validity to theory especially if one is involved as Jung claims in scientific investigation, it still can serve to illuminate areas for questioning and possible solutions to problems. In reading Jung it is often difficult to separate the material being presented to substantiate a claim or proposition from the material presented to show historical lineage of thought.

While I will argue in Part 4 of the thesis that Jung practised a type of poststructural theory well before its articulation by Foucault, I also suggest that Jung's form of 'truth creation' is not identical to that of Foucault. There are important points of difference. Similarities between the approach of Jung and Foucault, however, may be demonstrated. Again, the careful use of the survey method will facilitate a discernment of, if not Jung's truest convictions, at least his apparently *conscious* manipulation of data for the sole intent of making the idea of synchronicity seem more acceptable to specific audiences.

That Jung partially operates in a way akin to poststructural thought is evident not only in his presentation of synchronicity. Paul Stern argues that Jung's autobiographical *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* is a carefully calculated work of myth, designed to legitimize and even glorify both Jung and his ideas:

...with the help of his secretary, Aniela Jaffe, it was his personal myth much more than the factual events of his life that he set out to capture. Shunning the notion of reflecting the "objective" truth about himself - a goal he thought impossible in any case - he wanted to make sure that he was telling *his* truth, which he equated with his *fable*. Thus to set down his "autobiography," which he used to refer to in ironic question marks, was for him a poetic venture, a serried and imaginative

¹V. F. D'Lugin, "C. G. Jung and Political Theory" p. 166.

²In Part 4 I stress that while aspects of Jung's thought prefigure postmodernism, Jung cannot be fully described as a postmodern thinker due to his adherence to the notion of psychological progression, and the belief in a transhistorical component to the self.

recasting of his lived and remembered reality. Poetry, like every art form, defines its essence by leaving out what it views as nonessential...Thus Jung's mythologizing of his past, in his autobiography, was not naive or unintentional. The telling of the myth became itself a part of the myth, a "matter of fate," in Jung's words, an ineluctable task "imposed from within." An inveterate myth-maker, Jung saw the fine hand of fate everywhere...In telling his fable Jung, like any mythographer, was not above rearranging and embellishing his past, not above lapsing now and then into a bit of mystification, of himself and others. "Memories" is a multifaceted work, self-apology as much as logbook of an inner journey, self-glorification in the same breath as self-defense, a canny propaganda tract promoting the image of the "wise old man" that Jung wanted to bequeath to posterity. Jung's "Memories" is, in a sense, a self-conscious gospel and Bible of the Jungian dispensation

Likewise, the following example supports the idea that Jung displays a postmodern approach not only with his presentation of synchronicity, but also within other areas of his general theory. In his memoirs, Jung speaks of having two distinct personalities. Personality No. 1 is described as an "active and comprehending" ego-centric consciousness. No. 2 is characterized as a peaceful "Other."

Men with their ridiculous clothes, their meanness, vanity, mendacity, and abhorrent egoism—all qualities with which I was only too familiar from myself, that is, from personality No. 1, the schoolboy of 1890. Besides this world there existed another realm, like a temple in which anyone who entered was transformed and suddenly overpowered by a vision of the whole cosmos, so that he could marvel and admire, forgetful of himself. Here lived the "Other," who knew God was a hidden, personal, and at the same time suprapersonal secret. Here nothing separated man from God: indeed, it was as though the human mind looked down upon Creation simultaneously with God.

Jung claims such a duality is "played out in every individual" and has "nothing to do with a 'split' or dissociation in the ordinary medical

^jPaul J, Stern. *C. G. Jung: The Haunted Prophet* (New York: George Braziller, 1976), pp. 15-17.

Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 45

sense."¹ Whether or not this type of psychological duality is as common as Jung suggests remains open to question. More important for this thesis is the seeming contradiction between Jung's childhood knowledge of possessing two personalities with subsequent comments he makes about his psychiatric patient, "S. W." Some years after his own experience of a childhood marked by a dual personality, in speaking of S. W. the adult Jung states that she "led a curiously contradictory life, a real 'double life' with two personalities existing side by side or in succession." While it could be argued that personality No. 2 of "S. W." was not as exalted or close to "God" as Jung claims his own No. 2 was, one could - and perhaps should - question whether Jung's No. 2 was in fact identical to the Godhead, as he seems to suggest. If Jung's No. 2 was anything less than an ultimate Godhead (which seems probable), the difference between Jung's and S. W.'s respective No. 2 personalities would be a matter of character, rendering their psychological condition quite similar. The case of S. W. exemplifies how Jung uses his social power as a psychiatrist to define a patient's condition as being "curious," which implies deviance, sickness, and abnormality while he himself has experienced similar psychological conditions. Clearly Jung as a psychiatrist defines the dividing line between his own normality and the abnormality of the patient, while receiving prestige and monetary reward for

¹ibid., pp. 68, 45.

²C. G. Jung, *Psychiatric Studies in The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, ed. William McGuire et al., trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954-79) Vol. 1, p. 25.

³Another example is found in Jung's work on the Miller Fantasies. See C. G. Jung, "The Miller Fantasies: Anamnesis" and "The Miller Fantasies," *Symbols of Transformation in The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, ed. William McGuire et al., trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954-79) Vol. 5., pp. 47-55, 447-462.

doing so. This medicalization of individuals who possess similar experiences as Jung is mentioned to display Jung's tendency towards a poststructural type of conscious truth creation, in the form of truth control and manipulation: The management of truth for one's own advantage.

The third difficulty in studying Jung is related to the first two: statements he makes about synchronicity within his collected works are rife with internal contradiction. True, every thinker should be permitted the freedom to develop his or her concepts, and indeed change or reject them on the basis of accumulated knowledge over time. But Jung claims to be a scientist, and in part legitimizes the concept of synchronicity with an avowedly scientific approach. As a scientist he fails to rigorously define the concept of synchronicity. Moreover, some of the key concepts pertaining to, or implicated by, synchronicity have numerous, conflicted meanings.ⁱ

Jung, however, notes in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* his own inconsistency and suggests that it represents a normal, acceptable human quality. Perhaps the essence of his overall thought is best summed up in this confession:

ⁱRichard Evans similarly suggests that Jung manages his own intuitive-introvert personality by telling his story through his psychiatric patients. Richard I. Evans, *Dialogue with C. G. Jung* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), p. 107. See Part 4(g), pp. 280-283 for a more detailed discussion on the relation between social truth, power and prestige.

The occult writer, Colin Wilson suggests that Jung confuses synchronicity with ESP and telepathy. See Colin Wilson, *Lord of the Underworld: Jung and the Twentieth Century* (Wellingborough: The Aquarian Press, 1984), pp. 113-114.

^jThese inconsistencies are adequately illustrated in Parts 2 and 3 of this thesis.

I had to obey an inner law which was imposed on me and left me no freedom of choice. Of course I did not always obey it. How can anyone live without inconsistency?

As a philosophical argument this itself is inconsistent, for one cannot choose to disobey something which provides no option to choose. On another level, however, the statement is consistent in its admission of inconsistency, much like the *coniunctio oppositorum* (union of opposites) view of the self which Jung advocates.

Concerning Jung's personal lack of consistency and the related contradictions found in his theory, I will argue that this does not instantly invalidate any insights or utility which Jung's ideas may contain. And more important to the central thesis statement, I will suggest that by selfconsciously advancing his own inconsistency as an acceptable facet of human expression, Jung seems to indeed confess to being a type of poststructuralist well before the term came to fruition. Published in 1961, the self acknowledgement in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* of Jung's inconsistency provides further support for viewing him, at least in part, as a postmodern thinker, who for the most part is located in modernity.

Before I analyze Jung's presentation of synchronicity, it is necessary to clearly specify the terms "postmodernism," "modernism" and "poststructuralism." My use will closely coincide with J. J. Clarke's definition:

The term 'postmodern' may be taken to refer to the current disillusionment with the culture of 'modernism', in particular with the ideals (first clearly enunciated during the eighteenth-century Enlightenment) of: certainty in knowledge, universality of

Jung. *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 357. See pp. 79, 215-217 of this thesis.

moral and aesthetic values, progress through scientific rationalism and technology, and humanistic anthropocentrism.

The term "postmodern" coincides with "poststructural." The two terms are often used interchangeably. Nevertheless, "postmodern" includes fields such as art and architecture,² while "poststructural" usually refers to critical theory. Thomas Mautner, with a somewhat sceptical view, says postmodern refers to a particular historical period, but that its meaning is manifold:

...'post-modern' or 'post-modernism' can mean many different things, and an author who wishes to be understood will have to explain the intended sense...Some clusters of meaning can, however, be discerned...the word denotes fragmentation and promiscuous trivialization of values, symbols and images...In architecture, where the word first gained currency, post-modernism denotes a rejection of the functionalism and brutalism of modern architecture (high-rise slums; impersonal box-like office blocks), together with a preference for aimless eclecticism. In the arts, 'post-modernism' denotes a break with, or a continuation of, modernism...post-modernism, able to recognize absurdity when it sees it, has recourse to pastiche, many-layered irony, flippancy, etc.

Despite his obvious bias against postmodernism, it seems that Mautner's prescription to carefully define the term is valid.

Concerning the term poststructuralism, William Reese defines it as:

A movement of literary criticism and philosophic thought originating, like Structuralism (g. v.), in France, agreeing with its predecessor in stressing semiology while placing greater stress on the relations of signs to each other than to some objective reality.

¹J. J. Clarke, *In Search of Jung* (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 188n.

²See Part 3(d), pp. 159-160 for a discussion of Jung and the postmodern view of art and architecture.

³Thomas Mautner, *A Dictionary of Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1996), pp. 332-333.

William L. Reese, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion: Eastern and Western Thought*. New and Enlarged Edition (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996), p. 598. Regarding the "predecessor" of Structuralism, this refers to the view that fundamental structures are inherent to the observable world. Tom Bottomore

And Mark Poster says:

Poststructuralist writers, especially Michel Foucault, reevaluate the nature of the subject of theory and the theoretical subject, basing the reevaluation in large part on new ways of conceptualizing language. Poststructuralists question the easy assumption that the theoretical subject can generate a discourse that represents the real, unmasks domination in the real, without himself/herself introducing new forms of domination. Poststructuralists criticize the assumption of much modern thought that theoretical discourse is a direct expression of a truth in the theorist's mind, that this truth in some way captures historical reality, and that the question of freedom entails the appropriation of this truth by historical agents and their subsequent action to actualize it. Poststructuralists point to various ways in which language materially effects the relation of the theorist to his or her discourse and the ways in which the social field is composed of linguistic phenomena.

In simpler terms Chris Weedon says:

Language is not transparent in a humanist discourse, it is not expressive and does not label a 'real' world. Meanings do not exist prior to their articulation in language and language is not an abstract system, but is always socially and historically located in discourses. Discourses represent political interests and in consequence are constantly vying for status and power.

David Couzens Hoy adds that while both postmodernism and modernism think the unthinkable, hidden aspects of human history, which Hoy calls the "unthought," postmodern may nevertheless be distinguished from modern approaches by the way in which the unthought is thought.

and Robert Nisbet point out that Western Structuralism uses three main models of structure: 1) the organismic model 2) the mathematical model and 3) the mechanical model, and that its earliest roots may be traced back to the Pythagorean school of philosophy which argued that "reality...is formed by irreducible geometrical patterns." Tom Bottomore and Robert Nisbet, "Structuralism" in Tom Bottomore and Robert Nisbet (eds.), *A History of Sociological Analysis* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1978: 557-598), p. 557, 558.

Mark Poster, *Critical Theory and Poststructuralism: In Search of a Context* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 3-4.

²Chris Weedon. *Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 41.

What Foucault does... is to show us how to think the unthought without presupposing that what remains unthought is a metaphysical entity named man.

He continues:

Thinking the unthought in the postmodern, genealogical way thus counts as a genuine form of knowledge, since it comprehends some of what was left unthought. But it may not count as self-knowledge except in a partial and indirect way...the self that is thereby known turns out to be not single, unified, complete, and whole, but complex, disseminated, fractious, and fragile.

Hoy suggests that Foucault's type of postmodernism challenges the modernist assumption that reason is supreme. Interestingly, Foucault rejected the notion that he was to be termed a poststructuralist, because he feared that the academic label created an artificial restriction upon his freedom of thought.³

Another important criterion for postmodernism is that of discontinuity. As Charles C. Lemert and Garth Gillian point out, Foucault liberates the subject from a history of continuity into one of discontinuity—a discontinuity marked by moments of stability. And while the belief in a

*David Couzens Hoy, "Foucault: Modern or Postmodern" in Jonathan Arac (ed) *After Foucault: Humanistic Knowledge, Postmodern Challenges* (London: Rutgers University Press, 1988, pp. 12-41), p. 36.

²Ibid., p. 37.

³Ibid., p. 20. In an interview with Bob Gallagher and Alexander Wilson, Foucault states his position on freedom within a network of power relations:

We cannot jump *outside* the situation, and there is no point where you are free from all power relations. But you_m can always change it. So what I've said does not mean that we are always trapped, but that we are always free. Well, anyway, that there is the possibility of changing.

Bob Gallagher and Alexander Wilson, "Michel Foucault: An Interview." *Edinburgh Review* 69/March 1985, pp. 52-59, p. 56.

transhistorical subject vanishes, the historical study of subjectivity as a social phenomenon does not.

The break with subjectivity in Foucault's history is the elimination of the subject as a metatheoretical concept in historical methods. But the founding subject remains as an important object in the field of history.

If Jung's approach to theory is taken as a precursor to, and therefore as an imperfect example of, postmodernism, his inconsistency remains problematic on one level, but slightly less so than if he were simply unaware of his many-faceted, many-sided conceptual constructions. While aspects of Jung's theory tend to suggest a postmodern type of outlook (for example, his adherence to discontinuity within synchronicity), some do not (for instance, the notion of a psychoid, transcendent aspect of the archetype). More important, however, it is the *manner* in which Jung presents his theory that truly marks him as a forerunner to postmodernism. By this I mean that Jung's method of presentation displays some important strategies which themselves would later be designated as postmodern. Taken as a whole, it is almost as if Jung's thought contains a hybrid of the epistemological assumptions - and truth claims - that arise from the apparently contradictory corners of mysticism, science and postmodernism.

Concerning Jung's inconsistency, the related methodological problem is two-fold. First, the student of Jung must attempt to discern Jung's 'real' meaning amidst Jung's contradictory statements, and furthermore, ask if these

Charles C. Lemert and Garth Gillian, *Michel Foucault: Social Theory and Transgression* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 100.

²Ibid., p. 101.

³As noted above (p. 9), Jung's practice of science approximates the idea of scientism: i.e., a pseudo-science that reveals some of the attitudes and methods of the person of science, but which lacks a strict adherence to them.

statements are altered and re-altered by Jung in order to "hint" at some greater, esoteric wisdom that he believed himself to possess. Following in this vein, Jung would have had to continually reformulate his ideas in order to effectively communicate to various people who are, on the whole, less cosmically enlightened than Jung. It should be stressed that this thesis **will not** argue that Jung possessed a superior type of cosmic knowledge, or mystical form of gnosis, but only that one must consider that Jung himself believed this to be the case. This idea is supported by Jung's retrospective claim, found in his memoirs, that he was forever alone by virtue of his superior knowledge:

As a child I felt myself to be alone, and I am still, because I know things and must hint at things which others apparently know nothing of.

The second question remains of when, where, and to what degree is Jung *aware* of the inconsistencies in his theory. Put differently, are there instances in which Jung is unknowingly inconsistent? It is important to keep this question in mind in order to avoid portraying Jung as something he may not be entirely—i.e. a brilliantly shrewd, and moreover, *conscious* maker of modern myth. As we shall see in his exposition of synchronicity, Jung is

^xJung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 356.

²We must also ask whether an unconscious inconsistency on the part of Jung would necessarily conflict with the notion that his esoteric wisdom is greater than most people's. Jung's follower Aniela Jaffe² suggests that Jung preferred to be called a scientist rather than a mystic due to the pejorative connotations of the latter designation. She further says that while Jung's use of scientific language differentiates him from the mystic, the experiences he describes are the same as those articulated by mystics. Regarding Jung's methodological integrity as a scientist, Jaffe says that in his discussion of the archetype "he is not always consistent in maintaining an empirical attitude." As a defender of Jungian dogma, however, she continues: "This is presumably not possible because 'archetype' and 'archetypal image' are already borderline concepts." Aniela **Jaffe**, *Was C. G. Jung a Mystic? and other Essays* trans. Diana Dachler and Fiona Cairns (Einsiedeln, Switz.: Daimon, 1989), pp. 1-2, 63.

keenly aware of the problematic nature of the subject matter. It remains difficult to determine whether this keen awareness extends to the inconsistencies which rise up in that exposition.

Again, in suggesting that Jung prefigures postmodernism because his conceptualization and introduction of synchronicity exemplifies some of the ideas put forth by poststructuralism, there are several final methodological points which require clarification. First, the designation of an individual as a "poststructuralist" could itself have several meanings. It could simply refer to one who agrees with the main ideas of poststructural theory, but who does not put those ideas into practice. An example would be a scholar who agrees with poststructural ideas about human sexuality, but who does not advance them in his or her own work for fear of social or professional recrimination. On the other hand, a poststructuralist could refer to one who employs a certain methodological approach to human history (or psychology) and who assumes the *utility* of viewing the chosen subject matter through the lens of a particular postmodern theory. This type of poststructuralist might

(a) Chris Weedon points out that for Foucault, the criteria which define normal and abnormal human sexualities are created by social discourses which themselves are grounded within historically relative formations of social power.

In breaking with notions of essential sexuality, guaranteed by God, nature or the 'universal' structures of human sociality, Foucault opens up sexuality to history and change.

Chris Weedon. *Feminist Practice and Poststructural Theory*, p. 123. Please see parts 4(c) and (g) of this thesis for a detailed discussion of Foucault's understanding of the human subject and the subject's relation to social power. (b) A general distinction between (1) agreeing with a theory, and (2) practising that theory is necessary because it is possible to intellectually accept a set of postulates and yet conduct research by means of a different, or even conflicting set of postulates. Another hypothetical example would be that of a believing Catholic who, working as an anthropologist, sets out to discover the alleged "missing link" between chimpanzees and mankind.

designate himself or herself as a Foucauldian,¹ sharing with Foucault all, or most of, the significant aspects of Foucault's methodological approach and applying that method to a given set of research data. An explication of this approach is found in Foucault's *Archaeology of Knowledge*:

The analysis of the discursive field is orientated in a quite different way [from a mere 'history of thought']; we must grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence; determine its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlations with other statements that may be connected with it, and show what other forms of statements it excludes.

This type of poststructuralist would be, then, one who conducts a poststructural analysis of a series of written statements embodied within some fixed historical text, and who follows the prescriptions of the above quotation.⁴

Another type of a poststructuralist could be someone who agrees with the major ideas of poststructuralism and who implements them in order to advance a particular social cause. If, for instance, the work of Michel Foucault is favoured by a gay scholar who finds Foucault's study of male homosexuality in

In Jung's case this would be literally absurd; his theory was well articulated before Foucault's ideas were published.

¹To further illustrate this point: A Marxist, for instance, examines data in a manner that is based on Marx's ideas. Thus by adopting the assumptions outlined by the initial theorist (Marx), the follower of Marx (the Marxist) views, and arguably creates the world through the parameters set by the founding theorist. The same could be said of a structuralist, a behaviourist, a Jungian, a Darwinian, a Saussurian, a Foucauldian, *ad infinitum*. Because, however, poststructuralism is quite recent, this double edged, or refracted view of the initial theory and the biased practice of its subsequent adherents requires explanation.

⁴Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (London: Tavistock Publications, 1972), p. 28.

⁴Please see Parts 4(c),(d),(e),and (g) for a detailed discussion of poststructuralism.

ancient Greece to be useful for the advancement of gay rights within contemporary critical theory, he or she could be regarded as a poststructuralist. This type of poststructuralist advances poststructural ideas by putting them into social practice.

Last, we may designate a particular theory and practice as *prefiguring* poststructuralism, and it is this usage of "poststructural" and "postmodern" that will be applied to Jung's theory and practice: a prefigurative poststructuralist is someone existing prior to and yet who espouses many of the tenets of the postmodern viewpoint. Regarding practice, he or she wishes to implement novel ideas which he or she suspects will challenge the unexamined assumptions that are held by his or her contemporaries. Expecting an intellectual counterattack, or perhaps scorn and even professional ruin, the theorist wishes to avoid such difficulties by carefully modulating his or her discourse in accordance with his or her expectation of the mentality of his or her audience. He or she does this in order to best serve the end of communicating [what were then] new ideas which he or she deems to be significant. By virtue of the challenging contents of his or her theory, the individual practices a type of postmodernism in that he or she is acutely aware of the need to create a truth that is appropriate to - i.e. that may be both understood and accepted by - his or her professional peers and to the general public.¹ Unlike the previous example of the contemporary gay postmodern activist, this type of individual does not necessarily uphold all of Foucault's main postulates in his or her own theoretical analysis of human events. But in pursuing a given topic, he or she attempts to introduce some

*This scenario raises the problem of wisdom (i.e. the idea that at certain moments some individuals possess a type of knowledge that must be imparted to other individuals for some greater cause).

innovative idea, or he or she intends to reformulate historically existing ideas in a fresh and accessible way in order to make them useful for his or her present society.¹ By carefully manipulating the presentation of the research, he or she consciously and willingly hopes to legitimize an innovative way of looking at what may - or may not be - an old idea. By doing so, he or she participates to some degree in accordance with Foucault's vision of how truth is created. That is, the individual theorist creates a new concept or theory, and by virtue of implementing it with a deliberately cautious, selective, and calculated approach, he or she provides a concrete example of the postmodern notion that the manner in which one speaks about a theory is equally as important as the theory itself/ This is because, as any poststructuralist will point out, theory does not exist in a vacuum. Instead, theory is enmeshed within myriad relationships of social power."

¹With the example of Jesus who emerges from the Jewish tradition, Kenneth Scott Latourette suggests that:

While for almost all, and perhaps all of his moral and religious teachings parallels and precedents can be found in the writings of the Jewish sages, Jesus had about him a freshness and an originality which gave them such vivid expression and put them in such proportion and perspective that they were seen as both old and new.

Kenneth Scott Latourette, *A History of Christianity*, Vol. 1 (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1975), p. 45.

²Please see Parts 4(c), (d) and (g).

Although Jung's died in 1961, prior to the advent of the terms "poststructuralist" and "postmodern," this does not rule out the possibility that he prefigured the ideas which these terms express. By the term "prefiguration" I refer to an imperfect, or incomplete forerunner to something not yet fully manifested. A prefigurative idea or theory, in this sense, contains elements and perhaps salient tendencies of the idea or theory that "it foreshadows, but the prefiguration itself is not identical to the subsequent idea which it presages. Just as Lady Macbeth's repeated washing of her hands is often cited as a prefiguration of Freud's ideas about obsessive-compulsive behaviour, we cannot correctly say that Shakespeare *is* a Freudian. But we may argue that some of his ideas prefigure Freud's.

To sum, poststructuralism could be divided into poststructural theory (as in holding an agreement with its major postulates) on the one hand, and poststructural practice on the other hand. Moreover, "practice" itself could be subdivided into three main categories which may exist separately, together, or in some combination. The three categories of poststructural practice are as follows: (a) the manner in which one approaches a text (i.e. how research is conducted, informed, and limited by a relatively fixed conceptual schema),¹ (b) the implementation of another poststructural theorist's ideas within contemporary culture, and (c) the manner in which one writes about one's research (i.e. how it is presented to a real and/or imagined audience).² Concerning (c), this may be further subdivided into: (c-1) the ideological content of the presentation, and (c-2) the expositional form in which the argument is presented. And it seems that in each of (c-1) and (c-2), Jung prefigures Foucault's vision of poststructuralism, yet I will argue in the thesis that Jung's strategic implementation of his theory (c-2) prefigures the postulates of poststructuralism more fully than do his theoretical ideas (c-1), which in themselves are rife with contradiction.

¹This would only apply to inflexible theorists, convinced of the absolute authority of their particular system. For a worthwhile discussion of this notion of the "paradigm," see Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, second edition, enlarged (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

²In discussing his own dialectical method in relation to Hegel's dialectical method, Karl Marx makes a similar distinction between the mode of presentation and the mode of investigation when he says, "Of course my method of presentation must differ formally from the method of investigation." Karl Marx, *Preface to the 2nd edition of Capital, 1873*, cited in Karl Marx, *Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Psychology*, eds. T. B. Bottomore and Maximilien Rubel, trans. T. Bottomore (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956), p. 7.

A poststructuralist could assert that a contradiction within theory displays a quality, which according to Clare O'Farrell, is part and parcel of the Foucauldian attitude. Commenting on Foucault's reluctance to assign to himself a fixed label of "historian" or "philosopher," or to limit himself to a single

To suggest that Jung's ideas prefigure poststructuralism is not to imply a perfect or even germinal instance of what is taken as contemporary poststructural thought. Such a view might also imply that Foucault's approach was influenced by Jung's—and nothing could be further from the facts. In Foucault's work, both Jung and his analytical theory are routinely ignored.¹ As outlined in Part 4 of the thesis, several notions figure in both Jung and Foucault's work: historical discontinuity; the social relativity of truth; the essential oneness among the inner world of the subject and his or her external reality; and the acceptance of contradiction within human beings and their theories (making contradiction not something to be necessarily purged from theory). To repeat, however, there are significant points of difference between Jung's and Foucault's ideas.

theoretical "place" from which his ideas could be grounded, O'Farrell says "if nothing else, it was a relief to know that these contradictions might be intentional." Clare O'Farrell, *Foucault: Historian or Philosopher?* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), p. 46. She continues by citing this passage from *The Archaeology of Knowledge*:

Aren't you sure of what you are saying? Are you going to change again, to shift your ground, to say that any objections are not really aimed at the position you are speaking from? Are you getting ready to say, yet again, that you have never been what you are accused of being? Are you already arranging a way out, which will allow you to suddenly reappear somewhere else in your next book and jeer, as you are doing now: no, no, I am not over there where you were waiting for me, but over here laughing at you.

Michel Foucault, cited in O'Farrell, *Foucault*, pp. 46-47. I believe, however, that Jung's insistence on transcendence makes it difficult to designate him as a full-fledged postmodern.

foucault does, however, mention Sigmund Freud. See below pp. 245-247 in regard to Foucault's rejection of what he terms the repressive hypothesis.

'In this introduction I intend only to outline the main ideas of Foucault's mature thought in order to set a foundation for an analysis of Jung's creation and implementation of the theory of synchronicity. In Part 4, Jung's and Foucault's respective theories are examined in detail.

While Jung's implementation of synchronicity represents an attempt to create a new and socially recognized concept, at this point it should be reemphasized that Foucault grounds the process of truth creation in social power, with power representing human agency directed towards the acquisition of social and economic benefits:

'Truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A regime of truth. This regime of truth is not merely ideological or superstructural; it was a condition of the formation and development of capitalism...The essential political problem for the intellectual is to...that of ascertaining the possibility of constituting a new politics of truth. The problem is not changing people's consciousness - or what's in their heads - but the political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth. Its not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time.

In contrast, Jung in his memoirs says that the purpose of his own modern myth responds to the social need to create psychological "meaning."

Apparently there is no unanimous feeling about the nature of the world, any more than there is general agreement among contemporary astronomers on this question. To Western man, the meaninglessness of a merely static universe is unbearable. He must assume that it has meaning... but the meaning is both without and within___ I do not imagine that in my reflections on the meaning of man and his myth I have uttered a final truth.

This statement is in the context of an interview and most likely was not thought through as it clearly contradicts Foucault's notion of discourse. As outlined in Part 4(c) of the thesis, to change a social practice implies a change of discursive thought and speech—that which Foucault calls, "what's in their heads." See below pp. 238, 240.

²Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. C. Gordon et al. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), p. 133.

³Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, pp. 317, 339.

This need to create meaning is also seen by Jung as a religious type of "calling," as made evident in the following: "It is not we who invent myth, rather it speaks to us as a Word of God."¹ And in the final page of his memoirs, Jung muses, "Life is - or has - meaning and meaninglessness. I cherish the anxious hope that meaning will preponderate and win the battle."

For Jung, the creation of 'truth' must be calibrated in order to serve the existential needs of a given social formation. Thus the production of social truth is in fact the creation of a meaningful myth; this may take the form of a 'primitive' cave painting, an ancient religious manuscript, or a contemporary scientific discourse.

To conclude these introductory remarks, the method of analyzing Jung's work on synchronicity will follow Foucault's prescription that one must examine a given series of statements within the context in which they are

¹ibid., p. 340.

²Ibid., p. 359.

^JIbid., p. 317. While this idea is expressed in the autobiographical *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* from a postmodern standpoint it would be naive to assume that this text represents an accurate and comprehensive account of his life. Paul Stern says that Jung was purposely selective and creative (as may have been his posthumous editors) for the sake of preserving his mythic stature as a "wise man."

Carl Jung's "Memories," as has often been noted, tell us very little about the external events of his life and next to nothing - with the notable exceptions of his parents and Sigmund Freud - about the people who accompanied or crossed his life's path. But through this process of excision, the memories manage to project an image of intense inwardness that, in Jung's case, is more telling than the most minute chronicle of his actions and interactions could every be.

Stern, C. G. *Jung: The Haunted Prophet*, p. 16. Naomi Goldenberg suggests Jung's documented drive for 'greatness' was the compensatory result of an unresolved cumulative trauma within his own personal unconscious. Naomi Goldenberg, "Looking at Jung Looking at Himself," *Soundings*, 73/2-3 (Summer/Fall 1990), pp. 383-406.

produced. While Foucault uses the term discourse to refer to historically located statements that contain and reproduce culturally relative truth claims, he also notes the importance of *discursive practices*, which include the various social institutions to which those statements of discourse are connected, and through which "pedagogical forms" are "imposed and maintained."¹ Thus in providing a discursive analysis of Jung's attempt to legitimize synchronicity, both Jung's discourse about synchronicity and the medical and larger social context in which he implements that discourse will be taken into account. Much attention will be given to Jung's style of argumentation and to the existence of logical inconsistencies within his discourse about synchronicity. Each separate discourse about synchronicity mentioned in Parts 2 and 3 of the thesis will be viewed as a unique and specific truth claim, and analyzed *in situ*. That is, Foucault's prescription that discursive statements must be analyzed within the context of the specific discourse to which they belong will be followed. To repeat from the above:

The analysis of the discursive field [entails that] we must grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence; determine its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlations with other statements that may be connected with it, and show what other forms of statements it excludes.²

But each specific discourse will also be viewed within the context of it belonging to an overall, or general discourse about synchronicity which as noted, is located within the discursive practices of medical psychiatry in the first half of the twentieth century. In both the specific and general sense,

Michel Foucault, *"History of Systems of Thought" in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews* trans. D. F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 200.

²Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, p. 28.

I will focus on Jung's attempt to legitimize synchronicity within the professional and social contexts in which he writes.

As a final word on my method of analysis, however, it should be stressed that while I borrow from the poststructural method of discourse analysis, I hesitate to limit the thesis method to, or entirely designate the thesis as, a "poststructural analysis." This caveat is based upon the belief that many of the fundamental assumptions of poststructuralism themselves require critical examination. In part 4 of the thesis, Jung's views regarding knowledge, power, and subjectivity provide a useful mirror within which some of the implications of Foucault's work may be upheld for critical examination. Conversely, many of Jung's ideas will be evaluated from the vantage point of Foucauldian theory. Thus my overall, "meta-level" of method which runs throughout the thesis may be parsimoniously described as the method of critical comparative analysis.

Accordingly, the discourse analysis of Jung's implementation of synchronicity is augmented with a critical analysis which stems from various scholarly and religious traditions. Non-Jungian and non-postmodern ideas are used to critique, from a different angle, the implicit and explicit assumptions of both Jung's analytical psychology and postmodernism. From such an interdisciplinary method, it follows that any given truth claim or philosophical position may be assessed from the perspective of another, rival truth claim or position. The compound methodology of this thesis is intended to remain true to that supposition.

1(c) The Intellectual Climate in which Jung Introduces the Concept of Synchronicity

Carl Gustav Jung was born in 1875 in a middle-class family at Thurgovia, Switzerland. His father, described by Jung in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* as a somewhat "moody"¹ parson, was familiar with and taught latin to Jung at the age of six. Jung enjoyed this aspect of his relationship with his father, but could not share his father's unexamined belief in the Christian faith.³

In 1895 Jung entered medical school at Basel. Interestingly, it was an apparently paranormal series of events that Jung claims "was destined to influence me profoundly"⁴ in terms of choosing an area of specialization within medicine. During the summer holidays of 1898 Jung reports hearing a loud cracking sound which he discovered to be an inexplicable split from the rim to the centre of a solid wooden table. Two weeks later the blade of a bread knife had allegedly, and equally as inexplicably as the table, shattered into several segments. Two weeks after Jung heard of relatives who were practising "table turning" and consulting a "medium." Keenly interested, Jung began attending regular seances with his relatives. After discovering that

¹Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 25.

²Ibid., p. 43.

³Ibid., p. 22, 55, 73.

⁴Ibid., p. 104.

⁵Ibid., p. 105.

"Francis Charet argues that Jung's interest in spiritualism figured prominently in the development of his psychological ideas. See Francis Xavier Charet, "Spiritualism and the Foundations of C. G. Jung's Psychology" (Ottawa, Canada: Ph.D. Thesis for the Department of Religious Studies, University of Ottawa, June 30, 1988).

the medium had been attempting to "produce phenomena by trickery,"^{1,1} Jung became disenchanted with the study, which formerly he had written into his doctoral work. The import of the seances, however, was that he ascertained what he termed as the first "objective facts about the human psyche."* For he hypothesized a No. 2 personality in the medium, and believed he had observed through this example a general ontogeny of such secondary personalities. Two years later, his dissertation, "On the Psychology and Pathology of So-called Occult Phenomena" was submitted.

In his memoirs, Jung expresses dissatisfaction with his student days.

Though I had attended psychiatric lectures and clinics, the current instructor in psychiatry was not exactly stimulating, and when I recalled the effects which the experience of asylums had had on my father, this was not calculated to prepossess me in favour of psychiatry...The lectures and clinical demonstrations had not made the slightest impression on me. I could not remember a single one of the cases I had seen in the clinic, but only my boredom and disgust.

It was not until reading the preface to Krafft-Ebing's *Lehrbuch der Psychiatric* that Jung's "heart suddenly began to pound" with excitement in anticipation of a career in psychiatry.

It had suddenly become clear to me, in a flash of illumination, that for me the only possible goal was psychiatry. Here alone the two currents of my interest could flow together and in a united stream dig their own bed. Here was the empirical field common to biological and spiritual

Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 107.

²Ibid.

³C. G. Jung, "On the Psychology and Pathology of So-called Occult Phenomena" in *Psychiatric Studies in The Collected Works*, Vol. 1: '3-88.

*Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 108.

⁵Ibid., p. 108n.

⁶Ibid., p. 108.

facts, which I had everywhere sought and nowhere found. Here at last . was a place where the collision of nature and spirit became a reality.¹

This enthusiasm centred upon Krafft-Ebing's admission of the "subjective character" and incomplete status of psychiatric textbooks. Jung was drawn to this philosophical honesty because he found it lacking in his instructors at the medical clinic. Prior to the revelation of Krafft-Ebing's textbook, he had been a reluctant student of psychiatry.

Jung's fascination with the "collision of nature and spirit"¹ within the context of the mind accounts for his dissatisfaction with the state of psychiatry at the time of his entrance into that profession at the turn of the century. Indeed, Jung retrospectively describes psychiatrists as being "ridiculous materialists."³ Concerning the attitude that Jung held toward his professional colleagues, he writes about his experience at the Burghdlzli psychiatric hospital:

My professional colleagues seemed to me no less interesting than the patients. In the years that followed I secretly compiled statistics on the hereditary background of my Swiss colleagues, and gained much instruction. I did this for my personal edification as well as for the sake of understanding the psychiatric mentality. I need scarcely mention that my concentration and self-imposed confinement alienated me from my colleagues. They did not know, of course, how strange psychiatry seemed to me, and how intent I was on penetrating into its spirit.

It was in this context that the early ideas pertaining to the later elaboration of synchronicity were developed. When viewed retrospectively, we can see that in order for synchronicity to be accepted by the medical

¹Ibid., p. 109.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 94. ⁴Ibid.,

pp. 112-113.

establishment, Jung first had to reclaim the concept of "soul" to a psychiatry that was mostly interested in, or at least dominated by, an experimental psycho-biological bias.

While at Basel University Jung joined the Zofingia Club, a fraternity with members from several Swiss universities, and he presented his first lectures on the soul. Not to be confused with his concept of the *sehr* which he would articulate later, Jung states in "Some Thoughts on Psychology"² that the soul is a metaphysical, or "transcendental"[^] entity possessing three distinct qualities: The first quality Jung attributes to the soul is an intelligence independent of spatial and temporal restrictions. Jung claims this intelligence is proved by the second characteristic of the soul: its purposeful power of organization. In turn, the organizational ability of the soul is recognizable by the third property of the soul: its proclivity towards self-representation, which at this early date, Jung terms *materialization*. To legitimize his entry into a discourse on the metaphysic of the soul, Jung cites the German philosopher Immanuel Kant:

It will be demonstrated in the future...that even in this life the human soul dwells in an indissoluble communion with all the immaterial natures of the spirit world, alternately affecting these natures and receiving impressions from them.

¹See part 4(f), pp. 263-267.

²C. G. Jung, "Some Thoughts on Psychology" (May 1897), *The Zofingia Lectures in The Collected Works of C. G. Jung: Supplementary Volume A* (trans.) Jan Van Heurck (ed.) William McGuire, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983: 21-47), p. 38.

³Ibid., p. 39.

Immanuel Kant, *Traume eines Geistersehers*, p. 21 cited in Jung, *The Zofingia Lectures*, p. 34.

After presenting the threefold character of the soul, Jung then to some extent reiterates Kant's view of the soul, although in a simpler and apparently scientific manner:

The soul, as the metaphysical presupposition of organic life, likewise transcends space and time, and for this reason its emancipation from sensory manifestation must be expressed in the fact that the soul appears as the basic force of *actiones in distans*. Thus to substantiate the second clause of our definition of the soul, we must present evidence substantiating the *actio in distans*.

While Jung is not in a position to provide empirical support for Kant's notion of "spirits" with which the soul interacts, he does at this juncture document a host of experimental studies which he believes prove both "the long range effects of the soul in *space* and...the long range effects of the soul in *time*."²

This notion of a human ontology that is located within a relativistic view of space and time³ clearly is a precursor to Jung's later conceptualization of synchronicity. Furthermore, the third postulate of the soul - the concept of materialization as its self-representation - prefigures

Jung, *The Zofingia Lectures*, p. 40.

²Ibid.

⁵Edward Hall argues that Northern Europeans and Americans view time as "monochronic" while the Japanese have a polychronic understanding of time. The former refers to the learned belief that time is linear, while the latter view envisions time as a holistic phenomenon.

Monochronic time is arbitrary and imposed, that is, learned. Because it is so thoroughly integrated into our culture, it is treated as though it were the only natural and logical way of organizing life.

Edward Hall, *The Dance of Life: The Other Dimension of Time*, pp. 48-49, cited in F. Gregory Hayden, "Order Matters, and Thus So Does Timing: Graphical Clocks and Process Synchronicity." *Journal of Economic Issues*, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, March 1993: 95-113, pp. 99-100.

Jung's later formulation of two concepts essential to synchronicity: the *archetype* and the differentiation of the archetype from the *archetypal image* } In contrast to Jung's later archetypal theory, however, *materialization* specifies that the human body is a concrete manifestation of the soul's self-expression²—a type of self-representation which cannot belong under the category of an archetypal image.

Nevertheless, a relationship between psyche and soma does reemerge in Jung's theory in a slightly different form with synchronicity. Rather than the body being a representation of the soul, one form of synchronicity suggests that certain physiological conditions mirror one's psychic state. In another, more 'macroscopic' type of psyche/soma relationship, Jung states

¹See below pp. 213-214, and pp. 261, 264-266 for a discussion of the archetype and the archetypal image.

²Ibid., p. 38.

³Jung later alters his definition of soul in *Psychological Types*. In this formulation, soul refers to the personality, which in turn consists of the persona and anima. See C. G. Jung, *Psychological Types* in *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, ed. William McGuire et al., trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954-79) Vol. 6, pp. 463-473.

⁴On this point Carol Schreier Rupperecht suggests that synchronicity corresponds to the firing of neurons in the D-state of REM sleep. See "The Common Language of Women's Dreams: Colloquy of Mind and Body" in Estella Lauter and Carol Schreier Rupperecht, *Feminist Archetypal Theory: Interdisciplinary Re-Visions of Jungian Thought* (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1985: 187-219), pp. 195-197. The term synchronicity is also being used in experimental studies of human physiology. In one scientific study, subjects bimanually pressed two microswitches in response to stimuli, and their EMG values were measured. Instead of the word "correlation," "synchronicity" is used to describe the relation between reaction times and peak electromyography (EMG) values of the forearm. Bert De Brabander et. al, "Stability of Choice Reaction Time and Synchronicity of Peak EMG Values During Bimanual Reactions." *Perceptual and Motor Skills*, 1992, 75, pp. 165-166. In another study, synchronicity is used to describe the relation between cognitive operations and neural firing within the brain. See Stellan Ohlsson, "Psychological Implications of the Synchronicity Hypothesis" (Comment on L. Shastri and V. Ajjanagadde, "Association to Reasoning") *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*. Vol. 16, No. 3, 1993, p. 469.

that the bodily conception of Jesus within the Virgin Mary is synchronistic to the potential redemption of all human beings. He says since God becomes flesh, mankind "is potentially related to God." As we shall see from the definition of synchronicity to follow, it remains unclear how Jung sees this as being a 'synchronistic' phenomenon; moreover, this claim is countered with Jung's contradictory view that the historicity issue of Jesus is undecided.ⁱ

It seems the significance of Jung's tentative re-introduction of the 'soul' into medicine at the Zofingia club lies for Jung in its purported transcendental quality. At the age of twenty two, Jung demonstrates not only his impressive learning, but also a precocious manner of self expression attempts to link mundane consciousness^ with a relativistic view of space and time via the concept of 'soul.' From a postmodern perspective, Jung attempts to create a certain type of understanding regarding the soul within a proscribed medical context. The introduction of this early discourse on the soul has little initial effect. After much refinement, however, it takes root within Jung's system as the *psychoid* aspect of the *archetype* of the *self*. It was essential for these later concepts to be

¹**C. G. Jung, *Psychology and Alchemy in The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, ed. William McGuire et al., trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954-79) Vol. 12., pp. 306, 415.**

²Jung says that:

Christ, from the point of view of psychology and comparative religion, is a typical manifestation of the Self...the two ideas [Christ and the Self] are therefore of the same nature.

Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 392. Jung also cites several historical studies which challenge the theological view of Jesus, and which argue that there is insufficient evidence to construct a reliable biography of an historical Jesus. *Ibid.*, p. 31n.

³This, of course, is a problematic idea in itself.

clearly established before Jung could provide his formal definition of synchronicity, some 54 years after the Zofingia presentation of "Some Thoughts on Psychology." And it seems Jung was well aware of the prematurity of the Zofingia lectures because they remained unpublished until after his death.

1(d) Overview of the Thesis

In Part 1 of the thesis I briefly outlined the poststructuralist ideas of Michel Foucault in order to frame Jung's discussion on synchronicity. To this end, issues of theory and method that relate to an analysis of Jung's conceptualization and exposition of synchronicity were also outlined. Additionally, the intellectual climate within medical psychiatry just prior to Jung's introduction of synchronicity was mentioned, as was Jung's early attempt to bridge his understanding of the ego to the idea of an eternal "soul." I suggested that Jung's discussion of a transcendent factor in human psychology prefigured, in an undeveloped way, his later elaboration of synchronicity and how it relates to the concepts of the archetype and the self.

Part 2 will provide a detailed critical analysis of every published instance in which Jung mentions the concept of synchronicity, prior to his formal presentation of the concept in "On Synchronicity" (1951) and *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle* (1952). The analysis will take the form of a chronological study. The method will combine poststructuralist discourse theory with an interdisciplinary analytical critique. It will be suggested that Jung's attempt to legitimize the idea of synchronicity prefigures Michel Foucault's notion, and the poststructural view in general, that truth is a product of social power. Moreover, I will argue that Jung

acts as a poststructuralist; his consciousness of the relativity of truth and its sensitive relation to the social environment seems to lead him to implement his ideas in an extremely shrewd and often cautious manner. This is evident in what Jung says, how he says it, and also in that which he does *not* say.

The most striking example of Jung's postmodern attitude and approach to theory is found in his ambiguous use of science. By offering a forceful attack on the scientific method, saying it is a product of the deindividualized culture of "mass man," Jung proclaims that science is unable to appreciate the nuances of synchronicity, which often is a unique and individual event. Nevertheless, Jung is quite eager to highlight his own scientific credentials and methodology in order to legitimize synchronicity. In fact, he conducts a scientific astrological experiment which attempts to discover whether a synchronistic relationship exists between sun-moon conjunctions and marriage. Despite insignificant findings, Jung attempts to convert the failure into a success with what may be euphemistically described as advanced intellectual juggling. Jung's contradictory yet opportunistic use of science clearly indicates that he possesses a prefigurative type of postmodern awareness.

It will be argued, however, that Jung's presentation of synchronicity does not entirely, or perfectly prefigure Foucault's postmodernist understanding of truth. As evident in Part 4, in which the ideas of Jung and Foucault are compared among the categories of knowledge, power, and subjectivity, important differences exist among these two thinkers.

Part 3 will critically examine Jung's formal presentation of synchronicity by means of a thematic analysis of the material he uses in order

to justify the concept to both his professional colleagues and to the reading public. Attention will be given to the various logical inconsistencies which arise in his argumentation. It will be argued that, rather than invalidating his presentation, Jung's intellectual inconsistency is a facet of his overall approach. That is, he is eager to make synchronicity acceptable, and to do so he will argue in a variety of conflicting directions. This is especially evident in his extended discussion of the statistically insignificant results of his failed astrological experiment. With a twist of logic Jung attempts to present the failed experiment as if it favoured synchronicity. As we shall see, Jung also is inconsistent in his treatment of Chinese philosophy and in his discussion about scientific methodology. Again, it will be suggested that Jung's inconsistency is *not* problematic from a poststructural perspective; instead, it reveals Jung's concerted effort to make synchronicity more accessible to an occidental audience. As mentioned, it is possible that Jung is not always aware of his inconsistencies, and moreover, that his highly selective use of supportive data might not represent a conscious decision to attempt to legitimize synchronicity. Numerous instances in which Jung blatantly contradicts himself on major theoretical issues will be outlined, however, and the conclusion rendered will be that the concept of synchronicity itself is confused, and moreover, that Jung is well ahead of his time in terms of combining extensive scholarship with sociological acumen in order to present synchronicity in a manner that is consciously designed to convince the reader that synchronicity is a worthwhile concept.

Three main sources will be used for this section: "On Synchronicity," which is a transcript of Jung's lecture, "Ober Synchronizität," which was presented to an elite group of scholars at the 1951 Eranos conference at

Ascona, Switzerland, and subsequently published in the *Eranos-Jahrbuch 1951* at Zurich in 1952. The English version, "On Synchronicity" appears in the *Collected Works of C. G. Jung* and contains slight revisions of the Eranos lecture. The second source under scrutiny is the first version of "Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle," which appears in the book *The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche*. This book was published in German as *Naturerklarung und Psyche* in 1952, with the collaboration of the noted physicist, Wolfgang Pauli. Pauli's contribution to the book is the article, "The Influence of Archetypal Ideas on the Scientific Theories of Kepler;" Jung's piece on synchronicity will be analyzed within the context of the overall book in which it is written. The analysis reveals that Jung attempts to bolster his scientific credibility in order to match Pauli's known legitimacy. The third main source under examination is *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle* as it appears by itself in English in 1952. This is Jung's main opus on synchronicity and his 100 pages of argumentation will be examined, as with "On Synchronicity," by means of a discourse analysis.

Following my examination of *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle*, I will outline Jung's treatment of synchronicity in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* and in *Man and His Symbols* (both written after synchronicity was formally established in Jung's theory). This analysis demonstrates that Jung, at this point, is less anxious to legitimize synchronicity with lengthy arguments and copious supportive material.

Part 4 will compare Jung's concept of synchronicity to Michel Foucault's idea of discourse among the analytical categories of knowledge, power, and

Supra, p. 8, n4.

subjectivity. In regard to knowledge, I will argue that synchronicity poses a dilemma for Jung's theory because it implies a metaphysic of absolute truth which contradicts Jung's poststructural-style belief that all truth is relative to those who create it:

To make absolute statements is beyond man's reach, although it is ethically indispensable that he give all the credit to his subjective truth, which means that he admit being bound by the conviction to apply it as a principle of his actions. Any human judgement, no matter how great its subjective conviction, is liable to error, particularly judgements concerning transcendental subjects.

That this was a lasting opinion is testified by the statement that Jung offers in his memoirs, written just before his death:

The psyche cannot leap beyond itself. It cannot set up any absolute truths - for its own polarity determines the relativity of its statements.

I will also suggest that while Jung's treatment of power tends to focus on the psychological experience of power, Foucault emphasizes the social aspect of power. Jung says that synchronicity often evokes an experience of the numinous character of the archetypes, therefore the concepts of synchronicity, numinosity, and archetype are closely intertwined. By stressing the energy inherent to the numinous experience, Jung's analysis of synchronicity speaks to the importance of psychological power:

When an archetype appears in a dream, in a fantasy, or in life, it always brings with it a certain influence or power by virtue of which it either exercises a numinous or fascinating effect, or impels to action...Owing to their specific energy - for they behave like highly charged autonomous centres of power - they

ⁱC. G. Jung, *The Symbolic Life* in *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, ed. William McGuire et al., trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954-79) Vol. 18, p. 703.

¹Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, pp. 350-351.

exert a fascinating and possessive influence upon the conscious mind.

In brief, Jung's system is argued to emphasise the numinous² power of the transcendent symbol, whereas Foucault's treatment of power is taken as being primarily social and discursive, modifying the semiotician Roland Barthes¹ idea of the sign.

¹Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 7, p. 80, cited in Alan L. Miller, "Power" in Mircea Eliade, ed. *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, Vol. 11 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987: 467-476), p. 473. The term "power" itself has a variety of meanings, some of which overlap. From holy, sacred, magical, and demonic "power" to social, legal, economic, and physical "power", as well as moral, intellectual, artistic, musical and poetic "power" (not to exclude amorous "power"), the one commonality seems to have been pointed out by Aristotle, this being the potential and/or capability of an agent or thing to have an effect upon another agent or thing, and the ability of an agent or thing to be unaffected by another agent or thing. See op. cit., pp. 467-476; Stanley I. Benn. "Power" in Paul Edwards, ed. *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Vol. 6. New York: The Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1967, pp. 424-427; and for a summary of Aristotle on power, see George J. Stokes, "Power" in James Hastings, ed. *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. 10. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1918: 143-146. Merriam-Webster's dictionary points out that "power" also refers to specific beings and things, such as an order of angels, a celestial hierarchy, and a sovereign state. A. Merriam-Webster, *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary* (Springfield, Mass.: G. and C. Merriam Company, 1974), p. 902.

²Daniel Hoy notes that Rudolf Otto first used the term numinous in his *The Idea of the Holy* (1917). To define "deeply felt religious experience", Otto also says "I adopt a word coined from the Latin *numen*. Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, pp. 8, 6-7, cited in Daniel J. Hoy, "Numinous Experiences: Frequent or Rare?" *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, 1983: 17-31, Vol. 28, No. 17-32, p. 18. The Latin noun *numen* is defined by S. C. Woodhouse as: "nod, command, will; divine will; inspiration, divine majesty, god, goddess." S. C. Woodhouse. *Latin Dictionary* (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 113. Robert Schilling argues that the Latin *numen* is based on the Greek *neuma*, which "signifies the manifestation, will, or power of a divinity." He notes Festus' definition (1913), "The numen is, as it were, the nod or power of a god," and suggests that some scholars "have tried to give a completely different orientation to the Latin term by identifying *numen* with a Melanesian word, *mana*." Schilling says that R. H. Coddington in 1891 defined *mana* as an "autonomous, impersonal force", likening *numen* and *mana* to "an impersonal active power." See, Robert Schilling, "Numen" in Mircea Eliade, ed. *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, Vol. 11: 21-22), pp. 21-22. Otto's use of the numinous conveys a strong sense of power. He says it contains elements of "Awefulness," "Overpoweringness," and "Energy" or "Urgency." Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, trans. John W. Harvey, second edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1923), pp. 13, 19, 23.

Jung's understanding of synchronicity does not omit the dimension of social power, however. This is due to the fact that the archetypes belong to what Jung terms the *collective unconscious*. Thus the archetypal power inherent in synchronicity may manifest on a social scale. Such a manifestation is analyzed in terms of Jung's understanding of the archetypal image of Wotan, which he says represents the unconscious power that was unleashed with the concurrent rise of Nazism.

Concerning poststructuralism and the problem of knowledge, Foucault's stance that truth is a relative affair and something grounded and indeed *created* within matrices of social power will be outlined. Important precursors to Foucault's view on the relativity of truth will be highlighted. Nietzsche's critique of truth will be related to Foucault's, with the differences and similarities of these two theorists being brought to attention. Furthermore, a sketch of Roland Barthes' view of truth as linguistic significations bound up within an oppressive, class-based culture will be presented as it relates to Foucault's ideas about the relativity of truth. It will be argued that Barthes' critique of mythology, which suggests that myth cannot possibly evolve from the 'nature' of things, does not pose a threat to Jung's notion that the archetype is grounded in nature. For according to Jung's system, the archetypal image is the cultural expression of the underlying archetype. Thus I shall suggest that Barthes¹ critique, if applied to Jung's notion of the archetype, would pertain to the level of the archetypal image, and not the archetype proper.

In order to historically and ideologically locate Foucault's view on the relation between knowledge and power, I will illustrate how Foucault's omnidirectional schema of the flow of power contrasts sharply with Karl Marx's

view of power as capitalist, class-based oppression. Attention will be given to both Marx's critique of capitalism and to his theory of history in order to illustrate the novelty of Foucault's social and historical analyses. Marx's teleological view of history will also be used as a foil for Foucault's notion that human history is discontinuous and open-ended.

Finally, Jung and Foucault's views on subjectivity will be outlined. In the case of Jung, the implications which synchronicity holds for a transhistorical aspect of the psyche will be discussed. Furthermore, the idea that synchronicity accompanies the major transition phases in the path towards psychic wholeness (*individuation*) will be detailed in reference to the 'natural progression' of psychological development that is posited by Jung. Both the transhistorical aspect of the psyche and the idea of a natural progression of subject development run counter to Foucault's almost anarchistic view of subjectivity. In Foucault's case, I will present his view that subjectivity is a product of social power—specifically, power that expresses itself in the modalities of linguistic discourses and institutionalized discursive practices. In this view, the human subject is a creation of social and historical forces. There is no absolute, eternal, or transhistorical dimension to subjectivity as is implied by Jung's concept of synchronicity. Nor does the subject 'evolve' in a naturally based 'progression,' as suggested by Jung's Stages of Life Theory.

The conclusion will suggest that Jung adopted a poststructural approach by necessity when implementing the concept of synchronicity. The metaphysical claims pertaining to the relativity of space and time were too incredible to

h am referring to the political ideology of anarchism, which is characterized by a desire to decentralize existing modes of social and political power.

be easily assimilated within the psychiatric and general audience of the period from 1931-1961. It appears that Jung was aware of this problem, and moreover, that he took appropriate steps to overcome it. I will then suggest that the concept of synchronicity acts as a bridge to the paranormal. That is, I will demonstrate that synchronicity is currently being used by Jungian analysts and followers of Jung to legitimize and further advance paranormal phenomena within the context of psychoanalytic theory and practice. In order to highlight the heuristic value of synchronicity, I will also show how several non-Jungians use the concept of synchronicity in order to promote ideas pertaining to a societal paradigm shift towards increased spirituality, a transformation which would be characterized by a new psychological awareness that all actions, thoughts, things and places are essentially interconnected— both spatially and temporally.

Part (2) Jung's Introduction of Synchronicity: A Historical Overview

This section will provide a survey of the various instances in which Jung mentions synchronicity prior to his formal exposition of the concept in 1951. While much attention will be given to Jung's strategy for legitimizing the concept, it should be noted that no decisive evidence is available which would make it possible to conclude whether this strategy is at all times a conscious and deliberate scheme or whether Jung at given moments merely intuitively, in a somewhat subconscious manner, the means by which his concept of synchronicity should be formulated and presented. In any case, it appears from the evidence that for the greater part, Jung is fully aware of the need to legitimize the idea of synchronicity in a cautious, calculated manner.

2(a) Synchronicity and Dream Analysis (1928-1930)

While Jung first introduces synchronicity* to the public in 1930, he conducted a series of Dream Analysis seminars² for the Zurich Psychological Club from 1928-1930 in which he privately submitted the concept to both analysts and analysands. On 14 November 1928, Jung notes the dream of an old African chief whom he met while travelling in Africa. Because the man was a chief, he was blessed by heaven with a "big vision"³ in which he dreamed of a black cow and a calf⁴ at an unknown place by a river. The next morning after having the dream, the chief went down to the river and saw a cow and a calf. Jung does not term this as synchronicity, but asks: "was it a bit of telepathy?"⁵and continues to suggest what essentially prefigures the idea of synchronicity:

We are informed by our dreams about all the things which are going wrong in our psychology, in our subjective world, the things which we ought to know about ourselves.

On 28 November 1928, Jung then introduces the term *synchronism* to
account for the acausal and irregular science of the East. Next, Emmanuel

Vor Jung's definition of synchronicity, see below Parts 3(a), pp. 122, 123 and 3(d), p. 172.

²C. G. Jung. *Dream Analysis: Notes of the Seminar Given in 1928-1930 by C. G. Jung*, ed. William McGuire, Bollingen Series XCIX (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).

³Ibid., p. 20.

Jung says the Chief told him that dreams of cattle are linked to the tribe's status in relation to the enemy.

⁵Ibid., p. 21.

⁶Ibid.

¹As suggested in an editorial footnote on pp. 44-45, this idea is more fully developed in Jung's memorial address for Richard Wilhelm. See below Parts 2(b), pp. 57-58 and 3(a), p. 123.

Swedenborg's doctrine of *correspondentia* is mentioned on 26 June 1929. In this doctrine the Swedish mystic indicates a relation between one's actions in life to the heavenly or hellish afterlife abode in which one is placed. Jung psychologizes this belief to support the ideas which would lead to his formulation of synchronicity. He says:

These ideas remained in a metaphysical concretization. They were never fully evolved psychologically. They got stuck on the way to consciousness.

In a seminar of 27 November 1929 Jung suggests that all the children born in that year will possess certain characteristics reflecting the fact that "everything has the cast and brand of this year."³ As suggested in the editorial footnote⁴, Jung is very close to presenting the notion of synchronicity, especially as he says that the correlation of birth characteristics and the conditions of particular years is part of a "great process."^c

In 4 December 1929, Jung discusses Chinese philosophy, particularly the Chinese divinatory text, the *I Ching*,[^] in which oracular forecasting may

Swedenborg's notion of 'correspondence' indicates a continuum between one's moral qualities and one's relation to various heavens and hells, both during and after one's earthly life. Emanuel Swedenborg, *The Universal Human and Soul-Body Interaction*, ed. and trans. George F. Dole (Toronto: Paulist Press, 1984), pp. 165-205.

²Jung, *Dream Analysis*, p. 287n.

³*Ibid.*, p. 412.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 412n.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 412. Ironically, on the same page Jung points to the arbitrary nature of our calendar system - "we call this year 1929, because once upon a time we began counting" - and then uses this arbitrary system to delineate "yearly" characteristics.

⁶Richard Wilhelm, and Cary F. Baynes (trans.). *The I Ching: Or Book of Changes*, Bollingen Series XIX (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

relate to both the situations of individuals and groups. In applying this to his psychological system, Jung says

We are all affected by the same thing, for all these things are one and the same energy when it comes to the unconscious roots of our psychology.

He then says he has seen more than one example in which people are similarly affected by a connection to "common roots."² This occurs, he claims, even when individuals "not concerned" with these common roots are affected. Jung then indicates that for such instances he created the concept of synchronicity.

I have invented the word *synchronicity* as a term to cover these phenomena, that is, things happening at the same moment as an expression of the same time content.

Later on 19 February 1930 Jung mentions the term synchronicity in relation to a male patient's dream in which he worshipped the Greek boy Telesphoros and was concerned that the dream may have indicated his own homosexuality.

2(b) The Introduction of Synchronicity to a Public Audience (1930)

Jung first publicly introduces the concept of synchronicity in March 6, 1930 within the *Memorial*⁵ written for his friend, the celebrated sinologist Richard Wilhelm. It was an opportune moment for Jung to mention

*Jung, *Dream Analysis*, p. 417.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., pp. 489-490.

⁵C. G. Jung, "Richard Wilhelm: In Memoriam" (1930) in *The Spirit in Man, Art and Literature* in *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, ed. William McGuire et al., trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954-79) Vol. 15: 53-62, p. 56. This essay was later given as the principal address for Wilhelm's memorial service in Munich in May 1930.

synchronicity, as Wilhelm is best known for his translation of the ancient Chinese divinatory text, the *I Ching*.¹ At this time Jung's stature as a leading psychiatrist was well established. He had been closely associated with Sigmund Freud after meeting with Freud at Vienna in 1907. While this thesis is not the place to fully elaborate on Jung's collaboration with Freud,² it should be noted that Freud regarded Jung as his most favoured follower and Jung soon became the bright light in the Freudian camp. As a medical psychiatrist, which Freud was not, Jung conducted his psychiatrically based "Studies in Word Association"⁴ which was designed to give Freud's psychoanalytic movement increased legitimacy. Thus from the medical establishment it provided empirical support for Freud's concept of the unconscious by demonstrating that reaction times took longer when subjects' complexes were triggered by a stimulus word. As Jung states, the "[unconscious] complex makes use of a mode of reaction that is not usual in the subject." This implies that if more time is required for a subject to respond to a stimulus word, an underlying complex has been activated by the

According to Wilhelm, initial versions of the *I Ching* date back to 2205 B.C. Wilhelm et al., *The I Ching*, p. lviii.

For an excellent account of Jung's role in Freud's psychoanalytic movement, see Henri F. Ellenberger, *The Discovery of the Unconscious* (New York, Basic Books, 1970), pp. 454-819.

³Ellenberger notes that Freud was in fact trained as a neurologist. Ibid., p. 474.

*C. G. Jung, "Studies in Word Association" in *Experimental Researches in The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, ed. William McGuire et al., trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954-79) Vol. 2: 3-479.

⁵Ibid., p. 280-281.

⁶Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 2, p. 87.

initial word; like a knot in a thread, or perhaps an underlying sore, the activated complex slows down the process of responding with another word. From this theoretical assumption, Jung's Word Association Test advocated a psychoanalytic technique which purportedly quickened the identification and amelioration of analysands¹ complexes.

Besides being a psychiatrist, Jung had another badge of social legitimacy which Freud could not claim to possess—Jung was also a gentile. While Freud valued his Jewish heritage, he hoped Jung's discipleship would help to disperse any anti-Semitic stigma which might be placed upon his emergent school of psychoanalysis. Thus, for his keen intelligence, his status as a psychiatrist, and his status as a gentile, Jung had become a "Crown Prince" to the patriarchal father-figure of Freud.³ From 1909-1913 Jung became the first president of the International Psychoanalytic Association.

As Vincent Brome notes, much of the information pertaining to the series of events that lead to Jung's break with Freud is based on rumours and hearsay concerning statements made within the Vienna and Zurich circles of Freud's psychoanalytic movement.⁴ While the split with Freud resulted from a complicated unfolding of events, some of these may be viewed as salient. Henri Ellenberger points out that as early as 1906, while working at

*See Ellenberger, *The Discovery of the Unconscious*, pp. 691-694.

^Ellenberger argues that while anti-Semitism was "almost non-existent" in Austria when Freud was born, it increased during the last two decades of the 19th century, and especially after World War I. He suggests that a concomitant rise in a sense of Jewish identity helped upwardly mobile Jewish professional men to counteract the deleterious effects of anti-Semitism. *Ibid.*, p. 463.

³Leahey, *A History of Psychology* pp. 240-241.

Vincent Brome, *Jung* (London: Macmillan, 1978), p. 139.

Burgholzli Psychiatric Hospital/ Jung disagreed with Freud's emphasis on sexuality, especially in regard to infantile sexual trauma.

Brome says that a series of exchanges between Freud and Jung reveal increasing tensions over their differing understandings of both libido and the incest taboo.³ In "The Concept of the Libido" and "The Transformation of the Libido"⁴ Jung challenges Freud's understanding of the nature and scope of the libido as outlined by Freud in "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality."⁵ In his two essays Jung dismisses the common fallacy that Freud's usage of libido exclusively refers to sexual instinct, and asserts that the sexual component of libido is a partial aspect of Freud's broader hypothesis of libido which contains specialized instinctual forces, "libidinal affluxes." Jung says that while the specific nature of the libidinal affluxes' is unclear, they do not arise solely from sexual instinct. Jung also notes that Freud later considered the possibility of referring to libido as a general

*Jung worked at Burgholzli from 1900 to 1909.

^Ellenberger, *The Discovery of the Unconscious*, p. 694.

%rome, *Jung*, pp. 139-140.

⁴C. G. Jung, "The Concept of the Libido" and "The Transformation of Libido" in *Symbols of Transformation*, in Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 5, pp. 132-170.

⁵S. Freud, "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality" as cited in C. G. Jung, *Symbols of Transformation*, in *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, Volume 5, p. 132. Jung anticipated and deeply feared the loss of Freud's friendship while formulating his view of the libido. His anxiety was such that he consulted his wife - who reassured him that Freud would good-naturedly accept their theoretical differences - and even considered keeping his thoughts to himself. See C. G. Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* p. 167.

°Jung claims that Freud holds that the sexual instinct, however, may encroach from the sexual into other spheres. Cited in Jung, *The Collected Works* Vol. 5, p. 132.

"interest," but ultimately decided to uphold his original instinct theory. Regarding the incest taboo, Jean Bolen argues that Jung "considered incest symbolically, in opposition to Freud's literal, sexual interpretation."

In 1912 Jung embarked to the United States and in a lecture for the Extension Course of Fordham University in New York, openly attacked Freud's view of sexuality:

Although no fault can be found with Freud's sexual terminology as such, since he logically gives all the stages of sexual development the general name of Sexuality, it has nevertheless led to certain conclusions which in my view are untenable.

Concerning Freud's view of infantile sexuality, Jung left no room for any misinterpretation of his direct challenge to Freud:

The incorrectness of the conception of infantile sexuality [was] no error of observation...the error lies in the conception.

Ellenberger also points out that Jung was never satisfied with Freud's concept of the Oedipus complex; Jung wrote in 1909, in "The Meaning of the Father for the Destiny of the Individual,"⁵ that the results of the Word Association Test were equivalent for fathers and sons and mothers and daughters. Thus precursing contemporary trends in psychological research, Jung attributed to family dynamics and the internalization of family attitudes the psychological significance which Freud placed upon the resolution of the Oedipus complex.

¹Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 5, pp. 133-134.

²Jean Shinoda Bolen, "Jung, Carl Gustav (1875-1961)" in *The Social Science Encyclopedia*, eds. Adam Kuper and Jessica Kuper (London: Routledge, 1985: 420-421), p. 420.

³C. G. Jung, cited in Brome, *Jung*, p. 145.

⁴Ibid.

⁵C. G. Jung, "The Meaning of the Father for the Destiny of the Individual," in *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology* (London: Bailliere, (1916), pp. 156-175, cited in Ellenberger, *The Discovery of the Unconscious*, p. 694.

Jung's introduction of synchronicity occurred well after the split with Freud, which occurred in 1913. Shortly after the split Jung then resigned from his post at Zurich University. The break was formalized, and indeed finalized with the 1917 publication of "On the Psychology of the Unconscious" in which Freud's libido theory was directly challenged. Prior to the break, while still assuming the role of the heralded disciple and, indeed, heir apparent of Freud, it would have been imprudent for Jung to voice his interests in synchronicity and the related fields of precognition and parapsychology. As Jung says in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*:

It interested me to hear Freud's views on precognition and on parapsychology in general. When I visited him in Vienna in 1909 I asked him what he thought of these matters. Because of his materialistic prejudice, he rejected this entire complex of questions as nonsensical, and did so in terms of so shallow a positivism that I had difficulty in checking the sharp retort on the tip of my tongue. It was some years before he recognized the seriousness of parapsychology and acknowledged the factuality of "occult" phenomena.[^]

Jung continues by noting an instance of what Sean Kelly subsequently has termed "double synchronicity." Jung claims that Freud was once rebuking his interests in paranormal phenomena, when suddenly a nearby bookcase made a "loud report;" Jung explains this event in terms of a 'catalytic exteriorization' of extreme pain that had built up in Jung's diaphragm. He

C. G. Jung, "On the Psychology of the Unconscious" in *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology* in *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, Vol. 7: 1-119, pp. 28, 117.

²Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 157.

³Ibid., p. 155.

*Sean Kelly, "A Trip Through Lower Town: Reflections on a Case of Double Synchronicity." *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, Vol. 38(2), 1993: 191-198.

then writes that Freud's response to his interpretation of the event was that Jung was speaking "sheer bosh."¹ Jung then writes:

"It is not," I replied. "You are mistaken, Herr Professor. And to prove my point I now predict that in a moment there will be another such loud report!" Sure enough, no sooner had I said the words than the same detonation went off in the bookcase. To this day I do not know what gave me this certainty...Freud only stared aghast at me...this incident aroused his mistrust of me, and I had the feeling that I had done something against him. I never afterward discussed the incident with him.

Thus many years after his split from Freud, Jung publicly introduces his concept of synchronicity as the primary speaker at the memorial service for Wilhelm, held in Munich in 1930. As noted above, Wilhelm's translation of the Chinese *I Ching* is still regarded as the authoritative European translation of the text. With his own reputation secure, and at this opportune moment, Jung begins his address by appreciating Wilhelm's ability to "go beyond his specialty,"³ that is, to bridge the gap between what Jung envisions as the two qualitatively different mentalities of East and West. By doing so, Jung also applauds himself by suggesting that:

He as a Sinologist and I as a doctor would probably never have come into contact had we remained specialists. But we met in a field of humanity which begins beyond the academic boundary posts. There lay our point of contact; the spark leapt across and kindled a light that was to become for me one of the most significant events in my life.

The implication is that as Wilhelm had heroically surpassed the western, intellectualistic approach to sinology, Jung too had transcended the cultural limits of psychiatric medicine.

Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 155.

²Ibid., pp. 155-156.

³Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 53.

⁴Ibid.

In comparison to James Legge's rendering of the *I Ching*, which Jung used prior to Wilhelm's, the latter is said to have an "extraordinary difference" precisely because Wilhelm brought the ancient esoteric wisdom of the Chinese "to life" for contemporary western readers. Yet Jung cautions his audience about the inherent danger of attempting to mimic eastern principles without critical use of what Jung sees as the highly specialized western mind. He likens western spiritual sycophants of the east to unthinking beggars who grasp at a foreign meaning while ignoring their own psychological and historical heritage. By doing so, they are also oblivious, Jung claims, to the cultural underpinnings from which those foreign ideas arose. In China, Jung argues, the *I Ching* emerged from a society undergirded by, or at least, inclusive of massacres, evil secret societies, abject poverty, filth and mass depravity.

Jung's thinking and purpose here is difficult to assess. While mentioning the apparent debauchery of ancient Chinese society, Jung in this section of the text fails to mention the equally distressing european background of darkness from which the western intellect arose: a history replete with war, barbarism, poverty and corrupt imperial coercion not unlike that of China. This omission is perplexing, for throughout Jung's work there is no shortage of criticism for the apish, western *shadow*, as he terms it—the postulated dark, unconscious aspect contained in the western psyche.

Ibid., p. 54.

Ibid., p. 59.

'ibid.

See Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 10, pp. 222-223. Jung also says:

Moreover, Jung says eastern wisdom has no meaning for the west if westerners ignore their "real human nature with all its dangerous undercurrents and darkneses." Taking this into account, Jung's momentary omission of western evil and his emphasis on Chinese evil in his textual introduction to synchronicity might be optimistically viewed as Jung's attempt to point out the differing ethnological modalities of good and evil upon which the universal phenomenon of synchronicity rests. Taken less than euphemistically, it could be interpreted as an instance of racism on the part of Jung.'

At any rate, Wilhelm's death was an appropriate, or perhaps, opportune time for Jung to introduce synchronicity and the philosophic ideas it

When it [shadow] appears as an archetype... it is quite within the possibility for a man to recognize the relative evil of his nature, but it is a rare and shattering experience for him to gaze into the face of absolute evil.

C. G. Jung, *Aion* in *The Collected Works*, ed. William McGuire et al., trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954-79) Vol. 9/2, p. 10.

*Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 59.

^Jung does display racist tendencies. For example, he believes individuals of all the colonies of England are "slightly inferior," and that "there are facts to support this view" (in America, this being the psychological influence of the "lax, "childlike" and "inferior" blacks). Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 10, pp. 46-47, 121, 507-509. Jung's concept of the shadow is similarly misused by Volodymyr Odanjnyk, who writes about persons of colour in a manner which seems both racist and simplistic:

Psychic deflation, with its withdrawal, fatalism, and listlessness; semi-conscious suicide through alcohol, drugs, or individual acts of terrorism; and escape into the ecstasy of dance, music, and religion are other results of the shadow turned against one's self.

Volodymyr Walter Odanjnyk. *Jung and Politics* (New York, Harper and Row Publishers, 1976), p. 80. Naomi Goldenberg has collated several of Jung's most disturbingly racist comments and points out that "anyone who admires Jung's work is likely to find these statements embarrassing." Naomi R. Goldenberg. *Changing of the Gods: Feminism and the End of Traditional Religions* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1977), pp. 54-55.

embodies. By cautioning against the difficulty - and danger - involved in the western psychological appropriation of an alien cultural perspective, it is as if Jung takes up the baton in a relay that attempts to link ideas from east to west; by renaming and recasting them, the ideas revolving around synchronicity are symbolically passed from the deceased Wilhelm to the living and highly reputable, scientifically trained Jung. Speaking about Jung's concept of synchronicity, J. J. Clarke suggests that "It is clear that Jung's association with Wilhelm and with his translation of the *I Ching* was of considerable importance in enabling him to develop and articulate it more fully."¹ Jung seems to suggest that Wilhelm opened the door to the possibility of an east-west fusion by providing a meaningful account of eastern esoterica; in his own attempt to synthesize east and west, Jung portrays himself as cautiously stepping through the passage created by Wilhelm. On the *I Ching's* acausal, circular view of time, Jung comments:

The science of the *I Ching* is based not on the causality principle but on one which—hitherto unnamed because not familiar to us—I have tentatively called the *synchronistic* principle.

Jung continues by saying that from many years of research into the nature of the unconscious he found that a Newtonian world view of mere causality was insufficient to account for the extraordinary psychological activity of the unconscious.

There are psychic parallelisms which simply cannot be related to each other causally, but must be connected by another type of principle altogether. This connection seemed to lie essentially

\J. J. Clarke. *Jung and Eastern Thought: A Dialogue With the Orient* (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 96.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 56.

in the relative simultaneity of events, hence the term "synchronistic."

Thus the *I Ching* is used by Jung to prepare and validate his notion of synchronicity.

2(c) Synchronicity in a Medical Context (1935)

Following the introduction of synchronicity in Munich, it next appears in lectures given at the Tavistock Clinic in the Institute of Medical Psychology in London, 1935 to an audience of roughly 200 medical practitioners. In the first lecture, Jung broaches the concept of synchronicity in his response to a question from a Dr. B. D. Hendy about the causal relation between physiological changes and affective states in patients. Dr. Hendy asks whether Jung thinks that changes of affect cause alterations in physiology, or if the reverse is true—that physiological changes cause alterations in affect. Jung's response is typical of the approach which he will increasingly use to introduce and legitimize synchronicity.

He begins by cautiously suggesting that the body/mind question is problematic in itself, and cites the James-Lange functionalist view that physiological alteration is the cause of affect, as if to ground his audience and reinforce his own legitimacy by mentioning this well-known psychological

'Ibid.

²In the film, "Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Leonard Cohen," the opposite occurs: the personage of Jung is used to validate the *I Ching*. The narrator mentions the "influential psychologist" Carl Jung to legitimize the Canadian poet Leonard Cohen's use of the *I Ching*. Jung's view that the *I Ching* may be used as a "tool for self knowledge" is stressed instead of the text's divinatory aspect. Barrie Howells, ed. "Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Leonard Cohen." Montreal: National Film Board of Canada, 1965.

theory of the day. Ultimately Jung admits uncertainty as to the causal agent and suggests that one's "temperament" will determine one's view on the subject.¹ Next, what was then "modern physics" is referred to, specifically the apparent duality of light as both a particle (an element of 'matter') and a wave (a formation of 'energy') to illustrate the essential role which the method of observation has upon conclusions made about the observed. Jung continues to say that even though a given experimental approach determines whether light is observed to behave as either 'matter' or 'energy,' these two observable modalities represent "one and the same ultimate reality."³ Perhaps due to the medical audience Jung addresses, he does not enter too deeply into the philosophical questions surrounding this issue? he merely says that the particle/wave duality represents one ultimate reality and that "You cannot *think* this, but you are forced to admit it as a postulate."⁴ Of course, one *may* 'think' it, as no doubt Jung had: the alleged 'duality' is the result of humanly created hypothetical constructs generated within the socially accepted approaches, limits and rules of western science. It seems Jung is, as it were, 'playing dumb' before an audience perceived as such. For in his 1926 lecture, "Spirit and Life" Jung had previously questioned, from a

x. G. Jung, *The Symbolic Life* in *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, ed. William McGuire et al., trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954-79) Vol. 18, p. 33.

See also Gary Zukav, *The Dancing Wu Li Masters: An Overview of the New Physics* (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1979), pp. 212-317.

³Jung notes this to be the French physicist Louis Victor de Broglie's assertion. Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 34.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Thomas S. Kuhn's notion of paradigmatic change in the history of science supports this view. See Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*.

psychological perspective, the scientific distinction between matter and energy. He says:

Let us take as an example what a naive mind would consider to be the realest thing of all, namely matter. We can only make the dimmest theoretical guesses about the nature of matter, and these guesses are nothing but images created by our minds __ It is my mind, with its store of images, that gives the world colour and sound.¹

And in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* he suggests that linguistic concepts - which would include scientific concepts such as 'particle' and 'wave' - are somewhat hollow and can not capture the fullness of reality:

I am speaking of those who cannot tolerate the loss of myth and who can neither find a way to a merely exterior world, to the world as seen by science, nor rest satisfied with an intellectual juggling of words, which has nothing whatsoever to do with wisdom.

Concerning the original question of causality in the mind/body duality of psychological "illness," however, Jung chooses not to think the problem except in his own terms, which is to say that it represents another type of synchronicity.

Body and mind are two aspects of the living being, and that is all we know. Therefore I prefer to say that the two things happen together in a miraculous way, and we had better leave it at that, because we cannot think of them together. For my own use I have coined a term to illustrate this being together; I say there is a peculiar principle of *synchronicity* active in the world so that things happen together somehow and behave as if they were the same, and yet for us they are not. Perhaps we shall some day

¹C. G. Jung, "Spirit and Life" (1926) in *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8: 319-337, p. 327.

²Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* p. 144.

³Thomas Szasz has suggested that the psychiatric view of mental illness is scientifically invalid. See Thomas Stephen Szasz, *The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct* (London: Paladin, 1972 [1920]).

discover a new kind of mathematical method by which we can prove that it must be like that.

In the "Discussion" following the second Tavistock Lecture, Jung reissues the theme of Chinese philosophy or the "Chinese Mind" in attempting to persuade his audience of the soundness of his formulation of the concept of synchronicity. He mentions his friendship with the late Wilhelm and that he had written a psychological commentary on the Taoist text, *The Secret of the Golden Flower*. He then says, speaking about "old Chinese sages" in general, that they were uncannily wise and not mere fools. In fact, "they were as intelligent as we are."² This statement perhaps reflects the occidental cultural bias which Edward Said outlines in *Orientalism*.

Said takes a poststructuralist stance by arguing that the western textual and political tradition *creates* rather than *reflects* a "real" Orient. In a Foucauldian manner, Said calls this a process of 'Orientalism,' which is

a distribution of geopolitical awareness in aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical and philological texts; it is an elaboration...of a whole series of "interests" which, by such means as...psychological analysis...[create] a will or intention to understand...[and] a discourse that is...produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power.

Even more germane to Jung's questionable comments on the Chinese, Said says his work endeavours

... to show that European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as sort of surrogate and even underground Self.

*Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 34.

²Ibid., p. 68.

³Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978). ⁴Ibid., p. 12. Ibid., p. 3.

Jung's discourse on the Chinese illustrates one of the difficulties of our textual analysis of his discourse about synchronicity. As with any type of deconstructive analysis, the element of interpretation is unavoidable. In this instance, it is unclear whether Jung once believed the Chinese to be idiots, or that he never held this view and merely hopes to convince his audience that they are not. Another possible interpretation for this portion of the text is that Jung's audience does not think the Chinese are idiots but Jung himself had once believed this to be so.

To continue, after noting the "frightfully intelligent" Chinese, Jung says that although they may seem to be without science, they do in fact possess a science but one not based upon the principle of causality, for the Chinese, he contends, see causality in relativistic terms. He quickly supports this idea with the theory of relativity from modern physics, as in the first lecture. He then proceeds to say that Westerners have no name for the Chinese term *tao* - the principle upon which Chinese science is based. And after giving an example provided by his psychiatrist friend, Douglas McDougall, whose Chinese student became exasperated when asked to define the precise nature of *tao*, Jung introduces his own term to account for *tao*: synchronicity. Jung apologetically says his term is "poor enough" to account for *tao*, and it seems his humility is not misplaced. For as Jung rightly points out, *tao* has several meanings. The Chinese Philosopher Lao Tzu

*The uncertainty involved in discursive analyses must also take into account the biases of the researcher. On this issue Jean Baudrillard, like Foucault, notes that at some point theory must reflect upon its own historical positionality and the biases contained therein. See Jean Baudrillard *Forget Foucault/Forget Baudrillard*, pp. 125-135.

²C. G. Jung, *The Symbolic Life in The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, ed. William McGuire et al., trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954-79) Vol. 18, p. 69.

describes *tao* as both the unmanifest source and the manifestation of "all things" (i.e. of temporal being);¹ *Tao* is also taken in the *I Ching* as the interrelated "will of heaven and earth"² Concerning his own perception of the Eastern mind, Jung says:

The Eastern Mind, when it looks at an ensemble of facts, accepts that ensemble as it is, but the Western Mind divides it into entities, small quantities ___ It is like this: you are standing on the sea-shore and the waves wash up an old hat, an old box, a shoe, a dead fish, and there they lie on the shore. You say: "Chance Nonsense!" The Chinese mind asks: "What does it mean that these things are together?" The Chinese mind experiments with that *being together and coming together at the right moment.*

As for the Chinese concern for the will of heaven and earth, Jung notes that the ancient Chinese developed a "method of forecasting possibilities"⁴ which he says the Japanese continue to use in their governmental decisions. This discernment of the future is of course, divination, although Jung does not use this term for his medical audience, nor does he mention the actual title of the divinatory text - the *I Ching*- which may have sounded too alien or arcane for his listeners. But he does indicate that the apparently scientific "method" which underlies synchronicity was formulated in 1143 B. C, as if to say that the eons of longevity found in the "method" lends authenticity to the concept of synchronicity. Of course longevity of a given "method" in itself is no proof of the value of that method, nor of the concept or theory to which that method applies; moreover, even if the ancient method

Attributed to Lao Tzu, *Tao Te Ching* in Wing-Tsit Chan, (ed. & trans.), *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 139.

²Wilhelm & Baynes *The I Ching*, pp. 266, 269. Jung does not mention the "heavenly" aspect of *tao* in his discussion.

³Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 69.

⁴*Ibid.*

were of some partial value, it is possible that the value of this method could be improved. Yet Jung overlooks these issues in his address. By both his choice and omission of terms, he seems to consciously manipulate his presentation of synchronicity and *not*, as he later claims in a private letter of 12 November 1957 to the Rev. David Cox, to be a forthright scientist attempting to communicate his hypotheses in a straightforward, if inelegant manner. Jung writes to Rev. Cox:

I am much obliged to you for telling me exactly what you think and for criticising my blunt ways of thinking and writing (also of talking I am afraid). It seems, however, to be the style of natural scientists: we simply state our proposition, assuming that nobody will think it to be more than a disputable hypothesis. We are so imbued with doubts concerning our assumptions that scepticism is taken for granted. We are therefore apt to omit the conventional... "With hesitation I submit...", "I consider it a daring hypothesis...", etc. We even forget the preamble: "This is the way I look at it..."¹

The question remains: does Jung consciously manipulate information when he says he does not? Stated differently, does Jung in the above letter merely pretend to be obtuse when in fact even this apparent obtuseness is a persona, carefully calculated to appease his theologically minded correspondent? While this would not instantly make Jung a full-fledged postmodern, it does reveal his awareness of the need to create a discourse of truth which is viable for the particular audience that he addresses. Jung's truth becomes a relative, malleable truth, moulded and shaped for the different biases which he imagines each of his various audiences to possess. Certainly Jung's presentation of synchronicity in the second Tavistock Lecture reveals a subtle selectivity and modulation of supportive data. Moreover, when we compare his letter to Rev. Cox to another private letter of 10 November 1934, sent not to a religious

Ibid., p. 740.

figure, but to the German physicist, Pascual Jordan, a different Jung emerges - one not concerned with being blunt and scientific, but rather, in being quite cautious and hesitant when submitting his ideas:

The strange cases of parallelism in time, which are commonly called coincidences but which I call synchronistic phenomena, are very frequent in the observation of the unconscious. In this connection there is a rather crazy book by Kammerer, *Das Gesetz der Serie*, which may be known to you. It may be said in passing that Chinese science is based on the principle of synchronicity, or parallelism in time, which is naturally regarded by us as superstition.

It seems Jung writes for his audience in order to legitimize his ideas because the manner in which he writes changes according to the nature of the audience that he addresses.

2(d) Synchronicity and the Eranos Conference (1935-1936)

When Jung next publicly speaks of synchronicity in "Religious Ideas in Alchemy"² he places it on a much grander scale by elevating the concept to something comparable to the Taoist notion of 'the will of heaven and earth' which includes yet also surpasses the simpler idea of meaningful day to day coincidence.

From 1935 - 1936 Jung presented lectures based upon his extensive study of medieval alchemical practices to the audience at the Eranos Congress, which consisted of an elite group of scholars such as Mircea Eliade and Karl Kerényi. Jung published these lectures in 1937 under the title, "Religious

^xC. G. Jung, *C. G. Jung: Letters (1906-1950)*, eds. Gerhard Adler & Aniela Jaffe, trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XCV:1 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973) Vol. 1, pp. 177-178.

²C. G. Jung, "Religious Ideas in Alchemy" in *Psychology and Alchemy in The Collected Works*, Vol. 12.

Ideas in Alchemy,"¹ wherein synchronicity is described in relation to the historical and spiritual "work" of mankind's redemption. In this work Jung collapses the differing alchemical and orthodox Christian traditions in the sense that both are seen as being redemptive. In each system, Jung asserts that redemption takes the form of the elevation of the gross, uncultivated aspects of human ontology to a higher, finer level through the psychological mechanism of projection—specifically, through projection in the form of sacrificial death(s) and resurrection(s).² For Jung, the incarnation of the spiritualized Jesus in the fleshly womb of the Virgin Mary represents a synchronicity of events since God becomes flesh; therefore mankind "is potentially related to God."³ Complete salvation, Jung continues, is not achieved until the enactment of the sacrifice, resurrection, and return of Jesus to the Father.

By locating synchronicity within the death and resurrection cycle of Christian dogma, Jung further legitimizes synchronicity by tracing various historical parallels to the Christian story. Thus, Jung describes the death

¹Ibid.

Projection for Jung means attributing one's own unconscious contents another. The other, or "object" may be extended to refer to that which otherwise termed as a god, goddess, or God. He says:

God too is an unconscious content, a personification in so far as he is thought of as personal, and an image or expression of something in so far as he is thought of as dynamic. God and the soul are essentially the same when regarded as personifications of an unconscious content. Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 6, pp. 247-248.

³Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 12, pp. 306, 415.

and resurrection of Christ as an ideology concerned with an ultimate reality, and compares it to the preceding and analogous mythic cycles of Osiris, Orpheus, Dionysus, Hercules, and the Hebrew idea of a Messiah, all of which Jung claims emerge from "primitive" hero myths.

Jung's attempt to validate synchronicity by noting parallels to the Christian instance of synchronicity is a flawed approach. It is flawed because Jung also notes that the keynote of the Christian example of synchronicity is the historical juncture of spirit and flesh—a criterion that is absent in preceding mythic stories and also in those that are contemporaneous with the Christian instance of synchronicity.

The Christian projection differs from all these manifestations of the mystery of redemption and transformation by reason of the historical and personal figure of Jesus. The mythical event incarnates itself in him and so enters the realm of world history as a unique historical and mystical phenomenon.

The Christian example of synchronicity clearly differs from the example given in regard to Chinese thought (specifically, in regard to Jung's comments on the *I Ching* that he offers in the "Memoriam" for Wilhelm). If synchronicity involves something akin to the acausal interconnectedness of the

²The term '*ultimate reality*' is borrowed from Rudolf Otto. For Otto, this designates the mysterious object and baffling character of religious experience which is said to lie beyond the range of intellectual comprehension. See, Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, trans. John W. Harvey (London: Oxford University Press, 1950 [1923]), pp. 12-49.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 12, p. 307.

³Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 12, pp. 307-308. Of course, the ancient Egyptian practice of mummification was based upon the belief that the soul (*ka*) would return to the physical body and thus reanimate it. To complicate Jung's claim of the uniqueness of the historical event of the resurrected Jesus, the historical reality of Jesus must be taken as an article of faith due to the rather sketchy non-canonical textual evidence that is available. For a discussion on the question of the historical Jesus, see John P. Meier. *A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus* (New York: Doubleday, 1991).

Chinese oracle, this would imply some underlying ground of being through which the apparently miraculous connections of synchronicity are effected. In the example of synchronicity as a Christian projection, this involves the Godhead consciously incarnating itself into a man. In the former instance, the Chinese notion of *tao* as a ground of being may or may not be equated with the idea of the Christian "God," depending upon the particular beliefs concerning the nature of the Godhead held by individual members of each tradition. In any event, Taoist belief does not require *tao*, which is taken to be an unmanifest ground and manifest flow of the cosmos,² to fully incarnate itself into a single instance of human perfection. Therefore Jung's argument that the Christian synchronicity of the incarnation parallels the synchronistic Chinese world view is not a particularly strong one.

¹Later, in his formal exposition of synchronicity, *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle* Jung repeatedly denies this type of causality in relation to synchronicity.

Therefore it cannot be a question of cause and effect, but of a falling together in time, a kind of simultaneity. Because of this quality of simultaneity, I have picked the term "synchronicity" to designate a hypothetical factor equal in rank to causality as a principle of explanation.

He also argues:

A "transcendental cause" is a contradiction in terms, because anything transcendental cannot by definition be demonstrated.

C. G. Jung, *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle*, in *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche* in *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, ed. William McGuire et al., trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954-79) Vol. 8: 417-519, pp. 435, 446. I argue in Parts 2, 3 and 4 of this thesis that Jung vacillates between a causal and acausal explanation for synchronicity.

²For an English translation of the two central texts of Taoism, see Wing-Tsit Chan, ed. & trans. *The Lao-Tzu (Tao Te Ching) and The Chuang Tzu in A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, pp. 136-210.

Interestingly, however, Jung says that the Chinese mind perceives the world in a continuously synchronistic manner. This is due, Jung argues, to the Chinese holistic world view of acausal orderliness, which is evidenced by and "reached its climax in [the text of] the *I Ching*. .the purest expression of Chinese thinking in general."'

2(e) Synchronicity **and the Doctrine of the Assumption (1938)**

Synchronicity is next mentioned in 1938 in a discussion of the doctrine of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary and how this relates to the "union of opposites" found in alchemy.³ As in the previous publication, "Religious Ideas in Alchemy" (1937), Jung asserts that the Christian story is synchronistic. This instance of Christian synchronicity, however, is in relation to the archetype of the "eternal feminine," specifically in the form of what Jung terms the mother archetype. Drawing from a variety of sources, Jung attempts to connect Christianity to a general form of 'Chinese Philosophy' and with the scientific experiments on parapsychology made by J. B. Rhine.⁴

Jung recalls the dogma of the Assumption which asserts that the Virgin Mary is taken up to heaven in full bodily form (i.e. in the flesh) after her death. He deems this to be an important development in dogma because the

ⁱ**C. G. Jung, *Psychology and Religion in The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, ed. William McGuire et al., trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954-79) Vol. 11, pp. 591-593.**

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 57.

³It is difficult to determine with certainty whether synchronicity is indeed mentioned at this time as the essay was revised in 1954.

*For details about the "union of opposites" see below pp. 99-100, 104.

Catholic Church finally recognizes the importance of matter within its spiritual belief system. Prior to the dogma of the Assumption, Jung suggests that Catholicism, and the moral majority of western culture, viewed matter as something inferior to spirit. With the New Testament's strict adherence to the condemnation of the flesh, matter had been identified with evil. Jung asserts that the Catholic dogma of the Assumption helped to lessen the identification of the material with evil. In Protestantism, however, Jung claims that the identification of the material with evil was reinforced by Protestant attempts to sanction, as Max Weber puts it, worldly works as an ethical and religious "calling."² For in his view, Jung believes the Protestant inflexibility in upholding the authority of the original canon as unchanging law undermines the viability, and indeed, vitality of Christianity as a living, meaningful religious tradition. He suggests the Catholic doctrine of the Assumption breathes life into the previously ossified views of both the "feminine" and its debased parallel, matter. Thus the symbol system of the Catholic church grows, however slowly, while the Protestant inability to modify its symbolic representations of the collective unconscious results in stagnation. Protestantism in general becomes something of a historical monument or museum that reiterates an antiquated configuration of the unconscious, rather than acting as a living mediator which is able to provide fresh and meaningful representations of the collective psyche. And it is

^AC. G. Jung, *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious in The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, ed. William McGuire et al., trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954-79) Vol. 9/1, pp. 108-109.

²See Max Weber, "The Spirit of Capitalism" and "Luther's Conception of the Calling" in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Scribner, [1958]), pp. 72-92.

precisely because of the ability of Catholicism to respond to the changing demands of the collective unconscious that Jung, despite his refusal to accept Catholicism for his own personal philosophy, envisions it as superior to Protestantism. In fact, with the example of the Assumption, Jung enfolds Catholicism within his own system by claiming that this modification of Catholic dogma represents synchronicity on both a historical and on a cosmic, soteriological level.

As the Virgin Mary was declared in 1950 by Pope Pius XII to be raised in the fullness of her material body, Jung claims this is synchronistic with an overall attempt in the west to balance its skewed religious bias which favoured spirit over matter. Science, he says, was beginning to achieve a more comprehensive view of humankind's relation to the cosmos.

In the same way that the Mother of God was divested of all the essential qualities of a materiality, matter became completely de-souled, and this at a time when physics is pushing forward to insights which, if they do not exactly "de-materialize" matter, at least endue it with properties of its own and make its relation to the psyche a problem that can no longer be shelved. For just as the tremendous advancement of science led at first to a premature dethronement of mind and to an equally ill-considered deification of matter, so it is this same urge for scientific knowledge that is now attempting to bridge the huge gulf that has opened out between the two *Weltanschauungen*. The psychologist inclines to see in the dogma of the Assumption a symbol which, in a sense, anticipates this whole development.

'Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 9/1, p. 108. James Hillman argues that the synchronicity of the Assumption implies a connection between matter and spirit which has repercussions for not only psychology, but for all areas of social life. These other areas, he says, include feminism because the synchronicity of the Assumption challenges the traditional social view which associates antiquated conceptualizations of both "the feminine" and "matter." James Hillman, *The Myth of Analysis: Three Essays in Archetypal Psychology* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 216. In contrast, Naomi Goldenberg argues that Jung's construction of the archetypes - including those which apply to an alleged "eternal feminine" in women - detract from a true analysis of human behaviour:

Instead of drawing our attention to the web of past and present social contexts which give rise to psychological phenomena,

The synchronicity of the Assumption, then, represents what elsewhere Jung describes as *enantiodromia*—a term coined by the Greek philosopher, Heraclitus, which means that "everything runs into its opposite."* Jung likens *enantiodromia* to the Chinese idea of *yin* and *yang*, the two complementary antipodes which are said to in various combinations comprise the entire visible and invisible universe.

It seems in order to justify his connection of synchronicity and the Assumption, Jung draws attention to *yin* and *yang* as a philosophical parallel to the changeability of Catholic dogma. For *yin* and *yang* are not opposites; each contains within itself some aspect of the other—hence they are complementary. Likewise, matter contains spirit, thus if one extreme is exaggerated at the expense of the other, Jung believes it is a natural law that the ignored aspect - i.e. the feminine in Catholicism - must eventually manifest itself. In this connection, Jung then mentions the scientific investigations on the paranormal of J. B. Rhine which he claims provide definite statistical evidence for synchronicity. Speaking on matter and spirit, Jung says:

archetypal thinking draws us away from exploring our human circumstances...[and] hampers our ability to think clearly and effectively about psychological and social problems.

Goldenberg also points out that Jung's archetypal thinking about blacks and Jews is stereotypical, rather than actual. Naomi R. Goldenberg. *Resurrecting the Body: Feminism, Religion, and Psychoanalysis* (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1990), pp. 97-103.

*C. G. Jung, *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology* in *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, ed. William McGuire et al., trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954-79) Vol. 7, p. 72.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 9/1, p. 109.

³See below, pp. 119-122, 130, 156-157, 177-179.

There is no position without its negation. In spite or just because of their extreme position, neither can exist without the other. It is exactly as formulated in classical Chinese philosophy: *yang* (the light, warm, dry, masculine principle) contains within it the seed of *yin* (the dark, cold moist, feminine principle), and vice versa. Matter therefore would contain the seed of spirit and spirit the seed of matter. The long-known "synchronistic" phenomena that have now been statistically confirmed by Rhine's experiments point, to all appearances, in this direction. The psychization of matter puts the absolute immateriality of spirit in question, since this would then have to be accorded a kind of substantiality.

Jung then says this was anticipated within the alchemical symbolism of the tree, which represented a "union of opposites." Within the alchemical tradition, however, the synthesis of opposites is said by Jung to take the form of a projection of psychic contents onto the alchemical substances. As we have seen earlier in the miraculous birth and resurrection of Jesus, and in this case with the miraculous conception and Assumption of Mary, Jung asserts that only within the Christian tradition does the synchronistic union of spirit and matter become more than projection. By virtue of the alleged historical reality of the *connunctio* and the "tree" of the cross within Christianity, Jung claims it is unique among the world's religious systems.

Although this is not the place to offer a detailed critique of Jung's assertion, it should be noted that the Hindu tradition teaches that the *avatara* (physical, human manifestations of the Godhead) enter earthly reality whenever the world *dharma* (spiritual order) is in need of redirection or repair. Thus for many practising Hindus, Krishna is a real entity, and had equally real historical moments on earth. On this point, H. D. Lewis and Robert Lawson Slater argue that Jesus remains distinct from the *avatara*, and quote an Indian writer who says "An *avatar* may enter human life, but he does

Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 9/1, p. 109.

not share it. He is over and above it, always God, helping, guiding, instructing, but as God." The implication here is that the avatar does not suffer as did Christ. But a counterexample to Lewis and Slater's argument is found with the Hindu holy man Sri Ramakrishna who claimed to be an incarnation of the mother goddess, Kali, and who also claimed to have suffered for others, if not with the physical wounds Jesus is said to have endured. Conforming to the Indian theme of karma transfer, Ramakrishna apparently

had a vision of his subtle body...[with] a number of sores on the back. He was puzzled by the sight, but it was made clear...profane people had caused the sores on his body. They themselves had been purified, but they had left the suffering arising from their own sins with him.

Interestingly, if the male Ramakrishna's claim that he was an incarnation of the female Kali were true, this incarnation would represent a type of double synchronicity in that matter and spirit, as well as masculine and feminine

*Sabapathy Kulandran, *Grace in Christianity and Hinduism*, cited in H. D. Lewis and Robert Lawson Slater, *The Study of Religions* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1966), p. 199.

For a summary and critique of the non-canonical accounts of Jesus, see Meier, *A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus*.

Here I refer to the notion that positive or negative karmic attributes may be transferred among human individuals, gods and humans, and among gods themselves. Thus humans may be absolved of negative karma through grace or from intense devotion {as found in the Hindu bhakti cult, of which Ramakrishna is an excellent example}. See Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty, *Siva: The Erotic Ascetic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973: 183), and *The Origins of Evil in Hindu Mythology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976: 14-16, 141, 176). In the example given, Ramakrishna through his own piety, yet with divine assistance, absolves the negative attributes of other, less pure individuals.

'Swami Tejasarananda, *A Short Life of Sri Ramakrishna* (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama [Publication Department], 1990), p. 92.

⁵As Jung points out, "spirit" is a problematic term, mostly because the character of that which it apparently designates is difficult to assess. Jesus, Krishna and Kali, for instance, might represent, possess or distribute different spiritual properties. R. Balasubramanian says:

are synchronistically joined within one human being capable of suffering for the sins of others.

2(f) Synchronicity and the Christian Trinity (1942)

Synchronicity is next found in 1942 in Jung's "A Psychological Approach to the Dogma of the Trinity" which arose from a lecture Jung originally delivered at the Eranos Conference of 1940 entitled, "On the Psychology of the Idea of the Trinity."¹

In this essay Jung views the Christian trinity of the Father, the Son and the Paraclete as being psychologically incomplete because it lacks, or at least, represses the fourth element of evil. He further says it is not surprising that the idea of the Antichrist, or the "evil one" appears relatively early in both Christian and Persian religious history. In Christianity, Jung says the medieval idea of the *binarius* meant that on the second day of Creation, God created the dark *binarius* as the source of evil; in Persian literature Ahura-Mazda is said to have a "doubting thought" which resulted in the creation of the evil spirit, Ahriman, who develops into an

The universality of religious experience should not be interpreted to mean that there will be no difference in religious experience...there can be degrees or levels of experience.

R. Balasubramanian, "The Hindu Attitude to Knowledge and Nature" in Ravi Ravindra (ed.) *Science and Spirit* (New York: Paragon House, 1991: 53-81), p. 75. It is also debatable whether any of the main religious figures represent absolute spiritual authority. In the Christian story, Jesus claims, "the Father and I are one" (*John* 10:30), but seems to be referring to his ability to perfectly follow the Father's will, rather than to claim absolute identity with him (*John* 8:28-29, 14:31). Jesus also admits to not knowing the time of his return to earth. He says that "only the father" knows (*Matthew* 24:36, and *Mark* 13:32). Moreover, Jesus concedes that "the Father is greater than I." (*John* 14:28). See *The New Testament of The Holy Bible* Hew International Version (New York: Harper, 1973).

^his was revised in 1948. It is therefore assumed that the passage on synchronicity was not included later.

arch-demon and creates a dark world filled with wretched entities. Jung claims that these early ideas of the "evil one" are synchronistically connected with the beginning of the astrological aeon of Pisces, in conjunction with the implied duality (i.e. the repressed but necessary Satan) of the Christ figure. The connection with and significance of Pisces, he contends, rests in its dual fish symbolism - each swimming in opposite directions - an image which prefigures the coming of the perfect, yet from a psychological perspective, incomplete Son.

That Jesus and his disciples were lacking in evil is, of course, Jung's particular interpretation of the Jesus story. E. M. Butler in *The Myth of the Magus*¹ suggests that Jesus is not unlike other wonder-workers and refers to the unorthodox *Gospel of Thomas* which portrays Jesus' cursing of the fig tree as a vestige of his earlier childhood, one which was composed of irrational personality traits. With Jesus these traits remained, if to a lesser degree, in the adult. Butler suggests that the childhood personality traits of most gifted wonder-workers are often as horrible and ruthless as they are wonderful and gracious.

The second charge against Jung's vision of the Jesus symbol - and Christian thinking in general - as providing an incomplete schema of the self rests within the New Testament idea of being "wise as serpents, and harmless as doves." This biblical admonition does not appear to present a skewed

¹Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 174.

²E. M. Butler, *The Myth of the Magus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 68-70.

³Ibid.

⁴*Matthew, 10:16* in *The New Testament of The Holy Bible, King James Version* (London: Collins, 1949), p. 14.

vision of repressed or ignored evil, rather it seems to advocate exactly what Jung's psychology encourages: recognition but conscious control of evil.

On the whole it seems Jung's connection of synchronicity with the incomplete Christ image and the dawning of the age of Pisces is, to term it euphemistically, quite vague. Whether or not he is conscious of the lack of any real solid argumentation for this instance of synchronicity is open to debate. Later Jung says in his foreword to Richard Wilhelm's translation of the *I Ching* which, as has been discussed, Jung uses to legitimize synchronicity:

I must confess that I had not been feeling too happy in the course of writing this foreword, for, as a person with a sense of responsibility towards science, I am not in the habit of asserting something I cannot prove or at least present as acceptable to reason.

This is an important admission. On the one hand Jung legitimizes his concept of synchronicity with the wisdom of the *I Ching* which a "venerable sage," as he puts it, taught to Wilhelm, and then he says he does not enjoy writing the foreword to the *I Ching* due to the difficulty in providing scientific support for its claims. Previously, however, we have seen that Jung critiques the scientific approach from the ontological perspective of the *I Ching*. From this discrepancy it appears that Jung is truly *actings-acting* as a type of philosophical juggler. At one moment he with all seriousness holds the ball of science, only to toss it up and replace it with that of Chinese esotericism, which is grasped just as ardently as the previous. It is difficult to assess whether Jung is aware of this contradiction in his theory.

bung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 601. ²Ibid.,
p. 590. ³Supra, p. 58.

Thus by examining his written work, we may suggest he acts as a poststructuralist, yet it remains problematic to discern whether he does this consciously, semi-consciously, or entirely unconsciously. Certainly at the end of his career he is aware of his capacity for contradiction.¹

One could even argue that the busy schedule of his professional life did not allow adequate time for reflection upon the inconsistencies of his theory. But owing to Jung's oft noted intelligence and great attention to detail in other matters - for example the use of the complex technical language of his psychiatric trade - it *appears* that Jung simply plays at being a scientist. He uses his scientific credentials and scientific data to legitimize synchronicity, yet critiques the underlying assumptions of this scientific approach (e.g. the notions of linear time, causality, and objectivity) from the temporally relative, acausal, and intersubjective perspective of synchronicity. And as noted, he justifies the synchronistic approach with the so-called 'ancient wisdom' of the Chinese, even though he says he does not enjoy writing about the Chinese world view because it is not 'scientific' material. On this point Victor Fane D'Lugin concurs that Jung purposely presents his material in a confusing format in order to substantiate his own theory.

2(g) Synchronicity as a Scientific Construct (1946)

A good example in which Jung furthers the synchronicity principle at the expense of the scientific attitude is found in his next reference to

*Supra, p. 13.

²See below, pp. 112, 119-121, 125-129. ³D'Lugin, "C. G. Jung and Political Theory," p. 166.

synchronicity. In the Foreword to his 1946 publication of *The Psychology of the Transference* Jung notes that he is writing for professionals within his field who are well-acquainted with the idea of transference. He then says that the unprepared reader may be "astonished" by the vast amount of historical data he provides. He then mentions synchronicity in relation to the unpredictability of alchemical stages which Jung suggests symbolically

parallel the stages of the individuation process—this being a progression towards psychic 'wholeness,'^r which Jung calls the *coniunctio*.²

The time-sequence of phases in the *opus* is very uncertain. We see the same uncertainty in the individuation process, so that a typical sequence of stages can only be constructed in very general terms. The deeper reason for this "disorder" is probably the "timeless" quality of the unconscious, where conscious succession becomes simultaneity, a phenomenon I have called "synchronicity." From another point of view we would be justified in speaking of the "elasticity of unconscious time" on the analogy of the equally real "elasticity of space."³

Jung then directs his professional psychiatric readers to C. A. Meier's "Modern Physik" in order to substantiate his claims. For the notion that the psychology of the unconscious behaves in accordance with the claims of modern physics helps to make synchronicity more palatable for his audience. Naomi Goldenberg notes in regard to the archetype, which is crucial to synchronicity:

Jung often linked the idea of archetype to concepts having appropriate scientific associations...Jung had to be concerned

¹C. G. Jung, *The Practice of Psychotherapy in The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, ed. William McGuire et al., trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954-79) Vol. 16, p. 166.

²See "The Components of the Coniunctio" in C. G. Jung, *Mysterium Coniunctionis in The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, ed. William McGuire et al., trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XX. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954-79, Vol. 14, pp. 1-35.

³Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 259.

with public acceptance of his ideas and thus did, from time to time, coat them in the more acceptable metaphors of the day...

Earlier in the same essay Goldenberg argues that there is a conflict between 'scientific' vs. 'intuitive' methodologies within Jung's system.

Jungians seem to have an inherent fondness for intuitive methodology coupled with a severe reluctance to admit that it forms the basis of their conclusions, which they prefer to insist are "empirically derived.

While written in the context of the archetypes, the same would apply to Jung's treatment of synchronicity. As noted below, Jung admits in the Forward of his formal presentation of synchronicity, "Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle," that he had personally experienced the "phenomenon of synchronicity...over decades." The problem seems to hinge upon the intended meaning of the terms "empiricism" and "scientific." For Jung, a long-standing series of events personally recognized as being synchronistic are, in his terms, empirical. If over "decades" these empirical facts conglomerate into what Jung perceives as a larger coherent "story," or a consistent and meaningful theme, then this *ex post facto* observation is said to be "scientific." At least, it might be deemed scientific in a descriptive sense. Of course, others would contend that the scientific method is above all a procedure which provides a significant measure of statistically reliable predictions, and since synchronicity in Jung's terms may never be reliably

¹Idenberg, "Archetypal Theory After Jung," p. 201. Likewise, Edmund Cohen argues that the archetype is not unlike a stereotype and that following Jung's lead, Jungians need to name everything so that they may fit abstract ideas into "theoretical boxes." Edmund D. Cohen, *C. G. Jung and the Scientific Attitude* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1975), p. 146.

²Goldenberg, "Archetypal Theory After Jung," p. 207.

³See Part 3(c), p. 142.

⁴Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 419.

predictive, it may never be truly scientific in the experimental, predictive sense.

On this point, a brief diversion into another type of theory will help to illustrate the problem of what constitutes "science." In sociology, for instance, it should be noted that Karl Marx's prediction of the eventual collapse of Capitalism could be viewed as a scientific hypothesis. Based on the assumption that human nature is essentially lazy, greedy, and desirous of comfort, ease and abundance, Marx argued that an infinite surplus of material well-being would be supplied by the inevitable formation of true - as opposed to recent political forms of - communism. While Marx's hypothesis may not bear the test of time and thus be proved to be a *false* hypothesis, it still remains a *scientific* one because of its predictive nature. The criterion for science here is the predictive hypothesis—whether it be a true or false prediction is beside the point. Jung's treatment of synchronicity, however, cannot make this claim, for no predictive hypothesis is possible when dealing with acausality and 'elastic' time; thus taken in this sense, synchronicity cannot be regarded as being a true scientific construct.

There is, however, another approach to the scientific method which at first glance might seem more applicable to Jung's understanding of science, this being the method of correlation. In this instance, certain variables may be demonstrated to co-exist with a high degree of regularity, but no single variable or collection of variables is said to "cause" the existence or observability of any other variable or variables. Richard J. Shavelson writes

See Part 4(d), pp. 241-242, 252-255.

that correlational studies "do not show cause-effect relationships."¹ This type of scientific practice *would* seem to fit into Jung's understanding of both the scientific and empirical character of synchronicity—synchronicity as a purely correlational phenomenon. But Larry B. Christensen points out that while a correlational method cannot make statements about causality, it may offer predictions:

The correlational approach enables us to accomplish the goals of prediction. If a reliable relationship is found between two variables, then we have not only described the relationship between these two variables but also gained the ability to predict one variable from a knowledge of the other variable.

According to Jung's description of synchronicity, synchronistic events do not coincide frequently enough to be scientifically observed - or scientifically regarded - as correlational phenomena. Because synchronicity is not correlational, it is not a concept that can offer predictions. Therefore synchronicity is acausal, but can not be taken as a scientific construct in the correlational sense.

What Jung rather awkwardly phrases as an "acausal connecting principle" adds a further complication. For synchronicity is described as being acausal, but the term "connecting principle" implies something more than mere acausality, yet still something less than causality. And as social scientists regard causal experimental designs as being superior to, or as providing more useful information than acausal, correlational studies, Jung with his scientific training is well aware of the 'intermediate' status of

Richard J. Shavelson, *Statistical Reasoning for the Behavioural Sciences* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1981), p. 40.

¹Larry B. Christensen, *Experimental Methodology*, second edition (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1980), p. 31.

synchronicity-/ which in his definition lies somewhere between chance and causality.

A year later in "On the Nature of the Psyche" (1947) Jung offers his interpretation of the nature of scientific knowledge:

Scientific knowledge, of course, is another matter. Here we have to elicit from the sum total of our experience certain concepts of the greatest possible general validity, which are not given *a priori*. This particular work entails a translation of the timeless, ever-present operative archetype into the scientific language of the present.

This seems like an honest, straightforward description of the way in which Jung uses scientific language to articulate for modern audiences what he sees as an ancient principle, something lost to human consciousness which in order to be re-taught, must be re-named. If we view Jung's exposition of synchronicity in this manner - as the hope to reintroduce an archaic form of knowledge into Western culture - then in a postmodern sense (but *not* in a strictly scientific sense) his use of the name of "science" justifies the apparent contradiction that arises when he both criticizes the scientific viewpoint and yet employs the name of science to legitimize synchronicity. Depending on the situation, Jung uses the name of science when it seems opportune for him to do so, but he is equally willing to discard science if such an approach might further the case for synchronicity. It seems that

*As noted below, the psychological "meaning" attributed to synchronicity helps to bridge the gap between notions of "chance" and "causality." See pp. 116, 118, 148, 176. F. David Peat argues that the term "chance" could represent nothing more than an ignorance of all the causes which lead to a given phenomenon. F. David Peat, *The Philosopher's Stone: Chaos, Synchronicity, and the Hidden Order of the World*, (New York: Bantam Books, 1991), pp. 33-39.

²Jung, "On the Nature of the Psyche" in *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8: 159-234.

³*Ibid.*, p. 204.

Jung's changeability reveals that he is clearly aware of the dynamics of social power that exist in the various disciplines and professions in his own society. Like a dancer, Jung moves according to the music that surrounds him. Not to say that the style of his dancing is not unique; rather, it seems highly calculated. And this type of awareness and consequent action prefigures the postmodern notion that not only is truth a social matter, but one that must either exist or perish within various frameworks of social and economic power. Because Jung did not enjoy independent, inherited wealth, the success of his theory - and, indeed, career - depended on his ability to remain within the acceptable parameters of psychiatric thought, a discipline which saw itself as being scientific.

2(h) Synchronicity and the Archetype (1947/revised:1954)

To illustrate the tensions which Jung balances between the dyads of science-spirit, and of empiricism-intuition, consider another instance in which synchronicity is mentioned in relation to the archetypes, an instance which seems anything but scientific.

Jung says the psychological manifestation of the archetypes reveals their "distinctly numinous character which can only be described as "spiritual," if "magical" is too strong a word."¹ He continues to note that

*Ibid., p. 205. In relation to numinosity, Jung notes the anthropologist Lucien LeVi-Bruhl's notion of *participation mystique* in which the subject-object relationship of so-called primitive people is undifferentiated. Jung says this type of primordial consciousness becomes the collective unconscious of contemporary mankind. According to this view, a modern day sense of the numinous would have been regarded as evidence of the presence of mystical beings, powers or spirits of the dead. See, Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 6, par. 741 and par. 781, cited in Daryl Sharp, *Jung Lexicon* (Toronto: Inner City Books, 1991), p. 97; and Lucien Levi-Bruhl, *How Natives Think* trans. Lilian A. Clare (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966 [1910]), pp. 51, 61.

the incidence of numinosity is never experienced as being "indifferent;" rather its effect on the psyche is perceived as being either healing or destructive, once the encounter with numinosity has achieved a "certain degree of clarity."¹ Then in a footnote Jung says:

Occasionally it [numinosity] is associated with synchronistic or parapsychic effects. I mean by synchronicity, as I have explained elsewhere, the not uncommonly observed "coincidence" of subjective and objective happenings, which just cannot be explained casually, at least in the present state of our knowledge.

In the same footnote he mentions the quite unscientific methods of astrology and the *I Ching* to validate his introduction of synchronicity, and its connection to the paranormal. This is followed by an argument that says: although the findings of astrology and of the *I Ching* are not generally accepted within the West, "this never hurt the facts."³ Then Jung claims that synchronicity and parapsychic phenomena are realities which he mentions

Mung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 205.

²Ibid., 205n. Daniel Hoy notes a discrepancy between Jung's definition of numinosity and the way in which Jung describes it throughout his work. Hoy demonstrates that in the following instance, Jung defines numinosity as if it were a relatively rare experience, particular to pathology:

...it seizes and controls the human subject, who is always rather its victim than its creator. The *numinosum* - whatever its cause may be - is an experience of the subject independent of his will.

Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 11, par. 6, cited in Hoy, "Numinous Experiences: Frequent or Rare?", p. 19. Jung's *description*, however, suggests that numinous experiences

...do not belong exclusively to the domain of psychopathology but can be observed in normal people as well.

Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 14, par. 780, cited in op. cit., p. 19. Hoy attributes this discrepancy to the tension between Jung as a scientist and Jung as a "therapist, an intuitive, and a speculator." Op. cit., p. 21.

³Ibid.

for the sake of "completeness" and for the "benefit of readers" who have come to realize such realities.

Later in the essay Jung furthers his association with synchronicity and the paranormal - or perhaps rationalizes it - by introducing the theme that psyche and matter are two forms of "one and the same thing. Synchronicity is said to illustrate this meeting of the psychic and the material spheres, which are then likened to two cones which touch and do not touch at their apices, at a "real zero point."³

In 1949 Jung then mentions synchronicity in connection to a book which he is asked to endorse, despite the fact that he had not read it. In his Foreword to Abegg's *Obtasiem Denkt Anders* he says that although not having read the book, he and the author discussed its main ideas, which centred around Jung's notion of synchronicity. Having spent nearly a lifetime in Asia, the author, Jung says, is well-equipped to understand the subtle perceptions of the eastern mind which seem so strange to the western status quo. Jung says:

In the East it is consciousness that is characterized by an apperception of totality, while the West has developed a differentiated and therefore necessarily one-sided attention of awareness. With it goes the Western concept of causality, a principle of cognition irreconcilably opposed to the principle of synchronicity which forms the basis and the source of Eastern "incomprehensibility," and explains well the strangeness of the unconscious with which we in the West are confronted/

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 215.

Ibid.

Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 655.

Jung then continues by highlighting his concept of synchronicity within the context of the forward for Abegg's book.

The understanding of synchronicity is the key which unlocks the door to the Eastern apperception of totality that we find so mysterious. The author seems to have devoted particular attention to just this point. I do not hesitate to say that I look foreword to the publication of her book with greatest interest J

2(i) **Synchronicity and the Occult (1950)**

Perhaps only by chance, or perhaps with the advent of the new 'modern' decade of the 1950's, Jung becomes more confident in presenting synchronicity, for in 1950 the concept appears in three separate publications. Two appear in forwards which Jung writes for Fanny Moser's and Richard Wilhelm's publications. In Moser's *Spuk: Irrglaube Oder Wahrglaube* Jung writes about so-called occult phenomena, especially on ghosts, which the book deals with extensively. His conclusion is that ghost stories prove nothing about such related issues as, for instance, the immortality of the soul, which Jung says "for obvious reasons is incapable of proof. Nevertheless Jung asserts that ghost stories are important, if not for proving the immortality of the soul, then at least for his concept of synchronicity. This is an interesting claim; elsewhere Jung equates the unconscious psyche with so-called "spirits" of the dead.

[^]bid.

[^]Jung notes that the 1950*s exhibited a rise in public interest of the paranormal, especially in the form of science fiction literature and alleged UFO sightings. Jung says the circular UFO shape is a modern mandala (i.e. a projected image of the archetype of the self), but also admits that he cannot determine the truth or falsity of the UFO accounts. See Jung, "Flying Saucers: A Modern Myth of Things Seen in the Skies" in Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 10: 307-433, p. 309.

³Ibid., p. 319.

Those who are convinced of the reality of spirits should know that this is a subjective opinion which can be attacked on any number of grounds. Those who are not convinced should be aware of naively assuming that the whole question of spirits and ghosts has been settled and that all manifestations of this kind are meaningless swindles. This is not so at all. These phenomena exist in their own right, regardless of the way they are interpreted.

Jung continues in his forward to Moser by saying that his particular interpretation is flawless:

...it is *beyond all doubt* that they are genuine manifestations of the unconscious. The communication of "spirits" are *statements about the unconscious psyche*, provided they are really spontaneous and not cooked up by the unconscious mind [emphasis mine].

And in his definition of demonism, it appears that the unconscious complex is equated with the notion of demonic possession:

Demonism (synonymous with daemonomania=possession) denotes a peculiar state of mind characterized by the fact that certain psychic contents, the so-called complexes, take over the control of the total personality in place of the ego, at least temporarily, to such a degree that the free will of the ego is suspended. In certain of these states ego-consciousness is present, in others it is eclipsed...(Good descriptions in the New Testament, Luke 4:34, Mark 1:23, 5:2, etc.).

While complexes and spirits do not, of course, necessarily denote the "soul," spirits, being disincarnate entities, are usually said to be if not immortal, then at least to possess a life-duration longer than the corporal human lifespan.

¹Jung, "Psychology and Spiritualism" in Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 18: 312-316, p. 313.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 319.

³C. G. Jung, *The Symbolic Life in The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, ed. William McGuire et al., trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954-79) Vol. 18, p. 648.

Jung spoke at length on the soul in his Zofingia Lectures. At this early stage of his career he states that the soul is a "transcendental"² entity possessing three distinct qualities: 1) intelligence independent of spatial and temporal restrictions, 2) a purposeful power of organization, and 3) a tendency towards self-representation, which Jung terms *materialization*. Jung follows the philosopher Kant by suggesting "the soul, as the metaphysical presupposition of organic life, likewise transcends space and time."³ While Jung cannot provide empirical support for Kant's notion of spirits with which the soul interacts, he does at this point use a plethora of experimental studies which he suggests prove both "the long range effects of the soul in *space* and...the long range effects of the soul in *time*."

The notion which Jung forwarded during his Zofingia period that human ontology is something located within a relativistic framework of space and time prefigures the use of synchronicity in his forward to Moser's *Spuk: Irrglaube Oder Wahrglaube?* in which Jung details synchronicity as a scientific umbrella concept that includes occult ideas not readily amenable to scientific verification.

Jung later contributes his own personal "ghost story" to Moser's book; he relates his olfactory, auditory and visual experience of ghosts in a summer house where he stayed while delivering lectures in London. His belief in the hauntings was apparently corroborated by two hired maids who regularly

*Supra, p. 33-36.

²Jung, *The Zofingia Lectures*, p. 39.

³Ibid., p. 40. ⁴Ibid.

⁵Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 18, pp. 320-326.

fled the house before sundown. More important for our view on synchronicity, however, is the fact that Jung differentiates spirits from the exteriorization phenomena of the unconscious which he mentions in connection with Freud.

Jung initially associated creakings and unaccountable odours to an exteriorization of the unconscious contents of the hosts of the summer house, but revised his thinking to explain the phenomena via the paranormal:

During the night the same phenomena were repeated, but in intensified form. The thought occurred to me that they must be parapsychological. I knew that problems of which people are unconscious can give rise to exteriorization phenomena, because constellated unconscious contents often have a tendency to manifest themselves outwardly somehow or other. But I knew the problems of the present occupants of the house very well, and could discover nothing that would account for the exteriorizations.

After repeated occurrences of such inexplicable events, Jung finally had a vision of an old woman's disfigured head staring at him from his adjacent pillow while he lay in bed. This led him to tell the proprietor that he was "convinced the house was haunted."³

Later in the article Jung relates a synchronistic story he heard from a relative who dreamed of a woman being murdered in his hotel room, only to discover the next morning that a woman had indeed been murdered on the previous night in his very room. Interestingly, he then closes the article by saying:

These remarks are only meant to show that parapsychology would do well to take account of the modern psychology of the unconscious.⁴

Supra, p. 54.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 322. ³Ibid.,

p. 324. ⁴Ibid., p. 326.

Thus Jung returns to a more scientific attitude after relating the synchronistic murder story, perhaps to avoid alienating his professional colleagues by placing too much emphasis on ghosts, which would seem unverifiable, or at least unacceptable to scientifically-minded readers.

2(j) **Synchronicity and the Chinese *I Ching* (1950)**

The second instance in which synchronicity is mentioned in 1950 occurs in Jung's Foreword to Richard Wilhelm's translation of the *I Ching*. Prior to introducing the concept, Jung prepares the reader by arguing that "whatever happens in a given moment has inevitably the quality peculiar to that moment."¹ He supports this notion of qualitative and temporal simultaneity by noting how wine tasters with one sip may determine the year and specific vineyard in which the wine was made. He continues by suggesting that antiquarians with one brief glance are able to determine the time and area from which a particular piece of furniture or art object arose. Last, astrologers are said to be able to determine precise astrological charts (the position and alleged influence of the planets and stars) *without* having any previous knowledge of their client's date of birth.

If this preamble is intended to provide instances of synchronistic phenomena, it seems only the final example is valid, for the first two may be explained, not by a psyche-matter continuum, but by traditional notions of learning, experience and memory—all encoded within the physical boundaries of the human brain. That is, a wine taster may be able to determine the year and location of the grapes by the taste of the wine if he or she has accumulated much experience in tasting wine. To determine the date and origin of the wine

¹Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 593.

is a simple matter of expertise. Likewise, the experienced antiquarian may be able to locate the time and geographic origin of a piece of furniture by virtue of his or her practical experience. The last example of the astrologers, however, if valid - Jung provides no documentation - would point to some supramundane source of knowledge which informs the astrologer's accurate reading of clients' astrological charts in lieu of birth dates.

Jung, however, dogmatically and quite unscientifically declares that all three instances are synchronistic "facts" (i.e. indubitable instances of synchronicity) and proceeds to compare them to the groups of six lines -hexagrams - which in the *I Ching* are traditionally generated by a somewhat complex method of dropping and sorting piles of yarrow sticks, or more recently, by tossing groups of 3 coins six times. Jung says that the resultant hexagram indicates a grouping of events which is both peculiar to a given moment and at the same time archetypally based within human history. He describes this pairing in the *I Ching* of the immediate present and the historical past as being indicative of an "essential situation prevailing at the moment of its origin." Yet as the Chinese system is not regarded as being scientific in the Western sense of the word, Jung says this simultaneity of the past and the present formulation of its archetypal basis may only be forwarded as an "assumption," rather than as a fact. This assumption is furthermore identified as leading to what he describes as the "curious principle" of synchronicity.

Ibid., p. 592.

Ibid.

Ibid.

It is interesting from a poststructural perspective that Jung describes the principle as being "curious." If he is defending the concept, one might first suppose that an idea being placed at the introduction of the *I Ching* needs no particular defense because readers of the *I Ching* would be sympathetic to the implications of synchronicity. Yet Jung by 1950 had grown into an international figure within the world of depth psychology therefore he most likely expected his introduction to reach beyond the relatively limited audience of readers who would read Wilhelm's book. Indeed, the introduction did carry over to a larger audience when it was collated within Jung's *Collected Works* in 1958.

Jung once again mentions causality and linear time as ideas which he claims are "diametrically opposed" to synchronicity. He then claims that to the Chinese mind synchronicity deals with the holistic generation of meaningful coincidences, while causality describes events in terms of a linear sequence.

How does it happen that *A', B', C, D'* etc., appear all at the same moment and in the same place? It happens in the first place because the physical events *A'* and *B'* are of the same quality as the psychic events *C* and *D'*, and further because all are the exponents of one and the same momentary situation.. Causal connection can be determined statistically and can be subjected to experiment. Inasmuch as situations are unique and cannot be repeated, experimenting with synchronicity seems to be impossible under ordinary conditions.

Just what Jung means by his reference to "ordinary conditions" is unclear. Most likely he means to say that because synchronicity cannot be repeated, it is therefore impossible to study synchronicity with conventional

\Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 593. Commenting on Jung's discussion of synchronicity in relation to the *I Ching* and Taoism, J. J. Clarke argues that "Jung never adequately defined what he means by the term 'meaningful' in this context." J. J. Clarke. *Jung and Eastern Thought: A Dialogue With the Orient*, p. 184n.

social scientific methods (i.e. an experimental research design with a control group and an experimental group). Most contemporary scientists would likely claim that one of the criteria for scientific knowledge is that the results of an experiment may be replicated by other researchers. Indeed, most new scientific knowledge is not deemed to be valid until the experiment has been replicated several times. Jung, however, says that synchronicity cannot be repeated. Yet elsewhere Jung says that synchronicity is a scientific principle. As discussed above, Jung makes life in general and the world at large his experimental model, in which synchronicity may be said to be a scientific principle. Regarding the apparent impossibility of placing synchronicity under the scrutiny of an experimental model, it would seem that recognizing a dramatic or numinous stimulus, image, or motif at time 'A,' and then relating it in a meaningful way to some subsequent event at time 'B' is, in a sense, a scientific procedure. It could be taken as being somewhat scientific because the possibility exists that no meaningful connection could be made at time B'.

In this connection, Jung warns against actively selecting apparently synchronistic stimuli that are not there. In a letter to Erich Neumann of 10 March 1959, he says:

Meaningfulness always appears to be unconscious at first, and can therefore only be discovered *post hoc*, hence there is always the danger that meaning will be read into things where actually there is nothing of the sort.

¹Supra, p. 80.

²C. G. Jung, *C. G. Jung: Letters (1951-1961)*, eds. Gerhard Adler & Aniela Jaffe, trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XCV: 2 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975) Vol. 2, p. 495. Jung also wrote to J. B. Rhine on 9 August 1954:

That is, through a biased interpretation of objective events, certain stimuli are said to be "meaningfully related" which in fact could be seen to represent nothing more than the projection of an unconscious complex. In this case, the unresolved complex would cause the ego to impute a certain meaning to stimuli, thus the ego would actively seek out such meanings on the basis of, for instance, unconscious fear or desire. Such a projection could originate from the personal unconscious, yet could also stem from the collective unconscious. In this latter case of the collective unconscious, archetypally rather than personally based complexes would lead the ego to interpret such events as synchronistic. When projection stems from the collective unconscious, it seems that the issue of "active selectivity" becomes a moot point, because it is now the unconscious archetype rather than the conscious ego that actively selects certain stimuli that lead to the recognition of synchronicity. When viewed this way, it could be argued that from the point of reference of the archetype, a certain type of causality enters into the definition of synchronicity because the archetype leads the subject toward external events -which from the archetype's privileged ontological perspective may be viewed "ahead of time."¹ In this vein, when the synchronistic event is encountered by the subject, the experience of synchronicity would then increase the ego's

The main difficulty with synchronicity (and also with ESP) is that one thinks of it as being produced by the subject, while I think it is rather in the nature of objective events.

Ibid., p. 181. Likewise, in a letter of 12 February 1958 to the German professor of psychology, Hans Bender, Jung says that synchronistic effects are "not sought at all but found." Ibid., p. 415.

*On this point Jung's follower Marie-Louise von Franz says that the unconscious "knows the past and future." Marie-Louise von Franz, *On Divination and Synchronicity: The Psychology of Meaningful Chance* (Toronto: Inner City Books, 1980), p. 39.

conscious comprehension of the archetype which had guided it toward that synchronistic event. As revealed immediately below, Jung at times seems to imply that the archetype guides the individual towards events which become synchronistic, as if the ego is lead by archetypal forces which operate on a "deeper" substratum of human ontology. Thus active selectivity may be hypothesized to originate from either the ego which is influenced by a complex from the personal unconscious, or from the collective archetype. Yet while active selectivity based on the ego and the personal unconscious would seem to work *against* the scientific validity of synchronicity, active selectivity that originates from the collectively unconscious level might be integral to the functional mechanics of synchronicity.

Concerning Jung's view about the possibility of the ego being guided by the archetype toward synchronistic events, Jung, in apparent contradiction,

'By way of contrast, if one believed in heavenly or angelic guidance, this might be viewed in terms of a "higher" level of ontology. Sociologist Peter Berger writes about angels as "signals of transcendence" and as "messengers" of God, and says that he has "tried to show that our situation is not an exorable fate and that secularized consciousness is not the absolute it presents itself as." But like Jung and many others, he perhaps mistakenly equates the so-called pagan gods to Old and New Testament angels. Peter L. Berger. *A Rumour of Angels: Modern Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1970), p. 94.

² Jung does not make a distinction between personal and unconscious complexes in relation to the genesis of synchronistic events, except perhaps in an oblique reference found in a letter to L. Kling of 14 January 1958, regarding the pathological interpretation of synchronicity made by the so-called schizophrenic:

I have often found that synchronistic experiences were interpreted by schizophrenics as delusions. Since archetypal situations are not uncommon in schizophrenia, we must also suppose that corresponding synchronistic phenomena will occur which follow exactly the same course as with so-called normal persons. The difference lies simply and solely in the interpretation. The schizophrenic's interpretation is morbidly narrow because it is mostly restricted to the intentions of other people and to his own ego-imbalance.

Jung, C. G. *Jung: Letters*, Vol. 2, p. 409.

repeatedly stresses the acausal nature of synchronicity, yet says in a letter to "Dr. H." of 30 August 1951 that the *psychoid* - the unmanifest aspect of the archetype - plays what appears to be a causal role in the creation of synchronistic events.

I have just lectured at Eranos on synchronicity...This remarkable effect points to the "psychoid" and essentially transcendental nature of the archetype as an "arranger" of psychic forms inside and outside the psyche.

The word "arranger" implies some type of active causality on the part of the psychoid. In another letter to Werner Nowacki, a professor of mineralogy, Jung admits his confusion over the acausal - and causal - nature of synchronicity.

I have got stuck, on the one hand, in the acausality (or "synchronicity") of certain phenomena of unconscious provenance and, on the other hand, in the qualitative statements of numbers...I am particularly grateful to you for your appreciation of the transcendent "arranger."²

In a letter to the professor of German literature, Karl Schmid, Jung says:

If I occasionally speak of an "organizer," this is sheer mythology since at present I have no means of going beyond the bare fact that synchronistic phenomena are "just so."³

In the same letter, Jung attempts to eradicate the causality/acausality problem by positing the archetype as a "modality that represents visual forms,"⁴ whereas synchronicity represents "another modality representing events."⁵ Since forms and physical events are different, he continues,

¹Ibid., pp. 21-22.

²Ibid., p. 352.

³Ibid., p. 449.

⁴Ibid., p. 446.

⁵Ibid.

synchronicity cannot be described as an archetype "but only as a modality *sui generis*." Yet later in the same letter he says

In so far as both modalities, archetype and synchronicity, belong primarily to the realm of the psychic, we are justified in concluding that they are psychic phenomena. In so far, however, as synchronistic events include not only psychic but also physical forms of manifestation, the conclusion is justified that both modalities transcend the realm of the psychic and somehow also belong to the physical realm...there is a relativity of the psychic and physical categories.

Thus Jung initially separates the causal archetype from the acausal synchronicity by denoting the former as psychic and the latter as physical. He then collapses the categories of "psychic" and "physical" and by implication invalidates his insistence upon the acausality of synchronicity.

In his forward to the *I Ching*, Jung encounters another dialectical difficulty when he mentions the meeting of the archetypal past with the peculiarities of its individual expression in the temporal present. To illustrate the idea of individuality coexisting with, or perhaps merging within the generic structure of archetypal ontology, Jung provides the example of the hexagonal structure of the quartz crystal prism. He says, "In nature one finds no two crystals exactly alike, although all are unmistakably hexagonal."^

Thus with the collective structure of the archetype and its uniquely individual expression Jung attempts to reconcile another dialectical tension (the first being, as we have seen, the causal and acausal qualities of synchronicity). It seems that Jung fails to overtly reconcile the tension

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 447.

Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 591.

between causality and acausality as he repeatedly insists on acausality—even though the above quotations reveal his confusion on the matter. With the dialectic between the collectivity and individuality of archetypal expression, however, he is less rigid and willing to compromise between the two polarities.

2(k) Synchronicity, Art and Individuation (1950)

The third instance in which Jung publishes on synchronicity in 1950 occurs in "A Study In The Process of Individuation."¹ Jung describes one of his patients, Miss X, by presenting a series of her paintings which he argues illustrates her psychic journey toward wholeness, or *individuation* as Jung terms it. The paintings provide a visual example, Jung suggests, of how subjectivity may be experienced both as an individual and as a collective process. Although the paintings are highly personal and stylized, Jung believes they adhere to a basic form and progression which indicates that they are archetypally based. First, the pattern of the circular mandala which Jung argues represents the *complexio oppositorium* of the self is present. Second, Jung says the thematic sequence of the paintings illustrates the difficult path of psychological discovery which the individual encounters when raising the unconscious to consciousness.

Jung further argues that an aspect of the self cannot be represented. He says this "psychoid" aspect is "identical in all individuals,"^{1^} and that

¹Jung, "A Study in the Process of Individuation" in *Jung, The Collected Works*, Vol. 9/1: 290-354, p. 344.

¹Jung notes that mandala is a Sanskrit term meaning "circle." Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 9/1, p. 387.

³Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 436.

it represents the underlying psychic ground upon which all synchronistic events occur:

I am only too conscious that synchronicity is a highly abstract and "irrepresentable" quantity. It ascribes to the moving body a certain psychoid property which, like space, time and causality, forms a criterion of its behaviour.

The act of representing the self through the visual mandala produces a degree of order in place of chaos' as the universal tension of opposites is, if not permanently, at least to some extent reconciled.

Although the attainment of inner balance through symmetrical pairs of opposites was probably the main intention of this mandala, we should not overlook the fact that the duplication motif also occurs when unconscious contents are about to become conscious and differentiated...I have the impression, from this picture, that it really does represent a kind of solstice or climax, where decision and division take place. The dualities are, at bottom, Yes and No, the irreconcilable opposites, but they *have* to be held together if the balance of life is to be maintained...A climax like this, where universal opposites clash, is at the same time a moment when a wide perspective often opens out into the past and future. This is the psychological moment when, as the *consensus genitum* has established since ancient times, synchronistic phenomena occur—that is, when the far appears near: sixteen years later, Miss X became fatally ill with cancer of the breast.

This passage illustrates how Jung weaves the idea of synchronicity into his theory at the expense of the theory's integrity. To say that the conflict motif in a painting which was created 16 years prior to the occurrence of the artist's fatal breast cancer indicates a synchronistic connection is, from any perspective, let alone a scientific perspective, a very tenuous claim.

ibid., p. 505. On the psychoid as an underlying, transcendental, and connective ground of ego consciousness, see also: ibid., pp. 177-178, 436, and Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 18, pp. 683, 705.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 9/1, p. 360.

³Ibid, p. 358.

⁴Ibid., p. 344.

Nevertheless, Jung attempts to support this claim in two footnotes. In the first, Jung suggests Miss X's horoscope reveals four earth signs yet lacks an air sign, and that a dangerous configuration is inherent in her animus*— hence the illness. In the second footnote, Jung argues the case for "synchronistic phenomena that underlie astrology, briefly suggesting that the psychological underpinnings which he posits elsewhere in alchemy are also present in astrology.

In fairness to Jung, however, he does attempt to convey the salient thematic details of the patient's psychological history which lead him to decide upon the possibility of a synchronicity existing between her art and subsequent death 16 years later; it could be argued that a broader temporal perspective is required to reveal the theme of conflict as being synchronistic with Miss X's illness and subsequent death. But the scope of this type of reasoning is perhaps beyond the everyday range of occidental human thought, and beyond the reach of conventional scientific verification.

2(1) Synchronicity and the Scientific Method (1950)

There are two other instances in which Jung writes about synchronicity in 1950: two letters to the mathematician Markus Fierz that were not published until 1976. In his letter to Fierz of 21 February 1950, Jung thanks the professor for reading a portion of the manuscript of "Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle" and admits his ignorance of the statistical procedure known as the "deviation standard." Jung asks Professor Fierz to check the data from Jung's astrological experiment in which the horoscopes of

*See below, p. 210.

²Ibid.

180 married pairs are examined in relation to the "so-called classical marriage aspects, namely, the conjunction and opposition of sun and moon, Mars and Venus, ascending and descendant."¹ He also asks Fierz to offer an overall criticism of the related astrological tables he has prepared. In a subsequent letter to Fierz, which is a response to Fierz's reply to Jung's initial request, Jung ingratiates himself to the mathematician by thanking him for his "objective opinion," even though Jung by this point in his thinking does not adhere to the possibility of the existence of pure objectivity. In a letter of 14 May 1950 to Joseph Goldbrunner he writes, "Everything that touches us and that we touch is a reflection, therefore psychic." And he writes in 10 June 1950 to a Dr. N saying that "You get nowhere with theories."³ A year later, in 1951 he says:

Between the conscious and the unconscious there is a kind of "uncertainty relationship," because the observer is inseparable from the observed and always disturbs it by the act of observation. In other words, exact observation of the unconscious prejudices observation of the conscious and vice versa.

Several years later in *The Undiscovered Self* Jung says:

Scientific education is based in the main on statistical truths and abstract knowledge and therefore imparts an unrealistic, rational picture of the world, in which the individual, as a merely marginal phenomenon, plays a role. The individual, however, as an irrational datum, is the true and authentic carrier of reality, the *concrete* man as opposed to the unreal ideal or "normal" man to whom scientific statements refer. What is more, most of the natural sciences try to represent the results of their investigations as though these had come into existence without man's intervention, in such a way that the collaboration of the

¹Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol., 18, p. 502.

²C. G. Jung, *Selected Letters of C. G. Jung, 1909-1961* ed. Gerhard Adler, Bollingen Series (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 95.

³Ibid., p. 97.

⁴Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 9/2, p. 226.

psyche - an indispensable factor - remains invisible. (An exception to this is modern physics, which recognizes that the observed is not independent of the observer.) So, in this respects as well, science conveys a picture of the world from which a real human psyche appears to be excluded—the very antithesis of the "humanities."¹

In his second letter to Fierz, Jung then says that he finds the results of his astrological experiment "unsatisfactory" and indicates that he will forgo the collection of further material.

Jung does, however, alternately argue that one may "at least *conjecture*" that the poor results support rather than refute synchronicity because the low probability coincides with the "historical tradition. Just what he means by this statement remains unclear to the outside reader, nevertheless it is clear that with his astrological data, Jung strives to transform failure into success. For he continues, after not having found a statistically significant figure for the conjunction of astrological elements and marriage pairs, to argue that "synchronicity is a qualified individual event which is ruined by the statistical method"⁴ Why then, the question arises, does Jung invest much time and effort in attempting to obtain statistical support from Fierz if beforehand he believed that the statistical method was antithetical to synchronicity? Moreover, the related question arises: had the results been

¹Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 10, p. 252.

²*Ibid.*, p. 503.

³*Ibid.*

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 504.

statistically significant, would Jung have used them to his advantage? Recall that he says the results were "unsatisfactory."

Jung then continues in a more forceful manner by suggesting that synchronicity in fact destroys the statistical method and its implication of a linear causality that connects "uniform objects." Then he argues that on the one hand, the statistical method abolishes synchronicity, and that on the other hand, synchronicity abolishes the statistical method. Jung says that the two - statistics and synchronicity - exist in a "complementarity. It seems Jung modifies the adage "the best defense is a good offense" by challenging the scientific method which he claims synchronicity "ruins." Likewise, Jung asserts that synchronicity "abolishes" the assumption of linearity. It remains open to question whether Jung would have taken such a confusing tack had his results for synchronicity been statistically significant.

²Andrew Samuels argues that the results of the astrological experiment were statistically invalid, yet not due to chance; he says synchronicity was Jung's third option.

The experiment has been much criticised. The sample was based on people who believed in astrology and was therefore not random, the statistics have been challenged, and most important, astrology, whatever else it may be, cannot be claimed to be acausal! It is the supreme difficulty of demonstrating acausality that has bedeviled the attempt to put synchronicity on a scientific basis. Nevertheless, most people have experienced meaningful coincidences or detected some sort of tide in their affairs, and it is in connection with that type of experience that Jung's synchronicity hypothesis may have use.

Andrew Samuels, *Jung and the Post-Jungians* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), p. 101.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 504.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

Jung's type of *ad hoc* theorizing provides another example of how he attempts to graft uneasy findings onto his theory of 'wholeness,' a wholeness which allegedly arises from the union of archetypal opposites, and which in effect says: "anything goes." From the perspective of statistical analysis, Jung's concept of synchronicity could be taken as a fabrication founded on theoretical sleight-of-hand—recall how Jung says he "conjectures" the possibility of synchronicity without adequate statistical support for the phenomenon.

At any rate, Jung continues by citing the Rhine study² in order to justify synchronicity, which he says in this instance is easier to prove than astrology—the latter is more complex because it is more "sensitive" to the statistical method.³ Synchronicity, Jung claims, is not based on uniformity, but like the natural world is subject to chance and hence discontinuous. This prefigures some of Michel Foucault's views on the essential discontinuity of human history, for Jung says that to describe synchronicity "we need a

Jung does, however, provide a progressive critique of the scientific method by saying that it is "a very limited way of describing nature, since it grasps only uniform events. But nature is essentially discontinuous, i.e. subject to chance." Ibid., p. 504. This manner of critique would not become popularized until some twenty years later with Fritjof Capra's *The Tao of Physics: An Exploration of the Parallels Between Modern Physics and Eastern Mysticism* (London: Wildwood House, 1975), and more recently, by Gary Zukav's *The Dancing Wu Li Masters*. These studies, like Jung's critique, stress the element of discontinuity that is found when physicists study subatomic particles. Discontinuity challenges the assumptions of continuity that previously had been accepted within the Newtonian world view of nature. Also like Capra and Zukav, Jung suggests the notion that matter and energy are two variations of the same underlying essence. Elsewhere Jung says that both matter and spirit are transcendental phenomena. Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 216.

²See below, pp. 119-122, 130, 156-157, 177-179.

³Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 504.

principle of discontinuity."¹ He then uses the method of analogy - which he often employs in order to substantiate his claims - by noting parallels to the idea of synchronicity from related disciplines.

In psychology this is the drive to individuation, in biology, it is differentiation, but in nature it is the "meaningful coincidence," that is to say synchronicity.

Just how psychological individuation and biological differentiation compare is confusing, for the former speaks of the *integration* of diverse psychological elements within individuals within a species (i.e. specific humans), while the latter implies an increase in specialization, that is, a branching off which results in a distinct group which shares common features, making that group a unique individual species. What the individuation process in psychology and the differentiation of species in biology *do* have in common, is that both are geared toward the creation of individuals. But to repeat, in analytical psychology it is individual *subjects* who are "individuated" within the human species, while in biology the "individual" referred to is an individual *species* which is differentiated from the entire array of existing species. In this instance, Jung's use of analogy as a type of argumentation

ubid., pp. 504-505. For Foucault truth is neither absolute nor trans-historical: truth is an effect of power, specific to and grounded within discontinuous moments and geographic sites that together constitute human history. By this Foucault does not suggest temporal past or geographic proximity to be necessarily isolated from present events; rather, past and proximity influence, yet do not determine present conditions (i.e. many outcomes are possible, yet only one is actualized). Jung, however, contradictorily envisions the overall series of discontinuities in nature and history as being progressive. Foucault does not share this view. See part 4 for a more detailed discussion of Jung and Foucault's views on knowledge, truth and power.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 505. Archetypal theorist James Hillman attempts to reconcile Jung's apparently contradictory notions of discontinuity and progression by arguing that psychological development is not linear, but circular. For Hillman, the development of what he terms the "imaginal ego" is discontinuous, guided by the "synchronistic present" and the "causal past." Hillman, *The Myth of Analysis*, p. 184.

is not justified. Peter A. Angeles suggests that the successfulness of the method of analogy as a form of argumentation depends upon:

(a) the quantity of resemblances (similarities) that exist between the things compared; (b) the quantity of further resemblances suggested which on testing are verified as correct; and (c) the quantity of suggestions about resemblances implied in the analogy for further follow-up.*

Jung certainly does not follow this method. At any rate, it is unclear whether or not he is aware of his unrestrained and inexact use of analogy.

2(m) Synchronicity and the Astrological Aeon of Pisces (1951)

In the next instance in which synchronicity is publicly mentioned, its connection with numinosity is presented in the body of the main text, as opposed to the previous instance - outlined in 2(k) - which was located in a less visible footnote. In "The Sign of the Fishes" which appears in *Aion* in 1951, Jung provides a lengthy discussion about the Italian prophet Joachim of Fiore's (c. 1135-1202) understanding of the Holy Ghost, an idea which Jung believes charged Fiore's innovative ideas (and life) with a sense of numinous purpose. This, Jung claims, was further enhanced by the synchronicity of the fact that he lived in the beginning of the astrological aeon of Pisces:²

*Peter A. Angeles, *Dictionary of Philosophy*, p. 9.

^Although not in an astrological sense, Fiore viewed history in a sequential manner of three periods. In the first of Mosaic law, the Father presides and inspires "servile obedience and fear." The second, which is characterized by "grace, filial obedience and faith," is dominated by the Son, and which being less than perfect ends badly; this necessitates the third period of the reign of the Holy Spirit, which was to begin in 1260 and continue to end times, delivering the rule of "Spirit, liberty and love." Englebert Omer, *St. Francis of Assisi: A Biography*, Eve Marie Cooper, trans. (Servant Books: Ann Arbor Michigan, 1965), p. 58.

The numinosity of this feeling was heightened by the temporal coincidence - "synchronicity" - of the epoch he lived in with the beginning of the sphere of the "antichristian" fish in Pisces.

In this instance Jung mentions the symbol of the two contrary-directional fishes as representing the tension between the Antichrist and the Holy spirit. But Jung does not use this instance of synchronicity to introduce Fiore's ideas about the existence of an Antichrist; rather, he says this example of synchronicity amplifies Fiore's understanding of the opposite of the Antichrist—the Holy Ghost.

Jung says that synchronicity may be applied to the appearance of the "antichristian" fish and also to Fiore's understanding of the Holy Ghost; this statement demonstrates that synchronicity is an ethically neutral concept. As with numinosity (which Jung says may accompany and intensify the experience of synchronicity), synchronicity may relate to things interpreted as being evil, or to things construed as being good. As in Jung's linkage of synchronicity and the age of Pisces in his "A Psychological Approach to the Dogma of the Trinity" of 1942, it remains uncertain just how Joachim's experience of numinosity is synchronistic with the Pisces aeon. The amount of leeway in terms of the precise time in which Joachim experiences numinosity in connection to the aeon in which he finds himself makes this type of synchronicity a loose example—one apparently too imprecise to attribute to the concept the scientific status which Jung claims it possesses. This example of synchronicity is even less definite than the previous imprecise example of synchronicity cited in the artwork of Miss X. With the case of

Jung, *Aion* in *The Collected Works*, Vol. 9/2, p. 85. *Supra*,
Part 2(k), pp. 99-101.

Miss X Jung provided a considerable amount of supportive professional data, yet with Joachim no such professional data exists.

Also in *Aion* Jung speaks at length on the dual fish symbol as found within the Catharist Movement.* As in other Christian heretical movements, one fish symbolizes Christ and the other Satan, and Jung asserts that this dualistic symbolism appears during the middle of the eleventh century, being the astrological age of Pisces. He also notes that Talmudic astronomers began calculating the time of the Messiah at the beginning of the Pisces aeon. Jung then claims that all of these events are historically synchronistic by virtue of the dual symbol of the fish which emerges from the collective unconscious during this period of human history.

For Jung the Pisces era represents the onset of a "new world" consisting of a "strange medley of religious movements:"¹

These movements are also associated with the rise of Alchemy, Protestantism, the Enlightenment, and natural science, leading ultimately to the increasingly devilish developments we have lived to experience in our own day, and to the evaporation of Christianity under the assaults of rationalism, intellectualism, materialism, and "realism."

Jung's reasoning for attributing to Protestantism a precursory influence toward "increasingly devilish developments" is unclear, especially since he

¹Also termed the Albigensians, the Cathars were charismatic reincarnationists who denied the historical existence of Jesus and who saw the physical earth as a creation of the Devil. Rigorously chaste and non-violent, these 11 c. Gnostics were cruelly exterminated by the Church, under the decree of Pope Innocent III in 1208. See Stuart Gordon, *The Encyclopedia of Myths and Legends* (London: Headline Books, 1993), pp. 124-125 and Geddes MacGregor, *Dictionary of Religion and Philosophy* (New York: Paragon House, 1989), pp. 15-16.

²C. G. Jung, *Aion* in *The Collected Works*, Vol. 9/2, p. 149-150.

³*Ibid.*, p. 150.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 150.

had already written in 1944 his article "Why I Am Not a Catholic."¹ That Jung did have a favourable Christian bias seems clear. On 22 February 1955 he wrote in a private letter to Pater Lucas Menz of the Monastic Order of St. Benedict of Nursia: "For most people my Christian standpoint remains hidden."² Likewise, to Pastor W. Niederer he wrote on 1 October 1953: "I consider myself a Christian."⁰

If not Protestant and not Catholic, it would seem Jung favours the remaining option of the esoteric, experiential form of Gnostic Christianity. In an interview with John Freeman he says:

The word "belief" is a difficult thing for me. I don't *believe*. I must have a reason for a certain hypothesis. Either I *know* a thing, and then I know it—I don't need to believe it.

In his memoirs he says, "I understood that God was, for me at least, one of the most certain and immediate of experiences." Jung, however, also argues that a Gnostic approach to God - at least in its alchemical form - is one of the factors leading to the "evaporation of Christianity." This denigration of alchemical Christianity is perplexing, and seems to be incommensurable with

¹Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 645.

²Jung, C. G. *Jung: Letters* Vol. 2, p. 226.

³*Ibid.*, p. 130.

⁴C. G. Jung in "Face to Face: BBC Interview with John Freeman," cited in Jolande Jacobi ed. and R. F. C. Hull, trans., *C. - G. Jung: Psychological Reflections: A New Anthology of His Writings, 1905-1961*, Bollingen Series XXXI, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 352.

⁵Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 62.

⁶Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 9/2, p. 150.

Jung's subsequent designation of the medieval alchemist, Rosinus, as an "oldmaster"¹

At any rate, as an event or series of events, synchronicity is again presented as an ethically neutral concept; according to Jung's reasoning, synchronicity may accompany what he envisions as good or evil historical events.

2(n) **Synchronicity and** Gnosticism (1951)

In the next instance in which synchronicity is mentioned, Jung comments in "Gnostic Symbols of the Self" (1951),² that various Gnostic philosophers use the metaphor of the "magnet" and its attraction to "iron" as a symbol for the union of the Christ-figure (as the Logos) and the divine elements of humanity; like the magnet, the Logos raises the divine elements (the iron) to unite with the Godhead. However, Jung's explanation as to why the emergence of these symbols of the Redeemer is synchronistic is extremely cursory.

We meet these images and ideas in Gnosticism...for Gnosticism was, in the main, a product of cultural assimilation and is therefore of the greatest interest in elucidating and defining the contents constellated by prophecies about the Redeemer, or by his appearance in history, or by the synchronicity of the archetype.⁴

^xJung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 9/2, p. 169. Rosinus interprets the symbol of the fish as being representative of an ecstatic experience of the primal or cosmic "beginning" time which he says is invariably connected to the primal or cosmic "end" time. Ibid., p. 168-169.

²Jung, "Gnostic Symbols of the Self" in *The Collected Works*, Vol. 9/2: 184-221.

"The image of iron filings and the magnet is found within Jainism, but in a negative fashion it depicts the karmic impurities of non-liberated others which are transferred to the pure soul of the liberated. From lectures delivered by Dr. A. S. D. Sharma, Professor of Philosophy and Religion at Visva Bharati University, Santiniketan, India, 1988.

⁴Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 9/2, p. 184.

Unlike the example of the dual fish symbol and its synchronistic relation with the aeon of Pisces, no time frame is given. Synchronicity now occurs simply because of the supposed existence of a historical Redeemer on the one hand, and on the other hand, because of the appearance at some later time of further discursive elaborations (which are taken as archetypal ideas) of that Redeemer figure.

The above quotation is followed by a footnote in which Jung apologizes for not being able to "elucidate" or even "document" his assertion that this is a synchronistic event.¹ He then, however, shifts the focus by citing the Rhine study and links this to his idea of numinosity.

As Rhine's ESP...experiments show, any intense emotional interest or fascination is accompanied by phenomena which can only be explained by a psychic relativity of space, time and causality. Since the archetypes usually have a certain numinosity, they can arouse just that fascination which is accompanied by synchronistic phenomena. These consist in the *meaningful* coincidence of two or more causally unrelated facts.

At the end of the footnote Jung then refers to his upcoming "Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle," published in 1952, which leads one to believe that the footnote must have been a later addition, included in order to both explicate and further legitimize synchronicity.

Later in *Aion* Jung refers to synchronicity in regard to the philosopher Gottfried Leibniz's principle of *correspondence*, which according to Jung was used in an unsophisticated, unscientific manner. Referring to Leibniz's idea that a harmonic sympathy exists among all things, Jung notes that the notion of a universal correspondence had already existed within ancient Greek and medieval philosophy; yet Leibniz, Jung claims, was the first to introduce it

¹bid.

²Ibid.

into modern Western philosophy. Jung then suggests that his own work further advances the idea by placing it under scientific scrutiny. For Jung this refers to the recent scientific "quaternity" ideas of modern physics, rather than the conventional Newtonian "trinitarian" principles of space, time and causality which were prevalent in the western ethos of his era.

Jung then uses the following figure to describe his view of enantiodromia, which depicts consciousness as a cyclical process based upon the quaternity of the four psychological functions:




Figure 1: The Symbolic Process of Transformation¹

It is evident that the style of the figure is similar to that which chemists use to depict the formation of molecules. It is difficult to determine whether Jung uses this chemistry metaphor for the sake of clarity, scientific legitimization, or both. Regardless, it does provide synchronicity with a scientific look, not wholly unlike contemporary television advertisements which cloak actors in white doctors' smocks in order to sell products on the basis of their scientific acceptability. It seems that Jung is similarly

The quaternity is space, time, causality, and acausality (in this instance Jung calls acausality the "space-time continuum"). Ibid., p. 258, nl01.

Ibid., p. 259. See quotation on following page for explanation.

"selling" the idea of synchronicity by using a representation which speaks more of scientism than of science.

Using a scientific model which is based on the quaternity principle of synchronicity has another advantage: Jung is able to summarize his belief of the progressive "fall" and "rebirth" of the individual in particular, and humankind in general, within a precise, parsimonious schema. In reference to the figure of the preceding page, Jung writes,

The Anthropos *A* descends from above through his Shadow *B* into Physis *C* (=serpent), and through a kind of crystallization process *D*{-*lapis*) that reduces chaos to order, rises again to the original state, which in the meantime has been transformed from an unconscious into a conscious one. Consciousness and understanding arise from discrimination, that is, through analysis (dissolution) followed by synthesis, as stated in the symbolical terms by the alchemical dictum: "Solve et coagula" (dissolve and coagulate).

Thus Jung integrates several related themes around the concept of synchronicity, which itself is crucial to, or rather, most salient during the stage of rendering order to chaos as described scientifically in the "crystallization" or reintegration process of f.^2

¹Ibid., pp. 259-260. Marie-Louise von Franz comments that outer events are synchronistic symbolizations of inner processes; because synchronicity, she argues, occurs throughout one's entire lifetime, it is fruitless to attempt to hasten the individuation process. Marie-Louise von Franz, *Alchemy: An Introduction to the Symbolism and the Psychology* (Toronto: Inner City Books, 1980), pp. 259, 266.

⁴If synchronicity were a fundamental process of nature as Jung suggests here, its underlying dynamics would always be present; yet synchronicity would only be recognized as such when the subject became consciously aware of it as an active principle—thus designating certain events as being synchronistic. In a letter to Erich Neumann of 10 March, 1959, Jung in fact says that synchronicity can be unconscious:

Unconscious synchronicities are, as we know from experience, altogether possible, since in many cases we are unconscious of their happening, or have to have our attention drawn to the coincidence by an outsider. *C. G. Jung: Letters*, Vol. 2, p. 495.

Part (3) Jung's Formal Legitimization of the Concept of Synchronicity: A Thematic

Summary of his Approach

By 1951 Jung has mentioned synchronicity quite frequently, but always in passing within works not specifically intended to explain synchronicity; thus he is well prepared to formally introduce synchronicity. Considering the number of offhand references that he has provided for this allegedly new and progressive concept for depth psychology, it seems a formal exposition is almost overdue.

This formal exposition appears as "tiber Synchronizitat," which was given as a lecture to a select few scholars at the 1951 Eranos conference at Ascona, Switzerland, and was published in the *Eranos-Jahrbuch 1951* at Zurich in 1952. The English translation, "On Synchronicity" appears in the *Collected Works* as an appendix to *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle*, and contains minor revisions of the original Eranos lecture. Although "On Synchronicity" is placed after, it clearly is a prelude to *Synchronicity: An Acausal*

Connecting Principle. "On Synchronicity" contains condensed versions of the on extrasensory perception (ESP) and Jung's own ¹J. B. Rhine study astrological experiment, both of which are treated in greater detail in

Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle.

Perhaps the conflicting claims over the frequency (or infrequency) of synchronistic events in both Jung's theory and in the opinions of his commentators may be accounted for when the variability of the psyche among human beings is duly considered. It is likely that some individuals experience synchronicity frequently, while others experience it occasionally, and last, that some individuals never experience synchronicity.

***C. G. Jung, *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle in The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 417-519.**

²J. B. Rhine, *Extra-Sensory Perception* (Boston: 1934) and *Hew Frontiers of the Mind* (New York and London: 1937), cited in Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8.

3(a) "On Synchronicity" (1951)

In "On Synchronicity" Jung begins by informing his learned audience that he would prefer to describe rather than define synchronicity at this early stage of its exposition. After suggesting the term's etymology "has something to do with time, or to be more accurate, a kind of simultaneity," he introduces the idea of *meaningful coincidence* by means of an apparently hypothetical example of synchronicity:

Someone chances to notice the number on his street car ticket. On arriving home he receives a telephone call during which the same number is mentioned. In the evening he buys a theatre ticket that again has the same number. The three events form a chance grouping that, although not likely to occur often, nevertheless lies well within the framework of probability owing to the frequency of each of its terms.

The next example of synchronicity is not allegedly hypothetical, but admittedly gathered from Jung's personal experience, revealing a measure of confidence that was notably lacking in the hints and indirect examples found within Jung's previous work. Jung relates the occurrence of a chance grouping of six items which thematically pertain to the symbol of the fish.

Jung says on a particular morning of 1949 he saw a figure of a half man and half fish and then "there was fish for lunch. That same afternoon a former patient displayed impressive pictures of fish to Jung, while in the evening he was shown an embroidered design with sea monsters and fish motifs. The following morning a former patient whom Jung had not seen for ten years visited; the patient had dreamed the night before of a large fish. Several

From Part 3(b) below (p. 147), we see that Jung is indeed the subject who experiences this synchronicity.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 520.

³Ibid., p. 521.

months later while having just finished writing about these events, Jung strolled out to the lake where he had been several times earlier in the same morning. He then saw a foot long fish lying on the sea-wall and, he relates, "since no one else was present, I have no idea how the fish got there."

Jung next tells the audience that the first example of coincidences was indeed derived from a case study, yet he does not reveal the source; as noted, the subject was in fact Jung. Perhaps Jung feared the audience might deem two personal case histories as unworthy source material, which therefore would portray the phenomenon of synchronicity as being an ill-founded, personalistic fabrication. Usually, when Jung obtains data from some socially reputable type of individual, the data is deemed to be of high calibre, and the name and position of the subject are often repeated several times—but it seems Jung does not apply this strategy to *himself* as a subject.

Jung then suggests that synchronicity may involve precognition; that is, "a foreknowledge of the coming series of events." He then claims that an increased frequency of these events destroys, or at least, minimizes the possibility of the operation of mere chance. Jung then recalls a precognitive dream of a student friend. The friend apparently dreamed he was in Spain, saw a Gothic cathedral and after turning a street corner, a carriage drawn by cream-coloured horses passed by. In waking reality, after having completed his final examinations, the friend's father sent the friend to Spain where he found the exact same cathedral and after turning a street corner saw the same carriage with cream-coloured horses that he had dreamed of before his

¹Ibid.

²See Part 3(b), p. 147.

³Ibid., p. 522.

departure. Jung expects his audience to believe this story; they are left to trust his professional integrity as to the truthfulness of the account.

More important, however, Jung uses the story as a bridge towards his entry into the paranormal and its relation to synchronicity. He says:

The *sentiment du dej[^]-vu* is based, as I have found in a number of cases, on a foreknowledge in dreams, but we saw that this foreknowledge can also occur in the waking state. In such cases mere chance becomes highly improbable because the coincidence is known in advance. It thus loses its chance character not only psychologically and subjectively, but objectively too, since the accumulation of details that coincide immeasurably increases the improbability of chance as a determining factor.

He then cites the study of Dariex and Flammarion which calculates the probabilities for correct precognitions of deaths. The range of probabilities which Dariex and Flammarion present is from 1 in 4,000,000 to 1 in 8,000,000, which is a very low probability. Jung then uses this data to suggest that "in these cases"² (which we are to suppose refers to actual cases where precognition of a death is accurate) it makes little sense to speak of "'chance'" happenings, but more relevant to describe these as "meaningful coincidences.'

As for an explanation of the paranormal, Jung says a satisfactory one has not been provided, especially in regard to the means of the transmission of data through space and time to the perceiving mind. He suggests that "no one has succeeded in constructing a causal bridge between the elements making up a meaningful coincidence."* Considering his treatment of Leibniz and

Ibid. Ibid.

Ibid. Ibid., p.

523.

other western philosophers which deal with this problem on the speculative level, it seems Jung is referring to the lack of a scientific explanation for paranormal phenomena—one which could be empirically verified. The theme of the transmission of perceived data is elaborated on by Jung in *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle*. For the time being, however, Jung leaves the topic alone and uses his preamble into the paranormal to lead into one of the studies he refers to most in his attempt to legitimize synchronicity.

J. B. Rhine's study of ESP, if largely forgotten today, was somewhat groundbreaking in 1934 when it was first published. Jung provides an encapsulated account of the Rhine study, stressing its importance for establishing a "reliable basis"² for the alleged reality of ESP.

^xJung suggests the Rhine Experiments helped to rekindle interest in the paranormal and mysticism. He claims that mysticism had been rampant in the medieval period but that it was suppressed and virtually abolished in the 19th century by the rise of pragmatism and the new scientific ethos that carried with it reliable and impressive technological achievements. Apart from the Rhine studies, however, paranormal ideas were on the rise in late 19C to early 20C Western culture. William James notes the mystically inclined "Mind Cure" movement of the late 1800's. See William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, ed. Martin E. Marty (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1982 [1902]), pp. 94-131. Meanwhile Madame Helena Petrovna Blavatsky headed the influential Theosophical Society. See E. M. Butler, *The Myth of the Magus*, pp. 243-260.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 523.

³Jung's previous mentor, Freud, was not oblivious to the possibility of paranormal phenomena. As early as 1921 Freud suggests the existence of telepathy in order to explain a fortune teller's knowledge of a man's love for crayfish. Freud says that "we must draw the inference that there is such a thing as thought-transference." Freud also argues the case for oeneric telepathy, and provides several examples of telepathic dreams in support of this essentially paranormal hypothesis. Sigmund Freud, "Psycho-Analysis and Telepathy" and "Dreams and Telepathy" in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Group Psychology and Other Works in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* trans. James Strachey, Anna Freud et. al. (London: The Hogarth Press, 1961), Vol. XVIII (1920-1922), pp. 184, 174-193, 197-220.

Essentially, subjects in that study guessed the concealed images on cards held by another subject. The distance between subjects was both nearby and, in another run, 4,000 miles. Jung says that some of the subjects, out of a "very high" but unspecified number of subjects, scored more than twice the probable hits of 6.5 in a hundred. Jung also reports that one subject scored a perfect score of 25 correct guesses out of 25 attempts. As we will see in his treatment of the data in his astrological experiment, Jung highlights the few notable exceptions which would be regarded as aberrant to the statistician concerned with significant results—for without Jung indicating as much, it seems the results of all three of the Rhine experiments fell well below any type of statistical significance. Heedless of this major failing, Jung attests that the increase of distance had no effect on the results of the first experiment. A second experiment had subjects guess the image on a card that would be turned over in the near and more distant future. Here Jung merely indicates that the result showed a probability of 1 in 4,000,000, which even to the untrained ear would hardly sound convincing.

The third experiment studied subjects' ability to psychically influence the number which would appear upon rolled dice. On the second and third experiments Jung skirts over the results which for all intents and purposes seem insignificant; in fact, he fails to provide numerical results for the third experiment.

Regardless, and quite surprisingly, Jung asserts that the results of the Rhine study are "remarkable,"² and attempts to link this fantastical view of ESP with synchronicity by noting that the results became less positive as the

*See below, pp. 125-129.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 524.

experiment progressed; that is, the initial results proved to be highest. Jung attributes the degradation of positive results to an early "faith and optimism" which he implies decreases, by virtue of ensuing fatigue and boredom, to a mood of "scepticism and resistance" among subjects. He postulates from this that subjects' emotional state has a direct effect on the success - or failure - of their guesses.

In relation to synchronicity, which Jung now introduces as spontaneous, meaningful coincidences, Jung claims many of his professional cases confirm the observed connection between affectivity and the so-called paranormal. However, he provides only one example: Jung tells of a young woman who is steeped in "Cartesian rationalism;" that is, her intellectual function, according to Jung, is highly developed and indeed skewed towards a lopsided belief in a "geometrical," scientific, and causal world view.^j

Jung describes the client's intellect in a somewhat belittling manner:

My example concerns a young woman patient who, in spite of efforts made on both sides, proved to be psychologically inaccessible. The difficulty lay in the fact that she always knew better about everything.

Jung then notes that she reported a dream in which she was given a piece of jewellery—a golden scarab. In the midst of her discourse on the dream, Jung apparently heard a tapping on the office window; turning, he opened the window, caught the insect and saw that it was a scarabaeid beetle (the common rose chafer) with a gold-green colour resembling that of the golden scarab which the woman had dreamt of. Handing the insect to his client, Jung then

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 525.

Ibid.

said "here is your scarab," which apparently deflated her excessive intellectual resistance. This incident facilitated her ongoing treatment because she redefined her perspective on reality—away from the older view of excessive rationalism, toward a newer one of increased "human understanding.

Jung claims this is only one of "innumerable cases" of meaningful coincidence that he and others had observed, and prior to mentioning the rose chafer case, he quite dogmatically - certainly not scientifically - states:

It makes no difference whether you refuse to believe this particular case or whether you dispose of it with an *ad hoc* explanation.

He then continues by altering, or at least by highlighting the questionable results of the Rhine study:

I could tell you a great many such stories, which are in principle no more surprising or incredible than the *irrefutable* results arrived at by Rhine [emphasis mine].

Concerning the purported great number of other cases, Jung mentions only two: the Swedish scientist Emanuel Swedenborg's well-documented mystical vision of the Stockholm fire, and an Air Marshal's dream that allegedly⁴ prefigured his own plane accident.

At this point Jung summarizes the paranormal phenomena he has presented into three categories, representing three different types of synchronicity.

1. The coincidence of a psychic state with a simultaneous objective, external event that corresponds to the initial psychic state or content of the observer. No evidence of causality is present between the

¹bid.

²bid.

³bid.

The dream was of an unknown officer.

psychic state and the event, which considering the relativity of space and time, is not even conceivable.

2. The coincidence of a psychic state with a corresponding and more or less simultaneous external event which takes place at a distance, beyond the observer's normal range of perception.
3. The coincidence of a psychic state with a corresponding event which will occur in the distant future and which may be verified afterwards.

Jung somewhat confusingly says that 2 and 3 of the above, by virtue of being cases of synchronicity in which the present connects with "events not yet present in the observer's field of perception"² are to be termed *synchronistic* instead of *synchronous*. Clearly the first type is also synchronistic and not synchronous. If it were merely synchronous, it would be an instance of *synchronism*, which is later defined by Jung as the occurrence of two events which do not have any special or noteworthy meaning between them.³

While Jung intends to valorize synchronicity in this address, this confusing exposition does not help to further his aim. As we have seen in the discussion of the Rhine results and in Jung's definition of synchronicity, Jung's thought, or at least the presentation of his thought is scattered, selective, and in this recent instance, unclear.

Quite unperturbed by his own apparently shoddy exposition, however, Jung proceeds in an almost kaleidoscopic manner by turning the discussion over to manticism (i.e. divination) and its relation to synchronicity. Jung claims that manticism does not produce synchronistic events, but at least makes "them

Summarized from Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 526. Ibid., p. 526. 'ibid., p. 441.

serve its ends." The example *par excellence* of a raantic method has Jung again rely on Chinese philosophy, particularly on the *I Ching* wherein Jung notes that a connection is present between the mind of the diviner and the oracular text. Another slight contradiction again appears in Jung's thought regarding the method of the *I Ching*:

The result of the method is, incontestably, very interesting, but so far as I can see does not provide any tool for an objective determination of the facts, *that is to say a statistical evaluation*, since the psychic state in question is much too indefinite and indefinable [emphasis mine].

Elsewhere Jung vehemently argues against the inherent narrowness and artificiality of the statistical method, and as we have seen in the above, he suggests that as a human artifice, statistics ruin the "fact" of

i

synchronicity.

Despite this, Jung uses the *I Ching* which through the Wilhelm translation has gained some legitimacy in the West as one of the sacred books of a fabled, romanticised, and as Edward Said argues, economically and psychologically exploited world of the Far East. The Wilhelm translation's legitimization of Chinese thought has much in common with Max Miiller's facilitation of the western academic study of Indian thought. Like

¹Ibid., p. 526.

²Ibid., p. 527.

³See Parts 2(1) and 3(b).

⁴Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 504, Vol. 11, p. 592.

⁵Said, *Orientalism*.

"See, Max F. Miiller, ed. *The Sacred Books of the East*, trans. G. Bihler (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1964).

Muller's, the european Wilhelm's translation brought the 'esoteric' and 'incredible*' ideas of the east to the doorstep of western acceptability.

Having corroborated synchronicity with the tenable idea of the *I Ching*, Jung is ready to embark upon the shakier ground - from the perspective of 1951 - of astrology. Taken as a parlour game or as a mild amusement in the daily newspaper, astrology lacked the type of authentic ring that is associated with the philosophy of China. Astrology has no real 'buzzwords' of legitimacy ascribed to it, unlike the Chinese system which is variously described as being *ancient*, *sagely*, *philosophical* and so on. It takes no semiotic brilliance to recognize that each of these words contain a plethora of connotations^ which when associated with the idea of synchronicity, lend it a degree of gravity and authority. Having thus anchored synchronicity in a past philosophical idea which to some extent thematically antecedes it, Jung now attempts to firmly root synchronicity in the 'modern' soil of scientific analysis with use of his own study of the paranormal phenomenon of astrology.

A more complete exposition of Jung's "astrological experiment" is given in *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle*, but Jung provides an adequate summary account of it here. He begins by noting that a Professor Max Knoll has demonstrated that solar radiation is influenced by the position of the planets to the extent that magnetic storms may be predicted with a "fair" amount of probability.³ Further, these magnetic disturbances are apparently related to the mortality rate.

*See Part 2(j).

^See Part 4(c), pp. 222-223 for a discussion on the semiotic distinction between denotation and connotation.

³Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 527.

Jung notes, however, that by virtue of the natural movement of the stars over eons, the signs of the zodiac coincide with the calendar but not with the actual constellations upon which they were originally based. For instance, someone born in Aries today, Jung argues, was actually born in Pisces. Jung further says that each zodiacal house possesses a certain quality, yet argues that this may be causally related to magnetic conditions in space. If this were the actual case, one might ask whether the zodiacal houses would still retain their originally postulated influences on the psyche—that is, if astrological influence were due to magnetic storms, the ancient qualities of "Pisces" might today be manifest in an "Aries."

Moreover, and more important for Jung's use of astrology in relation to synchronicity, one could question the validity of his overall approach. For if the relation among the stars, planets and the psyche is causal, as Jung suggests, then it seems invalid to use astrological data in favour of synchronicity, which is, according to Jung's repeated insistence, an essentially *acausal* phenomenon.

Jung, however, overlooks this inconsistency, and proceeds to present his study which, in conjunction with Mrs. Liliane Frey-Rohn, examined the relation of 50 alleged marriage characteristics for 180 married couples (360 individual horoscopes).

For those unacquainted with the nuances of the astrological method, Jung's exposition appears complex and almost baffling. To begin, he claims, without any reference, that the "traditional belief" regarding marriage is that a conjunction of sun and moon, respectively belonging to two marriage partners, renders a suitable union. He claims that another, unspecified "old tradition" equates the dual conjunction of moon-moon with auspicious

marriages. Next, while describing the astrological experiment, Jung declares that he wished to examine the "important aspects that might possibly be characteristic of marriage", which suddenly and with no explanation as to why, are denoted as Mars and Venus in their ascending and descending trajectories. He then says that the probability of the result was 1 : 10,000, which some unreferenced mathematical physicists apparently declared was "considerable," and which others found "questionable."

This is hardly a scientific means of reporting results. The rationale of both the hypothesis and of the results is ambiguous, as is the reported method of data collection. Jung says he collected at random all the marriage horoscopes he and his partner could "lay hands on. No information is given as to the *means* of collecting the data, nor is information provided regarding the nature of the experimental group—for example, their ages and so-called "socio-economic status" (SES). If we momentarily accepted the validity of distinctions made in regard to SES, an array of questions arise which Jung does not address. For example, would a high SES group exhibit similar marriage configurations in comparison with a lower SES group? Furthermore, how would inter-SES group marriages affect the data? To complicate matters, Jung then says that the number of subjects (360) renders the study "inconclusive" from a statistical point of view.

¹ibid., p. 528.

²Ibid., pp. 528-529.

³Ibid.

⁴"SES" is a sociological term which some would argue artificially creates status distinctions on the basis of subjects' income or wealth.

Later, after presenting figures and conjunctions in an extremely inadequate and perplexing mode of explication (at least, to those unfamiliar with the finer points of astrology), Jung says that "the possibility of their being a scientifically valid connection" between proton radiation and the astrological data must be ruled out because the results are too weak to be deemed anything but "mere chance."

Nevertheless, Jung attempts to turn this discouraging study into an optimistic one by arguing:

[the fact that] the three classical moon conjunctions should occur at all, can only be explained either as the result of an intentional or unintentional fraud, or else as precisely such a meaningful coincidence, that is, as synchronicity.

Jung argues that the occurrence of three conjunctions which contained not the sun/moon but only the moon sign spells out synchronicity, despite the fact that the total number of conjunctions was over 180 (83 more were added in a second batch of data, rendering a total of 263 marriages). Written mathematically: $(3 \text{ [moon conjunctions]} * 263 \text{ [total marriages]}) \times 100 = 1.1 \%$. This is hardly a convincing percentage to offer in favour of synchronicity. Clearly the figure 1.1 % lies outside what statisticians describe as the range of significance. This finding would be regarded as nothing more than a statistical anomaly. Whether or not one accepts the world view of statistical research and its perspective on such "anomalies" is a moot point. What is significant, however, is that Jung attempts to give synchronicity a scientific facade by putting forth his scientific study of astrological data.

¹Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 529. ²Ibid., p. 520.

At least, he does this initially. When the scientific results fail to provide any real evidence for Jung's initial hypothesis, he perplexingly suggests that the failed study in fact *supports* synchronicity. Thus Jung makes a *volte face* and further dogmatizes his questionable strategy by stating that the experiment was a "success" and that it was "entirely in accord with Rhine's ESP results."¹

Perhaps Jung takes advantage of the fact that he is delivering a public address—a situation in which less detail and coherence is expected than in a formal written treatise. His audience consisted of the societally recognized "major figures" of the study of religion and mythology. Was it the expected decorum of a prestigious scholarly grouping that permitted such an haphazard lecture to pass by so easily?

The prominent Eranos member Mircea Eliade, who attended Jung's lecture, has argued against several of Jung's psychological ideas—for instance Jung's archetypal view of human history in which human individuals become creative heroes only by virtue of their repetition of some underlying archetypal reality. It seems Eliade expresses disagreement with Jung's position on the archetype when he writes:

The Christianity of the popular European strata never succeeded in abolishing...the theory of the archetype (which transformed a historical personage into an exemplary hero and a historical event into a mythical category).

Likewise in his treatment of alchemy, -Eliade expresses admiration for Jung's exhaustive studies in the area, yet provides a more cosmological view

*Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 530.

²Mircea Eliade, *The Myth of the Eternal Return* trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1954), p. 151.

³Ibid., p. 142.

of alchemy as an alternative to Jung's exclusively psychological perspective. According to Eliade, the alchemist's main concern was an attempt to alter the natural laws of time, and not necessarily to obtain, as Jung would have it, a psychological grip on immortality.

Concerning synchronicity, Eliade is not averse to the idea of magical causation and the potential reality of the paranormal-ideas which are closely related to synchronicity; but as with his treatment of alchemy, his emphasis is not as extensively psychological as is Jung's.

At any rate, for some reason, the members of the Eranos conference of 1951 - of which Eliade was one - apparently accepted the notion that Jung's failed astrological experiment became a success. Jung advances this apparent absurdity to the extreme when he declares that it might be a "minor miracle"² that one single instance of a moon-moon conjunction occurred.

Turning to the Rhine experiment, Jung launches an assault on the idea of causality: the Rhine experiment has apparently "demonstrated"³ the relativity of space and time and the concomitant possibility of eliminating causality. As a result, the notion of acausality is not miraculous but something possible and even feasible within the limits of natural understanding. Synchronicity is said to bring this abstract metaphysic directly into the tangible,

Jung postulates a difference between the 'linear' and 'holistic' mind, and attributes linear thinking to the rise of western science; whereas Eliade attributes linear thought to the advent of Jewish theophany. In general, Jung's views are overtly psychological while Eliade's are historical. See for instance, Eliade's dialogue among the "historical man" and the "archaic man" in *The Myth Of The Eternal Return*, pp. 141-162.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 530.

³*Ibid.*

observable realm of human experience by virtue of the essentially human psychological meaning that is attached to it.

Synchronicity designates the parallelism of time and meaning between psychic and psychophysical events, which scientific knowledge so far has been unable to reduce to a common principle.

While this passage may seem to question the scientific status of synchronicity, it would seem Jung refers to the brand of "science" that exists prior to his own. We have seen that Jung heralds the Rhine study as one that furthers the scientific legitimacy of synchronicity.

For Jung, however, science alone cannot adequately justify the idea of synchronicity. Even at this early, cursory stage of his formal presentation, a reminder of the German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz's idea of "correspondence" is provided. This term refers to Leibniz's theory of the interrelatedness of all things, based upon the notion of a "pre-established harmony." Jung ironically suggests that Leibniz's system was derived from Leibniz's experience of such connections, making Leibniz's notion of "pre-established harmony" acausal in the sense that the theory was based upon the gnostic view that fundamental unity is intrinsic to existence. Jung then says that synchronicity may be distinguished from Leibniz's idea of correspondence in that "It is based not on philosophical assumptions but on empirical experience and experimentation." The question remains, of course, whether Jung's vision of experimental verification is equivalent to that of other scientists.

Ibid., p. 531.

Ibid.

In the close of the lecture, Jung hints at provocative issues pertaining to space, time, and the psyche. Very briefly he suggests that the psyche, by virtue of synchronicity, may not be located in any specific region of space (i.e., space is relative to the psyche). Likewise, the psyche is said to not necessarily exist in any given parameter of time, or put differently, he suggests that time is relative to the psyche.

Jung is able to postulate these almost yogic or shamanistic-sounding ideas to his audience for two reasons: first, as he is addressing students of religion and mythology, the ideas are hardly novel. Religious observers of the human experience usually speculate that the mind has some relation to a supraphysical and atemporal environment. Second, having just presented synchronicity as the meaningful connection between a psychic content and an external event, Jung establishes a foundation for further elaboration on what he sees as the "far-reaching consequences" of synchronicity—for instance, what synchronicity holds for a scientific study of the relation among mind, time and the world.

Whether Jung's foundation is a solid one is not of special interest; we have outlined what appear to be major defects in his charismatic style of reasoning, and have revealed his equally suspect and arguably *strategic* cover-ups of data which do not support his claims. The interest arises not from a traditionally scientific standpoint, but from a poststructural perspective.

In his case for synchronicity, Jung provides an almost mesmerizing rush of various types of material. Signs of true brilliance emerge not necessarily because Jung provides a rationally coherent argument (which he does not), but because he uses shrewd means to implement his supportive material. In the

*Freud/Jung Letters** we learn that at an early stage in his career Jung was not oblivious to the legitimizing effects of scientific discourse. As the first president of the International Psychoanalytic School, he wrote to his mentor, Sigmund Freud on 4 October 1911:

Two boring things will be included in the next *Jahrbuch*, but because of their scientific veneer they will impress the kind of public that likes indirect statements. We must do a bit more infiltrating in scientific circles.

Forty years later in the close of his lecture "On Synchronicity," Jung notes the prominent physicist, Wolfgang Pauli who will contribute the essay, "The Influence of Archetypal Ideas on the Scientific Theories of Kepler" towards the upcoming publication of the book, *The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche*. Together with Pauli's piece, the book contains Jung's "Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle." Thus at the close of "On Synchronicity" Jung promises a veritable feast for those interested in further exploring some of the 'evidence' for synchronicity that Jung garners from the annals of human reflection upon phenomenology, cosmology, and their relation.

3(b) Synchronicity in *The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche* (1952)

It is important to study Jung's "Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle" not only as it appears in the *Collected Works*, but as it was originally intended. It was first published together with W. Pauli's "The Influence of Archetypal Ideas on the Scientific Theories of Kepler" in *The*

Sigmund Freud, C. G. Jung and William McGuire, *The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence Between Sigmund Freud and C. G. Jung* ed. William McGuire, trans. Ralph Manheim and R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XCIV (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974).

²Ibid., p. 445.

³Supra, p. 8, n4.

Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche, a piece that was intended to "advance" occidental knowledge of the so-called paranormal, and to argue for the paranormal and its amenability to scientific verification.

In what today may seem to be a vague, overgeneralized type of new age, east-west holism, the Frontispiece of the 1955 English translation reads, in reference to Jung's portion of the book:

The first important publication in the field of parapsychology by the noted Swiss psychologist. His discussion aims, on the one hand, to incorporate the findings of "extrasensory perception" (ESP) research into a general scientific point of view; on the other hand, he endeavours to ascertain the nature of the psychic factor in these phenomena.

And on Pauli's contribution:

The physicist Pauli, recipient of the Nobel Prize in 1945, discusses the polemic between the 17-century scientist Kepler and the alchemist Robert Fludd. He demonstrates the irreconcilability of scientific and alchemical premises in the late Renaissance, shown particularly in the discrepancy of symbols used by these two authors.

Last, in reference to both Jung and Pauli:

Contrary to the intellectual situation of the 17 century, there are indications in present times of a reconciliation between what in the past had been opposites, toward a more integrated world view. Proof of it is this book, uniting the work of a psychologist and a physicist, each eminent in his field.

If this lofty introductory sales pitch seems almost clichéd from a contemporary standpoint, one must bear in mind that their book was groundbreaking at that time. Jung had quite a formidable ideological task ahead

ibid.

frontispiece in Jung et. al., *The Interpretation and Nature of the Psyche*.

^JSee Beverley Zabriskie, "Jung and Pauli: A Subtle Asymmetry." *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, Vol. 40, 1995: 531-553, p. 531.


of him, and with the collaboration of Pauli he was well-armed to break into the field of parapsychology under the guise of science. As already noted, Jung's science could in fact be viewed as scientism—a sort of pseudo-science that reveals some of the attitudes and methods of the person of science, but which lacks a strict adherence to them.

Jung presents the data of his astrological experiment, formerly mentioned in "On Synchronicity," by using various tables and graphs which do not facilitate the presentation. Rather, they obfuscate the dismal statistical failure of his results. Notably, there are no truly representative graphs, bell-curves, or pictorial representations which would demonstrate the fact that in the experiment the expected findings for marriage characteristics did not occur. Especially with his bar graphs, the scale is unduly increased in order to make the results look better than they are/ A fair exposition would have used a much smaller scale, showing that the conjunctions observed were anomalous from the very scientific perspective which Jung, quite ironically, uses to justify his thesis about synchronicity.

Nevertheless, the results are given a scientific appearance. It seems from his initial collaboration with Pauli that Jung attempts to gain the high degree of social authenticity that the noted physicist enjoys; that is, Jung

Beverley Zabriskie notes that Albert Einstein regarded highly a critique of the idea of relativity which Pauli wrote at the age of 21. Einstein said: "No one studying this mature, grandly conceived work could believe that the author is a man of 21." Albert Einstein, cited in Zabriskie, ".Jung and Pauli: A Subtle Asymmetry," p. 534. Likewise David Lindorff writes that "Pauli was a genius, who as a Nobel Laureate ranked with the top ten physicists of this century." See David Lindorff, "One Thousand Dreams: The Spiritual Awakening of Wolfgang Pauli." *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, Vol. 40, 1995: 555-569, p. 555.

'See next page.




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Figure 2: Frequency of aspects in 180 married pairs¹



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Figure 3: Frequency of aspects per 180 unmarried pairs, observed in 32,220 pairs ²

¹C. G- Jung and W. Pauli, *The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche*,

Ibid., p. 71.

wishes to appear to be equally as stringent, scrupulous and honest in the process of knowledge gathering as many believe all scientists are.

Interestingly, Pauli seems to take the converse of Jung's approach. Beverley Zabriskie notes that Pauli was interested in "philosophy and religious issues throughout his life,"² which is evident in his portion of the book. The diagrams and illustrations he includes are derived from Kepler's musings on the human soul and from the alchemist Robert Fludd's archaic diagrams representing the relation between the "divine" and the "mundane," or the "formal" and the "material." Thus it seems that Pauli attempts to project the image of a "soul-doctor" or "mystic physician" in

*The process of scientific investigation has been argued to contain a considerable degree of subjectivity, rather than the supposed pure objectivity that is normally ascribed to it. See for instance, James D. Watson's account of the roundabout and highly intuitive 'discovery' of the DNA molecule. James D. Watson, *The Double Helix* (New York: Signet Classics, 1968). Likewise, Broad and Wade argue that while members of the scientific community herald the scientific method as a validation of scientific practice, this method is often ignored in the actual practice of medical science. Scientific research, publication and theory building is said to be not unlike any other social activity—replete with corruption, fraud, deceit, and various other human foibles and irrationalities. See William Broad & Nicholas Wade, *Betrayers of the Truth: Fraud and Deceit in the Halls of Science* (New York: Touchstone, 1982).

¹Zabriskie, *Jung and Pauli: A Subtle Asymmetry*, p. 547. Lindorff notes that Pauli experienced a so-called "nervous breakdown," which like Jung and the scientist *cum* mystic Emanuel Swedenborg, was followed by an increased sensitivity to matters spiritual. Pauli experienced dreams, visions, and partially underwent a Jungian analysis. Becoming a part of Jung's inner circle, he communicated with Jung "throughout his life about his dreams." See Lindorff, "One Thousand Dreams: The Spiritual Awakening of Wolfgang Pauli," pp. 556, 568; and David Lindorff, "Psyche, Matter and Synchronicity: A Collaboration Between C. G. Jung and Wolfgang Pauli." *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, Vol. 40, 1995: 571-586, p. 575.

³Jung and Pauli, *The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche*, pp. 192-193.

order to keep step with Jung's considerable status as the wise gnostic doctor or "depth-healer."¹

Pauli's contribution to *The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche* will now be outlined, specifically as it relates to Jung's "Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle."

Pauli begins his look at Kepler's scientific theories by suggesting that many physicists have recently adopted the view that

intuition and the direction of attention play a considerable role in the development of concepts and ideas, generally far transcending mere experience, that are necessary for the erection of a system of natural laws (that is, a scientific theory).

He continues, "all logical thinkers" seem to agree that logic alone is incapable of bridging the gap between empirical sense perceptions and concepts which are formed about them. Pauli then posits an intimate relation between human ideas and natural events, between the observer and that which is observed. The intuitive, non-rational link between the physical event and the conceptual understanding of the event is understood to have some connection with the "soul" of the perceiver; both the soul and the thing perceived are thus subject to some overriding, unifying principle. Pauli deems it

'This claim is, of course, based upon my reading of Pauli. Pauli did, indeed, have unusual, paranormal experiences occur around him. The so-called "Pauli Effect" refers to the fact that his scientific equipment would often break "in response to an 'unpleasant tension'" which would arise when Pauli entered the laboratory. Lindorff says that the Pauli Effect became so pronounced that Pauli's colleague, Otto Stern, would forbid Pauli to enter the lab while an experiment was under way. See Lindorff, *Psyche, Matter and Synchronicity: A Collaboration Between C. G. Jung and Wolfgang Pauli*, pp. . 572-573. I maintain, however, that even though Pauli had an interest in - and actually experienced -mysticism, his exposition is styled in the manner of the old world mystic, in contrast to Jung's apparently scientific mode of reporting.

²Ibid., pp. 151-152.

³Ibid., p. 152.

acceptable to postulate a universal "cosmic order" that connects, as it were, mind and matter. As observers of natural phenomena, human beings are at best able to form partial statements about this overall cosmic order by applying logical constructs which apply to the natural phenomena observed; yet these concepts "transcend" that 'thing' or 'event' which they are designed to denote by taking the form of idealized laws. Humans experience happiness when they construct these laws, which demonstrates the existence of a type of "correspondence, a "matching" of inner images pre-existent in the human psyche between external objects and their behaviour."¹

Pauli then notes that Kepler spoke of inner images ("archetypalis") that are perceived by the soul with the aid of innate instinct, and due reference is given to Jung's concept of the archetype. The importance of Kepler for Pauli rests in Pauli's historical position as a sort of junction point between an archaic, magical cosmology on the one hand, and on the other hand, the unitative views about humankind and the natural environment which emerged, *circa* 1952, from the scientific fields of higher mathematics and quantum physics.

Pauli outlines various novel and mystical ideas that were forwarded by the scientist Kepler, who in addition to formulating three famous laws on planetary motion, also believed the planets to be 'alive,' replete with individual souls. Pauli notes that Kepler also mentions the notion of an

bid., p. 151.

²Ibid., p. 156. This idea is not likely to be found in high school textbooks alongside coverage of Kepler's three laws of planetary motion. There is no mention of it under the entry of Kepler in *The Penguin Dictionary of Physics*. That the earth behaves as if it had its own interconnected consciousness is a notion revived by the "Gaia hypothesis" of James Lovelock. See James E. Lovelock, *Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). Likewise, Lewis Thomas suggests that the entire earth

anima mundi, i.e. an alchemical "world soul" common to all humanity. Other extracts from Kepler's writing reveal his related belief that the corporeal world parallels the mind of the Godhead—that through creation God replicates the Divine Mind in a physical form because he could not conceive of anything better:

For when the all-wise Creator sought to make everything as good, beautiful, and excellent as possible, he found nothing that could be better or more beautiful or more excellent than Himself. Therefore when He conceived in His Mind the corporeal world He chose for it a form that was as similar as possible to Himself.

Kepler's cosmology is then portrayed as being essentially Christian and trinitarian, which is compared to the "quaternary" cosmology of the Rosicrucian physician, Robert Fludd. Pauli, like Jung favours Fludd's worldview as it is believed to preserve a unity among the inner experience of the observer and the external processes of the natural world. Pauli depicts Kepler's view, despite the passage quoted above, as one lacking in an understanding of "a wholeness between microcosm and macrocosm," which Pauli clearly endorses. On this point Jung's theory of synchronicity is mentioned in a footnote as representing a "modern parallel" to the idea of wholeness.

Thus Pauli's essay and its endorsement of synchronicity provides some of the scientific status that Jung requires for his "new idea," precisely because a noted modern scientist suggests in a scholarly fashion that synchronicity is

behaves like a single, living cell. See Lewis Thomas, *The Lives of a Cell: Notes of a Biology Watcher* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974); and Valerie Illingworth (ed.), *The Penguin Dictionary of Physics*, second edition (London: Penguin Books, 1990), pp. 252-253.

*Jung and Pauli, *The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche*, p. 168.

²Ibid., p. 207.

³Ibid.

not an entirely new idea, but an important type of mislaid knowledge that, as Pauli argues, existed in antiquity yet was "lost in the world view of classical natural science."¹

3(c) **Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle (1952)**

Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle is an ingenious collage of personal case material, philosophy, religion and science—all geared towards proving the authenticity of synchronicity as a psychological, scientific, and historical phenomenon. The text reads almost like fiction, with the protagonists being Jung, his friends, clients, and others who have reported cases of synchronicity. These experiences of synchronicity are the action or plot of the piece. Even the scientific and historical portions of the text may be read as a type of fiction, or postmodern truth creation² because neither section fulfils the requirements of a legitimate historical or scientific examination of ideas related to synchronicity. Jung's use of

*Ibid. John Dourley points out that

Jung was influenced in his understanding of synchronicity through his work with Wolfgang Pauli...and that Pauli turned to Jung for help and was analyzed by one of Jung's associates.

John P. Dourley, *A Strategy for a Loss of Faith: Jung's Proposal* (Toronto: Inner City Books, 1992), p. 51. That Jung's and Pauli's lengthy association engendered a sincere belief between them that synchronicity could be explained from the perspective of modern physics is evident from their ongoing correspondence. Jung's letters that are not addressed to, but which mention Pauli also support this idea. See, for instance, *C. G. Jung Letters*, Vol. 1, pp. 113, 174-175, 176, 177, 367, 482, 494, and *C. G. Jung Letters*, Vol. 2, pp. 70, 109, 112, 119, 232, 257, 276, 308, 350, 354, 425, 437, 464, 470, 535, 561. While planning the "Institute for Analytical Psychology" in Zurich, Jung recognizes the authority of Pauli and other great figures. *Op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 482. This does not, however, mean that Jung was a mere opportunist striving for personal gain. Rather, it seems probable that he was genuinely pleased to have impressive collaborators working for a cause in which he truly believed.

²See Part 4(d).

historical data is a weak example of analogical argumentation; he presents a variety of different ideas as being equivalent to one another, despite the fact that he often extracts - and alters - them from their original social and historical contexts. Moreover, Jung's use of science does not adhere to the controls which practitioners of the scientific method are obligated to follow. Jung even admits this latter point in his foreword to

Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle, in which he openly admits his concerns and aspirations for the presentation of the concept of synchronicity:

In writing this paper I have, so to speak, made good a promise which for many years I lacked the courage to fulfil. The difficulties of the problem and its presentation seemed to me too great; too great the intellectual responsibility without which such a subject cannot be tackled; too inadequate, in the long run, my scientific training.

He continues:

If I have now conquered my hesitation and at last come to grips with my theme, it is chiefly because my experiences of the phenomenon of synchronicity have multiplied themselves over decades, while on the other hand my researches into the history of symbols, and of the fish symbol in particular, brought the problem even closer to me, and finally because I have been alluding to the existence of this phenomenon on and off in my writings for twenty years without discussing it any further. I would like to put a temporary end to this unsatisfactory state of affairs by trying to give a consistent account of everything I have to say on this subject/

¹Supra, p. 106.

²Throughout their *Betrayers of the Truth*, Broad and Wade suggest that the scientific method is not followed as stringently as the general public is led to believe. See below, p. 183.

³Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 419.

Ibid. Later, William McGuire relates some of the other instances of synchronicity which Jung apparently experienced but did not mention at this time: In "The Houston Films" Jung notes that he spoke of a red car which then appeared from around a corner. Jung also dreamed of Churchill or Roosevelt at the time that Churchill's plane had landed near Zurich for refuelling en route to Africa. And in 1934, Jung attempted to but was unable to work at Bollingen due to a

Jung also writes in the forward that "uncommon demands" will be placed upon the "openmindedness and goodwill of the reader"¹ as he or she is guided through a "dark, dubious" region of human experience that is "hedged about with prejudice."² Jung then claims that as a psychiatrist, he found that most of his clients expressed an uncommon reticence to discuss synchronicity for fear of reprisal and "thoughtless ridicule" from others. He says he was "amazed" to see that a good number of his clients kept experiences of synchronicity well guarded for this reason.

Since originally published with Pauli's work, it is not surprising that Jung begins his exposition of *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle*

massive depression on a Sunday and Monday; he put out a yellow flag to indicate to the mathematician Professor Fierz that he was "not home." McGuire then says "a heavy cloud seemed to oppress him," and that Professor Fierz later told him that the "Nazi purge" occurred on the same Sunday morning. See "From Ester Harding's Notebooks" in William McGuire & R. F. C. Hull eds. *C. G. Jung Speaking*, Bollingen Series XCVII (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 315, 183, 183-184.

bung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 419.

²Ibid.

¹Ibid., p. 420. Clearly Jung fears the same ridicule, for five years later in "The Houston Films" of 1957 he speaks very cautiously when asked about synchronicity:

This is awfully complicated, one wouldn't know where to begin. Of course this kind of thinking started long ago, and when Rhine brought out his results I thought now we have at least a more or less dependable basis to argue on. But the argument was not understood at all because it is really very difficult. When you observe the unconscious you come across plenty of instances of a very peculiar kind of parallel events. For example, I have a certain thought...at the same time something else happens, quite independently, that portrays just that thought. Now this is utter nonsense, you know, looked at from the causal point of view. That it is not nonsense is made evident by the results of Rhine's experiments.

C. G. Jung, cited in McGuire, *C. G. Jung Speaking*, p. 314.

with the legitimizing category of "modern physics." Jung says that modern physics, particularly subatomic physics, has "shattered" the once heralded notion of natural law since microscopic events do not behave predictably, unlike the predictable events of macroscopic reality. As natural laws are statistical truths, Jung continues, the very validity of the statistical method has been thrown into question by the findings of subatomic physics. While it may also be questioned whether it is valid to generalize this alleged failure of statistics on the microscopic level to an invalidity of statistics on the macroscopic level, Jung overlooks this. Thus, from the apparent failure of natural law on the microscopic level, he proceeds to challenge all theories of causality as being nothing more than "relatively true."¹ From this, Jung suggests the possible occurrence of *acausal* events.

Next, a philosophical attack is levelled against the experimental method, which is said to verify only those events which may be regularly repeated. Jung argues that not only are unique events "ruled out," but, moreover, that the inherent parameters of scientific experimentation³ and the very type of questions it asks shapes results. "Every answer of nature is therefore more or less influenced by the kind of questions asked."⁴ Although Jung's bibliography holds no references to sociological analyses of science,

Mung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 421.

²Ibid., p. 422.

³I should add to Jung's argument that these may be practical (e.g., lack of funds for expensive technological equipment) and/or intellectual limits (e.g., limited ways of looking at the world). A desire to acquire and use the latest, state of the art technological instruments may also contribute to the latter limitation.

⁴Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 422.

in the following critique of the scientific method he reveals knowledge of the main ideas contained within what might be termed, the sociology of science:

Absolutely unique and ephemeral events whose existence we have no means of either denying or proving can never be the object of empirical science; rare events might very well be, provided that there was a sufficient number of reliable individual observations. The so-called *possibility* of such events is of no importance whatever, for *the criterion of what is possible in any age is derived from that age's rationalistic assumptions.* There are no "absolute" natural laws to whose authority one can appeal in support of one's prejudices.

In his polemic against the statistical method, however, Jung seems to be misguided. He argues that poor experimental results which contain a few anomalous events (which are not statistically significant) do not make the isolated anomalies disappear altogether. He uses this argument to support the validity of synchronistic phenomena, yet fails to realize that by deriving the argument from his actual use of the statistical method, he in fact alters the original purpose of that method. In a standard experimental design, the statistical method is used to determine whether or not there exists what is deemed to be a "significant" relation between independent and dependent variables. The statistical method is *not* used to scan data for the existence of rare events. Rare events from the statistical perspective are meaningless because they are not reliable. If the experiment were conducted again under equivalent experimental conditions, significant results would be replicated. However, if the events are not replicated in a later experiment with the same conditions, they are viewed as mere chance results. Yet, synchronistic events are unique and cannot be replicated by virtue of their anomalous, one-time

^xIbid., p. 423, second italics added. I would also suggest that political, economic, and ideological pressures, as well as the geographic conditions and climate must also influence what is deemed to be "true" in a given milieu.

occurrence. Therefore, from the perspective of the statistical method, they would be interpreted as being mere chance events.

Thus Jung's attempt to use statistics to justify synchronicity¹ is seriously flawed, or perhaps ironic. Not only does he argue against the validity of that very method, but his reasoning reveals a type of *ex post facto* manipulation—not a manipulation of the data, but of the logic and meaning of the results. Nevertheless, in his determination to legitimize synchronicity, it seems he would rather use the statistical approach out of its intended context than abandon the allegedly 'scientific' component of his exposition, even if this seems like a clever charade.

Jung then focuses his discourse on the problem of chance, or the "world of chance"² as he expresses it. His reasoning about chance may be summarized as follows: Chance, at first glance, seems to be an event that is not causally related to a prior event, or to a "coinciding fact." But upon further reflection, we realize, Jung claims, that it is merely designated as chance because the causal event *has yet to be discovered*. Nevertheless, as Jung asserts that causality is "only relatively valid,"⁴ there must exist among the great majority of causally explicable "chance" events those which are not able to be explained through the notion of causality—that is, they are acausal. Thus Jung makes a distinction between acausal chance events and causal chance events, thereby creating two different categories of chance. Since Jung seems to believe that causal chance events are common, and that

*See Part 3(a) regarding Jung's astrological experiment.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 423.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

acausal ones are relatively rare, he further asserts that the superficial observer tends to overlook or purposely ignore the rare acausal chance events. He then perplexingly says that the problem of chance events demands statistical analysis, even though elsewhere he says that the statistical method misconstrues and de-emphasizes the great importance of chance events.

In continuing his argument, Jung confusingly says that because it is often impossible to determine the causality that underlies all apparently chance events, acausal events may be expected just where causality seems impossible to prove.

Jung uses this preamble to present his first example of synchronicity as a "duplication of cases." The instance Jung mentions is the same as presented in "On Synchronicity:" the run of events in which a tram ticket, a theatre ticket, and a telephone call all bear the same number, and all of these numbers occur on the same day. What differs from "On Synchronicity," however is that in *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle* Jung reveals that he was the anonymous male subject of the former. Previously, perhaps Jung was reticent to display his own identity as the subject in front of an immediate audience; in the latter written account, however, Jung, finally discloses his own personal experience of synchronicity. With this obvious contradiction in Jung's two major discourses - one originally spoken and one written - pertaining to synchronicity, the credibility of the image he intends to portray as the honest and straightforward "man of science" is irreconcilably jeopardised. The unsympathetic, scientifically-minded reader no doubt would

*As a final word on "chance," Jung here fails to mention that it too is arguably nothing more than a linguistic concept, bearing the same historically relative status that causality is said to possess. Further, the notion of *acausality* is presented as if it somehow may be extricated from the historical relativity of truth that Jung argues for in his commentary on causality.

dismiss Jung as a fraud; those from a postmodern perspective who discern a type of logic embedded within Jung's illogic, however, may find the 'fraud' to be both interesting and shrewd.

It is impossible to determine, as with other inconsistencies in Jung's thought, whether Jung consciously or unconsciously manipulates material to suit his audiences. But by not identifying himself as the subject experiencing synchronicity in his lecture which was to become "On Synchronicity," it seems that Jung is concerned to shield himself from the possibility of appearing to his audience as a bent, woolly-headed mystic.

Jung uses the concept of chance once again when he introduces his second personal case history of synchronicity. Chance groupings are said to seem "meaningless" to the contemporary mind since they fall within the realm of statistical probability.¹ Yet there are some results, Jung continues, that seem to represent more than mere random occurrence.

¹To be "statistically probable" means that chance groupings show no particular purpose or design, and that it is likely and probable that such groupings would naturally occur.

²In a later footnote the editors attempt to clarify Jung's discussion of chance by adding that scientifically based statistics distinguish between (a) random and (b) significant dispersions, the latter they claim, "suggest" causality (I have shown above that this statement is only partly true; see discussion on pp. 81-82 regarding the fallacy of attributing causality to correlational studies). Jung's version of chance, they continue, further subdivides chance dispersions - all of which would be deemed meaningless by conventional statistics - into meaningful and meaningless chance. The editorial note then reads: "The meaningless dispersions due to chance are made meaningful by the activation of the psychoid archetype." Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 440n. Victor Mansfield argues that in physics, the term "chance" means that a myriad of causal factors which contribute to an outcome are simply unknown. Mansfield differentiates between this definition of chance (which he claims implies causality) and genuine acausality. Victor Mansfield, *Synchronicity, Science, and Soul-Making* (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1995), pp. 80-81.

Jung then presents the fish series in much the same manner as he did in "On Synchronicity." There are two small differences, however. The first difference is the inclusion of the latin inscription which Jung noted in the morning: "Est homo totus medius *piscis* ab imo."¹ The second change is found in a footnote in which Jung says that immediately after working on the essay, "On Synchronicity" (and several months after having initially experienced the fish series), he went for a walk and discovered a fish on the sea-wall that was near his house.

Concerning the first alteration, the latin appears to be used for one of the reasons some scholars and professional writers might employ it—not so much to clarify as to hopefully provide a *bona fide* ring of authenticity and legitimacy to an idea or to its author.'

The relegation of this seventh fish item in the series to a footnote is most likely due to the fact that the incident of discovering the fish occurred two months after the previous, single day of synchronistic events. Even though this deferred event would fit well into Jung's definition of synchronicity, a good, clear example is perhaps best suited for those whom Jung deems to be the naive readers of the second exposition. Thus the synchronistic event occurring later in time is added as a curiosity, or pendant to the exposition. Jung then says, however, that the series had a profound influence on him; it seemed to possess a meaning that surpassed mere

¹bid., p. 426.

²While this thesis uses some short latin terms, the device is used more for creating freshness and readability instead of attempting to legitimize the text. Jung began to study latin with his father at a young age. His usage, therefore, is extensive and for those not acquainted with the finer points of latin, tends to obscure matters more than clarify them.

³Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 427.

coincidence. He then translates this meaningfulness into a representation of acausality, which he claims is apparently the "natural" way of viewing the scenario. Jung additionally notes, quite ambiguously, that the series evoked a numinous response. In relation to this the following footnote is appended:

The numinosity of a series of chance happenings grows in proportion to the number of its terms. Unconscious - probably archetypal - contents are thereby constellated, which then give rise to the impression that the series has been "caused" by these contents. Since we cannot conceive how this could be possible without recourse to positively magical categories, we generally let it go at the bare impression.

Despite his obvious attempt to superimpose a type of regular, scientific grid over what is often described as an essentially unpredictable, mystical phenomenon, Jung's proposed connection between synchronicity and numinosity is unsystematic. He says that the intensity of numinosity increases in direct proportion to the number of items experienced within a chance series, yet provides no evidence for this claim. The reader is expected to accept this hypothesis solely on the basis of Jung's professional authority. Moreover, Jung's argument against archetypal causality is hasty and unclear: it seems that the incidence of numinosity with synchronicity could indicate a type of archetypal causality for synchronicity, especially when we recall that Jung says one of the primary functions of the archetypes is to act as an organizing principle:

Archetypes, so far as we can observe and experience them at all, manifest themselves only through their ability to *organize* images and ideas, and this will always be an unconscious process which cannot be detected until afterward. .

Ibid., p. 426.

Ibid., p. 231.

A short discussion of causality and acausality follows, wherein Jung seems to indicate the possibility of the existence of causal chains of events, yet argues that events must be viewed acausally when it cannot be confirmed that their "incidence exceeds the limits of probability." Two types of series are therefore laid out. First, "causal chains" possess some form of validation or "proof" as to the existence of a linear and directly causal relation among enclosed, succeeding events within the chain; second, "meaningful cross-connection" or acausality is postulated for events which coincide yet have no apparent nor demonstrable causal relation among them.

This division frames most of the discussion on synchronicity which follows. Immediately after drawing the distinction, Jung employs western philosophy, in particular, Schopenhauer's "On the Apparent Design in the Fate of the Individual"³ to further substantiate the idea of synchronicity. Jung says that Schopenhauer's view of the "simultaneity of the causally unconnected" was a ground-breaking vision offered at a period when the scientific ethos and its numerous and observable achievements had almost entirely hoodwinked intelligentsia into unconditionally accepting the doctrine of causality. Schopenhauer's essay is further described as being the "godfather" to Jung's views on synchronicity.

The connecting principle was outlined by Schopenhauer, Jung tells us, by the use of the analogy of the cross-connection between geographical meridians,

bid., p. 427.

²Ibid.

³Cited in Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 427.

⁴Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 427, 430.

⁵Ibid., 427.

which are taken as causal chains. Essentially spherical, Schopenhauer's model postulates a *prima causa*—a transcendental Will or first cause from which all effects ripple outward in parallel lines. The meaningful simultaneity arises from the fact of the parallels, for the consciousness of the psyche mediates the parallel events, translating them into meaningful events by virtue of their identical point of origin. Yet as God is taken as the first cause, who furthermore creates a teleological world, Schopenhauer posits a deterministic model of human history which Jung does not accept, just as he cannot accept the idea of a first cause.

The idea that the simultaneous points in the causal chains, or meridians, represent meaningful coincidences would only hold water if the first cause really were a unity. But if it were a multiplicity, which is just as likely, then Schopenhauer's whole explanation collapses, quite apart from the fact that natural law possesses a merely statistical validity and thus keeps the door open to indeterminism.¹

From this Jung makes two points: First, he conceives of the possibility that the postulated "first cause" may be a *multiple* rather than a *single* phenomenon (or entity). Second, he further applies his critique of, not statistics proper, but of the statistical support for natural law. That is, he argues that a given natural law is never able to be supported by 100 per cent of the experimental data that pertains to it. As we have shown earlier, Jung seems to prefigure Foucault's view on discontinuity when he favours acausality and indeterminism over Schopenhauer's rigid historical determinism that stems from a first cause. Jung writes:

hbid., p. 428.

²Thomas Kuhn has similarly argued that "anomalous data" threatens a given scientific theorem or paradigmatic approach. Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, pp. 82, 77-110.

³See Part 4(d) concerning poststructuralism and discontinuity.

Schopenhauer thought and wrote at a time when causality held sovereign sway as a category a priori and had therefore to be dragged in to explain meaningful coincidences. But as we have seen, it can do this with some degree of probability only if we have recourse to the other, equally arbitrary assumption of the unity of the first cause.

Again Jung's exposition is confusing since he continues by saying that according to Schopenhauer's scheme, it necessarily follows "that every point on a given meridian stands in a relationship of meaningful coincidence to every other point on the same degree of latitude." Jung discards this idea by arguing that if it were the case, synchronicity would occur regularly and systematically, making its verification either unnecessary or exceedingly simple. But for Jung, synchronicity is a relatively rare phenomenon.³ Thus Jung closes his section on Schopenhauer by asserting the cultural relativity of terms such as prefiguration, correspondence, and pre-established harmony—all of which were employed by the philosopher within the master framework of a 19th century science that was based on the premises of causality and natural law.

Departing from the philosophy of Schopenhauer, Jung then abruptly turns to the paranormal and astronomy in his effort to promote synchronicity. Jung relates the study, "Le Hazard et la Telepathie," in which Xavier Dariex argues that because the probability of successful telepathic death precognitions is infinitesimal (1 : 4,11,545), reported precognitions are more likely to be

\Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 428-429.

²Ibid., p. 429.

³In contrast to Jung, Colin Wilson argues that an ongoing experience of synchronicity would indicate a healthy mind. "When we are psychologically healthy," he says, "synchronicities should occur all the time." Colin Wilson, *Lord of the Underworld: Jung and the Twentieth Century* (Wellingborough: The Aquarian Press, 1984), p. 154.

genuine than mere chance. Simply put, the odds are too small for the event to occur without the operation of some type of precognitive principle. Likewise, Jung observes that the astronomer Flammarion argues that observations of "phantasms of the living" are even more unlikely to occur (with a probability of 1 : 804,622,222) .² In both investigations Jung provides no detail as to the means upon which these probabilities were obtained. It might be questioned as to whether precognition and synchronicity are one and the same type of phenomenon. For instance, in the former study, rather than the reoccurrence of some semi-vague motif of, for instance, "the fish" which is open to a variety of meaningful psychological interpretations, a very clear and precise image of a future event enters the mind which is then borne out by a future outcome (e.g. the death of a friend or relative). While in the latter, one could argue that something more substantial than mere meaningful coincidence occurs.

Following these loose examples of synchronicity, Jung continues with Flammarion's account of a more genuine type of synchronicity: Flammarion reported that a sudden burst of wind blew his papers out the window just when he was writing a chapter on wind-force in a larger text on atmosphere. Flammarion also cites an example of triple coincidence in which a young boy, by the name of Deschamps, is given plum pudding by a M. de Fortgibu. Ten years after Deschamps orders plum pudding in a Paris restaurant, only to find a certain M. de Fortgibu had already ordered plum pudding; several years later M. Deschamps is given plum pudding at a party, and then the same M. de

¹Xavier Dariex, "Le Hazard et la Telepathie," cited in Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 430.

²Camille Flammarion, *The Unknown* cited in Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 430.

Fortgibu enters the party by mistake as he had the wrong address for his intended destination. Jung points out that this example is different from cases of telepathy, and suggests that Flammarion combines the two types of paranormal tales because of his unconscious awareness of the existence a "far more comprehensive principle."¹ Presumably Jung is referring to the notion of the *anima mundi*, or world soul—which Jung notes, is not his own idea. He indicates that the notion of a world soul is found in ancient Greek and Chinese thought, and in post-Schopenhauerian philosophy.*

Immediately following Flammarion's examples of the paranormal, Jung notes another writer concerned with the paranormal, Wilhelm von Scholz. After providing an example of how a lost article after many years returned to its owner, Jung explains that von Scholz posits a "'mutual attraction of related objects' or an 'elective affinity.'"² Apparently von Scholz believes that events in the phenomenal world may be likened to contents in the dream of a larger, more expansive yet unknowable consciousness.

¹Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 431.

²The idea of a unifying world-soul is also found in literature. In 1733, approximately two hundred years prior to Flammarion's study, the poet Alexander Pope wrote:

Nothing is foreign: parts relate to whole; One all-extending
all-preserving soul Connects each being, greatest with the least; Made
beast in aid of man, and man of beast; All serv'd, all serving! nothing
stands alone; The chain holds on, and where it ends, unknown.

Alexander Pope, "Epistle IV" from *An Essay on Man*, *The Batsford Book of English Poetry*, ed. Barbara Lloyd-Evans (London: B. T. Batsford Ltd., 1989), p. 567.

³Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 431.

This idea of human life as the dream of some other modality of consciousness exists - with variations - both within Indian and Chinese philosophy. In Indian thought, the creator god, Brahma, dreams reality into existence; In Chinese myth, the sage Chuang Tzu dreamed he was a butterfly and

Jung next mentions the psychologist Herbert Silberer whose discussion on chance argues that meaningful coincidences are partly due to unconscious arrangements, and partly to "arbitrary" conscious interpretations of those arrangements. He then challenges Silberer's refusal to include paranormal or synchronistic phenomena. Jung also demarcates synchronicity as an *acausal*, meaningful coincidence; he claims that Silberer's account of meaningful coincidence "does not go much beyond the causalism of Schopenhauer."¹

3(d) Synchronicity and the Rhine Experiments

Thus far, Jung has set up a discussion about synchronicity and the apparently radical assumption of acausality by using his own personal experiences, some western philosophy (Schopenhauer), and some unconvincing and equally unspecified scientific-style data; he is now ready to introduce J. B. Rhine's "decisive evidence," as he asserts, "for the existence of acausal combinations of events." His exposition of the Rhine study is similar to that found in "On Synchronicity. However, in *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle*, Jung gives more attention to contesting the existence of causality in synchronicity. In regard to Jung's idea that synchronicity is an acausal phenomenon, Jung paradoxically notes that the affective state of subjects has a considerable influence on their ability to make - or not to make - successful predictions of data within the experimental setting. How he

upon waking was unsure if he was a man who had just dreamed of being a butterfly, or conversely, a butterfly dreaming of being a man.

¹Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 431.

²Ibid., p. 432.

³See Part 3(a), pp. 119-122 for details of the Rhine experiments.

then overlooks affectivity as a causal factor in synchronicity is unclear. He reports on the results of the Rhine experiments:

Lack of interest and boredom are negative factors; enthusiasm, positive expectation, hope, and belief in the possibility of ESP make for good results *and seem to be the real conditions which determine whether there are going to be any results at all* [emphasis mine].

Another contradiction in Jung's thought is found in his discussion on how time and synchronicity relate to the Rhine experiments. Jung says that since the medium of transmission for the ESP phenomenon displays some unknown property concerning the behaviour of psychic energy, its character is uncertain. Because time delays had no effect on the results of the ESP experiments, Jung disputes the notion that ESP transmission is as a form of "energy" as it is conceptualized today. That is, subjects made correct guesses just as frequently when cards were overturned at a time *later* than the time of guessing as they did when the cards were overturned at the same time.² From this apparent irrelevance of temporality, Jung questions the notion of a medium of transmission altogether because the "transmission" does not exhibit the essential feature of a time delay which is found in the known properties of energy transmission. Jung says

There is good reason to doubt whether it [ESP] is a question of transmission at all. The time experiments rule out any such thing in principle, *for it would be absurd to suppose that a situation which does not yet exist and will only occur in the future could transmit itself as a phenomenon of energy to a receiver in the present* [emphasis mine].

¹Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 434.

²See Part 3(a), pp. 119-122.

³Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 435. On the question of whether the unconscious acts as a medium of transmission in regard to paranormal phenomena, Jung later writes in a letter to Hans Bender of 12 February 1958 that synchronicity encapsulates and thus better explains the

A contradiction to this strong statement arises, however, from a statement made by Jung directly afterward, concerning the view that concepts of "space" and "time" are arbitrary, social constructions—exhibiting more of a cultural than an absolute nature.

In themselves, space and time consist of *nothing*. They are hypostatized concepts born of the discriminating activity of the conscious mind – if space and time are only apparently properties of bodies in motion and are created by the intellectual needs of the observer, then their relativization by psychic conditions is...within the bounds of possibility. This possibility presents itself when the psyche observes, not external bodies, but itself.¹

In the first of the two quotations above, Jung says it is "absurd" to suppose that the future may influence the present; in the immediate above, however, he says "space" and "time" are mere cultural constructs—useful, but not real in themselves. He continues by arguing that the psyche in fact modulates, or

paranormal:

Until now such [synchronistic] phenomena were furnished with *ad hoc* explanations and with names like telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, psychokinesis, and so on. But that explains nothing, even when certain of these phenomena are compared with radar. I have never yet heard of a radar beam that could pick up a point in the future.

Jung, *C. G. Jung: Letters*, Vol. 2, p. 415. On this point Jungian analyst Michael Fordham seems to contradict Jung by indicating that the collective unconscious "acts as an 'organ of information,'¹ i.e. a perceptual system, comparable to the receiving set of a wireless." Michael Fordham, et. al. (eds). *Analytical Psychology: A Modern Science*, The Library of Analytical Psychology, Vol. 1 (London: Academic Press, 1980). Jung, however, does say in another letter to the analytical psychologist, L. Kling, of 14 January 1958:

If synchronicities occur...it is because an archetypal situation is present, for whenever archetypes are constellated we find manifestations of the *primordial unity* [emphasis mine].

Jung: Letters, Vol. 2, p. 409. It seems that this "primordial unity" could be the medium of transmission that Jung initially dismisses.

*Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 436.

reveals the underlying structure of the archetypes when it produces the correct guess. "The subject's answer," he says, "reveal(s) the structure of that which produces them, namely the unconscious." He then proceeds to outline his view of the archetypes as representing the "structure of the collective unconscious," and draws a distinction between the irrepresentable, "psychoid" aspect on the one hand, and the manifest, ideational and imaginal aspects of the collective unconscious on the other hand.

This contradiction in Jung's understanding of space and time seems curious; it certainly is an unconventional manner of writing from a "scientific" perspective, where consistency of argumentation - known as the "discussion" portion of the study - is expected. But from a postmodern perspective, a certain sensibility may be discerned in terms of the larger argument or, better put, cause that Jung forwards. The style of exposition may be vague and incoherent at moments, but it is, for lack of a better descriptive, "flashy." Apparently Jung wishes to dazzle the reader with his seeming wealth of erudition by presenting a pastiche of complex concepts concerning space, time, and seemingly everything else concerning the problem of metaphysics.

In relation to my claim that Jung's presentation of synchronicity prefigures aspects of a postmodern mode of awareness, Jung's *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle* self-consciously draws from the past but also reconfigures the past in order to create a new concept. Speaking on

Ibid.

Ibid.

postmodern painting and architecture, art critic and curator Germano Celant says:

Postmodern is a new way of saying modern.. .this kind of new culture that represents absence of distinction between originality and reproduction. ..the idea that you go to the past and pull the past, remake the past in order to say something new.

But the remaking of the past is not an unconscious accident or fluke; it is a deliberate and self-conscious undertaking. In an interview with Daniel Richler, the musician and actor David Bowie says:

I'm postmodern inasmuch that I do fragment all the experiences and all the ideas that I've heard, and artists that have influenced me, so they become, it becomes, what I make is more of a patchwork quilt of things.

And Art Historian Rosalind Krauss gives the example of a plain brick building in the soho district of New York in which she suggests that the artist "painted the [building's] back wall [in the style of a classical building with Greek pillars]...precisely to trick us."

While Jung may not try to "trick" his readers with his kaleidoscopic use of the past, he does, if you will, paste together a collage of old ideas in order to form a new idea. Moreover, we may assert that Jung does this selfconsciously because Part 2 of the thesis demonstrated that he takes great care to select and reformulate his ideas about synchronicity. Recall, also from

¹Perry Miller Adato, *Art of the Western World: From Ancient Greece to Post-modernism*, Vol. 4., hosted by Michael Wood (West Long Branch, New Jersey: Educational Broadcasting Corporation and Kultur International Films, 1989). At the time of making this film, Germano Celant was the curator of the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum.

²Bowie also expresses the postmodern tenet of the relativity of truth when he says, "To look for absolute certainty is possibly one of the roads to complete insanity; I really believe that." Daniel Richler, interview with David Bowie for *Big Life* (Toronto: CBC Television, April 5, 1997).

³Ibid.

Part 2, Naomi Goldenberg's assertion that Jung occasionally frames his ideas "in the more acceptable metaphors of the day so that they could be swallowed."¹

In his discussion about the relativity of space and time, for instance, Jung mentions the philosopher Immanuel Kant's notion of *a priori* categories. It is not clear, however, whether this reference to Kant supports Jung's intent to relegate the absolute categories of space and time to the realm of relativism, for Kant's *a priori* category of knowledge refers to concepts that are true or false before experience, but which have the possibility of being experienced in space and time.

Jung then further discusses the archetypes, and introduces the concept of numinosity and its relation to synchronicity. Numinosity often arises as a "specific charge" of the archetype, and is experienced as an affect which is experienced as a partial "abaissement du niveau mental" (a partial lowering of the level of consciousness). While an aspect of consciousness is raised to a high degree of luminosity, this withdraws energy from other aspects of consciousness which, Jung says, may be restricted to the point of unconsciousness. When severely restricted, unconscious archetypal contents

¹Naomi Goldenberg, "Archetypal Theory After Jung," p. 201.

²Kant argues that if concepts did not have the possibility of being experienced as empirical objects, then "nothing would be thought through them, and they themselves, being without data, could never arise in thought." See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), pp. 129-130.

may usurp the "space vacated"¹ by consciousness; these archetypal contents are usually identifiable as being primitive and archaic types of affect.

Jung briefly says in one sentence that "certain phenomena of simultaneity or synchronicity seem to be bound up with the archetypes," and proceeds to discuss the apparently synchronistic reproductive activity of the palolo worm (whose tail segments containing sexual material regularly appear on the ocean surface at specific times). He therefore converts to the "hard" natural sciences immediately after his cursory look at the concept of numinosity, which was derived from his "soft" science of psychology. The activity of the palolo worm apparently provides legitimacy for the notion of the psychic relativisation of space and time, as does the next biological example given, the human menstrual cycle.

Jung seems to suggest that menstruation coincides with the course of the moon, which would make it a biological instance of synchronicity. Yet he also says that menstruation is only connected with the moon cycle "numerically and does not really coincide with it."⁴ With such ambiguity, it seems Jung mentions menstruation, in conjunction with the palolo worm, only as another validating instance of synchronicity. Due to its prevalence and biological character, menstruation appears to be a solid, tangible type of synchronicity,

^xJung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 436.

*In this piece Jung provides no empirical support for this idea; it has, however, been developed throughout his work, especially in regard to a posited correspondence between so-called primitive mythologies and modern dreams. See, for instance, *Ibid.*, p. 247.

³*Ibid.*, p. 437.

⁴*Ibid.*

even if in reality it does not coincide with the lunar cycle closely enough to warrant its use as a legitimizing example.

With sixteen pages of introductory material complete, Jung admits that he has been concerned with the problem of synchronicity since his middle twenties, and prior to that he had vague inklings of the notion that "causality is only one principle and psychology essentially cannot be exhausted by causal methods only, because the mind [=psyche] lives by aims as well." Thus Jung suggests the importance of human agency, or the idea of "will" in his formulation of synchronicity. In this connection, it could be alternately argued that even the conscious will is determined, or at least, strongly influenced by an archetypal base which unsuspected by the subject, acts upon ego consciousness. Jung in fact often alludes to this elsewhere, especially in his discussion of "psychopathology," but hedges away from the idea of psychic determinism here.

This tension between determinism and free will is one which runs throughout Jung's work, and which is constellated in the concept of synchronicity. Synchronicity depends upon two factors: first a subject, or conscious willing agent is required in order to experience the phenomenon; second, a larger, more comprehensive external field of stimuli is necessary to 'supply' the conscious agent with data for that experience.

Regardless of the numerous philosophical possibilities which synchronicity holds for the problem of free will, Jung proceeds to mention his experiences with synchronicity as a practising psychiatrist, and relates certain meaningfully connected "coincidences" which he says displayed a degree

^AForward to the first edition of *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology*, cited in Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 437n.

of frequency high enough to render it, he claims, improbable to regard them as mere chance.

The first is the story of the scarabaeid beetle, which Jung presents in a highly condensed version, compared to its presentation in "On Synchronicity." Conspicuously absent in this version of the story is mention of the subject's "psychologically inaccessible" character, which was exacerbated by the "weapon" of Cartesian rationalism. It seems in this essay that Jung is more concerned to impress with his erudition than to provide questionable value judgements concerning his patient's psychic constitution, as he did in "On Synchronicity." *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle* contains a great deal of supportive material that is not found in "On Synchronicity."

The second example is almost as brief, and concerns the wife of one of Jung's patients. At the deaths of both her mother and grandmother, a flock of birds gathered outside the place where the deceased rested. Just before the patient's own death, his wife was concerned because a flock of birds appeared on her house at the moment when her husband was being taken to the hospital after having collapsed from heart disease.

The first example of synchronicity has a meaningful connection which Jung believes is obvious in itself "in view of the approximate identity of the chief objects (the scarab and the beetle)."² In the second example, however, Jung relies on his studies of mythology to supply meaning to the ornithological images involved, citing data from ancient Babylon, Egypt, and Greece. He writes that the Babylonian Hades contained souls wearing a

*Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 525. See also, supra pp. 121-122. ²Ibid., p. 439.

"feather dress," and that the Egyptian *ba*, or non-physical soul, was depicted as a bird, and last, that in Homer's *Odyssey*, the souls of the dead were said to "twitter."¹ From these three examples, Jung suggests the motif of birds is closely related to death, and thus reinforces his own example concerning the synchronicity of actual birds and actual death.

Concerning the first example, Jung says the synchronistic connection is clear, due to the close similarity among the beetle and the scarab; he later remarks, however, that the scarab is a "classic" symbol for rebirth, and cites from the *Egyptian Book of What Is* in which the dead sun-god changes into a scarab at the tenth station of his netherworld passage, prior to mounting a barge that will carry him to the morning sky (eternal life) of the twelfth station.

While Jung asserts that the patient was unaware of the classical significance of the scarab, the possibility of cryptomnesia is not entirely discarded, yet Jung notes the patient's ignorance of the symbol *after* he had noted that it might have been lodged in her subconscious memory, which makes

^{*}Ibid. Alternately, Jung does not mention that the bird motif is used in a Hindu image of two birds on a tree, representing a duality between the activities and dissatisfaction of temporal life as opposed to the stillness and peace of the eternal soul: the one bird eats the berries on the tree, representing temporal life, while the second bird on an adjacent branch watches the eater, symbolizing an eternal unchanging soul gazing on temporal life:

Two birds, bound to another in friendship, have made their homes on the same tree. One stares about him, one pecks at the sweet fruit. The personal self, weary of pecking here and there, sinks into dejection; but when he understands through meditation that the other - the impersonal Self - is indeed Spirit, dejection disappears.

See Shree Purohit Swami and W. B. Yeats (trans.), *The Mundaka-Upanisad in The Ten Principle Upanisads* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1970), pp. 54-55.

¹This refers to the latent or subconscious memory of consciously processed stimuli, as opposed to data arising from the collective unconscious. See Jung, "Cryptomnesia" in *The Collected Works*, Vol. 1, pp. 95-106.

little analytical sense. At any rate, it *is* clear that Jung demands the blind faith of his audience by suggesting, without much documentation, that synchronicity is an archetypally based phenomenon.

The psychologist is continually coming up against cases where the emergence of symbolic parallels cannot be explained without the hypothesis of the collective unconscious.

Returning next to Rhine, Jung argues, somewhat spuriously, that although it may seem difficult to discern an archetypal foundation for the type of synchronicity expressed in the Rhine experiment, the results were most encouraging at the beginning of the study, when subjects' interest presumably was at the highest level. This suggests, he continues, a link between affectivity and synchronicity; in addition, since affect, he claims, is based on instinct "whose formal aspect is the archetype," synchronicity may be construed to be an archetypally based phenomenon—even in the Rhine experiments.

Jung then indicates that the common element, both in his own case studies and in the Rhine experiments, is the "impossibility" of the results. In the analytical process, the impossibility takes the form of a difficult situation which is often accompanied by an archetypal dream, which in turn indicates a possible solution to the impasse. Thus the archetype is depicted as a psychological guide toward wholeness, individuation, and health; moreover, this mechanism of archetypal guidance will precipitate synchronistic events. Speaking about seemingly "impossible" circumstances, archetypes and their relation to synchronicity, Jung says:

In such situations, if they are serious enough, archetypal dreams are likely to occur which point out a possible line of advance one would have never have thought of oneself. It is this kind of

¹Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 440.

situation that constellates the archetype with the greatest regularity. In certain cases *the psychotherapist therefore sees himself obliged to discover the rationally insoluble problem towards which the patient's unconscious is steering.* Once this is found, the deeper layers of the unconscious, the primordial images, are activated and the transformation of the personality can get underway [emphasis mine].

Jung seems to indicate in this passage that synchronicity involves a deeper type of archetypal guidance, yet in the next breath, as it were, he contradicts this position by stressing the acausality of synchronicity. Despite this incongruity, Jung reiterates the dream of the flock of birds to re-emphasise the acausal nature of synchronicity, and even cites the poet, Schiller's "The Cranes of Ibycus" to support the view of acausality.

To further argue for acausality, Jung then cites a dream in which a man in Europe dreamed of the death of his friend in America. The next morning the dreamer received notice by telegram of his friend's actual death. While Jung argues for an acausal relation between the dream and the death, one *could* alternately view the situation in terms of archetypal causality. In this view, it could be said that one and the same archetypal constellation both

Mung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 440-441. That archetypal guidance and synchronicity are related in the individuation process, not only in dream but in waking reality is illustrated by Jungian analyst Daryl Sharp's semi-autobiographical tale in which motorists synchronistically encounter - or partially imagine to encounter - a stag and a unicorn, respectively representing soul and spirit, "the coming together of the opposites, the goal of individuation." Daryl Sharp, *Who Am I Really: Personality, Soul, and Individuation* (Toronto: Inner City Books, 1995), p. 114. Likewise, Harold Coward comments that the concept of synchronicity indicates that the "collective unconscious must be individuated to be understood" and likens this process - if inaccurately - to the yogi who "maintains that the *budhitattva* can only be known through one's personal experience of it." Harold Coward, *Jung and Eastern Thought* (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1985), p. 44.

^Ibid., p. 441. Elsewhere Jung suggests that synchronistic events often compensate for an imbalance in the psyche. Ibid., pp. 457, 525-526.

^In this poem a swarm of cranes fly over the scene of a crime and betray robbers who cry out at them.

caused the death *and* informed the dreamer of his friend's impending death. This may seem an extravagant or unwarranted claim, but recalling that one of the modalities of synchronicity posits an intricate psyche/soma relationship, this type of causality *is* consistent with Jung's system.

A similar argument - with a slight variation - may be applied to the second precognitive dream Jung outlines. Jung notes that J. W. Dunne dreamed of a volcanic disaster prior to an actual volcanic disaster in the town of Martinique. In this instance, an entire geographic area¹ (instead of a human body) and the dreamer's psyche are affected by the same archetypal energy. Thus it might be suggested that the archetype caused both the precognition and the series of events that led to the actual fire.

Again, causality - instead of acausality - may be attributed to the discussion which follows on paramnesia, the repeated mis-reading of certain words. Jung cites his own example with a patient which led to a synchronistic event. Reading a text about Orphism, Jung routinely read Ericapaeus instead of Ericepaeus; the patient had, during approximately the same time period, dreamed of a Latin hymn to a god "Ericipaeus," of whom she had not heard before. Jung believes that she was "put off her stroke"² by his misreading of the Latin text in which "Ericepaeus" appears, because although she dreamed of a different vowel, both she and Jung erred on the same vowel within the word. Jung suggests that she might have dreamed the correct word, Eric[^]aeus, had not Jung repeatedly misread it. This suggests two possibilities: first an underlying matrix connecting the two individuals (she

¹The Gaia hypothesis of James Lovelock has popularized the notion that the earth behaves like a living organism. Lovelock, *Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth*.

² Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 444.

was 50 miles away from Jung when the dream occurred), and second, a form of causality in that Jung's misreading of the word influenced, via the unconscious matrix, her dreaming of it. Interestingly, Jung does not suggest that her erroneous dreaming of the word could have disrupted *his* reading of it, in which case her dream would have caused Jung's misreading. The third possibility, which Jung also does not mention, is that the same archetypal influence caused both Jung and the patient to err on the word—albeit in different ways. I mention these logical possibilities in order to demonstrate that Jung glosses over the metaphysical complexities which are implied by synchronicity. He attributes a pan-acauality to synchronicity when in fact it is possible to conceive of causal explanations.

Walter Shelburne argues, quite optimistically, that Jung's ambiguous views regarding archetypal causality and acauality in relation to synchronicity require further resolution in order to enhance the "pioneering element in his thought" which attempts to bridge the methods (and world views) of quantum physics and psychology:

Since causation has been ruled out, the question might well be raised how the "influence" of the archetype can then be made intelligible...Making clear how the archetype is supposed to function as this ordering principle is one of the major conceptual ambiguities that must be resolved in order to make synchronicity into a truly explanatory hypothesis.

Recall, however, the quotation cited in Part 1(d) of this thesis in which Jung says:

Walter A. Shelburne, *Mythos and Logos in the Thought of Carl Jung* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 10-11, 150n18. Anthony Storr writes less favourably about Jung's views on synchronicity:

I must confess that his writings upon synchronicity seem to me to be both confused and of little practical value.

Anthony Storr, *C. G. Jung* (New York: Viking Press, 1973), p. 100.

Any human judgement, no matter how great its subjective conviction, is liable to error, particularly subjects concerning transcendental subjects.

From this, Jung's insistence on the acausality of synchronicity appears to be little more than dogmatic stubbornness. This seems especially so when we consider the following statements which he offers in his memoirs:

All conceivable statements are made by the psyche. Among other things, the psyche appears as a dynamic process which rests on a foundation of antithesis, on a flow of energy between two poles...Now if the dynamic conception of the psyche is correct, all statements which seek to overstep the limits of the psyche's polarity - statements about a metaphysical reality, for example - must be paradoxical if they are to lay claim to any sort of validity.

If statements must be paradoxical in order to be valid, then according to Jung's scheme it is valid to suggest that synchronicity may be causal.

Moreover, according to Jung's view it is invalid to insist, at the expense of a causal explanation, upon the acausality of synchronicity. Again, to cite a statement quoted in Part 1(d):

The psyche cannot leap beyond itself. It cannot set up any absolute truths, for its own polarity determines the relativity of its statements.

Contrary to the implications of this assertion, however, Jung continues in *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle* to argue for a purely acausal view of synchronicity. He says that synchronistic events delineate two states of mind: one apparently "normal" and the other, what Jung calls the "critical experience." He suggests the former is bound within the laws of

Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 703. Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 350. 'ibid., pp. 350-351.

Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 445.

causality, while the latter is not. Thus at the moment of synchronicity, the "normal" mind encounters a "critical experience" in which the world of temporality meets with atemporality and spatial distance becomes irrelevant. As Jung reiterates the now familiar theme that "space and time at bottom are one and the same," he justifies this claim by citing the Hellenistic Jewish philosopher, Philo Judaeus (30 B.C. - 50 A.D.), and his claim that "the extension of heavenly motion is time."²

Jung says it may be difficult for his audience to imagine a "space" in which a future event exists, and that a condensation of time and space may be experienced in the present. He then puts forth his main argument for acausality by arguing that

Since experience has shown that under certain conditions space and time can be reduced almost to zero, causality disappears along with them, because causality is bound up with the existence of space and time and physical changes, and consists essentially in the succession of cause and effect. For this reason synchronistic phenomena cannot in principle be associated with any conceptions of causality. Hence the interconnection of meaningfully coincident factors must necessarily be thought of as acausal.

Even though he says space and time may be "contracted"⁵ when an emotional state raises unconscious contents, which in turn results in a narrowing of ego consciousness, Jung does not recognize the emotional state as a type of causality in itself. He continues for another page, warning against falling into the trap of positing a transcendental causality to synchronicity.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 446.

Ibid.

Toward the end of his argument, he then alters his position by suggesting that our current western conception of causality is unable to account for the empirical facts of synchronicity. Whether this alteration makes room for a different, multidimensional type of causality is open to question.

At this juncture, Jung provides a tentative definition of synchronicity. First, synchronicity involves the entrance of an unconscious image into consciousness, either directly or indirectly (as in a dream, idea or premonition); second, some objective, external event coincides with the image.

Following this, part one of the article consists mainly of justificatory material, derived from a variety of sources. The Dominican philosopher and theologian Albertus Magnus (c.1200-1280) is cited as saying

When, therefore, the soul of a man falls into a great excess of any passion, it can be proved by experiment that it [the excess] binds things [magically] and alters them the way it wants.

And later, Magnus is reported to have said that "everyone" can do this, provided, they fall into "great excess."² Here synchronicity is given a slightly dark light, as if it were something which occurs only during moments of intemperance. The German poet, Goethe, however, is quoted next, representing a more positive - or at least neutral - interpretation of synchronicity as a phenomenon consisting of some sort of attraction and repulsion of magnetic or electric "powers," existing among things like and unlike. After this, the resistance of Galileo's contemporaries to accept the astronomer's discovery of the moons of Jupiter is used as an historical parallel to the sceptics whom Jung imagines will not accept the "fact" of his discovery of synchronicity. Here Jung laments:

¹ibid., p. 448.

²Ibid.

Naturally every age thinks that all ages before it were prejudiced, and today we think this more than ever and are just as wrong as all previous ages that thought so. How often have we not seen the truth condemned! It is sad but unfortunately true that man learns nothing from history.

In this passage Jung makes a logical error, for in the first sentence he argues that "truth" is biased because it is limited by the cultural constraints of those who speak it. Therefore, "truth" is a relative type of knowledge that emerges from, and which is influenced by, a given socio-historical setting. "Truth," according to the first sentence of the quotation, is not an eternal, unchanging absolute. In the second and third sentences, however, by saying that the "truth" is often censured, Jung treats "truth" as if it were some absolute entity that is unfortunately "condemned."

Nevertheless, Jung displays a tendency towards poststructural thinking in the following, which echoes, or rather prefigures Foucault's notion of a hidden history which is recreated through an "archaeology" of knowledge.

This melancholy fact will present us with the greatest difficulties as soon as we set about collecting empirical material that would throw a little light on this dark subject, for we shall be quite certain to find it where all the authorities have assured us that nothing is to be found.

As Jung suggests, Foucault contends that truth claims are reconstructed according to what is extracted from sources of knowledge deemed legitimate. The knowledge resulting is not only incomplete and biased, but mostly a fiction that purposely or unwittingly reinforces existing modes of social power. In this regard, Jung now indicates that he intends to provide the true story about synchronicity; he says "the great majority of 'professional'

¹ibid., p. 449.

²Ibid.

³See Part 4(d) below.

psychologists and psychiatrists seem to be completely ignorant of these researches."

Jung next mentions ESP and psychokinesis (PK) experiments which he claims have provided a statistical means to approach not only the paranormal, but synchronicity as well. He compares these to the Chinese mind which produced the *I Ching*, which unlike the "Greek-trained" Western mind sees minor details as belonging to a larger whole. Much attention is given to the *I Ching* and its posited unity of cosmic meaning, said to exist among the internal and external categories of mind and matter. As a western correlate, the thirteenth century *Ars Geomantica* is noted as a more complex and less philosophical form of manticism. Jung says this increase in complexity and decrease in philosophical speculation is typical of the difference between the eastern and western approaches to divination.

Because neither of the methods of the *I Ching* or of the *Ars Geomantica* are amenable to statistical analysis, Jung suggests their paranormal cousin astrology is better suited to provide an empirical defense for synchronicity. As in "On Synchronicity," Jung cites an unspecified "traditional" astrological connection between the Sun (*Solis*), Moon (*Lunae*) and marriage. Jung uses the latin term *coniunctio* to describe the conjunction of Sun and Moon, arguably to provide both a scholarly edge of legitimacy and a luminous charm to the idea.

3(e) Jung's Astrological Experiment

This leads into part two of the exposition, which exclusively deals with Jung's astrological experiment. Earlier we saw that Jung claimed a "great

¹Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 450.

²Ibid.

success" when indeed his experiment was a statistical failure.¹ To avoid redundancy, we will not present Jung's argument; it is highly similar to that found in "On Synchronicity." In this version, however, Jung's results about marriage pairs are represented as they were in *The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche*, with astrological tables, charts and bar-graphs. As of before, none of this material seems to convey anything immediately meaningful to the reader, other than a veil of scientism. The *I Ching* and raanticism are noted, as they were in "On Synchronicity," as parallels to the astrological method, and most likely for further legitimacy, the mathematician who assisted in Jung's calculations, Professor Fierz, is decorously described as a "professional."² Jung then writes that

From the scientific point of view the result of our investigation is in some respects not encouraging for astrology...there is little hope of proving that astrological correspondence is something that conforms to law.

He does, however, note the often cited objection in matters pertaining to the paranormal, specifically that the statistical method - and scientific procedure in general - is too awkward to accurately render a decisive portrait of the infinitely more sensitive objects of study which are involved in astrology. While this argument might seem reasonable in the case of telekinesis or some other mental operation in which the influence or even known presence of an observer may hinder performance, it seems implausible in the case of astrology. Because the observer is far removed from all of the variables in the study, it makes little sense to suggest that the astrological

¹See Part 3(a) above,

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 474-475. ³Ibid., pp. 475-476.

observer affects the relationship between certain movements of the heavens and their apparent coincidence with psychological and social events—such as sun-moon conjunctions and marriage.

As in "On Synchronicity," Jung disregards the insignificant sun-moon findings and emphasizes the incidence of three moon conjunctions that appear in each of the three experimental batches. He says:

It is nothing but a chance result from the statistical point of view, yet it is *meaningful* on account of the fact that it looks as if it validated this expectation. It is just what I call synchronistic phenomena.

The "expectation" Jung alludes to here is elusive. He hints that the figures, although statistically insignificant, "*imitate* accidentally the ideal answer to astrological expectation."² He continues to say that there is "no rule that is true under all circumstances, for this is the real and not a statistical world." As in the essay, "On Synchronicity" an unanswered question arises: If this is so, why then does Jung use the statistical method in his attempt to prove the existence of synchronicity, and in the case of *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle*, devote a third of the exposition to that end. In this treatise, an examination of Jung's graphs and figures seems to point more toward scientism than science.

Whether or not Jung is conscious of this as a venture for legitimacy, or whether it is something unconsciously enacted is open to debate. But considering the careful manipulation of data he presents in most of his preceding work on synchronicity, it seems *likely* that Jung fully intended to

Ibid., p. 477.

Ibid.

Ibid.

bombard the reader with a clever melange of scientific jargon, which through a process of questionable reasoning is distorted and re-formed in order to support synchronicity. This is not to suggest that the phenomenon of synchronicity is necessarily "false"; faulty evidence for a phenomenon does not necessarily invalidate that phenomenon—synchronicity may well occur. As noted earlier, however, this thesis argues that the concept of synchronicity implies elements of a postmodern theory of knowledge, and moreover, that Jung's *argument* for synchronicity prefigures a postmodern type of awareness. The thesis is not concerned with the phenomenon's "truth" or "falsity," which itself would be a topic of investigation for natural philosophy.

Jung then turns to the Rhine experiment on ESP and notes that the affective state of the subject influenced results. In connection with his own astrological experiment, Jung says it is his "scientific duty" to present all the data in order to determine whether the specific interests of the subjects of the study had some effect on the results. Regarding his astrological experiment, he then incongruously states:

It really does look as if the statistical material had been manipulated and arranged so as to give the appearance of a positive result.

What Jung fails to recall, however, is that the results of his study **were not** significant. At any rate, he attributes this alleged positive result to the "necessary emotional and archetypal conditions" that were between himself and his co-worker, Dr. Liliane Frey-Rohn. In essence, Jung attempts to gloss

Wd., p. 478.

'The statistical insignificance of the results of the astrological experiment is also noted by E. A. Bennet. See E. A. Bennet, *Meetings With Jung* (Zurich: Daimon, 1985), p. 43.

³Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 478.

over the scientific failure of his astrological experiment by using scientific-sounding concepts in his discussion. Colin Wilson likewise argues that Jung attempts to legitimize synchronicity with a scientific "dressing up."^{1,1} Thus not unlike a poststructural view, 'truth' is being discursively *created* from the experimental data instead of being uncovered, discerned or discovered.

Jung continues this intellectual cover up, or "redefinition" of the results by saying that errors made in the data calculations tended to favour the results for marriage combinations in astrology. Jung voices a concern that the results may seem fraudulent because of the errors, *and then attempts to convert the mistake in order to provide support for synchronicity.*

I know, however, from long experience of these things that spontaneous synchronistic phenomena draw the observer, by hook or by crook, into what is happening and occasionally make him an accessory to the deed.

Although not great enough to render significant statistical results, the favourable errors themselves are suggested to represent synchronicity—but not, it should be noted, of the type Jung initially set out to discover (i.e. between astrological conjunctions and marriage partners).

Jung again provides a short reminder of the influence of emotion on the results in the Rhine ESP experiments in order to reinforce the idea that the favourable mistakes in the calculations for the astrological experiment were synchronistic. The Rhine experiments are then mentioned again, specifically because of their alleged statistical support for ESP. Jung says this makes

Colin Wilson, *Lord of the Underworld*, p. 116. Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 479.

them essential to "any assessment of synchronistic phenomena." Recall, however, that elsewhere Jung denigrates the statistical method as something not relating to the facts of real life. It seems he accepts or rejects the importance of statistics according to the purpose at hand—in this instance, to render both ESP and his own poor astrological results in a form favourable to synchronicity.

Next, Jung postulates a connection between synchronicity and the unconscious, by virtue of the relation found in the ESP experiment between positive affectivity and positive results. In applying this to Manticism, the concept of the archetype (and its inherent numinosity) is given as a scientific explanation for a relation between the unconscious, numinosity, and synchronicity, despite the fact that *emotionality*, not numinosity played a role in the Rhine ESP experiments.

Next, mention is given to the Swiss seer, Emanuel Swedenborg and his simultaneous vision of the actual Stockholm fire, which Jung says happened "without there being any demonstrable or even thinkable connection between the two."^{1,4} Jung suggests a lowering of ego-consciousness enabled Swedenborg to access "absolute knowledge." Whether a vision of a fire indicates access to absolute knowledge or just a *different* and not necessarily "absolute" type of

¹Ibid., p. 480.

²Supra, Part 2(1), pp. 102-103.

While numinosity may have an emotional aspect, emotionality and numinosity are defined by Jung as two distinct concepts. Emotionality is further delineated into *affect* and *feeling*, the former accompanied by a marked physiological alteration not found in the latter. See Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 434.

⁴Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 481.

⁵Ibid.

knowledge is uncertain. It appears, however, that Jung exaggerates Swedenborg's position; to suggest that any human being could access absolute knowledge seems absurd, for as Jung himself says, part of what makes the human 'human' is the highly limited ego consciousness.

Jung then, more modestly, differentiates between intuitive and other forms of knowledge—for instance, knowledge gained from discursive information. Speaking on Swedenborg, he suggests:

For the unconscious psyche space and time seem to be relative; that is to say, knowledge finds itself in a space-time continuum in which space is no longer space, nor time time. If therefore, the unconscious should develop or maintain a potential in the direction of consciousness, it is then possible for parallel events to be perceived or "known."¹

Concerning the question of the transmission of intuitive knowledge, Jung says it is impossible to determine whether Swedenborg's unconscious caused the fire or conversely, whether the fire caused the images in Swedenborg's psyche. He then displays a bias against the so-called "primitive" mentality which apparently has always explained synchronicity in terms of magical causality.² Not wishing to do so himself, Jung favours a philosophic understanding of synchronicity which implies a correspondence of the internal and the external, a sort of simultaneity of time and space that does not conflict with the principle of causality because it does not enter into it.

As an appendix to Chapter 2, the editors include a scant array of mathematical material garnered from professor Fierz's mathematical argument.

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 483.

³One could posit, however, the existence of a greater agency which informs the two events of the internal vision and the external fire. If this proposition were true, then a certain type of causality would be involved with synchronicity.

Although Jung did not originally include this, it serves to round out the scientific look of the presentation, adding further credence to the argument despite the fact that the figures mean little to the average non-mathematically-minded reader, and more important, that they represent calculations leading to insignificant experimental results.

3(f) Jung's Use of Historical Ideas Relating to Synchronicity

In Chapter 3 of the text, Jung attempts to further legitimize synchronicity by providing forerunners to the concept from the history of eastern and western thought. In this section his impressive learning is displayed, as is his ability to conflate a diversity of ideas that originate from different sources into the single idea of synchronicity. This method of analogy, as I shall term it, is from a poststructural perspective useful for the legitimization of synchronicity, but it provides little credence for those interested in a critical approach to theory building.*

Jung begins by suggesting that *meaning* combined with the notion of *simultaneity* are the essential criteria for synchronicity. With a few scattered introductory references to ancient Greek philosophy, the paranormal and alchemy, Jung says that these correspond to the attitudes of Chinese philosophy, an attitude which he claims is altogether different and largely absent from the history of western thought.² He thus momentarily seems to

Victor Fane D'Lugin likewise argues that Jung's attempt to substantiate his ideas by showing their historical lineage is invalid. See D'Lugin, *C. G. Jung and Political Theory*, p. 166.

'The idea of synchronicity is not foreign to the western mind. The entire western Holy Bible contains innumerable instances of synchronicity which occur both as 1) primitive "magical" causality, and 2) as indicators of a Divine Will or Providence acting upon worldly affairs. The Old and New Testaments differentiate "evil magic" from "Godly miraculous" phenomena, both of which could

overlook the just mentioned and orthodox occidental idea of correspondence, which he said was best suited to his understanding of synchronicity.

At any rate, Chinese philosophy is given first priority in Jung's presentation of synchronicity, specifically, the Taoist *Book of Changes*, or *I Ching*. Jung likens the concept of *tao* to a metaphysical void of 'nothingness,' underlying and instilling meaning and order to the world of form. Several quotations are provided from the Taoist text attributed to the legendary sage Lao Tzu, the *Tao te Ching*, yet no evidence is found within these quotations to support Jung's interpretation of *tao* as having an "organizing" character. As the text itself proclaims, "Tao never does, yet through it all things are done." Jung also cites the sinologist Richard Wilhelm's notion that "the relation between meaning (Tao) and reality cannot be conceived under the category of cause and effect.' These quotations suggest that *tao* lies behind the phenomenal world, which would make it a medium of transmission rather than an organizing principle for synchronicity.

The other eminent Chinese philosopher, Chang-tzu is noted as a contemporary of Plato and as saying that *tao* is the "pivot" upon which ego and non-ego are no longer opposed. This brings synchronicity into the psychological sphere and enables Jung to introduce western thought by comparing *tao* to the psychological idea of *correspondent!a*. Correspondence, Jung writes, is an ancient idea that re-emerges in the natural philosophy of

be termed as synchronicity. See *Genesis* 40-41; *Exodus* 7:10-23; 8:1-12; *Matthew* 17-27; *Acts* 8:9-24; 13:6-11; 19:13-19. And Jung, himself, in this very section of his opus mentions the sympathy which the ancient Greeks had with the idea.

¹Lao Tzu, *Tao te Ching*, cited in Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 488.

²Cited in Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 487.

the Middle Ages. Citing the Greek philosopher Hippocrates, Jung attempts to ground synchronicity in the depths of western antiquity:

There is one common flow, one common breathing, all things are in sympathy. The whole organism and each one of its parts are working in conjunction for the same purpose... the great principle extends to the extremest part, and from the extremest part it returns to the great principle, to the one nature, being and not being.

Immediately following, the Hellenistic Jewish thinker Philo (25 B.C. -A.D. 42) is cited. Much the same idea is presented, although in a theistic framework in which a monotheistic God is said to "bear within himself, like holy images" the constituents of the natural world. Next, the Greek Theophrastus' {371-288 B.C.) idea that the "suprasensuous and the sensuous are joined by a bond of community... [which] must be God"³ is cited; another prominent Greek, Plotinus, is quoted to have said that "individual souls born of one World Soul are related to one another by sympathy or antipathy, regardless of distance."⁴ Immediately following, the Italian Pico della Mirandola's notion of man as the microcosmic little God of this world is cited. Mirandola maintains that human beings exist within the fusion and synthesis of three cosmic planes—the supracelestial, the celestial, and the sublunary.

By likening these ideas to synchronicity, Jung suggests that synchronicity is a somewhat abstract concept. By analogizing these very different conceptualizations of the relation among the ego, the cosmos and the Godhead, Jung provides a concept which through an increase in abstraction is

Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 490.

Ibid.

ibid.

Ibid.

able, so he implies, to embrace a variety of different religious and philosophical ideas. Thus in legitimizing synchronicity, Jung additionally attempts to synthesize diverse viewpoints through the concept.

This synthesis is continued in the next paragraph with Schopenhauer, Leibniz, Iranian Mithraism and the Greek alchemist Zosimos of Panopolis. The common element found in these thinkers is the notion of the individual resembling God in that "all things revolve about him."¹ Jung continues to analogize the ideas of different thinkers by listing Hippocrates, the German philosopher Agrippa von Nettesheim, the Iranian prophet Zoroaster and the Roman poet, Virgil, who is cited as saying, "I for my part do not believe that they [the rocks] are endowed with divine spirit or with a foreknowledge of things greater than the oracle."² As with Swedenborg's vision of the Stockholm fire, Jung sees this foreknowledge as representing an absolute instead of a different form of knowledge:

It is certainly not a knowledge that could be connected with the ego...I would prefer to call [it] "absolute knowledge."

The synchronistic mode of perception is then likened to Leibniz's notion of "perceiving." Leibniz's "perceiving" involves the reception of universal, subjectless images, which he terms *simulacra*, and which Jung equates to his own notion of the archetypes. Additionally, these Leibnizian "images of all creation"⁴ are likened to the collective unconscious, which Jung says is a more "modern" way to describe the same idea.

Ibid., p. 492.

Ibid., p. 493.

Ibid. Ibid., p.

494.

Next, Agrippa's notion of a "World Soul" that binds all elements together is likened to the collective unconscious, and is analogized to the Italian alchemist Aegidius de Vadis¹ concept of an *anima mundi*, which together with "sol-lapis-philosophorum-cor-Lucifer" is said to represent de Vadis' attempt to posit a hierarchy of archetypes.¹ Precisely what Jung is alluding to with his introduction of the Lucifer idea is unclear; in all likelihood he wishes to avoid the possibility of alienating his audience by merely hinting at the idea of a cosmological holism which would include evil as comprising part of the Godhead.

Agrippa's thought is then compared to the Swiss alchemist Theophrastus Paracelsus's notion that everything found within heaven and earth may also be found in man. If for a moment we were to assume the existence of heavens and hells, it could be argued that these afterlife realms possibly include more than that contained within the limits of human psychological experience. In this vein, Jung's view of the heavens as psychic energy belonging to the collective unconscious might be taken as problematic, because this implies that all forms of numinosity exist in an unconscious—that is, below or deeper than normal ego consciousness. In contrast, the major texts within the Moslem, Hindu and Christian traditions speak of the heavens in terms of a lofty or elevated place, and most mystics from those traditions describe the heavens in terms of an elevated and uplifting psychological experience.

The same problem arises in Jung's treatment of Agrippa's discussion of the *spiritus mundi*, in which "a certain fifth thing, having its being *above*,

¹bid., p. 495.

²See, for instance, Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism* (New York: The New American Library, 1955), pp. 364-365.

and beside" the four elements of nature is posited [emphasis mine].¹ It is found again in Jung's use of the physicist Johannes Kepler. Commenting on Kepler's *Tertius interveniens*, Jung interprets the following to imply a geometrical principle that *underlies* the physical world.

This...is also, according to the doctrine of Aristotle, the strongest tie that links the lower world to the heavens and unifies it therewith so that all its forms are governed from on high; for in this lower world, that is to say the globe of the earth, there is inherent a spiritual nature...[which] comes to life and stimulates itself into a use of its forces through the geometrical and harmonious combination of the heavenly rays of light.²

Later Kepler writes "that man, too, through his soul and its lower faculties, has a like affinity to the heavens as has the soil of the earth can be tested and proven in many ways.' Thus it seems that Kepler posits something analogous to the notion of an unconscious, yet he also suggests something higher and nobler than the so-called "lower faculties." That Jung equates all of Kepler's thought with the idea of the unconscious demonstrates again his tendency to simplify complex ideas in order to make them fit his own theoretical constructs.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) is the next great personage Jung cites in his case for synchronicity. The philosopher's notion of a "pre-established harmony" and his overall theory of "monadology" closely corresponds with synchronicity. With the idea of pre-established harmony, Leibniz proposes a synchronism between physical and psychological events. In

Wd., p. 494.

²Ibid., p. 496.

³Ibid. ⁴Ibid.

his *monadology* he postulates the existence of individual souls, termed "monads," which have no causal effect upon one another yet are mutually influenced by the will of the Godhead. Jung notes that Leibniz makes a further distinction between the mind and the monad. The former is an intellectual faculty able to comprehend the workings of the universe, while the latter is described as a living mirror of the created world. Knowledge based upon the mind is described by Leibniz as apperception, which is a conscious process, while that of the monad is termed perception, which is, Jung says, an unconscious process. All events in the universe, both within and outside the monad are said to exist in a pre-established parallelism, which except for the notion of God as the prime agent, is an idea similar to Jung's acausal concept of synchronicity. In the conclusion of his essay, Jung takes exception to Leibniz's emphasis on God as a monolithic great cause, because the idea is believed to be based upon speculation rather than empirical evidence. It could be argued, however, as many saints and mystics have, that to realize and follow God is an empirical process, not necessarily devoid of reason and practical observation. When we consider that in the

For instance, the Christian mystics Faustina Kowalska and St. Teresa of Avila, as well as the Hindu-influenced Aurobindo Ghose, all shared a desire to verify their mystical visions - and Godly instructions - with the faculty of their human reason. Aurobindo writes of an intermediary state, a sort of midpoint between mundane "imperfect" and sacred "true" knowledge, in which "one may go astray...follow false voices __ that ends in spiritual disaster." These voices arise from the imperfect guidance of "little Gods...[or from] the well-known danger of actually hostile beings whose sole purpose is to create confusion, falsehood, corruption." Aurobindo Ghose, *The Riddle of This World* (Calcutta: Arya Publishing House, 1933), pp. 56-57. See also Sister Mary Faustina, *Divine Mercy in My Soul: The Diary of the Servant of God Sister M. Faustina Kowalska* (Stockbridge, Mass.: Marian Press, 1987), and J. M. Cohen, (trans.), *The Life of Saint Teresa of Avila by Herself* (London: Penguin Books, 1957). On the need for rational discernment on the part of the mystic, Evelyn Underhill suggests that:

development of his archetypal theory Jung demands that his readers accept dream and archetypal images as empirical data, it would seem that his rejection of the possibility of a direct, empirical experience of God rests upon the fact that Jung himself never had an all-encompassing encounter with a wholly other type of ultimate reality as described by, for instance, Rudolf Otto in *The Idea of the Holy*} Jung's complete rejection of this idea on the basis of empiricism is surprising, considering that there is no dearth of

Ecstasies, no less than visions and voices, must, they declare, be subjected to unsparing criticism before they are recognized as divine: whilst some are undoubtably "of God," others are no less clearly "of the devil."

Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 361.

*(a) Otto describes the experience of the wholly other Godhead as an awe-filled encounter with ultimate reality (UR). UR is designated by Otto as a *mysterium tremendum* and a *majestus* as it is experienced as a powerful sentient force, worthy of utmost respect. It inspires not only awe, but also fear. While the subject is urgently attracted to this ineffable source of creation, UR may in some instances frighten, humble and "purify" the subject. Otto also notes that subjects often perceive a sense of creaturely wretchedness and unworthiness, standing naked, as it were, in the face of a great and powerful, "wholly other," UR-Creator-God, Godhead. See Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, pp. 12, 19, 25-27, 28, 8-49.

(b) The term "ultimate reality" is also used by Joachim Wach, who separates religious from magical experience: The former is a continuous (yet with intermittences) response to a "powerful, comprehensive, shattering, and profound" experience of UR that must simultaneously involve the hierarchical elements of intellect, affect, and volition, and which leads to definite and imperative action, while the latter is a mere series of "unconnected thrills." Interestingly, Wach's "action" includes contemplation, and in distinguishing this from slothful indifference, Wach notes William James' Christian pragmatism: "Our practice is the only sure evidence even to ourselves, that we are genuinely Christians." Cited in Joachim Wach, *The Comparative Study of Religions*, Joseph M. Kitagawa ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958) pp. 31-35.

(c) John Hick notes that the monotheistic belief in a wholly other Godhead runs throughout the history of the Jewish and Christian traditions. According to Hick, this being is characterized by the following attributes: The Godhead is 1) infinite and self-existent 2) eternal 3) the sole creator of all creation 4) regarded as a personal being 5) loving and good 6) Holy. John Hick, *Philosophy of Religion*, second edition in *Prentice-Hall Foundations of Philosophy Series* eds. Elizabeth Beardsley and Monroe Beardsley. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1973, pp. 4-14.

scriptural and personal accounts from Jewish, Christian, Islamic and Hindu sources which point toward the notion that a monotheistic prime cause may be directly perceived. Jung's bias against the notion of a wholly other Godhead is also surprising if we consider Charles Hanna's claim that Jung does not have a clear formulation in regard to his own understanding of God:

Jung once said to a minister: "God for you theologians is out there in front of you," and he made his hands the outline of a square. "You know exactly what he is, and what he is not. My God is behind me; I don't know what exactly he is like, but I know he is there."¹

Concerning synchronicity, Jung argues that like the notion of a Godhead, it too is difficult to verify empirically. While synchronicity is said to occur more often than most people would realize, it apparently does not conform to a natural law. On this point, it could be argued that the empirical experience of synchronicity occurs in direct proportion to one's degree of psychic awareness of the contents of the collective unconscious, or more precisely, of the underlying, absolute knowledge of the 'world soul,' as Jung often terms it. This seems to be what Colin Wilson means when he says that the psychologically healthy mind should experience ongoing synchronicity. On this issue, Jung himself says in "On the Nature of the Psyche" that synchronicity is a common experience.

¹Charles Hanna, *The Face of the Deep: The Religious Ideas of C. G. Jung* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962), p. 35. Hanna also argues that synchronicity implies the existence of an underlying ground which is "not far from...the Christian conception of God as behind all life and events." But he warns against positing an absolute likeness between Jung's and a Christian's views about a Godhead. Op. cit., p. 178.

⁴Colin Wilson, *Lord of the Underworld*, p. 154.

³Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 233.

While Jung hesitates to uncritically accept the notion of a wholly other God, he envisions the archetype as something which comes close to his understanding of a Godhead, although not a "wholly other" one. In

Psychology and Religion: West and East he says

It is only through the psyche that we can establish that God acts upon us, but we are unable to distinguish whether these actions come from God or from the unconscious. We cannot tell whether God and Unconscious are two different entities. Both are borderline concepts — But empirically it can be established, with a sufficient degree of probability, that there is in the Unconscious an archetype of wholeness which manifests itself spontaneously in dreams, etc., and a tendency, independent of the conscious will, to relate other archetypes to this center. Consequently it does not seem improbable that the archetype of wholeness occupies as such a central position which approximates it to the God-image.

In *Psychology and Alchemy* Jung says that ultimate reality *cannot* take the form of a wholly-other Godhead. See Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 12, p. 11.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 11, pp. 468-469. Jung's understanding of the Godhead is perhaps best outlined in "Answer to Job," in which Jung often speaks of the archetypal image of the Godhead as if it were the actual archetype of the Godhead. His view of the Old Testament *Book of Job* is that God initially made a wager with Satan and subsequently punishes the undeserving Job because God is unaware of his own shadow (i.e. dark aspect). While James Forsyth argues that Jung is speaking of the God-image instead of God proper, Jung does, however, say that "modern man" must "[come] to terms with the divine darkness which is unveiled in the Book of Job." The term "unveiled" seems to imply the recognition of an essence, not an image. Thus it seems reasonable to argue that Jung is in fact speaking about God proper, and not the God-image. Furthermore, regarding God's thundering response - "Who is this that darkens counsel by words without insight?" - to Job's demand for an explanation, Jung writes

The only dark thing here is how Yahweh ever came to make a bet with Satan. It is certainly not Job who has darkened anything.

Jung then argues that by becoming conscious of his own shadow, God matures into a whole being. See C. G. Jung, "Answer to Job" in Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 11: 553-758, pp. 365, 377; and James Forsyth, *Freud, Jung and Christianity* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1989), pp. 110, 135-163. Clearly Jung's view of a Yahweh who "matures" over time differs from the one forwarded in the Old Testament passage of *Isaiah*, in which Yahweh proclaims his omniscience:

As high as the heavens are above the earth, so
high are my ways above your ways and my thoughts
above your thoughts.

While Jung is ambiguous about the relation between the archetype and the idea of a Godhead, he does suggest that synchronicity implies an *a priori* meaning—that is, a meaning existing *before* experience and which lies beyond the ken of human imagination. To support this idea, Plato's notion of ideal forms is noted. As eternal truths existing in a world of "being," the forms may only be partially comprehended as dim reflections of the phenomenal, earthly world of "becoming." Jung says the notion of *a priori* meaning also finds support in what he terms, the "older mathematics" of the mathematician Jacobi, who is quoted as writing this paraphrase of Schiller's poem, "Archimedes and His Pupil":

What you behold in the cosmos is only the light of God's glory; In the Olympian host Number eternally reigns.

Likewise, the mathematician Gauss is cited as having said that "God arithmetizes. Again, Chinese philosophy, the occidental magical beliefs of the Middle Ages and astrology are noted as counter-examples to a scientific determinism which Jung claims has attempted to ignore and repress the synchronicity principle. At this point Jung seems to abandon his former notion that truth is relative to the society in which it is found when he declares:

For in the last resort it [synchronicity] is not so much a question of superstition as of a *truth* which remained hidden for so long only because it had less to do with the physical side of events than with their psychic aspects [emphasis mine].

Isaiah, 55:9 in *The New American Bible* (Washington: Collins World Publishers, 1970), p. 1074.

*Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 502. Unfortunately both Jacobi and Schiller's works are not adequately documented by Jung.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

Forgetting as well that he had previously said that the difficulty in empirically verifying synchronicity made it impossible to view it as a natural law, Jung now states that "we have to consider a formal factor, namely synchronicity, as a principle of explanation," which ironically implies that synchronicity is a naturally occurring law.

Thus Jung departs from his sociological approach which saw theory building as a human activity geared towards the creation of relative knowledge which, like mythology, provides meaning to the questions of existence; here he displays an obdurate insistence upon the actuality of synchronicity, saying that its articulation represents not a relative, but an absolute truth which is grounded in the laws of nature.

The close of part three of the article reinforces the notion that synchronicity implies a greater cosmological meaning or, as Jung terms it, a "formal factor" in human existence. For evidence, Jung cites two synchronistic dreams reported by two of his friends. In a footnote to the dreams, Jung says that he follows "the rules of dream interpretation,"¹ seeming to suggest that *his* form of analysis is the *only* valid way to interpret dreams. Yet paradoxically, Jung's final words of the chapter state:

I frankly admit that I do not understand the dream, but I take good care not to juggle it into line with some preconceived theory.

One could ask whether or not his "rules of dream interpretation"⁴ are not in themselves a preconceived theory.

¹ibid., p. 503.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 504.

⁴Ibid., p. 503.

In the beginning of part four of the article, Jung softens his previously dogmatic approach by suggesting that his views on synchronicity do indicate a final proof, but a conclusion based upon empirical observation. Thus he contradicts both his former assertion that synchronicity reveals the true existence of a formal factor in nature, as well as his earlier admission that synchronicity is not amenable to empirical verification. My reading of this change from a rigid to a more flexible approach is that Jung softened his claims in order to give the article - and the notion of synchronicity - a more agreeable and accessible appearance.

A short discussion follows on the abstract nature of synchronicity; Jung says it is an "irrepresentable" idea, overlooking the fact that the concept itself is a form of discursive representation. Jung then suggests that synchronicity implies a *psychoid*, non-physical, and (supposedly) irrepresentable aspect of the archetypes, as well as the physical, observable aspect of material objects; due to this "we must completely give up the idea of the psyche's being somehow connected with the brain."¹ However, the archetypes, - according to definition - are elsewhere said to be distinctly rooted in the instincts, which reveals an internal contradiction of Jung's system as it relates to synchronicity.

Jung then suggests that the relation between soul and body may be viewed acausally—that is from the perspective of synchronicity. Representing an alternative to the notion of acausality, Leibniz is mentioned. The philosopher viewed the relation between mind and body as an act of God, a view

¹bid., p. 505.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 210, and Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 50.

which Jung suggests lies beyond the ken of empiricism. Jung argues that Leibniz's view is plagued with theoretical difficulties; he says it is difficult to comprehend how an immaterial psyche, such as a wholly-other God, could produce movement in physical objects. Instead of the wholly-other approach, Jung prefers the almost pantheistic view that God and nature are one and the same:

It is not necessary to think of Leibniz's pre-established harmony or anything of that kind, which would have to be absolute and would manifest itself in a universal correspondence and sympathy, rather like the meaningful coincidence of time-points lying on the same degree of latitude in Schopenhauer.

He continues by providing a possible answer to the mind-body problem:

The synchronicity principle possesses properties that may help to clear up the body-soul problem.. *Such a form of existence can only be transcendental, since, as the knowledge of future or spatially distant events shows, it is contained in a psychically relative space and time, that is to say in an irrepresentable space-time continuum [emphasis mine].*

This argument is, from an analytical perspective, weak. For in reference to Leibniz, a distinction is made between the immaterial and the physical, in which Jung argues it is difficult to understand how the former could effect the latter. In the preceding quotation, however, he posits a type of transcendental aspect which cannot be represented and which seems to be separate from imaginal and physical stimuli. This contradiction appears on the very same page of Jung's text. The argumentation just prior to and

^xAs suggested above, the experience of God is not universally taken as something that is beyond empiricism, but merely as a relatively rare occurrence. *Supra*, pp. 187, 188.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 506.

Ibid. Jung's notion of a space-time continuum refers to Einstein's theories about the relationships found among mass, energy, velocity, and time. Illingworth, (ed.) *Penguin Dictionary of Physics*, pp. 133-134, 404-406.

including the passage is confusing because Jung initially forwards his concept of the psychoid, which cannot be represented. He then challenges Leibniz's position on the basis of its immaterial aspect, only to say again that his own solution to the mind-body problem necessitates an irrepresentable transcendental factor. Thus his argument from an analytical position would be deemed invalid, at best.

From a postmodern perspective, however, we must ask whether Jung is aware of the numerous and often blatant contradictions he sets out, and if so, why he allows them to occur in his work. It seems reasonable to suggest that Jung shifts his entire philosophical standpoint and mode of argumentation in order to string together, like an array of glistening gems, a great number of intellectual ideas which in their sheer brilliance might dazzle the reader to believe in the validity of synchronicity.

These justificatory ideas of Jung's are not limited to the realm of the scholarly, the intellectual, or the religious. In his plan to legitimize synchronicity, Jung next cites the so-called hallucinations of levitation which occur in the out-of-body experiences that result from brain injuries or coma states. In these cases, subjects accurately observe the events around them, despite their apparent unconsciousness. Jung applies these and the ESP studies of Sir Auckland Geddes¹ and G. N. M. Tyrrell² to support synchronistic phenomena, because these studies are said to represent "events which have no causal connection with organic processes...which cannot be explained as processes in the biological substrate." This idea is further

*Sir Auckland Geddes, lecture given before the Royal Society of Medicine on February 26, 1927, cited in Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 509.

²G. N. M. Tyrrell, *The Personality of Man* cited in Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8. p. 509.

corroborated by material from the natural sciences, specifically, the "bee dance" in which bees communicate to one another the location of a newly discovered feeding place. On this point, it is difficult to square Jung's rejection of a biological substrate when his archetypal theory is based upon instinct.

The natural sciences are further employed when Jung suggests that biological change, in general, may represent synchronistic phenomena. The biologist A. M. Dalcq, the zoologist A. C. Hardy, and physicist Sir James Jeans' comments on the half-life of radioactive decay are cited—all pointing, Jung argues, towards the synchronistic notion of acausal orderliness.

Jung's vacillation over notions of absolute and relative truth appears once again when he then states:

Synchronicity is not a philosophical view but an empirical concept which postulates an intellectually necessary principle.

The contradiction in Jung's theory becomes obvious when this is compared to the statement offered a page earlier:

Synchronicity is not a phenomenon whose regularity it is at all easy to demonstrate. One is as much impressed by the disharmony of things as one is surprised by their occasional harmony.

Indeed Jung's unwillingness to accept paradox as a purely negative event - i.e. that it makes for poor theory - seems to apply to the machinations of his own theory. He is forced to seek a means of reconciling the empirical fact of synchronicity with the empirical difficulties involved in proving that fact.

*Karl von Frisch, *The Dancing Bees*, cited in Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 510.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 512.

³Ibid., p. 511.

Jung finally recognizes the problem and says that the answer must lie neither in materialism nor in metaphysics, but somewhere between those two extremes.

To solve the dilemma, Jung notes the physicist, W. Pauli and his notion of a "neutral language" with which the idea of an overall "unity of being" may be expressed. By using the language of physics, Jung elevates synchronicity to the status of the missing fourth element which must accompany and thereby complete the classical trinity of space, time, and causality. Thus Jung offers the following tetrad:




Figure 4: Jung's quaternio

Jung attempts to further justify this *quaternio* with the idea found in Plato's *Timaeus* of a "fourth" dimension which may be "added by force" to the three dimensions of space, which we must assume are to be taken as length, width, and height.⁴ Next, Jung cites another quad from the alchemical practices of "fifteen hundred years"⁵ of history in which an elusive "One" emerges as the "Fourth" from an equally cryptic "Third." Jung then presents

Ibid., p. 512.

¹Ibid.

¹ibid., p. 513.

Jung does not specify what Plato's "three dimensions of space" are.

Ibid.

the problem as a numerological "dilemma of three and four"¹ and cit^s the Cabiri scene from his much favoured *Faust*,²and the sixteenth-century alchemist, Gerhard Dorn who indicates the esoteric fourth to represent a choice between the Christian trinity and the *serpens quadricornutus*, a four-horned variant of the Devil. The ethos of Western science is portrayed as the influence which stole the missing fourth element of synchronicity from the occidental mind. Jung argues that Kepler's (1571-1630) theory of three principles led western science to explain natural phenomena according to a trinity of space, time, and causality.

Next, Jung speaks of his friendly relations with the noted physicist, Professor Pauli, who advised Jung to revise the quatemio as follows:




Figure 5: Jung's revised *quatemio*²

As we see in the above, the idea of the *quatemio* is formulated with the use of slightly more orthodox terms—according to the dictates of modern subatomic physics. Again Jung stresses the acausality of the overall schema, and poses the question of whether the definition of synchronicity may be

¹Ibid.

² Jung was deeply impressed by the notion, expressed in *Faust*, of having two souls—one worldly and the other heavenly and ancient. See Goethe, Johann Wolfgang. *Faust*, trans. Eugene Delacroix (Wisbech, Cambs.: Paddington Press, 1977).

³Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 514.

broadened. He suggests that synchronicity should perhaps be applied only to situations wherein the psychic and physical coincide, or as he puts it, are "equivalent." Jung then stresses the danger of attributing a type of causality to the phenomenon if one were to posit an archetypal background to the occurrence of synchronicity.

Elsewhere Jung does in fact suggest an archetypal background to synchronicity,¹ therefore it seems reasonable to propose at least a relativistic sense of archetypal causality. By this I mean that the archetypes may not represent a first cause of all events, but they may play a part in the overall dynamics of change. At any rate, Jung says the danger of lapsing into any type of causal explanation "is avoided if one regards synchronicity as a special instance of general acausal orderliness."

^xSupra, p. 169.

²To extend this idea, God would be a first single cause who creates various archetypes. By way of analogy, imagine God manufacturing a bicycle and then deciding to ride it. As the rider, God moves the bicycle pedals, which in turn move the cranks, the sprocket and segments of the chain, extending to the rear sprocket, and then to the rear wheel. In this analogy, the bicycle *parts* would be the archetypes. While the various bicycle parts cause others to move, the ultimate cause is the rider (God).

³Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 516. It seems questionable, however, that order could occur *without* some agent of causality. Whether the ultimate causal agent is taken as a World Soul, the Hindu junction of the *atman-brahman*, or the Chinese *Tao*, would depend upon one's theoretical, personal, or experiential inclinations. A theistic approach would alternately suggest that while the Godhead may be represented by what Jung terms as an archetypal image - for instance, a dream, vision, or spontaneous work of art - the Godhead itself would remain greater than both the archetype and its images. In this understanding, the Godhead would be the creator of the archetypes and their images. Thus from a Jewish, Moslem or Christian perspective, the energy that Jung attributes to the archetypes might be taken to be "gods," "demons," "forces," and "angels." In this vein, Edmund Cohen argues that Jung's concept of the "complex" is tantamount to the notion of the incorporeal "spirit." Edmund D. Cohen, *C. G. Jung and the Scientific Attitude*, p. 86.

Jung then makes an interesting distinction between what he envisions as the eternal reality of numerical quantities and the discontinuities of physics on the one hand, and synchronicity on the other hand. Unlike the former which do not exist in time, synchronicity is temporally bound. It is surprising that Jung posits an eternal reality to the scientific, essentially socio-symbolic construction of numbers when he repeatedly stresses his unwillingness to transgress the limits of empiricism: If Jung believes that numbers and discontinuities are eternal, why does he elsewhere say that scientific ideas are relativistic social constructs?¹

Jung is willing to accept the constructs of numbers and the discontinuities of physics as eternal entities, but perhaps due to a personal bias, he is not willing to accept the theoretical possibility of a wholly other eternal Godhead as the ultimate causal agent of synchronistic events. Concerning his bias against the theoretical possibility of a wholly-other Godhead, it might be partially explained by Jung's personal psychological history. Naomi Goldenberg argues that Jung had a drive for "greatness" which was fuelled by his need to compensate for his insecurity. This would explain, in part, why Jung's *own* theory posits a psychoid, transcendental factor, while Jung rejects a traditional conception of a Godhead. In this

*Supra, p. 144. Robin Robertson notes that like Jung, Albert Einstein and the mathematician Kurt Godel believed that numbers may represent "an aspect of objective reality." Kurt Godel, cited in Robin Robertson, "Godel and Jung: The Twilight of Rational Consciousness?" in *Psychological Perspectives*, Fall Vol. 18/2, 1987, p. 317, (304-318). On the inherent contradiction between (a) the historically relative status of symbols and (b) the alleged eternal dimension of numbers, Einstein says, "How can it be that mathematics, being after all a product of human thought, is so admirably appropriate to the objects of reality?" Albert Einstein, cited in Robertson "Godel and Jung" p. 317.

'Goldenberg argues that Jung experienced an ongoing, cumulative trauma in his childhood years. Goldenberg, "Looking at Jung Looking at Himself," pp. 393, 395, 403, 404.

connection, Jung in his memoirs describes his father as a moody and weak parson who unsuccessfully attempted to convince Jung of the goodness of God:

My doubts and uneasiness increased whenever I heard my father in his emotional sermons speak of the "good" God, praising God's love for man and exhorting man to love God in return. "Does he really know what he is talking about?" I wondered. "Could he have me, his son, put to the knife as a human sacrifice, like Isaac, or deliver him to an unjust court which would have him crucified like Jesus? No, he could not do that. Therefore in some cases he could not do the will of God, which can be absolutely terrible, as the Bible itself shows."³

Earlier in the same text, however, Jung says that after an experience of grace, he believes he is chosen to do the work of God.

was obedience which brought me grace, and after that experience I knew what God's grace was. One must be ut

It experience* I knew what God's grace was. One must be utterly abandoned to God; nothing matters but fulfilling His will. Otherwise all is folly and meaningless. From that moment on, when I experienced grace, my true responsibility began.

Alternately, perhaps the exclusion of the idea of a wholly-other Godhead in his empirically-based work stems from a desire to avoid alienating his audience. In this regard, it seems that Jung does not have the idea of God clearly resolved in his own thought and therefore does not wish to include it in his empirically-based work on synchronicity.

*Jung overlooks the fact that God intervened just before Abraham was about to complete the act of killing his son (Isaac), and blessed the former with numerous offspring as recompense for his obedience. *Genesis* 22:15-18.

Like Abraham, Jesus was rewarded for his obedience. The resurrected Jesus is said to occupy the highest, eternal position in heaven. *Revelation* 1:17-18, 22:1-6.

³Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, pp. 46-47.

The experience Jung refers to is his vision that God from a throne on high defecated on a cathedral, bursting open its roof and shattering its walls. It was after this that Jung says he, contrary to his expectation, experienced grace. *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 40.

The concluding pages of the essay reiterate Leibniz's idea of pre-established harmony, based on the concepts of correspondence and sympathy. Jung then dismisses Schopenhauer's thought as being too causalistic, and heralds ESP experiments as being an excellent source of empirically demonstrable evidence for acausal events which belong under the umbrella of synchronicity. So-called superstitions, such as the divining rod or magic wand are suggested to perhaps contain "a core of truth that is well worth knowing!", as is the alleged efficacy of prayer. Jung closes the text by saying:

Synchronicity is no more baffling or mysterious than the discontinuities of physics. It is only the ingrained belief in the sovereign power of causality that creates intellectual difficulties and makes it appear unthinkable that causeless events exist or could ever occur.

Jung offers a final note in which he suggests the possibility of a causal factor in synchronicity; this is incongruous, considering a good majority of the text vehemently argues against any type of causality in synchronicity. Speaking for the possibility of causality, Jung continues (from the preceding quotation):

But if they do, then we must regard them as creative acts, as the continuous creation of a pattern that exists from all eternity... We must of course guard against thinking of every event whose cause is unknown as "causeless." This, as I have already stressed, is admissible only when a cause is not even thinkable.

From this it seems that Jung, once again, makes a distinction between an eternal factor, seeming much like the Platonic forms, and the world of temporal events. In the close of the article, synchronicity is said to exist

bung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 517-518.

²Ibid., p. 518.

³Ibid.

because of two main factors: individual acts in time, on the one hand, and a type of eternal factor on the other hand. Regarding the eternal factor in synchronicity, it is impossible to determine whether Jung merely avoids theistic conceptions of a wholly-other Godhead in order to appear scientific, or whether his personal psychological makeup has some influence in his desire to construct his own grand theory, as suggested by Naomi Goldenberg.

3(g) Synchronicity After *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle*

(1953-1961)

Having completed his major opus on synchronicity, Jung is now in a position to discuss synchronicity with less reservations and complicated explanations about the phenomena. In the autobiographical *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, several instances of synchronicity are mentioned by Jung. From the Introduction we learn that these passages about synchronicity are written in about 1958.² Jung's tone is confident and straightforward. It seems that he believes synchronicity has been justified and no longer requires detailed argumentation.

The first instance which Jung writes about refers to when he awoke from a sleep and felt a presence in his room, accompanied with a pain in his skull. The next day he received a telegram, informing him that one of his patients had committed suicide by shooting himself in the head.

This experience was a genuine synchronistic phenomena such as is quite often observed in connection with an archetypal situation— in this case, death. By means of a relativization of time and

Goldenberg, "Looking at Jung Looking at Himself," pp. 393, 395, 403, 404. Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. vi.

space in the unconscious it could well be that I had perceived something which in reality was taking place elsewhere.

Clearly Jung reiterates his previous style of argumentation by saying:

The collective unconscious is common to all; it is the foundation of what the ancients called the "sympathy of all things." In this case the unconscious had knowledge of my patient's condition.

Later in his autobiography, Jung notes that in 1927 he had sketched a mandala, based on a dream. He then sketched a second mandala that had a golden castle in the centre, and Jung asked himself: "why is this so Chinese?" Shortly after, he says that he received a letter from Richard Wilhelm in which Jung was asked to write a commentary to the Chinese alchemical text, *The Secret of the Golden Flower*.

Jung next mentions synchronicity in his autobiography by recounting his commentary in *Aion* regarding the astrological aeon of Pisces and the life of Christ, which he again claims is synchronistic.

The following instance of synchronicity that Jung notes in *Memories* is quite suppositional. One night he had a vivid and recurring dream of hundreds of peasant boys walking by his first Tower⁵ in Bollingen. Due to the intensity of the dream, upon waking Jung deemed it to be a haunting. He then reflects that he may have had a vision of actual Swiss mercenary soldiers who had gatherings in the Middle Ages in order to bid farewell to their homeland,

*Ibid., p. 138.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 197.

⁴Ibid., p. 221.

^bIn the mid-1920's Jung had a Tower constructed in Bollingen upon which he carved images in stone that reflected his personal encounter with his idea of the collective unconscious.

prior to enlisting in Italy. He says such a vision could be taken as synchronistic.

Later in *Memories* Jung collates synchronicity with "premonitions and dreams that come true"² by telling the tale of being overpowered on a train ride home by an image of drowning that was impressed upon him from a book. Upon returning home, Jung learned that his grandson had nearly drowned in the family boathouse. "This had taken place at exactly the time that I had been assailed by that memory on the train.

The idea of synchronicity is again mentioned in *Memories* in connection with Richard Wilhelm and his translation of the *I Ching*. Jung uses the concept of synchronicity to explain the possibility that the oracle may provide meaningful answers to questions. The passage about Wilhelm is included in *Memories* as an appendix, and appears to be a shorter version of the "Foreword" to the *I Ching* which Jung had already written for Wilhelm. It is likely that Jung wrote the shorter text as a first, unpublished draft of the "Foreword" which he ultimately included in Wilhelm's translation of the *I Ching*. If this is the case, it would explain a cautious style of presentation because synchronicity had not yet been formally valorized. This shorter note about synchronicity is, indeed, the most prudent that is found in *Memories*.

Jung writes:

Are the *I Ching's* answers meaningful or not? If they are, how does the connection between the psychic and the physical sequence of events come about? Time and again I encountered amazing coincidences which seemed to suggest the idea of an acausal parallelism (a synchronicity, as I later called it). So

¹ibid., p. 231.

²ibid., p. 302.

³ibid., p. 303.

fascinated was I by these experiments that I altogether forgot to take notes, which I afterward greatly regretted.

With the exception of this last instance, Jung presents synchronicity in a confident manner in his autobiography. By 1958, his credentials are established and he has written his two major pieces about synchronicity.

The last note that Jung makes about synchronicity appears in *Man and His Symbols*. This book was written for a large, general audience, and in Jung's contribution to it, we find the idea of synchronicity mentioned in connection to a discussion about the psychological importance of the symbol. Jung notes that the content of a symbol is manifested not only in dreams, but also in physical coincidences. While Jung does not designate the following examples as being synchronistic, they are listed in the index under "synchronicity."

The first instance is the pendulum clock of Frederick the Great at Sans Souci, which apparently stopped at the moment of the emperor's death. Jung then mentions other unreferenced instances of

a mirror that breaks, or a picture that falls, when a death occurs;
or minor but unexplained breakages in a house where someone is
passing through an emotional crisis.

As in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Jung's account of synchronistic phenomena is confident, bordering on authoritarian.

Even if skeptics refuse to credit such reports, stories of this kind are always cropping up, and this alone should serve as ample proof of their psychological importance.

¹ibid., pp. 373-374.

²C. G. Jung (ed.), *Man and His Symbols* (New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 1964).

³Ibid., p. 41.

*Ibid. See Part 4(c), pp. 236-239 for Jung's view of the symbol in comparison to the Barthes' understanding of signification and the symbol.

Jung wrote *Memories* in his final days while ill and mostly in bed. There was little time, nor need, for him to go to great extremes to justify synchronicity. He had already grappled with the concept for the preceding thirty years, and had written a formal opus about synchronicity. The task of legitimation was finished, and from his writings after *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle*, we can safely state that he must have believed to have done the job well.

Part (4) Synchronicity and Poststructuralist Thought: A Comparison

Gilles Deleuze notes, in reference to Foucauldian theory, that the categories of knowledge, power, and subjectivity are interdependent yet discrete. According to Deleuze, these categories are essential to Foucault's later formulation of what Deleuze terms, the "ontological fold"¹—i.e. the intersection of internal and external reality in the conscious mind of the subject.

These three dimensions - knowledge, power and self - are irreducible, yet constantly imply one another. They are three 'ontologies'.

As with Jung's notion of synchronicity, the space in consciousness called the 'fold' contains thoughts from internal and external fields of perception; it also embraces thoughts from the past and from the real and imagined future. Moreover, the relation of these elements of thought to other elements of thought is discontinuous, as is the relation of elements of action to other

^{*}Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault* trans, and ed. Sean Hand (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1988), pp. 94-123. Deleuze goes further to suggest, "This is Foucault's major achievement: the conversion of phenomenology into epistemology." Op. cit., p. 109.

²Ibid., p. 114.

elements of action. Elements of action may or may not influence thought, or be influenced by thought, because actions are translated into thoughts within the ontological fold, which, on their way out of the ontological fold, may be re-translated into new modalities of action.

...every inside-space is topologically in contact with the outside-space, independent of distance and on the limits of a 'living'; and this carnal or vital topology, far from showing up in space, frees a sense of time that fits the past into the inside, brings about the future in the outside, and brings the two into confrontation at the limit of the living present.

Deleuze, in referring to Foucault's view, uses the term "strata" to denote the entire field of internal and external stimuli that act upon consciousness. In so doing, he approaches something akin to an amalgamation of Jung's notion of the collective consciousness on the one hand, and the archetypal images of the collective unconscious on the other hand.

If the inside is constituted by the folding of the outside, between them there is a topological relation: the relation to oneself is homologous to the relation with the outside and the two are in contact, through the intermediary of the strata which are relatively external environments (and therefore relatively internal). On the limit of the strata, the whole of the inside finds itself actively present on the outside. The inside condenses the past (a long period of time) in ways that are not at all continuous but instead confront it with a future that comes from the outside, exchange it and re-create it. To think means to be embedded in the present-time stratum that serves as a limit: what can I see and what can I say today?

This introductory commentary is not to imply that Jung's concept of synchronicity and Foucault's formulation of discourse theory are equivalent. There are similarities, but also areas of uncertainty and points of difference between them, which presently will be outlined among the categories of knowledge, power and subjectivity.

Ibid., p. 119.

Ibid.

4(a) Synchronicity and Knowledge

Jung's approach to the problem of what constitutes valid knowledge appears to contradict itself. On the one hand, he seems to prefigure Foucault's poststructuralist idea that absolute truth is non-existent, a premise that puts all forms of knowledge in the category of relative social constructions; on the other hand, Jung's stance differs from Foucault's in that the concept of synchronicity seems to be predicated upon a metaphysic of archetypal, transhistorical truth. Recall that the archetypes, as opposed to their images, are eternal, unchanging entities not unlike Platonic forms.

Throughout his work Jung argues that knowledge is relative. In *Psychology and Alchemy* he speaks at length about the relativity of truth in the context of historical perceptions of cosmology. Interestingly, Jung sees the symbolic interpretation of data as a psychological truth, if not an absolute one.

Religious symbols are phenomena of life, plain facts and not intellectual opinions. If the Church clung for so long to the idea that the sun rotates round the earth, and then abandoned this contention in the nineteenth century, she can always appeal to the psychological truth that for millions of people the sun did revolve round the earth and that it was only in the nineteenth century that any major portion of mankind became sufficiently sure of the intellectual function to grasp the proofs of the earth's planetary nature. Unfortunately there is no "truth" unless there are people to understand it.

Here Jung points out two things: first, the existence of a relative, psychological level of truth; and second, in saying that "truth" requires a human audience, he points to the social level of truth—which is also relative.

¹Jung, "The Symbolism of the Mandala," in *The Collected Works*, Vol. 12, p. 127.

²*Ibid.*

In *Aion* Jung says that psychological projections may change the world into a "replica of one's own unknown face."¹ That is, one interprets or creates a unique perception of reality on the basis of one's unresolved unconscious contents. While Jung argues this is not always the case, he says it most often is. Even if projection is overcome at one level of the unconscious, deeper aspects take the place of the recently resolved psychic contents.

One might assume that projections.. .which are so very difficult if not impossible to dissolve, would belong to the realm of the shadow—that is, to the negative side of the personality. This assumption becomes untenable after a certain point, because the symbols that then appear no longer refer to the same but to the opposite sex, in a man's case to a woman and vice versa. The source of projections is no longer the shadow—which is always of the same sex as the subject—but a contrasexual figure. Here we meet the animus of a woman and the anima of a man.

Toward the end of his life, when it is from a professional perspective more prudent to elaborate upon the relativity of his own ideas, Jung says:

Universal rules can be postulated only with a grain of salt. A psychological truth is valid only if it can be reversed. A solution which would be out of the question for me may be just the right one for someone else.

While this statement is made in the context of the relativity and interchangeability of therapeutic methods, Jung does speak, prior to his retirement, on the relativity of his construct of the archetype:

"Archetype," far from being a modern term, was already in use before the time of St. Augustine, and was synonymous with the "Idea" in Platonic usage...But I am an empiricist, not a philosopher: I cannot let myself presuppose that my peculiar

C. G. Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 9/2, p. 9. Ibid.,

p. 10.

t. G. Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 131.

temperament, my own attitude to intellectual problems, is universally valid.

Since archetypes are a psychological construct, Jung seems to imply that they do not stand for any absolute level of metaphysical truth, but rather, as useful tools through which the business of psychotherapy may be achieved. We have seen that the concept of synchronicity depends upon the construct of the archetypes, and that synchronicity evokes an archetypal experience of the numinous. Speaking about the numinous and synchronicity, and in apparent contradiction to his view that truth is relative, Jung in an interview with Mircea Eliade says:

Religious experience is *numinous*, as Rudolf Otto calls it, and for me, as a psychologist, this experience differs from all others in the way it transcends the ordinary categories of space, time, and causality. Recently I have put a great deal of study into synchronicity (briefly, the "rupture of time"), and I have established that it closely resembles numinous experiences where space, time, and causality are abolished.

By terming synchronicity a "rupture of time" Jung speaks in a way Eliade could sympathize with because in his own treatment of alchemy, Eliade stresses the element of time and how the alchemist seeks to manipulate it through alchemical processes. At the same time Jung posits an eternal dimension which synchronicity points to and operates upon. This eternal dimension of the archetypal aspect of the psyche is clearly connected to synchronicity in "A Psychological View of Conscience:"

*Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 9/1, p. 75.

^C. G. Jung, cited in McGuire, et. al., (eds.) *C. G. Jung Speaking*, p. 230.

³See Mircea Eliade. *The Forge and the Crucible: The Origins and Structures of Alchemy*, second ed., trans. Stephen Corrin (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1962).

Since the parapsychological phenomena associated with the unconscious psyche show a peculiar tendency to relativize the categories of time and space, the collective unconscious must have a spaceless and timeless quality. Consequently, there is some probability that an archetypal situation will be accompanied by synchronistic phenomena.

As outlined in Part 4(d), Foucault studies systems of knowledge, such as Jung's, which allude to the idea of absolute truth, yet Foucault does not deem it necessary to posit such a metaphysic in his analysis of knowledge. For Foucault, all truth - without exception - is relative.

In discussing truth under the aegis of poststructural thought, it is impossible to overlook the importance of the concept of social power. Foucault says truth is a creation of power and thus grounds the process of truth creation in the concept of social power. In Foucault's schema, power represents human agency directed toward the acquisition of social and material benefits. Jung, on the other hand, mostly overlooks this aspect of power and posits a drive toward the creation of ontological "meaning" as being essential to the production of relative, or mythical truth. Jung's conceptualization of relative truth includes both the so-called 'primitive' and the 'scientific' versions of knowledge. Lamenting on the inherent poverty of the purely discursive forms of knowledge which characterize occidental ego-centrism, Jung says this form of "knowledge does not enrich us;

^xC. G. Jung, "A Psychological View of Conscience," in *Civilization in Transition in The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, ed. William McGuire et al., trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XX (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954-79) Vol. 10, p. 450. Jung also says synchronicity is connected to conscience in that the constellation of archetypal situations often activate the "voice of genuine conscience (and not just the recollection of the moral code)." Ibid., pp. 450-451.

²Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 133.

³See Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, pp. 252, 317, 340.

it removes us more and more from the mythic world in which we were once at home by right of birth."¹

4(b) Synchronicity and Power

Jung's use of the concept of power is mostly limited to the psychological sphere, although his comments on power and how it acts in the psyche are extended to the level of sociological analysis,

We saw above that synchronicity involves the archetypes; accordingly, Jung says synchronicity often evokes a psychological sense of luminous power which he terms, the *numinous*. To understand how synchronicity relates to ideas of both psychological and sociological power, we must review the construct of the archetype and how Jung relates this to the term, *numinosity*.

Recall that Jung differentiates the archetypal image from the archetype proper by suggesting that the latter is never amenable to representation² and cannot reach ego consciousness. The inherited "crystal lattice" structures of the archetypes are represented through various archetypal images and ideas.⁴ These *imagos* are expressed in art, architecture, religion - i.e.,

Ibid., p. 252. As outlined below in section 4(f) about synchronicity and subjectivity, Jung contradicts himself on this point, for in that section we find that the ego is deemed as the high-point of human civilization, and moreover, Jung suggests that the ego's representation of the mythic world is the key to emancipation from the potentially absorbing, primordial energy of the underlying archetypes.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 7, p. 214. Jung seems to overlook the fact that the words he writes are a type of representation.

Ibid, p. 213. Given Jung's formulation of archetypal images and ideas, we must still ask: if the numinosity of the archetypal image or idea originates from the archetype, is not the ego at least dimly aware of that archetypal source which it "feels"?

⁴Ibid, p. 214.

human civilization - and are individually experienced either in dream or waking consciousness with corresponding "feeling values." It is these feeling values which may take the form of the numinous.

For Jung, the precipitating object of numinosity may be externally or inwardly perceived stimuli. In the latter, the object is not immediately subject to verification through observable consensus. In *Psychology and Religion: West and East*, he says:

The *numinosum* is either a quality belonging to a visible object or the influence of an invisible presence that causes a peculiar alteration of consciousness.

Thus the archetype is not perceptible in itself, yet one of the hallmarks of the archetype's *influence* on the ego is numinosity. Numinosity from archetypal experience may be psychologically experienced as being destructive, but if properly guided through the analytical, or some other functional process,⁴ it assists what he terms the individuation process of the self. Jung realized that the uniquely individual outcome of a successful individuation depends on many factors. One's cultural location - to include

bung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 205.

² Jung claims to have to overcome the problem of consensus by correlating a vast amount of what he interprets as analogous dream and mythological material. As only dreams supportive of his ideas were published, we are impelled to trust that he did not observe a great amount of conflicting dream data. See Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 12, p. 46.

³Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 7.

⁴For instance, Jung would not challenge his clients' religious beliefs if he believed them to be appropriate for their interpretation of the direct experience of the numinous.

I never try to convert a patient to anything. ..Under my treatment a pagan becomes a pagan and a Christian a Christian, a Jew a Jew, according to what his destiny prescribes for him.

Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 138.

gender, ethnic, religious and socio-economic status - to a large extent influences the optimal relation between the numinous and the ego.

For Westerners in general, Jung says that if regulated and made conscious by the ego, archetypal numinosity is enriching; in the negative case, it may invoke regression or a host of other psychological maladies. Thus power in this sense - as the power of the numinosum acting on the psyche - is analyzed mostly on a psychological level; cultural factors are taken into account, but mostly as a given. The focus for Jung is *first* on the growth of the individual, and *second*, on the set environmental context in which he or she exists.

Jung's idea of the *shadow*, however, attempts to link Jung's psychological analysis of power to a sociological view of archetypal numinosity and how it relates to power *en masse*.

Once the *persons'* is consciously differentiated from the ego, the subject often realizes that he or she possesses a negative ego personality than may bear, as Jung says, "painful and regrettable" results to self, others or both. In Jung's model of the self, the *shadow* rests deeper in the psyche than the persona since it belongs to both the personal and collective

¹Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 205.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 10, p. 237.

³Daryl Sharp notes that the original meaning of the term, persona, was a mask worn by actors to indicate their role within a stage performance. Daryl Sharp, *Jung Lexicon*, p. 97. Jung adapts this to refer to the "performances" or social graces that facilitate human social life; Jung's understanding of the persona represents the various psychological masks that facilitate social interaction, and which exist for "reasons of adaptation or personal convenience" in either a conscious or unconscious relation with the ego. See C. G. Jung, *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology in The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, Vol. 7, p. 158; and Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 9/1 pp. 122-123.

⁴Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 12, p. 177.

unconscious spheres. Not only may the shadow belong to both the personal and collective spheres, it may do so consciously or unconsciously within each sphere. Thus the concept of the shadow links ego consciousness to both the personal unconscious and the collective unconscious. Accordingly, if one were to remain unconscious of the shadow, these various aspects of the psyche may negatively influence both private and social affairs. Only by raising the negative shadow aspects to consciousness may one master what Jung terms the "demonic" and "daemonic" within.

By using the term demonic, Jung suggests the possibility of moral evil. Jung's use of the term daemonic, on the other hand, suggests the numerous "spirits," "gods" and "goddesses" which have been attributed to what in fact^A are the archetypes of the collective unconscious.

Speaking on the shadow in general, Jung says in "Rex and Regina":

Medical psychology has recognized today that it is a therapeutic necessity...for consciousness to confront the shadow. In the end this must lead to some kind of union, even though the union consists at first in an open conflict.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 10, pp. 222-223.

^AThe schematic linkage of the shadow from the personal to the collective unconscious is complex. Jung says the shadow belongs to both the personal and collective unconscious, and also that it acts as a bridge to the anima, which in turn links consciousness to the archetypes of the collective unconscious. Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 14, pp. 107n-108n.

³Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 36.

⁴For example, in the fairy tale of Snow White, the shadow side of the "daemonic mother" is personified by Snow White's wicked, stepmother, who is both destructive and manipulative. In contrast, Snow White's fairy godmother, by granting a much needed boon to Snow White, personifies the nurturing, transforming aspect of the mother archetype. See Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 36. and Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 9/1 pp. 81-82, 83-110.

⁵Jung, "Rex and Regina" in *The Collected Works*, Vol. 14: 258-381, p. 365.

While potentially confused with the ego if the subject's ego is undifferentiated from the shadow aspects, the shadow must be recognized as something "other" than ego to facilitate its integration within consciousness. As suggested by Jung's usage of the term "daemonic," this process does not necessarily entail an encounter with pure evil, for Jung purports that the shadow may also contain positive qualities of instinct, creativity, insight, and socially appropriate reactions. Concerning the shadow's relation to moral evil, Jung says that a "distortion" of nature leads to evil. In psychological terms, when the shadow manifests as an archetype, Jung says

It is quite within the bounds of possibility for a man to recognize the relative evil of his nature, but it is a rare and shattering experience for him to gaze into the face of absolute evil.¹

The importance of the concept of the shadow in connection to the idea of social power is made evident in Jung's discussion of the social dimension of the archetypes. While the concept of the archetype is central to Jung's system, it was not yet fully developed for entry into the chapter entitled "Definitions" in *Psychological Types* (1921)⁴ where most of Jung's terms are defined. Throughout his work, however, various statements made about archetypes adequately describe their character.

Jung's mature thought demarcates the archetypal image from the archetype proper. As the bio-culturally transmitted content of humanity's collective

Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 9/2, pp. 266-267.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 10.

Jung, Chapter XI, "Definitions," *Psychological Types* in *The Works Collected Vol. 6*, pp. 408-486.

unconscious¹ the archetype, he says, is a sort of "crystal lattice" structure inherent in all nature.² Due to its instinctual character, the essence of the archetype is not amenable to representation. The archetypal *image*, however, is that visible aspect, or more correctly, manifestation of the underlying archetype which through human representation enters into the temporal realm of human history.

Jung's student Erich Neumann argues that the archetypes themselves are interrelated:

The single archetypes are not isolated from each other in the unconscious, but are in a state of contamination, mutual interpenetration and interfusion.

But Neumann says that the symbols which are created from the archetypes, that is, the archetypal *images* and *ideas*, are "differentiated and ordered."

while Neumann chooses one central archetype for his analysis, in fact Jung

¹Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 50.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 210.

³Neumann, Erich. *The Great Mother: An Analysis of the Archetype* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), p. 7. Regarding the archetype, Naomi Goldenberg argues:

With myriad sources available to quote, it is possible to make the word "archetype" mean just about anything you would like...Archetypes are facts of mind, not a transcendent reality. They are soft facts, conditioned facts. They change when minds change.. .The important thing to ask about an archetype.. .is this: In whose mind does it exist? If an archetype exists in the minds of people with power - whether that power is political, economic, or intellectual - then that archetype can become true...There is no such thing as an archetype.

She adds that "the notion of archetypes does not help us see the complicated ways in which we humans affect one another." Goldenberg, *Resurrecting the Body*, pp. 103, 105, 106.

⁴Jung, cited in Neumann, *The Great Mother*, p. 7.

suggests that there are a plethora of archetypes which when activated in ego consciousness correspond to various stages of psychological development.

Neumann argues that the directional flow of archetypal energy is not always from the vast collective unconscious to the conscious ego. For the symbol, Neumann contends, is a two-way device. That is, it acts as both an "energy transformer" and a "moulder of consciousness."¹ As an energy transformer it enables the ego to access the numinous experience of the collective unconscious. Jung says this usually evokes for the subject an experience of "feeling values," these sometimes taking the form of a "numinous," seemingly "magical" or "spiritual" or type of heightened awareness. As a shaper of consciousness, the symbol operates on the collective *conscious* level as well. It shapes, or at least informs, the

Neumann, *The Great Mother*, p. 8.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 205. Jung's view that the symbol is able to mediate the numinous power of the collective unconscious is similar to Levi-Bruhl's notion that

...in the collective representations of primitive mentality, objects, beings, phenomena can be, though in a way incomprehensible to us, both themselves and something other than themselves. In a fashion which is no less incomprehensible, they give forth and they receive mystic powers, virtues, qualities, influences, which make themselves felt outside, without ceasing to remain where they are.

Levi-Bruhl, *How natives Think*, p. 61. While Levi-Bruhl was not directly impressed with Emile Durkheim's notion of the totem and its role in defining social differences and in upholding social order, he was, however, influenced by Durkheim's notion of "collective representations":

...concepts that are common to members of social groups that cannot be accounted for by the usual laws of individual psychology, but which impress themselves upon individual members of groups and awaken in them sentiments of fear, awe, and respect.

Emile Durkheim, cited in *op. cit.*, p. x. See also, Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* trans. Joseph Ward Swain, (New York: Collier Books, 1961), pp. 121-193.

ideological relations of a given culture. Jung suggests in his somewhat sociologically naive, *The Undiscovered Self* that the interrelation between the unconscious and the conscious aspects of humanity in general cannot be severed:

You can take away a man's gods, but only to give him others in return. The leaders of the mass State cannot avoid being deified, and wherever crudities of this kind have not been put over by force, obsessive factors arise in their stead, charged with demonic energy—for instance, money, work, political influence, and so forth.

Thus in relation to symbols and the archetypes which they represent, a mass-produced placard image of, for example, Lenin in post-revolutionary Russia expresses, from Jung's perspective, a demonic archetypal force which once expressed on the conscious level reinforces a message of coercion and subjugation for the individual, who is oppressed by the dominant force of the archetype. In Jung's analytical terms, World War II is an example of the projection of the unconscious shadow onto societal reality on a grand scale.

¹*The Undiscovered Self* seems naive from the perspective of sociological theory because Jung simplifies complex social phenomena by offering sweeping generalizations. His analysis lacks many of the useful analytical typologies and tools which have been provided, for instance, by Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Karl Marx, and Michel Foucault. Moreover, his thinking contains numerous cultural biases which characterize the historical period in which he wrote the book. See "The Undiscovered Self" in Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 10: 488-588.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 10, p. 280.

interestingly, the Indian mystic philosopher Sri Aurobindo (Ghose) held a similar view to Jung's on this phenomenon. Commenting on Hitler's Nazi Germany, Aurobindo likened Hitler's pogrom to the threatened reign of the *asura*; which in Jainism represents a variety of demonic beings overcome by the forces of hatred. Navajata, *Sri Aurobindo*, third edition, in *National Biography Series* (New Delhi: National Book Trust, India, 1972), p. 74.

⁴Jung, "The Fight With the Shadow," *The Collected Works*, Vol. 10: 218-226, pp. 222-223.

This example demonstrates how Jung's concepts of the shadow and the archetype overlap, with the former representing a subset of the latter. If, for instance, the Nietzschean "overman" or "hero" archetype is manifest in the negative, destructive modality, it produces a flesh and blood tyrant; the unreflective shadow content is given full reign in individual human relations, and at times on the global scale.¹ Recall that Hitler was initially perceived as the heroic saviour of a Germany that hoped to regain its national pride after a period of economic and cultural decline.

Volodymyr Odanynyk argues that Jung's theory of social change is based on the idea of psychological change. Ideological and political change is ineffectual if it is not accompanied by a genuine psychological change of individuals:

...for Jung the psychology of a nation reflects the psychology of individuals, and only appropriate psychological changes in its individual citizens can initiate a change in the psychology of the nation... [positive change]... cannot be established by propaganda, social engineering, and agitation, or by political, economic, or humanitarian revolutions. The revolutions must first take place within the individual, and it is meaningless to speak of national or international peace until individuals achieve a degree of conscious harmony among the warring powers of their own psyches.

Volodymyr Odanynyk. *Jung and Politics*, p. 112. "The great problems of humanity," Jung himself says, "were never yet solved by general laws, but only through regeneration of the attitudes of individuals." Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 7, p. 4, cited by Odanynyk, op cit, p. 112.

²(a) According to the historian David Thomson, the initial success of the Nazi expansion hinged upon the fact that "men could not believe that so monstrous a regime could exist or succeed." Not unlike the unrestrained shadow:

The movement and its leader were nihilistic—bent upon total destruction of the liberal matrix of civilization which they detested, and if in this they failed, they were bent upon self-destruction.

See David Thomson, *Europe Since Napoleon* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1957), p. 758.

(b) The horrific "energy transforming" and "consciousness moulding" symbol of Nazism was the swastika, yet J. E. Cirlot notes that this image did not originate in Hitler's Germany. Rather, the swastika could be seen as an archetypal symbol because it was prevalent among various ancient cults,

Jung speaks out against Hitler in 1936 in his essay "Wotan" likening the rise of Nazism to the recurrence of the archetype of Wotan.

But what is more than curious - indeed piquant to a degree - is that an ancient god of storm and frenzy, the long quiescent Wotan, should awake, like an extinct volcano, to new activity, in a civilized country that had long been supposed to have outgrown the Middle Ages. We have seen him come to life in the German Youth Movement, and right at the beginning the blood of several sheep was shed in honour of his resurrection.

Although Jung does not specifically denote this as an instance of synchronicity, per se, he does describe the activation of the archetype and the rise of Hitler's power as a "coincidence:"

The coincidence of anti-Semitism with the reawakening of Wotan is a psychological subtlety that may perhaps be worth mentioning. The German youths who celebrated the solstice with sheep-

both in Europe (to include the Germanic peoples), Asia and pre-Columbian America. Its meanings are said to vary from being emblematic of the "mystic centre," to having some connection to the origins of the physical universe. See J. E. Cirlot, *A Dictionary of Symbols* trans. Jack Sage (New York: Philosophical Library Inc., 1962) p. 307. Clearly Hitler's promulgation of the swastika - and what it symbolized for Nazi Germany - conforms to Jung's view of moral evil as representing a "distortion" of natural, archetypal facts. Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 9/2, p. 267.

¹Jung, "Wotan," in *The Collected Works*, Vol. 10, pp. 179-193. Much debate has arisen over the fact that Jung decided to accept the first presidency of the International Psychoanalytic Association while it was under the ideological control of the Nazis. For a review of the allegations that Jung was - and the argumentation that he was not - a Nazi sympathizer, see Aryeh Maidenbaum and Stephen A. Martin (eds.) *Lingering Shadows: Jungians, Freudians, and Anti-Semitism* (Boston: Shambhala Publications, Inc., 1991). In "A Rejoinder to Dr. Bally" Jung himself says:

Amoral conflict arose for me as it would any decent man in this situation. Should I, as a prudent neutral, withdraw into security this side of the frontier and wash my hands in innocence, or should I - as I am well aware - risk my skin and expose myself to the inevitable misunderstandings which no one escapes who, from higher necessity, has to make a pact with the existing political powers in Germany?

C. G. Jung, cited in Maidenbaum et. al., pp. 54-55.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 10, p. 180.

sacrifices were not the first to hear a rustling in the primeval forest of the unconscious. They were anticipated by Nietzsche.

Again, in the same article, Jung says:

The rouser of this tempest is named Wotan, and we can learn a good deal about him from the political confusion and spiritual upheaval he has caused throughout history.

On the essentially synchronistic causality of the power of the archetype on social events, he indicates:

Man's earliest intuitions personified these powers as gods, and described them in the myths with great care and circumstantiality according to their various characters. This could be done the more readily on account of the firmly established primordial types or images which are innate in the unconscious of many races and exercise a direct influence upon them. Because the behaviour of a race takes on its specific character from its underlying images we can speak of an archetype "Wotan." As an autonomous psychic factor, Wotan produces effects in the collective life of a people and thereby reveals his own nature...It is only from time to time that individuals fall under the irresistible influence of this unconscious factor.³

Although Jung does not designate this as a synchronistic event, in "Flying Saucers: A Modern Myth" (1959) he mentions Wotan again, in this instance to support his argument that the rise of flying saucer imagery is synchronistic with the onset of an occidental quest for mandalic, psychological wholeness.- This particular reference to Wotan clearly suggests that Jung has synchronicity in mind in his understanding of the Wotan archetype, for much of "Flying Saucers" is a defense of the idea of synchronicity in connection with

¹ibid., p. 181.

²Ibid., 187.

³Ibid.

⁴C. G. Jung, "Flying Saucers: A Modern Myth of Things Seen in the Skies" in Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 10: 307-403. Wholeness for Jung means psychic totality—i.e. an integration of the ethical opposites of good and evil. Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 9/2, pp. 31-32, 63.

UFO imagery. In "Flying Saucers," Wotan is given as an additional example of synchronicity.

What would they say if I connected the dream of a quite simple person with Wotan or Baldur? They would accuse me of learned eccentricity, not knowing that in the same village there was a "wizard" who had taken the spell off the dreamers' stable, using for that purpose a book of magic that begins with the Merseburg incantation. Anyone who does not know that "Wotan's host" -enlightenment or no enlightenment - still roams about our Swiss cantons would accuse me of the greatest whimsicality [yet]...Wotan's nightly cavalcade are a reality which they fear without admitting it, and profess to know nothing about.

We see that Jung at this point is aware - or at least wary - of the possibility of being branded as a dealer of mystic quackery. Yet he does not retreat from his metaphysical position that archetypal truths endure over centuries because they dwell in an unspeakable, eternal ground of being. In direct contradistinction to Foucault's socio-analytical focus on the relativity of *all* truths/ Jung continues:

It needs so little to bridge the apparent abyss that yawns between the prehistoric world and the present. But we identify so much with the fleeting consciousness of the present that we forget the "timelessness" of our psychic foundations. Everything that has lasted longer, and will last longer, than the whirl of modern political movements is regarded as fantastical nonsense that should be studiously avoided.

It seems the only reason Jung does not overtly portray in "Wotan" the link between Wotan and Hitler's movement as being a synchronistic one is that at the time of writing (1936), it is too early in his career. Recall that synchronicity is only first mentioned in 1931. It would take Jung twenty years to acquire the professional confidence to fully elaborate upon

¹Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 10, p. 371. ²See Part 4(c) below.

³Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 10, p. 371.

synchronicity as a scientific concept in its own right, and twenty-eight years to apply it to the idea of Wotan.

To sum, it is clear that synchronicity is linked to not only psychological power, also to social power; moreover, in both cases the roots of this power are said to stem from a timeless aspect of the archetype.

4(c) Poststructuralism and Knowledge

Foucault's position is that knowledge is essentially social. His theory has little room for a metaphysical component to knowledge. In fact, all forms of knowledge, be they psychological, social, philosophical, or religious, are analyzed under the rubric of social knowledge. This is evident in *Technologies of the Self*, in which Foucault outlines the development of various conceptualizations of the self in Greek and Roman philosophy of the first two centuries, and in Christian monasticism in the late Roman empire of the fourth and fifth centuries. Just prior to his study he states:

My objective for more than twenty-five years has been to sketch out a history of the different ways in our culture that humans develop knowledge about themselves: economics, biology, psychiatry, medicine, and penology. The main point is not to accept this knowledge at face value but to analyze these so-called sciences as very specific "truth games" related to specific techniques that human beings use to understand themselves.

While Gary Gutting suggests that Foucault's treatment of knowledge is overly reductionist because discourse analysis ignores the phenomenology of pre-discursive types of experience, Foucault's perspective is avowedly

'Michel Foucault, "Technologies of the Self" in *Technologies of the Self* eds. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), pp. 17-18.

'Gary Gutting, *Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 243.

sociological—although the terra "sociological" is somewhat arbitrary. When asked in an interview by Rux Martin how he envisions himself - i.e. as a historian, a philosopher, a structuralist or a Marxist - Foucault responds:

I don't feel that it is necessary to know exactly what I am. The main interest in life and work is to become someone else that you were not in the beginning...The game is worthwhile insofar as we don't know what will be the end. My field is the history of thought.¹

Likewise, Clare O'Farrel notes that in responding to an imaginary interlocuter, Foucault attempts to be "faceless":

I am probably not the only one who writes in order to become faceless. Don't ask me who I am, or tell me to stay the same: that is the bureaucratic morality, which ensures that our papers are kept in order. It ought to let us be when it comes to writing.

Foucault never claims to present a new "mystic truth"³ or a grand,

Michel Foucault, in Rux Martin, "Truth, Power, Self: An Interview" in *Technologies of the Self*, pp. 9-10.

'Michel Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge*, p. 17, cited in Clare O'Farrell, *Foucault: Historian or Philosopher?* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), p. 47. Keith Tester notes that Foucault gave an anonymous interview for *Le Monde* because he apparently wanted to participate in a discourse without pertaining to the rules of that discourse. Keith Tester, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture. Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984* (Book Review). *Sociology* Vol. 25, February 1991, p. 347.

^According to David Macey, Foucault did, however, imbibe mind-altering substances:

Foucault was no stranger to the pleasures afforded by cannabis or probably, opium...his first encounter with the hallucinogen [LSD] was to be a Californian experience, and it did not take place until 1975.

David Macey, *The Lives of Michel Foucault* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), p. 254. Macey says that Foucault's comments on the experience of LSD are "surprising." Ibid, p. 253. The following passage is, in fact, surprising because it reveals a side of Foucault that is not well-known. Foucault writes about LSD in the style of Jack Kerouac, Allen Ginsberg, or Timothy Leary—the so-called "beat" writers, poets, and thinkers of the 1950's and 1960's:

overriding world view to society, nor does he wish to. His work is aimed to create a series of concepts which may be used not for understanding alone, but

...not only does it reveal this whole univocal and a-categorical mass to be rainbow-coloured, mobile, asymmetrical, decentred, spiraloid and resonating; it makes it swarm constantly with event-fantasies; sliding across this surface, which is at once punctiform and immensely vibratory, thought, freed from its catatonic chrysalis, has always contemplated the infinite equivalence which has become an acute event and a sumptuously adorned repetition.

Michel Foucault, "These complementaire," pp. 126-127, cited in Macey, *The Lives of Michel Foucault*, pp. 253-254. This is as close to any kind of mysticism that may be found in Foucault's writing. However, Foucault's spontaneous perceptions are not included in Foucault's theory of knowledge. From the perspective of a disciplined mystic from any religious tradition, these writings would most likely seem juvenile. Concerning her own view of mystical "adolescence," Evelyn Underhill writes:

It seems as though the moment of puberty were far more critical in the spiritual than it is in the physical life: the ordinary dangers of adolescence being intensified when they appear upon the higher levels of consciousness. In the condition of psychic instability which is characteristic of this movement to new states, man is usually at the mercy of the suggestions and impressions which he receives. Hence in every period of true mystical activity we find an outbreak of occultism, illuminism, and other perverted spirituality.

Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 149. Jung writes about drug-induced perceptions from a psychiatric perspective, comparing them to the experience of the so-called schizophrenic:

Obviously a disintegration has taken place, a decay of apperception...Very often then associative variants that are excluded by normal apperception enter the field of consciousness, e.g., those countless nuances of form, meaning, and value such as are true characteristics of the effects of mescaline. This and kindred drugs cause, as we know, an *abaissement* which, by lowering the threshold of consciousness, renders perceptible the perceptual variants that are normally unconscious, thereby enriching one's apperception to an astounding degree, but on the other hand making it impossible to integrate them into the general orientation of consciousness. This is because the accumulation of variants that have become conscious gives each single act of apperception a dimension that fills the whole of consciousness. This explains the fascination so typical of mescaline. It cannot be denied that schizophrenic apperception is very similar.

Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 263.

also for social change. In the "Afterword" of *Technologies of the Self* he stresses the "necessity of excavating our own culture in order to open a free space for innovation and creativity."¹¹

In this section on Poststructuralism and Knowledge, I am concerned with Foucault's treatment of *notions* of truth. Because the question of how truth claims emerge is, for Foucault, intricately linked to the idea of social power, this section leads into the next - 4(d) Poststructuralism, Knowledge and Power - and by necessity there is some overlap within the two sections. Moreover, to understand how Foucault arrived at his position on knowledge, power and truth, it will be useful to examine some of the salient precursors to his standpoint.

While Foucault acknowledges many theorists who - more and less closely - prefigure his views, the contributions of Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Marx and Roland Barthes will be sketched as they relate to Foucault's perspective on knowledge, which as mentioned, is closely connected to his ideas of truth and power.

Foucault says, "truth is a thing of this world."² Truth is always a relative truth, instead of an immutable, transcendent truth. For Foucault, the notion of transhistorical truth may be contextualized within the context of relative truth, generated from within a particular social milieu.

David Couzens Hoy suggests that an important distinguishing feature between Foucault's postmodernism and the modernism of other thinkers is the manner in which the postmodern theorist approaches what Hoy terms, the "great

foucault, "Afterword" in *Technologies of the Self*, p. 163.

¹Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings, 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. C. Gordon et al. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 131.

unthought." Like Cartesian and Enlightenment thinkers, Hoy argues, the postmodern thinker is able to think about matters that are invisible, or unthinkable to others; unlike the Cartesian and Enlightenment thinkers, however, the postmodern advances his or her inquiry by allowing for the notion that thought may never be able to uncover an absolute, immutable truth—precisely because the postmodern does not believe such a thing to exist. For the postmodern, the act of thinking creates complexity rather than simplistic generalizations or fabricated theorems. In a sense, the postmodern thinker is at loggerheads with both transcendentalists and with adherents to Ockham's razor.¹ On this point, Hoy suggests that postmodern science is following the course that postmodern art and architecture has already traversed; he cites Jean-Francois Lyotard:

Postmodern science - by concerning itself with such things as undecidables, the limits of precise control, conflicts characterized by incomplete information, 'fracta,' catastrophes, and pragmatic paradoxes - is theorizing its own evolution as discontinuous, catastrophic, nonrectifiable, and paradoxical. It is changing the meaning of the world *knowledge*, while expressing how such a change can take place. It is producing not the known, but the unknown.

Although Foucault's influence within contemporary scholarship may seem to indicate that he was the first to advance this idea, this clearly is not the case. Foucault himself acknowledges his debt to Nietzsche, who prior to

^he theologian William of Ockham (c. 1285-1347) forwarded the notion that all extraneous assumptions and postulates should be discarded in favour of simplicity. See Alister E. Mcgrath, *Christian Theology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 45-46.

^Jean-Francois Lyotard, cited in David Couzens Hoy, "Foucault: Modern or Postmodern?" in Jonathan Arac (ed) *After Foucault: Humanistic Knowledge, Postmodern Challenges* (London: Rutgers University Press, 1988: 12-41) p. 23.

^That the relativity of truth is not a recent formulation is evidenced in Pontius Pilate's question - "what is truth?" - to Jesus. *John* 18:38. More recently, thinkers such as Louis Althusser, Ferdinand de Saussure and Jacques

Foucault argued that notions of cultural value and cultural truth are isomorphic. That is, Nietzsche argued that truth¹ is a product of the moral ideals which are valued in a particular social arrangement.

Like Foucault, Nietzsche maintains that truth is relative to a social setting, and further suggests that notions of absolute 'truth' are intertwined with the ideal 'values' of particular social groupings. Nietzsche's most common example of the convergence of truth and value is found in what he envisions as the "sick,"² unhealthy world-renouncing ascetic ideal of Christian society.³ In *The Genealogy of Morals** He says

I know of hardly anything else that has had so destructive an effect upon the health and racial strength of Europeans as this ideal; one may without any exaggeration call it the true calamity

Derrida, have pointed, each in their own way, to the idea that truth is relative to society. For a good discussion of how each of these thinkers contribute to Foucault's version of poststructuralism, see Weedon, *Feminist Practice and Poststructural Theory*, pp. 22-25, 29-32, 52-53.

*One exception to Nietzsche's view about the relativity of truth is his notion of the 'eternal return' (an eternal cosmic repetition of all the elements which form history) which he most likely develops from the Stoic notion of 'conflagration' (an eternal cycle of cosmic destruction and subsequent repetition of the essential elements of the cosmos). Foucault does not adhere to either of these views. See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1961), pp. 237-238, and Peter A. Angeles, *Dictionary of Philosophy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), pp. 45, 241-242.

²Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols/The Anti-Christ* trans., R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 167.

³Ibid. Colleen McDannell and Bernard Lang suggest the ascetic ideal was initially popularized by Augustine. Irenaeus, prior to Augustine, anticipated an earthly resurrection of the flesh, and consequently held a more positive attitude toward things of this world. Colleen McDannell and Bernard Lang. *Heaven: A History* (New York: Vintage Books, 1988) p. 47-68.

⁴Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Genealogy of Morals* ed. and trans., Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967).

in the history of European health...The ascetic priest has ruined psychological health wherever he has come to power.¹

Later in the same work the ascetic ideal of Christianity is further lambasted:

The ascetic ideal has hitherto *dominated* all philosophy, because truth was posited as being, as God, as the highest court of appeal—because truth was not *permitted* to be a problem at all...The will to truth requires a critique.

Nietzsche also contends that replacing "religious truth" with "scientific truth" does not create a dramatically different ideal if the new scientific ideal maintains a belief in some absolute truth to be "discovered" or "uncovered."

This pair, science and the ascetic ideal, both rest on the same foundation—I have already indicated it: on the same overestimation of truth (more exactly: on the same belief that truth is inestimable and cannot be criticized).

Michael Mahon suggests that Foucault's method aims at "the locale of the positive"__ in place of a "negative, unconscious of knowledge," and that Nietzsche is similarly concerned with how truth is "willed" into existence. Mahon cites Foucault's 1968 response when asked to explain the purpose of his work:

I have tried to disengage an autonomous domain which would be that of the unconscious of science, of the unconscious of knowledge (*savoir*), which would have its own rules, like the unconscious of the human individual similarly has its rules and determinations.

^{*}Ibid., p. 143.

²Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, p. 153.

³Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, p. 153. As noted, Nietzsche posits his *own* absolute truth with his notion of the eternal return. *Supra*, p. 230 nl.

[^]Michael Mahon. *Foucault's Nietzschean Genealogy: Truth, Power and the Subject* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), pp. 61, 83.

⁵Michel Foucault, cited in Michael Mahon, *Foucault's Nietzschean Genealogy*, p. 61. This reference to the "rules" of the individual unconscious is a notion which Foucault more thoroughly abandons in his relativisation of the 'truth' of

Nietzsche is not the only influence upon Foucault's idea of truth. The semiotician Roland Barthes figures prominently as well. Barthes follows Nietzsche's view of truth as something linked to cultural ideals, and is much influenced by Marx's critique of capitalism as an oppressive social formation wherein the owners of the means of production control their workers by imparting to them a false, distorted ideology. Barthes advances Marx's claim by examining what he believes to be the precise means by which this ideological falsification is achieved.

For Barthes, the mechanism of social oppression is language, or more exactly, any symbol or mythic system located within inequitable relations of social power. Barthes suggests that "class interests and values" are primary to the creation of social contexts in which culturally scripted relationships exist between the language of signification and that which is signified. To explain the mechanism of this essentially social creation of signified meaning, Barthes makes a distinction between denotation and connotation. He proposes that while some linguistic signifiers simply *denote* a single, fixed content of meaning, *most* signifiers *connote* a variety of culturally relative meanings.² This relation between *signifier* and *signified* is called a *sign*.

psychology in *The History of Sexuality*, Vol. 2.

*Kaja Silverman, *The Subject of Semiotics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 29.

²David Silverman and Brian Torode say that connotative meaning exists "in addition to the "primary [denoted] meaning." David Silverman and Brian Torode, *The Material World: Some Theories of Language and its Limits* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 259. For instance, rather than denoting a single, fixed meaning, the signifier "tweed jacket" will also connote various meanings (significations) about itself and the subject wearing it - from "sporty," "classy," "pretentious," to "ridiculous." Thus the type of signified meaning depends in part upon the audience. Roland Barthes, *The Elements of Semiology*, trans. Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), [1964] p. 89-90. In contrast to Barthes, Jacques Derrida claims that *all* signifiers are

The sign is a (two-faced) slice of sonority, visuality, etc. The *signification* can be conceived as a process; it is the act which binds the signifier and the signified, an act whose product is the sign.

As we shall see from the following, the sign extends to notions of "truth" because the relation between signifier and signified represents a deceptive language of "truth."

This distortion of truth may extend into what Barthes calls *metalanguage*. Metalanguage is found in the language of science and also in popular language. Scientific language may be described as a metalanguage because the signifiers used to signify an element of meaning are themselves elements of a previous signification. In the case of the scientific operation, $2+3=5$, the language of $2 + 3$ (signifier) = 5 (signified) depends upon the previous signification that "2," "3," and "5" respectively signify two, three and five objects, quantities, thoughts, feelings, ideas or events. Thus $2 + 3$ signifies 5, but this is a secondary signification which rests upon a previous, "lower" level of signification. Thus the overall sign of $2 + 3 = 5$ is a metalanguage since it is a secondary relation that depends upon a previous, lower relation (i.e. what each number signifies).

connotational and that none are denotational; all ideas exist in relation to and therefore modify one another in a "discursive chain" of meaning. For a discussion on the historical development of the notion of signification, see Silverman, *The Subject of Semiotics*, pp. 3-53.

¹Barthes' system builds on the work of Ferdinand de Saussure who originated the idea that the sign is a relationship between a signifier and that which the signifier signifies. As a structuralist, however, de Saussure believed in "a pre-given, fixed structuring of language, prior to its realization in speech or writing. Weedon, *Feminist Practice and Poststructural Theory*, p. 23. Barthes does not share the idea that signification expresses a fixed, underlying linguistic structure.

¹Roland Barthes, *The Elements of Semiology*, p. 48.

In popular language, metalanguage can be found in any system of signification that depends upon the previous existence of a lower set of significations. Barthes gives the example of the fashion magazine.

The notion of metalanguage must not be confined to scientific languages; when ordinary language, in its denoted state, takes over a system of signifying objects, it becomes an 'operation', that is, a metalanguage. This is the case, for instance, with the fashion magazine which 'speaks' the significations of garments, just as one speaks a language; this, however, is only ideally speaking, for magazines do not usually exhibit a purely denoted discourse, so eventually we deal here with a complex ensemble, where language, at its denoted level, is a metalanguage, but where this metalanguage is in its turn caught up in a process of connotation.

Later Barthes complicates the notion of metalanguage by noting that a given metalanguage may be surpassed by another metalanguage.

Nothing in principle prevents a metalanguage from becoming in its turn the language object of a new metalanguage; this would for example, be the case with semiology if it were to be 'spoken' by another science.

In *Mythologies* Barthes describes myth as "depoliticized speech"³ in which the potency - or power - of myth lies in relation to its hidden political content. So-called "strong myths" are politically charged and yet depoliticized; that is, the myth appears to be neutral as the metalanguage of the myth serves to naturalize - and therefore legitimize - what in essence is a relative truth. Racism, he says, represents a strong myth in that much force is required to misrepresent a human being or group of human beings.

¹Ibid., pp. 92-93.

²Ibid., p. 93. In this vein, one could argue the existence of multiple metalanguages, each one building upon the other.

³Roland Barthes, *Mythologies*, trans. Annette Lavers (New York: Hill and Wang 1972 [1957]) p. 143.

⁴Barthes provides the example of a Sudanese. Ibid., p. 144.

The "weak myths" on the other hand tend to carry political power which lies in a potential state—like an explosive that will burst only if ignited. For weak myths, Barthes provides the example of the film *The Lost Continent*, in which a jovial group of occidental anthropologists superficially explore Asia without ever leaving the ideological confines of their particular colonial outlook.

The political quality of the object has *faded* like the colour, but the slightest things can bring back its strength brutally; what is more *natural* than the sea? and what more 'political' than the sea celebrated by the makers of the film *The Lost Continent***

Concerning the notion of absolute truth, for Barthes this is relative to the series of significations present within the language of a particular social and historical moment. This notion that all truth is relative is extended to religious and mythological truth claims. Barthes argues in "Myth Today" that:

Ancient or not, mythology can only have an historical foundation, for myth is a type of speech chosen by history: it cannot possibly evolve from the 'nature' of things.

This view appears to be at loggerheads with Jung's notion of the archetype as something grounded in the essential structure of nature, yet Jung's emphatic distinction between the archetype proper and the archetypal image complicates the issue. From a Jungian perspective, Barthes' concern with mythology is focused upon the level of the archetypal image. While archetypal images manifest different details, they apparently express an

Ibid., pp. 94, 144. Ibid.,

p. 144. Ibid., p. 110.

inherited and equivalent underlying archetypal pattern. In *Man and His*

Symbols Jung writes:

My views about "archaic remnants," which I call "archetypes" or "primordial images" have been constantly criticized by people who lack a sufficient knowledge of the psychology of dreams and of mythology. The term "archetype" is often misunderstood as meaning certain definite mythological images or motifs. But these are nothing more than conscious representations; it would be absurd to assume that such variable representations could be inherited. The archetype is a tendency to form such representations of a motif—representations that can vary a great deal in detail without losing their basic pattern.

If one were to accept Jung's assertion, it would seem that Barthes' critique of a natural evolution of the signifier falls short for the reasons Jung outlines. From a Jungian standpoint, Barthes collapses the archetype proper into the archetypal image. As the following reveals, Barthes'

^xC. G. Jung, et al. (eds.) C.G. Jung and M.-L. von Franz. *Man and His Symbols* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1964), p. 67. Michael P. Levine argues that any attempt to compare different religious systems results in a simplified and reductive appraisal because "Religion itself, and so any comparative strategy in the study of religions, is more complex than deep structural accounts can allow for." Levine's use of the term "deep structure" refers to Ronald Green's notion that different religions may be judged on the basis of their rational and ethical content. Michael P. Levine. "Deep Structure and the Comparative Philosophy of Religion." *Religious Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 3, Sept. 1992: 387-400, p. 387.

²Morris Philipson points out that Jung's usage of the term symbol refers to the archetypal contents of the collective unconscious, whereas one of Jung's usages of the term sign refers to the instinctual contents of the personal unconscious. Philipson suggests that Jung challenged Freud by offering a new way of interpreting the unconscious that

...is based on the fact that the symbol (i.e. the dream picture of fantasy), is no longer evaluated *semiotically*, as a sign for the elementary instinctual processes, but really *symbolically*, whereby the word 'symbol'¹ is taken to mean the best possible expression of a complex fact not yet clearly grasped by consciousness.

C. G. Jung, "The Transcendent Function" (1916), cited in Morris Philipson, *Outline of a Jungian Aesthetics* (Northwestern University Press, 1963), p. 18. Philipson also cites the following to support his claim:

understanding of "speech" does indeed include the mythological "symbol." Jung would envision Barthes' understanding of the symbol as pointing towards the archetypal image rather than the archetype, proper.

We shall therefore take *language, discourse, speech*, etc. to mean any significant unit or synthesis, whether verbal or visual.

For Barthes, verbal or visual language does not represent some "natural" truth; instead, a given chain of signification is located within and reinforces socially created class distinctions. Therefore from Barthes' perspective, Jung's emphasis on the symbol overlooks the important connotative aspects of the process of signification. Jung may be aware of the role that

Far be it from me to assert that the semiotic interpretation is meaningless; it is not only possible, but also very true. Its usefulness is undisputed in all those cases where nature is merely crippled, without any effective accomplishment coming from it. But the semiotic interpretation becomes meaningless when it is applied exclusively and schematically, when, in short, it ignores the real nature of the symbol and seeks to depreciate it to the level of a mere sign.

C. G. Jung, "On Psychical Energy" (1928), cited in Philipson, *Outline of a Jungian Aesthetics*, pp. 18-19.

Poland Barthes, *Mythologies*, p. 111.

^Whether or not the element of the "social" may be distinguished, as Barthes would suggest, from that of the "natural" is itself a highly debatable and politically charged point. For Jung, nature is hierarchical, and this extends to the social; accordingly, Jung's treatment of non-european peoples at times appears racist. For instance, Jung says that individuals of the English colonies are "slightly inferior," and that "there are facts to support this view." In the United States, he cites the so-called 'fact' of the psychological influence of the "lax," "childlike" and "inferior" blacks. See, Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 10, pp. 46-47, 121, 507-509.

³Jung does make a distinction between semiotic and symbolic forms of representation, but it differs from Barthes system because for Jung, the semiotic "sign" refers to (a) purely descriptive, or denotative signification (Jung gives the example of the badge of a railway official that distinguishes him or her as a member of the railway), or (b) the elements (and elementary processes of wishing and striving) of the personal unconscious which are revealed by what Jung sees as the "reductive" methods (as in looking backwards) of Freud and Adler. In contrast, the "symbol" is a "psychological mechanism that transforms energy"

social power plays in the creation of the various meanings that are implied by the process of signification, but he does not include this idea in his theory.

That Barthes' idea of "class distinction" is decidedly Marxist in tone is evidenced by his frequent reference to the so-called "bourgeoisie" and its tendency to distort an *arbitrary* history into an apparently *natural* history—a history which naturalizes the political oppression of the "proletariat." The most effective means through which the bourgeoisie dominates the proletariat is by hiding itself and the process of exploitation from which it benefits. Barthes calls this a process of "ex-nomination,"^J and duly defines the bourgeoisie as "the social class that does not want to be named." In contrast to the bourgeoisie, both the aim and identity of the political "left" are highly visible—they are the group that openly challenges the *status quo* as defined by the bourgeoisie.

from the collective unconscious. See Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 6, pp. 63, 63n, 459, 473, and Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, 45, 75, 175.

*Jung summarizes his position in *Man and His Symbols* by saying: "The sign is always less than the concept it represents, while a symbol always stands for something more than its obvious and immediate meaning." He then discusses his view of the symbol in regard to its psychic manifestation in synchronistic phenomena. Jung, *Man and His Symbols*, (Bantam) p. 41. We have seen that for Barthes, the sign (referring to a relation between signifier and signified) may speak several meanings. Therefore the Barthian sign does not always contain "less" than that which it represents, as indicated by Jung. But it does not necessarily include the occurrence of synchronicity, whereas the symbol often is accompanied with synchronicity. James Hillman argues that synchronicity joins archetypal opposites, and that this does not result from the will, *but simply "as symbols happen."* Hillman, *The Myth of Analysis*, p. 86.

²Roland Barthes, *Mythologies* p. 138.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

The oppressed is nothing, he has only one language, that of his emancipation; the oppressor is everything, his language is rich, multiform, supple, with all possible degrees of dignity at its disposal: he has an exclusive right to *meta-language*. The oppressed *makes* the world, he has only an active, transitive (political) language; the oppressor conserves it, his language is plenary, intransitive, gestural, theatrical: it is Myth. The language of the former aims at transforming, of the latter at eternalizing.

Somewhat like Barthes, Foucault argues:

Such discourses as economics, medicine, grammar, the science of living beings give rise to certain organizations of concepts, certain regroupings of objects, certain types of enunciation, which form, according to their degree of coherence, rigour, stability, themes or theories.

Foucault's main challenge to Barthes centres upon the essentially Marxist ideas of "class" which are prominent in Barthes' thought. Before Barthes, Marx says in *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* that American society is not "mature enough to make the class struggle obvious and comprehensible."³ As evident in his discourse on myth in *Mythologies*, Barthes both echoes Marx and yet surveys the terrain upon which Foucault would carve out his own position, placing Barthes somewhere in between these two

bid., p. 149.

²Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, p. 64.

³Karl Marx. *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York: International Publishers, 1984 [1852]), p. 138. Jon Elster argues that Marx's use of the term "class" is intended "to explain the incidence and the forms of collective action"—in short, almost every aspect of societal behaviour. Elster claims that while Marx failed to clearly define "class," a survey of Marx's writings enables one to define it in terms of:

...a group of people who by virtue of what they possess are compelled to engage in the same activities if they want to make the best use of their endowments.

Jon Elster, *Making Sense of Marx* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 318, 331.

theorists. Except for his reference to the bourgeoisie, however, Barthes' affinity with Foucault is perhaps even more evident when he concludes:

It is now possible to complete the semiological definition of myth in a bourgeois society: *myth is depoliticized speech*. One must naturally understand *political* in its deeper meaning, as describing the whole of human relations in their real, social structure, in their power of making the world—Myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply, it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal justification, it gives them a clarity which is not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact.

Compare this to Foucault's view about signification and discourse:

In relation to this implicit, sovereign, communal 'meaning,' statements appear in superabundant proliferation, since it is to that meaning alone that they all refer and to it alone that they owe their truth...But the primary and ultimate meaning springs up through the manifest formulations, it hides beneath what appears, and secretly duplicates it, because each discourse contains the power to say something other than what it actually says, and thus to embrace a plurality of meanings: a plethora of 'signified' in relation to a single 'signifier.' From this point of view, discourse is both plentitude and endless wealth.

While Barthes bases semiotic analyses on class differences, Foucault would treat a Barthian type of analysis as a discourse not unlike any other discourse. That is, Foucault argues that the central concept of "class" itself requires deconstruction. Accordingly, the term "class" and neo-Marxist class-based analyses are for Foucault simplistic and misleading indicators of what he envisions as a highly complex dynamic of social struggle. As outlined in the next section, Foucault believes his approach is a more accurate means

Poland Barthes, *Mythologies*, p. 143.

²Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, p. 118. Walter Privitera, suggests that Foucault's "semiological period," as found in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, reveals a scientific approach to semiology. Walter Privitera, *Problems of Style: Michel Foucault's Epistemology* (Albany: State University of New York, 1995), pp. 67-68.

of understanding, and prefers to speak of discourse - as a field of relations that exists in an omnidirectional web of power relations - instead of class.

4(d) Poststructuralism, **Knowledge and Power**

While Barthes seems quite concerned to establish semiotics as a "science" which exposes cultural chimeras that pretend to be natural or eternal truths, Marx, upon which Barthes' system is built, dealt more directly with the idea of eradicating social and material oppression. In his attempt to establish a science of semiotics, Barthes mentions the bourgeoisie's oppression of the proletariat, but for Marx to outline this relationship is the *raison d'etre* of his life work. Thus Marx's contribution to Foucault may be discussed under the heading of "Poststructuralism, Knowledge And Power."

While there is considerable difference in how Marx's work is interpreted, G. A. Cohen² argues that Marxist class-based analyses posit two main aspects of production within all societal types. These are 1) the forces of production and 2) the relations of production. The forces of production, or productive forces (PFs) refer to the means of commodity production, which includes land, tools, and technical knowledge. The relations of production, or productive relations (PRs) refers to the social structures, rules and regulations of a particular societal form, which Cohen argues are dependent upon the PFs. That is, the PFs (as the physical and technological means of

It seems Barthes falls into the trap he attempts to dismantle as he, like Jung, legitimizes semiology by claiming it to be "a science among others", as if the scientific enterprise itself were not bounded within the confines of history and culture. See Roland Barthes, *Mythologies*, p. 112. In commenting upon an earlier draft of this thesis, however, Naomi Goldenberg has suggested that in the French language, "science" has a more general meaning.

'G. A. Cohen, *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978).

production) are the primary element that determine the economic, legal and political formations of a particular societal arrangement - be this primitive communism, feudal society, contemporary capitalism, or Marx's projected form of Utopian communism.

In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure, the real basis on which rises a legal and political superstructure.*

Cohen argues that the PRs include relative, ideological truths that serve to reinforce the existing PFs which in capitalist society, are owned and controlled by the bourgeoisie.

The bourgeoisie cannot exist without continually revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production and all the social relations.

These relations of production are, in part, relative ideological truths - as opposed to an absolute truth - which serve to define the individual's understanding of her or his imagined "class" position—that is, where she or he believes to "rightfully" belong in the hierarchical social structure.

Regardless of the historical epoch in which the individual is located, ideological truths arise from the existing form of the material base (the PFs). When the PFs change over the course of time, the ideological truths of the PRs are duly modified in order to facilitate the new means of production.

*Karl Marx, *Critique of Political Economy*, cited in G. A. Cohen, *Karl Marx's Theory of History*, p. 28. The distinction between productive forces and relations of production is also made by Marx in *Capital, Vol. I*. See Karl Marx, *Capital, Vol. I: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production*, ed. Frederick Engels (New York: International Publishers, 1967), pp. 113-115, 173-180.

²Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 24, cited in G. A. Cohen, *Karl Marx's Theory of History*, p. 145.

As Marx says, "consciousness of class [difference] arises in the same way in different times and places, but never in just the same way."¹

In the capitalist mode of production, Marx suggests that a monolithic class of elites use the ideological PRs to maintain the material oppression of the working class—the downtrodden proletariat from whose exploited labour the elites' enjoy their prosperity. This is effected ideologically and economically. Ideology serves to keep the system in place, and in the case of Capitalist exploitation, the economic reinvestment of surplus profits (profits over and above the costs of production and the wages paid to workers) ensures the growth of the owners' capital. In short, Marx envisions the owners of the means of production in the capitalist system as being the most significant agents of social oppression.

Foucault challenges this view of one-way, what may be termed above to below exploitation with his formulation of discourse. Discourse theory portrays the relation between relative, discursively created truths and ideological power in a multi-directional manner—unlike the one-way domination

*Karl Marx, *Making of the English Working Class* pp. 9-10, cited in G. A. Cohen, *Karl Marx's Theory of History*, p. 74.

¹John Elster notes that Marx makes a distinction between different exploiting classes, such as Landlords and Capitalists. Elster, *Making Sense of Marx*, p. 323.

²While Anthony Cutler, Barry Hindess et. al. suggest that Marx's definition of class includes not only the means of production, but also "definite political forces and cultural forms," Max Weber clearly conceptualized the different modalities and significances of: 1) class (ownership), 2) social honour (status), and 3) political affiliation (party), and 4) jurisprudence. Like Marx, however, this elaboration of social spheres still rendered domination, *in toto*, from above to below. See Anthony Cutler, Barry Hindess, Paul Hirst, and Athar Hussain, *Marx's Capital and Capitalism Today* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 231; and Max Weber, "Class, Status, Party" in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. & trans. H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946: 180-195), p. 187.

envisioned by the Marxist system. Rather than positing the owners of the means of production as wielding dominant interests over a separate and distinct group of wage-labourers, Foucault suggests that power takes a multiplicity of different forms. Instead of adhering to an uncomplicated above to below schema, Foucault argues that power acts within a grid-like setup of competing discourses, institutions and practices.

Concerning the concept of class and its relation to social power, Foucault contests the Marxist view and replaces it with the analogy of a chain-like schema of power. On the circular flow of power, Foucault says in *Power/Knowledge*:

Power must be analysed as something that circulates, or rather as something that only functions in the form of a chain___Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organization.

In this view, power flows throughout the social body much like the blood in the human body. Its expression is roundabout and diffuse rather than clear and direct, as defined in the Marxist system.

Moreover, wherever power expresses itself, it inevitably meets with some form of resistance—that is, with a counter force attempting to nullify or reverse the initial force applied. Foucault unequivocally says in *The History of Sexuality*, Vol. 1, that "where there is power, there is resistance."² Resistance, however, is not understood in the Marxist sense of some large-scale revolt of a united group of alienated workers; rather resistance is as

foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 98.

²Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, Vol. 1 trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), p. 95.

³In the close of *The Communist Manifesto*, Marx writes the famous "WORKERS OF THE WORLD, UNITE!" See, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Manifeste du Parti Communiste* (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1972), p. 95.

intricate as the poly-directional web of discourses which it confronts.

Speaking on the relational aspect of power relationships, Foucault suggests:

Their existence depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance...these points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network. Hence there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of them in a special case: resistances that are spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant or violent; still others that are quick to compromise, interested or sacrificial; by definition, they can only exist in the strategic field of power relations.

Thus the articulation of, and resistance to, power cannot be adequately described by use of a vertical dialectic of a powerful class of land-owners on the one hand, and powerless class of oppressed workers on the other hand.

There is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations...no such duality extending from the top down and reacting on more and more limited groups to the very depths of the social body. One must suppose rather that the manifold relationships of force that take shape and come into play in the machinery of production, in families, limited groups, and institutions, are the basis for wide-ranging effects of cleavage that run through the social body as a whole. These then form a general line of force that traverses the local oppositions and links them together; to be sure, they also bring about redistributions, realignments, homogenizations, serial arrangements, and convergences of the force relations. Major dominations are the hegemonic effects that are sustained by all these confrontations.

Another dimension of Foucault's more recent sense of power is that power is not merely an agent of social repression, as it is articulated in Marxist

Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, Vol. 1, pp. 95-96.

²Ibid., p. 94. A recent proponent of the dualistic, essentially Marxist "above to below" view which Foucault eschews is found in the work of Michael Parenti. See for example, Michael Parenti, *Power and the Powerless* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 126.

and neo-Marxist social analyses. Against the simple idea of power as contributing to social repression, Foucault offers a more complex view of the role of power and how it relates to repression. He states in "Truth and Power" in *Power/Knowledge*:

The notion of repression is a more insidious one, or at all events I myself have had much trouble in freeing myself of it.. .When I wrote *Madness and Civilization*, I made at least an implicit use of this notion of repression. I think indeed that I was positing the existence of a sort of living, voluble and anxious madness which the mechanisms of power and psychiatry were supposed to repress and reduce to silence. But it seems to me now that the notion of repression is quite inadequate for capturing what is precisely the productive aspect of power.

^{*}The term, repression originates from Freud's master defense mechanism; on a societal level his repressive hypothesis entails the introjection of the moral demands of significant others, which in turn quells - or more opportunely, sublimates - the essentially asocial demands of the instinctual id. See Sigmund Freud, "The Ego and the Id" and "The Economic Problem of Masochism" in *The Ego and The Id and Other Works* in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* trans. James Strachey, Anna Freud et. al. (London: The Hogarth Press, 1961: 19-27, 159-170), Vol. XIX, pp. 25, 168.

²Jill Harsin points out that Foucault's historical analysis of power, repression and madness in *Madness and Civilization* is factually flawed. She contends that Foucault's insistence that only the poor were victimized by a "great confinement" within Europe from approximately 1660 to 1800 is inaccurate because confinement began in the fifteenth century. Harsin also claims that

The process of a large-scale "great confinement" was not a European-wide phenomenon; even in France itself it may not have been as extensive as Foucault has suggested, and it was not the poor alone who made up the small number of people who were locked up as mad.

Furthermore, she says that Foucault overlooks the possibility that "women might well have been more easily locked up, more easily brushed aside, than men." Jill Harsin, "Gender, Class, and Madness." *French Historical Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 4, Fall 1992: 1048-1071, pp. 1068-1069.

³Foucault, *Power/Knowledge* 118-119. Foucault arrived at this view after his *Madness and Civilization*, wherein an implied repressive hypothesis interprets the relation between psychiatry and madness as one of power and subjugation. In the preface, however, Foucault does say that madness is "constituted" as a "mental illness" at the end of the 18th century, which implies a creative element to power. But in his treatment of Nietzsche and Van Gogh as "madpersons," he seems to return to the repressive hypothesis—in this instance contributing to it by suggesting that both Nietzsche and Van Gogh actually became "mad" because at some

Likewise, in "Lecture One: 7 January 1976" in *Power/Knowledge* he says:

The need to investigate this notion of repression more thoroughly springs therefore from the impression I have that it is wholly inadequate to the analysis of the mechanisms and effects of power that it is so pervasively used to characterize today.

And when Pierre Boncenne in an interview suggests, "In order to analyze power, one must not link it *a priori* to repression..." Foucault responds,

"Exactly." Power, according to Foucault's later formulation, is essentially *creative* rather than repressive. Essentially relative social truths which pose as natural or absolute truths are constructed within sites of social

stage the information contained in their utterances could not be grasped by the larger culture. What Foucault fails to mention is the relativity of his *own* classification of madness in regard to Nietzsche and Van Gogh. See Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*. trans. Richard Howard (New York: Vintage Books, 1973, c1965), pp. x, 286. Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* also looked at power in terms of repression as it focused on the systematization of repression within penal codes and practices in Europe and the United States. Foucault argued that Jeremy Bentham's panopticon - an eighteenth-century prison structure that facilitated constant one-way surveillance of prisoners - provided a more "economic and effective" means by which power could repress individuals. He says the panopticon "automatizes and disindividualizes power" as the prisoners who ringed the surrounding walls could not see into the space where the centrally located prison guard stood, nor could they determine whether the guard was actually present— hence the constant fear of being watched. Michel Foucault. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), pp. 202, 207, 195-228. James Miller suggests that Foucault's apparent erudition in *Discipline and Punish* is deceiving as "it was based on a relatively small number of archival sources." Miller further argues that Foucault places a "recurrent emphasis on control, domination, and punishment as the only mediating qualities possible in personal and social relationships." James Miller, *The Passion of Michel Foucault* (New York : Simon and Shuster, 1993), pp. 235-236.

foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 92.

[^]Michel Foucault, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984* ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman, trans. Alan Sheridan et. al. (New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 102.

³Peter Quigley notes that Nietzsche similarly argued that human beings have a tendency to naturalize and hence legitimize what are essentially relative ethical constructions:

struggle among a variety of competing interest groups. Truth, then, emerges as a product of social struggle, amidst a multiplicity of rival discursive truths.¹

When we refer to "discourse theory" in the Foucauldian sense, then, this refers to a series of written, spoken and visual signs which create relative, specific *notions* of truth. In his words:

The problem does not consist in drawing the line between that in a discourse which falls under the category of scientificity or truth, and that which comes under some other category, but in seeing historically how effects of truth are produced within discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false.

Not unlike the Darwinian survival of the fittest paradigm, Foucault's system is based on competition. He says, "there is a battle 'for truth'...a battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays."³ Unlike Darwinian thought, however, discourses of truth that survive are not necessarily those which are best suited to their environments; rather, the most powerful endure. In fact, a powerful discourse may exist that is truly injurious to the greater social whole, as witnessed for instance with

While you rapturously pose as deriving your law from nature, you want something quite the reverse of that, you strange actors and self-deceivers? Your pride wants to prescribe your morality, your ideal, to nature, yes to nature itself, and incorporate them in it; you__would like to make all existence exist only after your own image....But this is an old and never ending story.

Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, cited in Peter Quigley, "Rethinking Resistance: Environmentalism, Literature, and Poststructural Theory." *Environmental Ethics*, Vol. 14/4, Winter 1992: 291-307, p. 299.

*Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman introduced this idea to mainstream sociology in 1966, albeit with less emphasis on power. See, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1966).

²Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 118.

³Ibid., p. 132.

the rise of Nazi Germany and the discourse of cultural supremacy which it advanced. While this discourse survived long enough to threaten the autonomy of most of the world, it certainly was not "adaptive" but obviously pernicious to the greater, global social environment.

Foucault indicates that discursive truth is not the only means of exerting influence over human beings. Power, as the creation of social knowledge, appears in other forms, for instance in the form of brute force (i.e. militaristic decrees such as "do or die"). Yet discursive forms of truth which, once having become taken for granted types of knowledge within the social body, are by virtue of their subtlety the most likely to become socially sanctioned truths, and hence represent the most effective means of coercively applying power.

Power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms. Would power be accepted if it were entirely cynical?...Would they accept it if they did not see it as a mere limit placed on their desire, leaving a measure of freedom - however slight - intact? Power as a pure limit set on freedom is, at least in our society, the general form of its acceptability.

In this case, human beings believe in the truthfulness, naturalness or rightful character of the discourse that informs their actions, rather than simply complying to it for fear of retribution. To brainwash, as it were, a group of people or to convince them of the "reasonableness" of a coercive situation is surely more effective and less expensive - in terms of overall efficiency - than to hold them all at gunpoint.

As we have demonstrated, Jung as a psychiatrist makes full use of the medical paradigm of knowledge creation to legitimize his particular psychological theory as being a valuable addition to it.

²Foucault, *The History of Sexuality* Vol. 1, p. 86.

This is not to imply, however, that this social process is always a conscious ploy on behalf of the powerful. Coercion and indoctrination do not necessarily take the form of a conscious strategy of control. Foucault's analysis is more complex than simple social coercion or manipulation, be it militaristic¹ or discursive. Foucault sums up his position well by saying that

'Truth' is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements. 'Truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A 'regime' of truth/

We have seen that unlike Marxist analyses, Foucault posits power as a creative force. In addition to the creative aspect of power, another difference from Marxism within Foucault's scheme is the multidirectional flow of power. As a formative agent of truth, power may be applied within the 'social body' from any sector or group to any other sector or group. Moreover, resistance to power - in the form of counter-discourse - is equally as multidirectional. As a result, competing discourses of power occur at specific sites of social struggle, and these sites are subject to continual modification and relocation within the social whole. Put differently, competing discourses of truth emerge throughout the social body, each discourse influencing (or not influencing) others to various degrees.

Regarding military coercion, the secular police force could be seen as an acceptable and hence unconscious "army of state."

²Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 133.

A contemporary example could be the competing pro-life versus pro-choice discourses about abortion. This discussion involves a plethora of competing discourses from a wide array of truths about the sanctity of life, women's right to have control over their bodies, etc. Different Christian religious groups hold competing views on abortion, as do different women's groups. Moreover, the

Therefore the "regime of truth" alluded to in the above quotation is not one controlled by a single privileged group. Instead, it is a regime created by the entire process of truth creation.

By saying that power is directed in a variety of directions, however, Foucault does not deny the existence of skewed weightings of power within a given configuration of social relations. In "The Confession of the Flesh" he says:

Power in the substantive sense, '*le pouvoir*', doesn't exist. What I mean is this. The idea that there is either located at - or emanating from - a given point something which is a 'power' seems to me to be based on a misguided analysis, one which at all events fails to account for a considerable number of phenomena. In reality power means relations, *a more-or-less organized, hierarchical, co-ordinated cluster of relations* [emphasis mine].¹

To sum, Foucault argues that any religious or philosophical notion of absolute truth is essentially a relative truth. That is, truth is an *instance* of knowledge which itself is generated by discourse and if successful, is subsequently reinforced by institutional practices. As one of many instances of relative knowledge, truth is neither absolute nor trans-historical. Truth is an effect of power, specific to and grounded within discontinuous moments and geographic sites that together constitute human history.

By stressing the discontinuity of human history, Foucault vehemently argues against the notion of social causality and, on a larger scale, against grand teleological models which posit a deterministic view of history as a

culmination of these competing discourses sometimes results in not mere discursive discord, but actual physical violence at the geographic site of struggle.

¹Foucault, *Power/Knowledge* p. 198.

process of unfolding toward some ultimate end. Foucault's argument against specific instances of social causality runs as follows: He suggests that past events are not necessarily isolated from present events; and that geographical proximity does not necessarily have no effect on political events (for example, one cannot say that a war in village 'A' would definitely have no effect on a nearby village 'B'). Instead, the past may *or may not* effect the present; likewise, the war in village 'A' may or may not have simultaneous or subsequent effects in village 'B.' Unlike Marx's belief in an inevitable march of history toward revolution and the formation of Utopian communism, the magnitude and character of temporally past and geographically contiguous events is not determined. Foucault holds that while only one outcome is actualized, many outcomes are possible. Therefore, in any type of social formation, temporal past, geographic proximity - and, if present, electronic and print media - *influence*, yet do not *determine* present conditions.

Clare O'Farrell argues that Foucault's original sense of discontinuity applied to history at large, whereas he subsequently refined discontinuity to refer to highly specific, local instances; this development, she suggests, had the effect of making discontinuity approximate continuity.

...the basis of Foucault's historiography was a principle of *discontinuity* (the methodological equivalent of the limit), a discontinuity which also underlay his political and ethical views. This principle, however, changed considerably in appearance throughout his career. Beginning with discontinuity on a large historical scale, discontinuity shrank to a smaller and smaller scale to re-emerge in a highly complex series of transformations. By the 1970's, he changed the entire focus of his discussion on discontinuity from the arrangement of historical events and 'discourse' to the arrangement of 'theory', 'power', and the role of the intellectual. By this stage, the particles of discontinuity had become so fine as to almost produce the effect of continuity.

Clare O'Farrell, *Foucault*, p. 47. It seems her view that Foucault in the 1970's abandoned 'discourse' as an object of study is misplaced. Foucault's *Power/Knowledge*, being a collection of interviews and writings from 1972-1977, deals almost exclusively with the importance of discourse.

It follows that if causality cannot be attributed to small-scale social events, neither may it be ascribed to large-scale, historical processes. Foucault perceives both Marx's theory of history, and the Hegelian notion of a dialectical process of determined historical unfolding that informs it as representing the antithesis of his own view.

As always with relations of power, one is faced with complex phenomena which don't obey the Hegelian form of the dialectic. Mastery and awareness of one's own body can be acquired only through the effect of an investment of power in the body: gymnastics, exercises, muscle-building, nudism, glorification of the body beautiful. All of this belongs to a pathway leading to the desire of one's own body, by way of the insistent, persistent, meticulous work of power on the bodies of children or soldiers, the healthy bodies. But once power produces this effect, there inevitably emerge the responding claims and affirmations, those of one's body against power, or health against the economic system, or pleasure against the moral norms of sexuality, marriage, decency. Suddenly what had made power strong becomes used to attack it. Power, after investing itself in the body, finds itself exposed to a counter-attack in that same body.

For Foucault, these historical and competing discourses of truth are relative, yet their perceived effects are pragmatically *real*. In the above

Hegel was trained in Christian theology and his notion of a world spirit that guides the orderly progression of history is usually taken as a thinly disguised form of theology.

²Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 56.

³This idea is less systematically prefigured by Machiavelli and further developed by Nietzsche. Of the former, consider:

One must know how to colour one's actions and to be a great liar and deceiver. Men are so simple, and so much creatures of circumstance, that the deceiver will always find someone ready to be deceived.

Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. George Bull (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1961), p. 100. And of the latter, Mark Warren notes this 'great lie of power' is understood by Nietzsche to create an ideology

defined by (a) its self-deluding qualities in relation to one's interest in being an agent, and (b) its systematic psychological function in providing an illusory sense of agency in social situations that rule out action.

quotation, the subject believes in the importance of culturally scripted notions of physical beauty, and acts to create or preserve this beauty within the actual physical body. Moreover, counter-discourses of, for instance, pro-environmentalism or of moral liberalism arise *in response* to the initial discourse of the desirability of the body beautiful.

This schema may be differentiated from Hegel's notion of the dialectic in two ways. First, in Hegel's system, every historical element of thesis and antithesis arise simultaneously; the antithesis does not occur after, or in response to the thesis. Rather, both thesis and antithesis mutually arise in a process of historical becoming.¹ Second, the simultaneous appearance of the thesis and the antithesis occurs in response to a metaphysically determined historical process; thus the appearance of the antithesis is both *immediate* and *necessary*.* Whereas in Foucault's view, antitheses, or

See Mark Warren, "Nietzsche's Concept of Ideology." *Theory and Society* Vol. 13, 1984: 541-563, p. 555.

¹ Anthony Flew argues that while Hegel does not use the terms thesis antithesis and synthesis, commentators on his work find these to be convenient terms which explain his dialectical system. See Anthony Flew (ed.), *A Dictionary of Philosophy* 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), p. 140. The following reveals, however, that this terminology is not based upon sheer invention:

The immediate existence of Spirit, *consciousness*, contains the two moments of knowing and the objectivity negative to knowing. Since it is in the element [of consciousness] that Spirit develops itself and explicates its moments, these moments contain that antithesis, and they all appear as shapes of consciousness.

That Hegel's system is an intricately woven form of Christian theology finds biblical support when we compare this to *Romans* 7:14-25, in which Paul laments the "law" of his inner duality, consisting of good (God) and evil (his own sin).

*On the necessity of world history as a progressive sequence, with each passing stage leading to a new, higher stage, see G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right* trans. T. M. Knox (London, Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 216-217.

counter-discourses challenge a *previously* existing set of discourses—rival ideas do not arise simultaneously. Furthermore, discourses and counter-discourses are not subject to teleological laws. Unlike the Hegelian thesis/antithesis, the emergence of discourse/counter-discourse is not determined in the sense of being an earthly manifestation of an overriding metaphysical scheme.

It is generally understood that Hegel's dialectic influenced Marx's dialectical materialism since Marx posits a dialectical tension between forces of production and relations of production that acts as a catalyst in human history, driving it through various stages of social organization toward the ultimate ideal of pure communism. Notably absent in dialectically based Marxist and Neomarxist critiques of the capitalist stage of production - this being our current stage - is Foucault's notion of power as a *multi-vectorial* and, moreover, *creative* agent that produces effects of relative truth. Thus Foucault's scheme contests not only the importance, but essential validity of the traditional Marxist and NeoMarxist dialectic of a class of owners who by means of their power, present a distorted truth to a class of unsuspecting,

A complete account of Marx's theory of historical development is beyond the scope of this thesis. For a clear elucidation of Marx's theory, see G. A. Cohen, *Karl Marx's Theory of History*.

'The one "truth" for Marx is that human beings innately desire a maximum of ease, comfort and material well-being:

The realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production. Just as the savage must wrestle with nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life, so must civilized man... [rationally control nature and maximize production with a minimum of effort in a manner]... worthy of their human nature.

Karl Marx, *Capital* Vol. 3, cited in Cohen, *Karl Marx's Theory of History*, p. 324.

unenlightened workers. Another aspect that distinguishes discourse theory from neoMarxist critiques is its scope. Most neoMarxist analyses of so-called Capitalist society are limited to isolated, individual state¹ foci. Foucault, however, maintains a global perspective by suggesting that while regimes of truth may be born from local struggles, they may extend to and be influenced by civic, provincial, territorial, state, national or global spheres. Thus when a discursive truth extends beyond the local sphere and becomes legally codified or at least, informally sanctioned either by the political process or the entertainment media, the discourse gains a corresponding rise of hegemonic authority. Poststructural analyses of western culture have a potentially global outlook, while the neoMarxist views tend to focus on what are termed the means of production and the relations of production (or the ideological state apparatus) within a given culture and geographic space.

¹State here refers to nation, with corresponding geographic and ideological boundaries.

[^]State here refers the idea of states within a nation.

Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge* p. 142. For instance, the media slogan "if you drink, don't drive" would represent the hegemonic truth in Ontario that automobile drivers under the influence of alcoholic inebriation commit not only a crime, but engage in a type of social evil.

*On this issue Barry Smart seems to disagree by suggesting the converse: that Marxist and neoMarxist (Smart wrongly describes the neoMarxist Louis Althusser as a Marxist) theory is global while Foucauldian thought is specific:

In direct contrast to Marxist theory and analysis Foucault's work does not constitute a form of global theorizing; it avoids the reproduction of totalising forms of analysis and is generally critical of systematicity.

Barry Smart, *Foucault, Marxism and Critique* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), pp. 73, 74. Smart, however, overlooks the fact that Marx's theory of history simply failed in the case of China because that country entered into a form of Communism without first passing through the essential - so Marx claims -

Having perhaps challenged Marx as the most influential social critic of western culture, Foucault's discourse about social theory has become almost hegemonic in itself, as Marx's theory was prior to Foucault. In the 1990's, Foucauldian-style poststructuralism enjoys a high degree of culturally sanctioned authority within contemporary European and North American sociology, critical theory, literature, film and popular music theory. Lois McNay notes that Maurice Blanchot says that Foucault's work has a " 'privileged' position...in relation to twentieth-century thought."¹ Martin Kusch attests to the fact that "there seems to be no other modern philosopher with reference to whom a comparable number of introductions have been produced in such a short period."² Clare O'Farrell comments: "Why write about Foucault?... it is not least because everybody else is writing about Foucault."³ The preface to the english translation of Rudi Visker's work of

phase of Capitalism. While Marx's theory may have been global in scope, neoMarxism surely cannot be so. On the issue of Foucault's apparent disregard for "totalising forms of analysis," J. G. Merquior suggests that Foucault implies that reason is the only legitimate form of knowledge, which is indeed a "totalizing" form of analysis; moreover, Merquior argues that despite this implication, Foucault himself does not adhere to the principles of reason:

In intellectual machismo, the strength of one's argument is not propped up by logical quality - rather, it is conveyed by the unflinching self-confidence of one's tone. Impressiveness, not cogency, is the thing.

J. G. Merquior, *Foucault*. Fontana Modern Masters, ed. Frank Kermode. (London: Fontana Press, 1985), p. 157.

¹Lois McNay, *Foucault: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Continuum, 1994), p. 1.

²Martin Kusch. *Foucault's Strata and Fields: An Investigation into Archaeological and Genealogical Studies* (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), p. xi.

³Clare O'Farrell, *Foucault*, p. vii.

Foucault is entitled, "Not Another Book on Foucault!" In this preface Visker pretends to hear an imaginary conversation, which he relates tongue-in-cheek:

'I guess you're right. I wonder what made them translate this -as if the dozens of critical outlines of Foucault in English have left anything to be said. What arrogance!'¹

Bert States argues that there is a current trend towards practically deifying Foucauldian thought within contemporary social theory. He says that the "poststructural code" (i.e. the way of speaking within poststructuralism) has as its central attraction the "almost religious citation" of several poststructuralist thinkers, "not to mention Michel Foucault."

As for the task that Foucault prescribes to social theorists who are left in the wake of his somewhat faddist and almost hegemonic discourse:

I would like to suggest another way to go further towards a new economy of power relations, a way which is more empirical, more directly related to our present situation, and which implies more relations between theory and practice.

This prescription may be seen as paradoxical and slightly ironic since Foucault admits to and is quite conscious of his own penchant for "fictioning" reality:

I am well aware that I have never written anything but fictions. I do not mean to say, however, that truth is therefore absent...a true discourse engenders or 'manufactures' something that does as yet not exist, that is, 'fictions' it. One 'fictions' history on the basis of a political reality that makes it true, one 'fictions' a politics not yet in existence on the basis of a historical truth.

²Rudi Visker, *Michel Foucault: Genealogy as Critique* trans. Chris Turner (London: Verso, 1995), p. vii.

²Bert O. States. "Notes on the Poststructural Code." *American Scholar*, Winter Vol. 63, No. 1, 1994: 111-117, p. 114.

⁴Michel Foucault, cited in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 210-211.

⁴Foucault, *Power Knowledge*, p. 193.

Thus the "deification" of Foucault seems to overlook - or perhaps it rejoices in - the master's own admission that the theory is a fiction.

Clare O'Farrell, however, questions the Foucauldian paradigm and the assumptions which are built into it:

In other words, this is a question of an opposition between a world view based on the belief that we are discontinuous and continually changing historical beings, and a world view which posits a small number of general principles valid for all times and places.

This question leads to the next section, in which Foucault's ahistorical view of subjectivity is compared with Jung's schema—a schema which outlines a transhistorical component to the human psyche.

4(e) Introduction to Jung and Foucault on Subjectivity

This section will provide a critical analysis of the psychological ontology implied by both Foucault's poststructural thought and Jung's concept of synchronicity. Parts 2 and 3 examined the strategy with which Jung legitimized the concept of synchronicity, suggesting that it exemplified a special type of awareness that prefigured aspects of Foucault's theory and of postmodernism in general. In the following, however, I will compare the ontology suggested by Jung's concept of synchronicity with that which is implied by Foucault's poststructuralism. By the term ontology, I refer to the theory of being which each theorist proposes. Specifically, my analysis of ontology will focus on the narrower topic of subjectivity. The term

Mean Baudrillard takes an even more extreme position by arguing, in reference to both Foucault's and his own ideas, that good theory should lose its own meaning when "pushed to its conclusion" at the "limits of the text." See, Jean Baudrillard, *Forget Foucault/Forget Baudrillard*, p. 38.

²Clare O'Farrell, *Foucault*, p. vii.

subjectivity is not to be confused with the philosophical idea of *subjectivism*, the latter being the notion that "human knowledge is limited to one's own mental states."¹ Rather, subjectivity will be used to denote the two main interrelated questions of (1) what constitutes the individual human subject? and (2) how is the subject related to the greater social (and cosmic) spheres?

As this is a potentially complex problem, definite parameters of inquiry are required in order to avoid the confusion which would arise if certain limits were not set. Without limits, an explication of Jung's view of subjectivity could involve an exposition of his entire model of the self. This would outline each and every concept that Jung uses to represent various aspects of the psyche—for instance, ego, shadow, persona, anima, animus, archetype, self, as well as his theory of psychological types, which would include his constructs of the introversion and extraversion orientations, as well as the four posited psychological functions of thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition. However, numerous summaries of Jung's model of the self are presently available; moreover, as this thesis is concerned with the concept of synchronicity, it therefore will limit the problem of subjectivity to the question of how Jung's concept of synchronicity informs Jung's understanding of subjectivity. While various Jungian concepts will arise in the analysis, these will not be treated exhaustively, but only in regard to how they relate to the problem of synchronicity and subjectivity.

¹eddes MacGregor, *Dictionary of Religion and Philosophy* (New York: Paragon House, 1989), p. 591.

²Perhaps the best short summary of Jung's model of the self is found in Jolande Jacobi, *The Psychology of C. G. Jung* (London: Kegan Paul, 1942).

Concerning Foucault, his view of subjectivity and how it relates to the greater social spheres uses a language which, as Pamela Major-Poetzl points out, is suggestive of the claims made by subatomic physics.

Foucault does not discuss the adventures of space travel...But the concept of black holes provides a dramatic image that is used today in ordinary conversation, and Foucault uses similar images. In his discussion of language, for example, he speaks of thought folding back and collapsing on itself, leaving behind mere "literature" incapable of communicating to an outside world and endlessly reflecting back on itself. He also speaks of the dangerous quest for "origins" and the emergence of "singularities" at points of extreme density. Examples such as these, of course, do not indicate exact parallels with cosmological concepts; they do, however, suggest that a common imaginative structure obtains between Foucault's archaeological studies and modern science.

She continues:

Among the "crazy" ideas of quantum theory are a number of concepts that deserve mention here because they are similar to concepts employed by Foucault. The central feature of quantum mechanics is the assertion that change is discontinuous, that matter and energy are made up of units, or quanta, which can 'vary only by jumps.' Other concepts associated with quantum theory include Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and the replacement of prediction by probability, Bohr's principle of complementarity, Pauli's exclusion principle and the role of conservation laws, and Dirac's theory of antimatter and related concepts of symmetry.

These are truth claims located in a particular, scientific discursive field which, as we have suggested, Jung does not hesitate to exploit in order to valorize the notion of synchronicity. Thus, the following will compare Foucault's convictions regarding the two questions posited above, to discern how his view of subjectivity compares to the Jungian position on subjectivity, as implied by the concept of synchronicity.

Pamela Major-Poetzl. *Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Western Culture: Toward a New Science of History* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), p. 71.

²Ibid., pp. 71-72.

4(f) Synchronicity **and Subjectivity**

Jung repeatedly stresses the acausal nature of synchronicity, and denies the idea that the archetypes lead the subject towards synchronistic events. Synchronicity does nonetheless require the existence of the archetypes and by implication, some relation of them to his concept of the ego. To think of synchronicity without the existence of a conscious ego would be absurd, especially since Jung says that synchronicity is not a transcendental idea, but one that mediates between the notion of the eternal and the actions of this world.'

While the *ego* is a hypothetical construct, Jung presents it as if it were a psychological fact. Indeed, Jung describes all his psychological concepts as empirical facts.

In *Psychological Types* Jung defines the ego as a highly continuous complex of ideas which constitutes the centre of [one's] field of consciousness and appears to possess a high degree of continuity and identity.

Jung further elaborates the idea of the ego as

¹ Jung's inconsistent views about discontinuity and the related idea of acausality make it difficult to entirely locate his thought within poststructuralism. Recall Jung's discussion about the archetypal influence of Wotan which seems to point to a cosmic causality, in apparent contradiction to the allegedly acausal nature of synchronicity. Jung says that the archetype of "Wotan produces effects" which during World War II, culminated in the Nazi storm.

As an autonomous psychic factor, Wotan produces effects in the collective life of a people and thereby reveals his own nature.. .It is only from time to time that individuals fall under the irresistible influence of this unconscious factor.

Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 10, p. 187.

²Supra, p. 200.

³Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 425.

[coming] into existence as a complex quantity which is constituted partly by the inherited disposition (character constituents) and partly by unconsciously acquired impressions and their attendant phenomena.¹

Ego is also referred to as the "point of reference"* of the psyche; its partly biological inheritance is offset by unconsciously *acquired* material. The ego then, is the locus of subject self-identification in the western psyche. It does not comprise the totality of the self, but rather is the space where the healthy individual discursively says, "I am this that says I am."⁴ That is, the concept of the ego represents a highly focused centre of consciousness which, when consciously differentiated from other psychic contents, is able to regulate and balance the various demands, or "pushes and pulls" of both the unconscious and of external stimuli.⁵ As a mediator that strives for psychic integrity, the ego must balance not merely internal and external stimuli, it also must achieve some equilibrium between the ethical

¹C. G. Jung. *The Development of Personality in The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, ed. William McGuire et al., trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XX. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954-79, Vol. 17, p. 91.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 9/1, p. 389.

³C. G. Jung, "Analytical Psychology and Education," *The Collected Works* Vol. 17, par. 169, cited in Daryl Sharp, *Jung-Lexicon*, p. 49.

*This should not be confused with Rene Descartes' depiction of the subject -"I think, therefore I am" - which relies solely on thought and the notion of an absolute, all-good, monotheistic God, rather than on archetypes and physical stimuli. See Rene Descartes, "Meditations on the First Philosophy" in *Discourse on Method and the Meditations* trans. F. E. Sutcliffe (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968: 95-169), pp. 103, 95-167.

⁵Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 9/1, pp. 318-319.

extremes of good and evil.¹ Offsetting these polarities produces for the subject a psychological tension that for Jung is a universal law.

For Jung the ego plays a monumental role in the western psyche. Jung seems to imply that it is a great achievement of western civilization. In fact he often judges people from other cultures on the basis of their "primitive" or "underdeveloped" collective egos, as if the West provided the supreme model for the evolution of human psychological development. Jung justifies this judgement by claiming that the egos of modern westerners are more differentiated and less luminous³ than those of their, as Jung would have it, cruder ancestors.⁴

Like the ego, the archetypes are hypothetical constructs, and they are central to Jung's system. The concept of the archetype was not yet fully developed when Jung wrote *Psychological Types*, the text that defines most of Jung's terms. Throughout his work, however, various statements are made about the archetypes which adequately portray their character.

As noted above, Jung's mature thought demarcates the archetypal image from the archetype proper. As a sort of crystal lattice structure inherent in all nature, and thus a bio-culturally transmitted content of humanity's collective unconscious, the essence of the archetype is not amenable to

¹Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 219. ²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 197. ³Jung is referring to the idea of numinosity. ⁴Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 189. ⁵Jung, *Psychological Types* in *The Collected Works*, Vol. 6. ⁶Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 210. ⁷Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 50.

representation,¹ nor may it reach ego consciousness. Of the numerous archetypal structures, their diversity is represented by so many archetypal images and ideas.³ The archetype is individually experienced with the evocation of corresponding feeling values, these sometimes taking the form of "magical" heightened awareness. Jung repeatedly stresses that the archetype itself, is not accessible to representation. What is represented in art, literature, music, architecture, dreams, and culture in general are the archetypal images, which despite their great variability, express an equivalent and inherited underlying pattern.

An additional function of the archetype is to organize images and ideas.

Archetypes, so far as we can observe and experience them at all, manifest themselves only through their ability to *organize* images

Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 214. Jung seems to overlook the fact that the words he writes about the archetypes are a form of representation.

²Ibid., p. 213.

³Ibid., p. 214.

⁴Supra, p. 237. Claude Levi-Strauss similarly argues that basic patterns are expressed in culture in the form of binary oppositions. This view is not unlike Jung's notion that the archetypal images represent an attempt to unify opposites. Following in the tradition of Plato's *Republic*, in which the content and form of the exposition parallel one another, Levi-Strauss attempts to reproduce the structure of his exposition of *The Raw and the Cooked* to match the structure of music, which itself is claimed to express common mental structures. "In other words," he says, "music and mythology appeal to mental structures that the different listeners have in common." Claude Levi-Strauss, *The Raw and the Cooked* trans. John and Doreen Weightman, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1969), p. 15-32, 26. Tom Bottomore and Robert Nisbet note that there is some debate over the question of whether, or to what degree, Levi-Strauss's views about the genesis of certain structures - especially kinship structures - changed over time. Bottomore, Tom and Robert Nisbet, "Structuralism" in Tom Bottomore and Robert Nisbet, eds. *A History of Sociological Analysis* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1978: 557-598), pp. 580-586. Likewise, Jean Pouillon traces the complex debate over Levi-Strauss's views about unconscious versus socially generated structures. Jean Pouillon, "Levi-Strauss, Claude (1908-)" in *The Social Science Encyclopedia*, eds. Adam Kuper and Jessica Kuper (London: Routledge, 1985), pp. 455-459.

and ideas, and this will always be an unconscious process which cannot be detected until afterward.

From this it is clear that the archetypal images and ideas are productions of the archetypes, proper, and these are unconscious, unmanifest aspects of psychic reality that have a tendency towards self-representation.

Concerning the problem of subjectivity, Jung's theory becomes confusing at this point, for his concept of the self is itself an archetype. Jung seems to say that the self can be anything. As an archetype, it must have an unmanifest, invisible aspect that cannot be grasped. Thus the conundrum arises that part of our own self must be inaccessible to ourselves.

Moreover, the self is variously described as the "sum total of conscious and unconscious contents," a "*complexio opposi tori urn*,"* and as the "psychic totality of the individual."⁵ As noted, part of the self cannot be represented. This "psychoid" aspect is said to be "identical in all individuals." Jung therefore says the self is illimitable, yet uses the

^xJung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 231.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 156. In relation to the archetype, Roger Brooke argues that like Descartes, Jung is guilty of psychologism by "enclosing psychological life into a solipsistic inner world from which__ it is impossible to speak coherently of any real relationships with other beings." Brook also says Jung's theory is overly positivistic as he "attempts to found psychology on a material base, specifically neuro-physiology." Jung, he says, falls into the "realist trap." Regarding synchronicity, Brooke says that Jung continues to view the psyche-body relationship from an exclusively solipsistic and materialistic standpoint. Roger Brooke, *Jung and Phenomenology* (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 66-67.

³Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 82.

⁴Here Jung refers to dialectical opposites of, for instance, good and evil, masculine and feminine, hatred and love. *Ibid.*, p. 443.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 156.

⁶Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 436.

term "individual" to describe it. From a logical standpoint, however, individuals cannot all be infinite. There must be some mark of difference among them. Jung makes another statement that seems to confirm his inconsistency in delineating the self as both a holistic and individualistic type of subjectivity: he clearly says that the unconscious part of the self "cannot be distinguished from that of another individual."¹

It seems the problem of this internally inconsistent theorizing lies in Jung's notion of the self as a "psychic totality." For Jung in fact offers a two-tiered model of the psyche. The *conscious* part is individual, the *unconscious*, collective aspect is potentially impersonal. As it stands, however, Jung's definition of the self is ambiguous. It seems problematic to term something as 'self if at bottom it is identical among all subjects.

^{*}Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 277.

[^]For Jung, the subject's act of representing the archetypes, in his or her unique way, is crucial to the process of individuation:

The essential thing is to differentiate oneself from these unconscious contents by personifying them, and at the same time bring them into relationship with consciousness. That is the technique for stripping them of their power.

Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 187. Whether the conflict between conscious individuality and unconscious collectivity is ever fully resolved remains unclear.

³Jung's model of the self could also be seen as externally invalid; that is, the religious and mythological data used to support his model are often incomplete, highly selective, and unduly misrepresented. For instance, Jung's frequent use of the mandala as a symbol of the self is misleading, for in the eastern context, the mandala ultimately aims towards ego dissolution, whereas Jung's concept of the self includes and indeed glorifies the ego. In this connection, Lama Anagarika Govinda notes that while there are a series of mandalas leading towards the ultimate mandala, the Tibetan Mandala of Highest Bliss is "a vehicle of an all-embracing, imperishable wholeness, in which the limits of individual egohood do not exist any more." See, Lama Anagarika Govinda, *Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism* (New Delhi: B.I. Publications PVT Ltd., 1960), pp. 166-171.

To sum, in relation to subjectivity, synchronicity implies the existence of a strata of ontology other than the mundane, so-called 'everyday' experience of ego-consciousness. As synchronicity involves meaningful connections over time, sometimes over extended periods, it seems safe to suggest that the unconscious aspect of the self exists in a type of timelessness, or at least, in a different, larger time frame than that of the ego.²

This indicates an inconsistency in Jung's concept of synchronicity which becomes evident when we consider his larger psychological theory. On the one hand Jung stresses the acausal nature of synchronicity, yet on the other hand he contends that synchronicity figures in the process of psychological maturation which he terms the *individuation process*. Jung envisions psychological development - i.e. individuation - as a process grounded in

Likewise, W. Y. Evans-Wentz says the Mandala of Liberation entails a "gradual dispersion of the psychic or mental atoms of the - thought body." See, W. Y. Evans-Wentz ed., *The Tibetan Book of the Dead*, trans. Lama Kazi Dawa-Samdub (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 126.

Prior to Buddhism, the Hindu mandala refers to each of the ten books of the *Rig Veda*, which collectively are designed to return one to an undifferentiated original state that apparently existed prior to such dualisms as life/death, reality/unreality, good/evil and, we should add, self/ego. See, Troy Wilson Organ, *Hinduism: Its Historical Development* (London: Barron's Educational Series, Inc., 1974), pp. 59, 76-77, 80.

From these examples, it is clear that Jung's use of the term mandala to support and legitimize his holistic notion of the Self is not in accord with the original meanings of mandala. In short, the supreme Asian mandala does not include the ego; whereas Jung's mandala of the self does.

*The question of just what constitutes 'normal' consciousness, or whether we live in a plurality of different yet somehow consensual ego-consciousnesses is open to debate.

² John P. Dourley argues that if the experience of synchronicity ever became continuous, "such a synchronous consciousness would be characterized by a residual sense of its possessor's rootedness in the ground of the universe." John P. Dourley, *Love, Celibacy and the Inner Marriage* (Toronto: Inner City Books, 1987), p. 56. Elsewhere Jung says that the experience of synchronicity may indeed be continuous. See pp. 69, 189.

nature which contains certain stages of life which the self must pass through in order for it to achieve wholeness. Synchronicity occurs during the critical phases of transformation which are characterized by a state of heightened anxiety which presumably elevates normal ego consciousness to a higher degree of awareness of some greater psychic landscape. If one must progress through more or less determined, natural stages of psychological development, and if the rites of passage include the experience of synchronicity, then synchronicity itself would fit into a larger type of natural causality—recall that for Jung the stages of life are a natural occurrence within the equally natural process of individuation.

From this perspective, synchronicity could arguably belong within a greater type of causality, one grounded in a natural progression toward the desired goal of psychic wholeness. Since this greater causality perhaps would not be immediately perceptible to the ego on a day-to-day basis, it nonetheless would necessarily exist if Jung's theory about the stages of life were taken to be true.

^xJung, *The Stages of Life, The Collected Works*, Vol. 8., pp. 385-403. Concerning the notion of individuation, J. J. Clarke argues that it "goes beyond the domain of orthodox scientific psychology, [and] can be described as metaphysical, not because it makes claims to knowledge of a transcendent kind, but because it deals in ends and purposes." J. J. Clarke, *In Search of Jung*, p. 38. Conversely, Jung repeatedly stresses that his theoretical ideas are based on the scientific observation of his clients. In another work, Clarke says that Jung envisions the conflict between science and religion in terms of a "new disease." C. G. Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 773, cited in J. J. Clarke, *Jung and Eastern Thought*, p. 73.

²On the issue of causality, Mary Ann Mattoon argues that "the hypothesis that synchronicity has an archetypal base casts doubt on the acausality of the combination of events." See, Mary Ann Mattoon, *Jungian Psychology in Perspective* (New York: The Free Press, 1981), p. 147. Mattoon's doubts on the acausality of synchronicity are mirrored by Frey-Wehrlin who argues that synchronistic meaning arises if and only if the archetype is constellated; i.e. synchronicity is caused by archetypal activity. Frey-Wehrlin (1976), cited in Mattoon, op. cit., p. 147.

John Dourley seems to agree; in his discussion of synchronicity's

relation to the individuation process he states:

More important than discrete synchronistic events is the synchronous consciousness they point to and whose appropriation they in some sense urge...One must assume that Jung took this description of the movement of the psyche toward its maturation to be in some sense based on the nature of the psyche, and so, allowing for immense variations of cultural expression, a universal process in which every psyche participates.

Regarding the ego and its necessary existence in relation to the experience of synchronicity, Jung's conceptualization of the ego supports the notion of an archetypal causality in synchronicity. Jung says that the ego must be a servant to the self because it evolves out of the self and stands in relation to it as "moved to the mover."³ He says further:

The ego stands to the self as the moved to the mover, or as object to subject, because the *determining factors* which radiate out from the self surround the ego on all sides and are therefore supraordinate to it. The self, like the unconscious, is an *a priori* existent out of which the ego evolves [emphasis mine].

¹John P. Dourley, *Love, Celibacy and the Inner Marriage*, p. 56.

²Marilyn Nagy points out that because of the requirement of "meaning," synchronicity in part depends upon a perceiving ego, which she terms the "mind of the subject-observer."

A synchronistic event occurs always *in time* and since "meaning" occurs only in the mind of the subject-observer, it requires a human presence for whom the event in time is significant for a synchronistic event to happen.

Marilyn Nagy, *Philosophical Issues in the Psychology of C. G. Jung* (Albany: State University of New York Press. 1991), p. 184.

³Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 391.

⁴Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 11, par. 491, cited in Sharp, *Jung Lexicon*, p. 49.

Regarding the self, Jung seems to propose that it is synonymous with his understanding of the Godhead. The self, he says, is "God within us."¹ It seems that both the ego and the synchronicity that it experiences must be determined by the archetypal basis of the self. That is, if

I) Synchronicity is a phenomenon that arises from the archetypes (which and themselves are located within the totality of the self).

II) The experience of synchronicity is also dependent upon the and existence of the perceiving ego.

III) The ego is determined by the archetypal basis of the self. then

IV) Synchronicity, by virtue of its dependence upon the archetypes and the archetypally determined ego, is archetypally determined.

Whether or not the idea of an archetypal causality in synchronicity is accepted or rejected, it is clear that Jung's schema depicting the ego, the self and synchronicity, implies that a part of human subjectivity exists on and is determined by a transhistorical, transcendent, or supramundane level of existence.

Nevertheless, Jung's view is contradictory. As noted, the self is defined as the psychic totality of the individual. It is always a *complexio oppositorium*, representing the sum total of conscious and unconscious psychological contents.⁴ Furthermore, the archetypes are capable of endless development and differentiation, and, as noted, the self is itself an archetype. Jung seems to say on the one hand that the psychoid aspect of the

¹Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 7, par. 399, cited in Sharp, *Jung Lexicon*, p. 120.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 232.

³*Ibid.*, p. 716.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 140.

self is identical among all individuals and is synonymous with the eternal Godhead within. On the other hand, the self as an archetype of wholeness (a *complexio oppositorium*) is something that must change over time because of its location within human history. It is this changeable aspect of the self that places Jung's thought within the parameters of a postmodern viewpoint. Jung eschews the scientific understanding of the "normal" self. Instead, he sees mankind as essentially irrational. The following is a prefigurative type of "deconstruction" of the scientific assumptions that are implicit to western scientific rationalism:

Scientific education is based in the main on statistical truths and abstract knowledge and therefore imparts an unrealistic, rational picture of the world, in which the individual, as a merely marginal phenomenon, plays no role. The individual, however, as an irrational datum, is the true and authentic carrier of reality, the *concrete* man as opposed to the unreal ideal or "normal" man to whom the scientific statements refer.

As we shall discover in the next section, Foucault's formulation of the subject also deconstructs the ideals and assumptions of science. However, Foucault explicitly links social power to the role of science as an arbiter of human subjectivity, while Jung does not. Foucault does not eliminate the subject, but he does emphasise the role that social power plays in defining the subject. Jung, on the other hand, warns against a scenario in which an excess of power and a mindless approach to science obliterates the individuality of the subject:

Rivalry for power and exaggerated distrust pervade the entire organism from top to bottom. Furthermore, in order to compensate for its chaotic formlessness, a mass always produces a "Leader," who infallibly becomes the victim of his own inflated ego-consciousness, as numerous examples in history show. This development becomes logically unavoidable the moment the individual combines with the mass and thus renders himself

Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 10, p. 252.

obsolete. Apart from the agglomeration of huge masses in which the individual disappears anyway, one of the chief factors responsible for psychological mass-mindedness is scientific rationalism, which robs the individual of his foundations and his dignity.

4(g) Foucault and Subjectivity

For Foucault, the problem of subjectivity is posed in terms of social power and its ability to create reality. Foucault argues against the notion of any type of natural progression, or evolution of the self in human history. History, as he sees it, discursively and discontinuously creates various notions of subjectivity; moreover, there is no transhistorical, unchanging, supramundane element to the subject. In fact, Foucault inverts the Christian mystical - and Hindu upanisadic - notion of an eternal soul that is fettered by the temporal human body. In *Discipline and Punish* he says, "The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body." Thus, the entire subject is an effect of social power. The articulation of the subject - i.e. what it is understood to be - is a construction; it is relative to the modes of power existing within a given social formation.

The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive atom, a multiple of inert material on which power comes to fasten or against which it happens to strike, and in so doing subdues or crushes individuals. In fact, it is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be

^xJung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 10, p. 253.

¹Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, cited in Karlis Racevskis, *Michel Foucault and the Subversion of the Intellect* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 103. J. G. Merquior says that this is one of the two original points that Foucault makes, the other being his view that in history there is no absolute truth. While the second point borrows from Nietzsche, Foucault differs "in his view of history." J. G. Merquior, *Foucault*, pp. 100-101.

identified and constituted as individuals. The individual that is, is not the *vis-a-vis* of power; it is, I believe, one of its prime effects. The individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation.

By believing in the naturalness or normality of the discourses of power which define individual tastes and desires, and, moreover, by internalizing the moral attitudes that are associated with these tastes and desires, the subject is both created by power and becomes a carrier of power. Put differently, discourse is internally adopted by the very individual that it creates. While resistance to that discourse does occur, Foucault notes that in any event, power continues to be transmitted through the notion of subjectivity that it serves to define. He says, "the individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle. .

While Foucault places a great deal of emphasis on the idea of social power and its ability to construct notions of subjectivity, it would be misleading to suggest that his theory is concerned primarily with power. In "The Subject and Power" he explicitly states that his main concern is the problem of the social construction of subjectivity; that is, how the definition of the so-called normal subject changes over time, according to the particular social discourses that inform a given era.

I would like to say, first of all, what has been the goal of my work during the last twenty years. It has not been to analyze the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the foundations of such an analysis. My objective, instead, has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects.

¹Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 98.

²Ibid.

Michel Foucault, cited in Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Michel Foucault*, p. 208

In *Technologies of the Self*, Foucault distinguishes between two main approaches to the social construction of subjectivity. On the one hand, the Christian doctrine of "know thyself" specifies that through self-knowledge one is free to participate in an afterlife of eternal paradise. But this eternal afterlife seems to be gained at the expense of one's temporal, material life.¹ On the other hand, in ancient Greece and Rome, Foucault contends that the emphasis was placed on caring for the self. While the Christian who believes in the eschatological scenario outlined in *Revelation* would argue that by knowing the self they *are* caring for the self, albeit with emphasis on their eternal rather than a temporal self, Foucault upholds the distinction between self care and self knowledge. He argues that since both of these processes ("caring for the self" and "knowing the self") exhibit manifold characteristics throughout history, their articulation is based upon social relations of power.

Jesus exhorts his disciples to pick up their own crosses, and warns his apostles that they will be persecuted for upholding Jesus' status as the son of God. Renunciation of the physical world is not exclusive to Christianity; Hinduism posits that the round of rebirths (samsara) may be avoided through knowledge of one's eternal self (atman) and its essential identity with ultimate reality (brahman); coupled with worldly renunciation, this form of knowing the self leads to eternal liberation (moksha). See *Matthew* 10:16-23, 16:24, *Mark* 8:34, 13:9-13, *Luke* 9:23, 21:12-17; and John Grimes, *A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy* (Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 308, 75, 100, 206.

²Foucault, *Technologies of the Self*, p. 22.

³In the three volumes of *The History of Sexuality* Foucault outlines his interpretation of the major approaches to the creation of subjectivity in the West. In Volume 1, Foucault's notions of power, discourse, subject identity and sexual identity are developed, with emphasis on the Catholic renunciation and confession of an essentially evil self, which Foucault argues prefigures Freud's psychoanalytic technique in which the asocial demands of the id are redirected in a socially acceptable manner. See Michel Foucault, *A History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), pp. 53-70. Volume 2 focuses on the intricate dynamics of ancient Greek sexuality and its relation to the meticulous, socially scripted process of caring for the

Having said this, we may now ask whether the view of subjectivity implied by Jung's concept of synchronicity has any point of intersection with Foucault's view that the status quo understanding of subjectivity is a type of outgrowth, emerging from matrices of social power. A cursory examination of these two theorists would suggest that their views about subjectivity are poles apart and quite irreconcilable. Jung would no doubt envision Foucault's system - particularly Foucault's view of power - as being overly sociological, one which places undue emphasis on discourse and the language of signification while ignoring the transcendent power of the symbol. On the other hand, Foucault most likely would place Jung's entire theory under the umbrella of a regime of truth, not unlike any other system of truth that offers a specific, yet historically relative construction of subjectivity.

While Jung is generally ignored by social theorists, Jung's teacher Freud is not. Although the following statement made by John Toews refers to Freudian theory, it may be extrapolated to Jung's thought:

From the Foucauldian perspective the Freudian corpus and the psychoanalytic discourse that it initiates must be inserted into the scientific disciplinary discourses or other systems of representation that preceded and accompanied it.

self in Greek high society. Michel Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure in The History of Sexuality*, Vol. 2 trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1985). Volume 3 expands upon the notion of "cultivating the self" with an examination of ancient Greek and Roman texts pertaining to dream interpretation, the meaning of husband-wife conjugality, and philosophical and medical exhortations toward the creation and maintenance of the "healthy self." Michel Foucault, , *The Care of the Self in The History of Sexuality*, Vol. 3 trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986).

*Supra, pp. 213-220, 237-239.

²John E. Toews "Foucault and the Freudian Subject" pp. 116-134, in Jan Goldstein, ed. *Foucault and the Writing of History* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1994), p. 131.

While the details of various psychological and psychoanalytic systems may vary, from Foucault's standpoint they all share the common feature of creating some relativistic form of subjectivity and moreover, of presenting a theory of subjectivity as if it possessed some intrinsic, non-relativistic form of scientifically objective "truthfulness." Foucault attempts to locate the scientific attitude within - not outside of - the history of culture, moral ideas, politics, and economics. Speaking about psychiatric practice, Foucault says it is predicated upon relativistic psychiatric models; furthermore, psychiatric theory and practice is linked to the legal system, economics and power:

Psychiatric internment, the mental normalization of individuals and penal institutions...are undoubtedly essential to the general functioning of the wheels of power. So long as the posing of the question of power was kept subordinate to the economic instance and the system of interests which this served, there was a tendency to regard these problems as of small importance.

Since Jung headed the Burgholzli Psychiatric Hospital from 1900-1909, his mode of scientifically observing and treating subjects and the theories he developed from this process no doubt would fall under Foucault's gaze as a socially relative perspective. On this point Rudi Visker notes that much of Foucault's work offers a critique of psychology's attempt to legitimize itself through science, or as a science. Visker, like Foucault, says: "Psychology is no more than an *a posteriori* legitimation of the practices which make it possible." Visker also cites Foucault's view of psychology:

Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 116. Rudi

Visker, *Michel Foucault*, p. 20. 'ibid., p.

21.

What one discovers under the name of the "psychology" of madness is merely the result of the operations by which one has invested

Foucault suggests that psychiatric discourses and practices create deviant subjects. Therefore the so-called "mad" are socially created as such. Again, John Toews' comments on Foucault's view of Freud are relevant to Jungian theory and practice:

Foucault situates psychoanalytic theory and therapy within the context of the institutions and social practices of a modern disciplinary, normalizing society, and the apparatus that constructs individuals...

Regarding psychiatry, Foucault observes that the psychiatrist does not exist outside of culture and therefore cannot be entirely objective; as noted, psychiatry is intricately connected to the legal system, and in the case of the violently insane, the prison system. Therefore psychiatric diagnoses

¹Michel Foucault and Sennet, R. (1981), 'Sexuality and Solitude', London Review of Books, 21 May-3 June., p. 5., cited in Visker, *Michel Foucault*, p. 22.

²John Toews, "Foucault and the Freudian Subject," p. 132.

Ibid., p. 45. For a sketch of the historical development of the relation between psychiatric practice and the legal system, see "The Dangerous Individual" in Michel Foucault, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture*, pp. 125-151. Malcolm Nicolson notes that Foucault also wrote the introduction to Georges Canguilhem's *The Normal and the Pathological* in which Canguilhem argues that the understanding of the idea of illness has changed over history. Nicolson summarizes Canguilhem's position by saying that an "ontological" explanation of illness originated in Ancient Egypt in which illness resulted from an invasion of the body by a foreign entity (this idea, it should be noted, is also present in ancient India). Another "dynamic" idea of illness arose with Greek medicine, in which disease results from a disruption of a the body's "harmony and equilibrium." The third main interpretation of illness, Nicolson continues, arises in the eighteenth century. At this stage, "pathological phenomena came instead to be regarded as quantitative variations of the phenomena of health." In this stage, the medicalized study of disease became rationalized and objectified, divesting the patient from any power that she or he may have had in regard to analyzing their own condition. See Malcolm Nicolson. "The Social and the Cognitive: Resources for the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge." *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1991: 347-369, pp. 348-349.

and treatments are informed by the existing biases of psychological theory, and by the real and current rules of the greater social system in which the practitioner is located:

Magistrates and psychiatrists, doctors and social workers, laboratory technicians and sociologists have become able to participate, both within their own fields and through mutual exchange and support, in a global process of politicisation of intellectuals.

Martin Kusch says that

...Foucault's treatment of interests and power has strong similarities with the use of interests as explanatory devices in the Edinburgh type of sociology of science. Interests focused upon in the latter are, foremost, (1) "professional nested^ interests" as scientists' interests to (re-)define object areas for the purpose of establishing their (exclusive) competence in dealing with them, (2) scientists' interests in keeping laymen out of the field; (3) scientists* interests in using conceptual tools drawn from the broader cultural context (in order to arouse wider attention to their work); (4) interests in the wider society to make scientific results effectively applicable; and (5) scientists* interests in drawing support from classes or institutions.

Foucault*s understanding of how psychiatry legitimizes its own practices and how this legitimization informs the psychiatric view of subjectivity is similar to Max Weber's pioneering work about social power and legitimization. For Weber, a truth claim may be legitimized "because it [a tradition, affect, or rational belief] has been established in a manner which is recognized to be *legal*."* Malcolm Nicolson argues that the sociological critique of

foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 127.

²The text reads "nested." Possibly this is a typographic error which should have read "vested."

Martin Kusch, *Foucault's Strata and Fields*, p. 189.

*Max Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building* ed. S. N. Eisenstadt (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968) p. 12. Weber argues that truth claims may also be legitimized via sacred laws, personal charisma and bureaucratic rationalism. *Ibid.*, pp. 48-65, 66-77, 81-94.

scientific knowledge has, at least in Anglophone circles, focussed on the physical sciences, such as modern physics. Critical analyses of biology and medicine, he claims, have been overlooked. But this oversight requires rectification because, Nicolson continues, "medical matters touch our lives more intimately than those of physics and chemistry."¹

The remaining point to consider in the social creation of the subject is that of professional prestige and reward, which further connects Foucault's notions of subjectivity, power and knowledge. Foucault says:

First question: who is speaking? Who, among the totality of speaking individuals, is accorded the right to use this sort of language (*langage*)? Who is qualified to do so? Who derives from it his own special assurance, at least the presumption that what he says is true? What is the status of the individuals who - alone - have the right, sanctioned by law or tradition ___ to proffer such a discourse? The status of doctor involves criteria of competence and knowledge ___ It also involves a number of characteristics that define its functioning in relation to society as a whole... The status of the doctor is generally a rather special one in all forms of society and civilization.

Wlcolm Nicolson. "The Social and the Cognitive," p. 347. A notable exception to Nicolson's claim that Anglophones have failed to provide critical analyses of the medical perspective is found in the work of the American, Susan Sontag. Sontag critiques medical perceptions of TB and cancer from various literary and sociological perspectives. See Susan Sontag, *Illness as Metaphor* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977).

'Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, pp. 50-51. Brian Evenson notes that Foucault moved away from the archaeological method to "later modes" of analysis. Brian Evenson, "Dits et Ecrits: 1954-1988, 4 Vols." (Book Review). *World Literature Today*, Winter Vol. 70, No. 1, 1996: 164, p. 164. Foucault's shift to a "genealogical" approach to knowledge stipulates that even the genealogical "will to knowledge" must at some point be analyzed.

In a sense, genealogy returns to the three modalities of history that Nietzsche recognized in 1874. It returns to them in spite of the objections that Nietzsche raised in the name of the affirmative and creative powers of life. But they are metamorphosed; the veneration of monuments becomes parody; the respect for ancient continuities becomes systematic dissociation; the critique of the injustices of the past by a truth held by men in the present becomes the destruction of the man who maintains knowledge by the injustice proper to the will to knowledge.

Jung's theory was developed in the context of psychiatric practise. He based his model of the self on his interpretation of the diurnal speech and nocturnal dreams of psychiatrically interned hospital patients and private psychiatric clients; therefore, the transhistorical component to the psyche which he develops from his professional work - specifically his theory of the archetypes and synchronicity - would be termed a uniquely historical construct from Foucault's standpoint—one not divorced but intimately connected to the strategies of power that were present in a psychiatric discourse that characterized, and indeed, reinforced the dominant societal beliefs about Jung's historical period. While Jung's concept of synchronicity may have seemed heretical both to Freud's school of psychoanalysis and to the medical psychiatry of Jung's era, Jung never abandoned the role of the doctor and thus enjoyed the legitimating - and monetary - effects which that privileged social position afforded him/

Indeed, when reading both Jung's work and that of his Jungian disciples, one cannot help sensing an element of self-satisfied elitism, as if the

Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" in *The Foucault Reader ed.* Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984: 76-100), p. 97.

Barnes Miller argues that while Foucault may pretend to escape the limits of his own thought, he too cannot escape the cultural filters through which his theorizing is produced. James Miller, *The Passion of Michel Foucault*, p. 153. Likewise, John Toews says:

As Foucault's own changing constructions of psychoanalysis make obvious, contextualization not only follows interpretation but is part of interpretation.

John Toews, "Foucault and the Freudian Subject," p. 132.

^Miller points out that Foucault also enjoyed the social and material benefits of a highly successful professional career. Ibid., p. 125. Likewise, Keith Tester argues that "Foucault wanted anonymity, but all the time he was playing the game of celebrity.. he was also a product of the academic star system." Keith Tester, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture* (Book Review), p. 158.

concepts contained in the "new science" of analytical psychology were beyond reproach. A certain egotistical clannishness seems to be present in Jung and his circle of admiring followers, as if they are tacitly saying: "we're on the ball and you'd better agree if *you* want to be." On this point Mark Stern agrees that there exists a certain amount of snobbery in Jung's work. To what degree his status as the fashionable, "new-ideas doctor" reinforced Jung's ability to generate income is open to debate.

Richard Noll envisions Jung and his circle of followers as a type of psychoanalytic Church. Noll relates the story of how the Jungian Jolande Jacobi converted to Catholicism in an effort to express love for her Catholic husband; when Jung learned of the event he is said to have angrily replied in a letter, "With me nobody has his place who is in the Church. I am for those people who are out of the Church."² Apparently Aneila Jaffe refused to publish the letter in the two volumes of *C. G. Jung: Letters* because "it doesn't throw a good light on Jung." Noll continues by noting that Jacobi, in summing up Jung's behaviour within his inner circle, says, "He himself behaved as if his psychology was another religion."⁴ Noll concludes that while Jung had no single charismatic follower to perpetuate the new 'Church,' both he and his ideas were nonetheless institutionalized via training in Jungian institutes, and by films, videos, publications and numerous locally

*Mark E. Stern, (ed.) *Carl Jung and Soul Psychology* (New York: Hawthorn Press, 1986), p. 65.

²Noll indicates that it is unknown whether this is a direct quotation or a paraphrase of Jung's letter to Jacobi. Richard Noll. *The Jung Cult: Origins of a Charismatic Movement* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 286.

³Aneila Jaffe, cited in Noll, *The Jung Cult*, p. 286.

Poland Jacobi, cited in Noll, *The Jung Cult*, p. 286.

based Jungian organizations. "He was therefore succeeded," Noll argues, "in a sense, by his own manufactured image."¹

Part (5) Conclusion: Synchronicity, Depth Psychology and the Paranormal

5(a) The Heuristic Value of the Concept of Synchronicity: Recent Applications Toward the Legitimization of The Paranormal

I have argued that Carl Jung's presentation of the concept of synchronicity foreshadows Michel Foucault's poststructuralist notion that like beauty, truth is in the eye of the beholder. More precisely, I have suggested that Jung's defence for synchronicity is a cleverly constructed, ever-changing body of argumentation, aimed specifically at legitimizing a concept which could potentially be regarded as being nonsense or as indicating pathology/

Wll, *The Jung Cult*, p. 287. Regarding Jungian analysis, the institutionalized legacy of Jung's name certainly helps to legitimize the considerable fees charged for individual analyses and analytical workshops. As testament to the burgeoning popularity of Jungian thought, a two page article in *The Globe and Mail* lauds Jung (and the veritable industry of services radiating from his thought) over Sigmund Freud. See Alanna Mitchell, "Jung Inc." in *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto: Southam, May 8, 1993), pp. D1, D5. In another *Globe* article, however, Freud's appeal over Jung within academic inquiry is made evident by the fact that since 1986, the top ten authorities cited in academic journals of the arts and humanities are as follows:

- | | |
|-----------------|------------------|
| 1. Marx. | 6. Plato. |
| 2. Lenin. | 7. Freud. |
| 3. Shakespeare. | 8. Chomsky. |
| 4. Aristotle. | 9. Hegel. |
| 5. Bible. | 10. Cicero. |

Source: Institute for Scientific Information as cited in *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto: Southam, February 11, 1993).

²Freud apparently experienced the phenomenon of recurring numbers, and wrote to Jung in 1909:

Adventures such as mine with the number 62 can be explained by two things. The first is an enormously intensified alertness on the

It is my belief that Jung was compelled to invent a prefigurative type of poststructuralism—if not exactly in the form of a coherent articulation of poststructural ideas, most definitely in his manner of presenting the difficult concept of synchronicity to a western audience situated in the time period of 1930 - 1961.

Concerning the ideological content of Jung's notion of synchronicity, my comparison of Jung and Foucault along the analytical categories of knowledge, power and subjectivity has revealed that several of the ideas embedded within the concept of synchronicity are found within postmodern thought. The world views implied by synchronicity and postmodernism share the common features of discontinuity, acausality, and an intimate connection between internal experience and external stimuli. Furthermore, Jung's exposition of synchronicity reveals an acceptance of contradiction within theory, and a belief in the social relativity of truth claims. Indeed, explicit to the

part of the unconscious, so that one is led like Faust to see a Helen in every woman. The second is the undeniable "cooperation of chance."

Freud continues to say that this "cooperation of chance" plays a role in the development of "delusions." At a time when Jung's career was still vulnerable, Freud seems to either dismiss or pathologize Jung's interest in what would later be called synchronicity. Freud further writes in his letter to Jung:

I therefore look forward to hearing more about your investigations of the spook-complex, my interest being the interest one has in a lovely delusion which one does not share oneself*.

See Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 363.

Jung, however, later distinguishes true synchronicity from both active selectivity and pathology. See *supra*, p. 94, and Jung, *C. G. Jung: Letters Vol. 2*, p. 409.

postmodern ethos are the ideas that contradiction is acceptable and that truth is relative to culture and history.

While the theoretical ideas of discontinuity, an internal-external continuum, the relativity of truth, and the acceptability of contradiction are all postmodern ideas, Jung's method of presenting the concept of synchronicity, however, reveals a postmodern style of argumentation. I showed that Jung carefully alters his data according to the audience and era, despite the fact that he portrays himself as a pragmatic scientist concerned only with the simple, inelegant presentation of "facts." In fact, Jung's view of science is extremely inconsistent. Jung repeatedly contradicts himself by offering a thorough critique of the scientific method (and its concordant world view) on the one hand, and on the other hand, by using his social status as a scientist to legitimize synchronicity. This may be problematic from a traditional, or modernist approach to theory, but not when viewed from a postmodern perspective. Like postmodern art and architecture, Jung's exposition of synchronicity borrows and indeed transfigures elements from the past in order to make a new conceptual synthesis. This is evident in Jung's extensive use of historical forerunners to the idea of synchronicity. By presenting historical data from various historical epochs and locations, Jung uses the device of analogy to both create and legitimize his new concept of synchronicity.

To sum, most of the theoretical ideas implied by synchronicity and the entire manner by which Jung presents those ideas indicate that Jung's work on

¹I demonstrated that Jung vacillates between notions of causality and acausality within synchronicity and the role it plays in the naturally determined "stages of life" inherent to the process of individuation.

synchronicity prefigures (1) some of the important aspects of postmodern theory, and (2) a postmodern attitude towards the presentation of theory.

My analysis suggests, however, that Jung's view of power emphasises the numinosity which is associated with the transcendent symbol, while a postmodern analysis of power focuses on the significations of discourse— specifically, on discourses that are located within culture and history. Thus, Jung's treatment of synchronicity posits an archetypal, transhistorical component to the self, while postmodernism is not predicated upon the existence of a transhistorical element within human subjectivity. This difference between the two theoretical perspectives is the reason why I stress that the ideological content of the concept of synchronicity as well as Jung's presentation of that ideological content prefigure *aspects* of postmodern thought. I do not suggest that the ideas implied by Jung's concept of synchronicity, or that Jung's manner of presenting those ideas perfectly embody postmodernism. Jung's alleged knowledge of God (and the sense of religious calling that such a belief implies) differs from Foucault's poststructural focus on knowledge as something located within history and culture. While poststructural analyses may indeed examine beliefs about God, it seems safe to suggest that most poststructural analyses are not motivated

It could be argued that the power of the symbol (i.e. psychological transcendence) and the power of the sign (i.e. social discourse and practice) do not originate from categorically different nor mutually exclusive forms of power. But for the most part, Jung concentrates on the former modality of power while Foucault focuses on the latter. The two exceptions to this schema were noted as (a) Jung's analysis of the Wotan archetype and its relation to Nazism, which is both a sociological and transcendental explanation, and (b) Foucault's account of his drug-induced perceptions of "non-ordinary" states of consciousness, which reads almost like the beat culture psychology of Richard Alpert and Timothy Leary.

by a conventional sense of "religious calling."¹ Rather, the sheer pleasure of intellectual understanding² or the quest for social justice³ seem to be the two main motives for doing poststructural theory. Jung, on the other hand, attempts to restore spiritual meaning to what he perceives as the existentially alienated human beings of modernity. This is taken by Jung to

Nietzsche's famous quotation that "God is dead" comes to mind. Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, p. 41. Mary Daly could be taken as an exception to the distinction between the "social" and the "religious" because her work in part is aimed towards helping women rediscover what Chris Weedon calls "their true biological femaleness." The discourse of patriarchally power-based society "distorts, fragments and denies" the true nature of women. Weedon, *Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory*, p. 133. Therefore Daly advocates that women begin to define their own natural identity. "As we feel the empowerment of our own naming we hear more deeply our call of the wild." Mary Daly, *Gyn/Ecology* p. 423, cited in op. cit. p. 134. This could be construed as a form of pantheist spiritual or "religious" quest. Naomi Goldenberg notes that Daly "identifies the advancement of sisterhood as a religious struggle - as a struggle against patriarchal religion." Naomi R. Goldenberg. *The End of God : Important Directions for a Feminist Critique of Religion in the Works of Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1982), p. 86.

²Baudrillard says that good theory eventually implodes upon itself, which is "suicidal, but in a good way. If this game didn't exist, there would be no pleasure in writing, or in theorizing." He also contends that there is "an art of disappearing, a way of modulating it and making it into a state of grace. This is what I am trying to master in theory." But Baudrillard's use of the term grace seems more literary than literal. My reading of his work places his understanding of "grace" closer to the word graceful (as in polished and elegant); Baudrillard does not speak of grace in the sense of Jung's or Otto's conception of an overpowering, transcendent experience of the numinous. Baudrillard, *Forget Foucault, Forget Baudrillard*, p. 128.

³Foucault says that the intellectual must actively pursue the social implementation of his or her interpretation of truth.

...the role of the specific intellectual must become more and more important in proportion to the political responsibilities which he is obliged willy-nilly to accept...The essential political problem for the intellectual is not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic, and cultural, within which it operates at the present time.

Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 133.

be a sort of calling in the religious sense. Synchronicity is an important concept towards the aim of restoring meaning because it points towards the larger reality of the collective unconscious, and all the numinous dangers, intrigues, and charms which Jung claims it possesses for both the psychological and social aspects of human experience.

Arguably, Jung and Foucault both attempt to join theory and practice, but they each do so in their own particular way. Jung wishes to restore meaning, and acts like a postmodern to achieve that end; Foucault finds meaning in emphasizing the need for social and political action. In Jung's case, I suggest that it is precisely due to the problematic nature of synchronicity that Jung had to act in a self-consciously, even clandestine manner.² Although he dealt with ideas already prevalent within the world of subatomic physics, these new perspectives on the interchangeable nature of matter and energy, the relativity of space and time, and the problems of

It could be argued that both Jungian and poststructural theories wish to foster "spiritual" or "religious" meaning within an alienated culture. The difference is that Jung specifies, and limits himself to, this ideal, whereas poststructural theorists generally do not. However, the line between the "religious" and the "social" is, and perhaps always has been, a blurred one within various religions and social reform movements. For instance, The Hindu puranic notion of karma yoga stipulates that the respective dharmas (sacred duties) of the kshatriya (rulers and warriors) and vaisya (merchants and traders) castes are fulfilled only through social action. On the other hand, the social philosopher John Stuart Mill's utilitarian advocacy of the highest form of pleasure is one which Geddes MacGregor says "is a view much more reconcilable with the teaching of the great religious leaders in human history." See S. Radhakrishnan, *The Hindu View of Life* (Bombay: Blackie and Son (India) Ltd., 1979), pp. 45-92; and Geddes MacGregor, *Dictionary of Religion and Philosophy*, p. 414.

²On the need to be secretive, Hermann Hesse told the Chilean diplomat Miguel Serrano that he believed that he, Serrano and Jung belonged to a mystically based "Hermetic Circle." Serrano envisions Jung's writing a Preface for him as an instance of synchronicity, or alternately, as the result of "an impulse from the Hermetic Circle." Miguel, Serrano. *C. G. Jung and Hermann Hesse: A Record of Two Friendships* trans. Frank MacShane (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966) pp. 24, 31-32, 70-71.

objectivity and causality were somewhat foreign to the psychoanalytic movement in which Jung participated; moreover, they were ideas novel to the western ethos of the period between 1930 and 1961.

Concerning the heuristic value of synchronicity, it appears that the relativistic implications which the concept holds for contemporary and future psychological models of human subjectivity are potentially staggering. While Robert Aziz argues that Jung does not publish enough case material to justify the theoretical claims he makes in regard to synchronicity and moreover, that Jung does not always demonstrate how synchronistic events are meaningful, Aziz paradoxically suggests that Jung failed to adequately convey the greater significance of the concept. Aziz submits that the perception of synchronicity is related to one's ability to access various layers of psychological awareness.

In a book review of Aziz's *C. G. Jung's Psychology of Religion and Synchronicity*, David Holt suggests that "Aziz could take his argument further if he were prepared to break more radically with the Jungian frame of reference." Holt says that in regard to synchronicity, Jung's approach to time is simplistic. Instead of Jung's distinction between time and timelessness, Holt favours the ideas of J. B. Frazer, who "has distinguished five orders of temporality in the universe, and named them as atemporal,

Victor Mansfield similarly argues that one of the main problems with Jung's concept of synchronicity is that "Jung never gave an adequate sense of what the meaning was for individual synchronistic events." Victor Mansfield, *Synchronicity, Science, and Soul-Making*, p. 26.

^Robert Aziz, *C. G. Jung's Psychology of Religion and Synchronicity* (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1990), pp. 2, 64, 75.

^David Holt, "Robert Aziz: *C. G. Jung's Psychology of Religion and Synchronicity*" (Book Review). *Religion* Vol. 21, 1991: 397-400, p. 397.

prototemporal, eotemporal, biotemporal, nootemporal. Holt argues that Jung's study of alchemy refers to the first three categories of time (as outlined by Frazer), but that Jung could not have known this. Holt concludes that

If synchronicity studies are to enable us to make the jump between psychology and cosmology, and then to ground that jump in scientific discourse, we need work on time which allows for more than the simple contrast with timelessness.

In reviewing Aziz's book, James L. Jarrett argues that Jung's explication of two types of synchronicity is contradictory. The first type refers to synchronicity that occurs simultaneously, whereas the second type refers to synchronicity that is not simultaneous. Jarrett says "he [Jung] is trapped by the implication of simultaneity in the very word *synchronicity*."³ And like Aziz, Jarrett believes that Jung does not adequately outline the greater implications and possibilities which the concept of synchronicity holds. On this issue, Daniel J. Meckel reiterates the idea expressed in this thesis that Jung's treatment of synchronicity is geared towards Jung's perception of his audience. Meckel says:

Jung was hesitant to spell out the implications of synchronicity for his psychology, for fear that they would be unacceptable or incomprehensible to his scientific and popular audiences.

In contrast to Aziz's, Jarrett's and Meckel's claims that Jung does not adequately extrapolate the greater meaning of synchronicity, Colin Wilson, a

¹Ibid., p. 398.

²Ibid., pp. 397-398.

³James L. Jarrett. "C. G. Jung's Psychology of Religion and Synchronicity" (Book Review). *Journal of American Academy of Religion*. Vol. 61, No. 2, 1993: 343-347, p. 345.

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[^]Daniel J. Meckel. "C. G. Jung's Psychology of Religion and Synchronicity" (Book Review). *The Journal of Religion*. Vol. 73, No. 1, 1993: 149-151, p. 150.

writer about occult and paranormal phenomena, suggests that Jung uses the idea of synchronicity in order to further the reality of the paranormal. Wilson further argues that Jung confuses synchronicity with precognition, ESP and telepathy, and that the only true example of synchronicity in Jung's exposition is found in a woman patient's dream of a scarab. Likewise, Victor Mansfield says that Jung "mixes an entire zoo of paranormal phenomena with synchronicity, thereby making both classes of experience more mysterious."²

Regarding the idea that Jung uses the concept of synchronicity to legitimize the paranormal, Mary Ann Mattoon argues that Jung postulates three basic criteria for synchronicity: acausality, simultaneity and meaning. She further says that Jung includes the paranormal phenomenon of ESP under the umbrella of synchronicity, even though it does not meet the requirements of acausality, simultaneity and meaning.

Jung included extrasensory perception (ESP) in his definition of synchronicity, although it seems not to meet his criteria. Each form of ESP he mentioned (telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, and psychokinesis) lacks one or more qualifications (simultaneity, acausality, and meaning) for synchronicity.

Like Colin Wilson, Herman Borenzweig says that "synchronicity is the entree into the paranormal."⁵ Yet unlike Mattoon, Borenzweig suggests that, according to Jung's definition and intent, synchronicity may be relevant to

¹Wilson, *Lord of the Underworld*, pp. 113-114, 143.

²Victor Mansfield, *Synchronicity, Science and Soul-Making*, pp. 26-27.

Mattoon, *Jungian Psychology in Perspective*, p. 141.

⁴Ibid., p. 145.

⁵Herman Borenzweig *Jung and Social Work* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1984), p. 145.

several different types of paranormal phenomena. Borenzweig points out that Jung speaks of three types of synchronistic phenomena. The first type involves the simultaneous and meaningful coincidence of a psychic state with an immediately perceived external event. The second type refers to synchronicity at a distance (recall that Jung gives the example of Swedenborg's vision of the geographically removed Stockholm fire). The third type points toward the prediction of future events, as is apparently demonstrated by the Rhine experiments.

Borenzweig further suggests that synchronicity is a useful concept for rendering the paranormal more acceptable to those who might possess unusual psychic abilities, like telepathy. Speaking as a clinician, Borenzweig says:

It is my belief that telepathy is a major factor in good therapy... Jung helps us to feel more comfortable with our introverted telepathic capacities. In addition, he helps us to give more credibility to those of our clients who report their own telepathic experiences.

Jungian therapist June Singer provides an example of this type of telepathic communication with one of her clients. As Borenzweig indicates, the term "synchronicity" helps her to normalize the essentially paranormal phenomenon of telepathy. Singer speaks of a "long series of synchronistic events" with her client, Abraham, who would telephone just when Singer was considering one of his dreams "so that it seems fully believable that we were united on an unconscious level by some archetype which was constellated in our way of being-with one another."³

¹Ibid., pp. 135-136.

²Ibid., p. 152.

³ June Singer, *Boundaries of the Soul* (New York: Doubleday fit Co., 1972), p. 376.

Edmund Cohen similarly argues that the concept of synchronicity is used to validate Jung's paranormal experiences. Earlier we have seen how Jung's name is used as a badge of legitimacy for "occult" ideas that are portrayed in the National Film Board's "Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Leonard Cohen."² The narrator of the film says that the "influential psychologist" Carl Jung used the *I Ching*; apparently Jung was mentioned in order to legitimize the poet/musician Leonard Cohen's use of the, at the time of 1965, occultish Chinese oracle. In order to further minimize the apparent strangeness of the *I Ching*, the narrator disregards its predictive aspect and emphasizes Cohen's use of the technique as a "tool for self-knowledge." The rejection of the divinatory aspect of the oracle seems to parallel an overall western reluctance to accept the possibility of a psyche-matter continuum. Such a psyche-matter continuum would extend beyond Newtonian conceptions of linear time. This possibility is, however, advanced by Jung's concept of synchronicity.

I noted earlier that, speaking about synchronicity and time, the well-known Jungian Marie-Louise Von Franz says that the unconscious "knows the past and the future." In *Psyche and Matter*, Von Franz extends her claims about synchronicity, advancing the concept to include the paranormal, and yet seems to hasten back to Jung's model and his construct of the archetype in order to remain a Jungian:

Synchronistic events constitute moments in which a "cosmic" or "greater" meaning becomes gradually conscious in an individual; generally it is a shaking experience. One is moved because one

Edmund D. Cohen, *C. G. Jung and the Scientific Attitude*, pp. 70-91, 128.

²Supra, p. 57.

Marie-Louise Von Franz, *On Divination and Synchronicity*, p. 39.

feels like a primitive, that a higher force, a ghost or god, aims at you, often by playing a trick on you. But such an interpretation regresses to the level of magical causal thinking, which Jung sought to avoid. The archetype does not magically cause such events but becomes manifest in them without any antecedents seeming to exist.

Jungian analyst Eugene Pascal relates the synchronistic event of seeing an internal image of one of his students, Myrna, and then immediately afterward, physically bumping into her as she turned a street corner. Then like Von Franz, he gives thought to extending the concept of synchronicity in order to advocate a type of New Age, transpersonal cosmology:

Synchronistic events truly make us feel interconnected and interrelated with the world at large, the transcendent self being the invisible connection that unites us all. We must allow the vibrant life of the transpersonal self to flow through us...In so doing we ascend to a new transpersonal space, a divine state of consciousness of the self beyond even the highest wisdom and compassion, a state that is inconceivably greater than anything that can be defined.

Other examples of Jungians who use synchronicity to hint at, or to overtly advance metaphysical and paranormal ideas are abundant. In studying the life of the Czech writer Franz Kafka from a Jungian perspective, Daryl Sharp describes the paranormal idea of Kafka's discovery of a "soul mate" in terms of it being a synchronistic event. Furthermore Sharp says that Kafka's life has an introspective, "religious order" which is evidenced by psychological reflection and several corresponding instances of synchronicity.

^xMarie-Louise Von Franz, *Psyche and Matter* (Boston: Shambhala, 1992), p. 272.

²Eugene Pascal. *Jung to Live By* (New York: Warner Books, 1992), p. 204.

³Kafka discovered his "soul mate," Dora Dymant while she was cleaning fish in a kitchen, which Daryl Sharp claims was synchronistic because Kafka "was ready for a chance meeting in the outside world that coincided with the inner development of his anima." Sharp also suggests that the fish symbolizes rebirth,

The influential Jungian, Edward F. Edinger, says that the "miraculous events" attributed to the mystic Hermes Trismegistus may be related to the concept of synchronicity.* Edinger advances another daring idea under the protective mantle of synchronicity when he suggests that the phenomenon is connected to the idea of the *unus mundus* (one world or world soul) and that synchronicity involves a symbolic loss and reclamation of the human head—a process that reunites a previously dissociated consciousness to the world in which it is situated.

Jungian therapist Deldon Anne McNeely uses the concept of synchronicity to advance the paranormal idea of what she terms, "mirroring." While perhaps not consistent with Jung's initial intent regarding the meaning and scope of synchronicity, she suggests that in the process of mirroring, a therapist may reduce clients' bodily pain by miraculously transferring it to themselves.³

sexual energy, and several other psychological motifs which Kafka benefitted from in his association with Dymant. Daryl Sharp. *The Secret Raven: Conflict and Transformation in the Life of Franz Kafka* (Toronto: Inner City Books, 1980), pp. 101, 103-104, 112-113.

Edward F. Edinger, *The Mysterium Lectures: A Journey Through C. G. Jung's Mysterium Coniunctionis*, ed. Joan Dexter Blackmer (Toronto: Inner City Books, 1995), p. 160.

²Ibid., pp. 286-7.

³Deldon Anne McNeely, *Touching: Body Therapy and Depth Psychology* (Toronto: Inner City Books, 1987), p. 67-68. This idea is similar to that found in the Christian mystical tradition wherein the religious person allegedly suffers for the sins of others. See, for instance, the Catholic Polish mystic's autobiographical diary, Sister Mary Faustina Kowalska, *Divine Mercy in My Soul*, pp. 21, 23. That this may be a two-way process of mutual assistance is suggested on p. 87; the notion of two-way assistance has also been expressed by a Catholic ex-monk, with whom I have held several conversations in Ottawa, Canada from 1993 to the present (January 1997). Likewise, the apostle Paul exhorts people of the churches of Galatia to "bear one another's burdens." *Galatians* 6:2; this presumably is possible since they belong to one spiritual body. See, *1 Corinthians* 12:27, *Ephesians* 4:4. Concerning Hinduism, the Hindu Yogi in like manner is said to receive the negative "karma" of the disciple. See, for instance, Swami Tejasarananda, *Sri Ramakrishna*, p. 92. Likewise, J. G. Frazer

Sallie Nichols comments that synchronicity is connected to the divinatory, oftendeemed "occult," Tarot deck. She claims that in her own experience synchronicity appeared in relation to the trump cards of the deck, and that this happened with increasing frequency as she became more familiar with the Tarot. She says the recurrence of the trump card of the Magician was synchronistic because it caused her to "look at the world - and at myself -with new eyes."¹

Another instance in which synchronicity is related to the paranormal occurs in the work of Jungian therapist, James A. Hall. In *Jungian Dream Interpretation*, Hall extends the idea of synchronicity in order to include and to legitimize the parapsychologies of telepathy, clairvoyance, and psychokinesis.

Likewise, Mario Jacobi suggests that telepathic events are similar to synchronistic events because both involve the constellation of an unconscious healer archetype. Jacobi gives the example of a therapist's apparently irrational anxiety over a client which prompted the former to call and indeed prevent the latter's actual suicide attempt. In discussing synchronicity and its relation to "quasi-telepathic" events, Jacobi cautions against the

claims that the belief in the magical transference of evil from one human being to another was prevalent in "savage or barbarous peoples," as well as "among the civilized nations of Europe, both in ancient and modern times." See J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough* Abridged Edition (London: Papermac, 1987 [1922]), pp. 543, 542-546.

Sallie Nichols, *Jung and Tarot: An Archetypal Journey* (York Beach, Maine: Samuel Weiser, Inc, 1980), p. 63.

James A. Hall, *Jungian Dream Interpretation* (Toronto: Inner City Books, 1983), pp. 92-95.

Mario Jacobi, *The Analytic Encounter: Transference and Human Relationship* (Toronto: Inner City Books, 1984), p. 30.

possibility that a telepathic therapist may deleteriously invade a patient's ego-boundaries. Nevertheless, Jacobi argues that the therapist's ability to "see through" a patient can be beneficial if the telepathic event is discussed with the client-

Concerning telepathy, Jung himself says at one point that it is a real phenomenon, yet one not amenable to his psychological theory. Don McGowan suggests that Jung contradicts himself when he claims to be a scientist, yet makes unverifiable metaphysical claims that border on the paranormal. In *What is Wrong With Jung* he argues, "saying that the psyche transcends space and time are fairly substantial claims for someone who claimed not to be a metaphysician. On the other hand, Francis Charet suggests that Jung's true desire was to combine religious and scientific methodologies, and that this desire was fuelled by the need to heal a societally based schism between science and religion. Charet also argues that Jung wished to heal this schism in a personal sense because it had left a mark on Jung's own psyche.

¹ibid., p. 39.

²Jung, *The Collected Works*, Vol. 8 pp. 262-263.

³Don McGowan, *What is Wrong With Jung* (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1994), p. 136. Conversely, Stuart Gordon says that the astronomer Fred Hoyle

...insists that everything that was and will be exists 'all the time'¹, and that the consciousness that gives us the sense of history, of Past and Future, is in fact an illusion.

This view, spoken by a scientist, locates consciousness within an eternal and, therefore, metaphysical perspective. See Stuart Gordon, *The Paranormal: An Illustrated Encyclopedia* (London: Headline Book Publishing PLC, 1992), p. 666.

⁴Francis Xavier Charet, "Spiritualism and the Foundations of C. G. Jung's Psychology" (Ottawa: Ph.D. Thesis for the Department of Religious Studies, University of Ottawa, June 30, 1988).

It appears that both McGowan's and Charet's views are partially true, yet incomplete. In McGowan's case, the conflict between Jung's unprovable metaphysical claims and his alleged scientific status only becomes problematic if Jung's system is assessed from a modernist conception of what constitutes good theory.

McGowan's view could be taken as a relatively constricted vision because logical inconsistency is judged by its own terms—contradiction is seen as a weakness. What is not considered is the possibility, as Jung himself suggests, that a larger set of archetypal forces guide the smaller ego-centred mind through the various mazes of a human life, which necessitates both paradox and contradiction. In fact, synchronicity in particular, and Jung's theory in general are built upon the idea of unifying apparent opposites—which would include the dyad of logical consistency and logical inconsistency. Thus it could be argued that McGowan neglects the possibility of a greater Logos emerging in Jung's system: the emergence of a greater Logos which is made possible through the unification of lesser logical contradictions. Such a notion approaches Hegel's idea of a larger *Zeitgeist* (World Spirit) that guides history by unifying a series of lesser dialectics which are individually termed as thesis and antithesis.^

^ung says that human beings progress through a developmental sequence, as outlined in his essay, "The Stages of Life" (supra, p. 80). In his psychological interpretation of ancient and medieval alchemy, he likens this progression to the sequential stages of transformation found in the alchemists' attempt to transmute base metals into gold. While Jung claims that alchemical transformation parallels a general sequence of psychological development, it is unclear why Jung hesitates to relate this idea of natural progression to synchronicity.

' (a) While a postmodern would not agree with the notion of a guiding World Spirit [see Part 4(d)], he or she would not necessarily critique Jung's system on the basis of its apparent inconsistency. Instead of envisioning the inconsistent argumentation in Jung's theory as belonging to part of a greater psychological - and perhaps historical - unfolding of unified ideas, it might be

Regarding Charet's assertion that Jung attempts to heal a science and religion dichotomy within both history and his own psyche, I would agree that such a view is partially correct, yet in light of Foucault's assertion that truth claims are a product of social power, the idea of merely "healing the split" appears to be simplistic, naive, and trite. Nevertheless, it does seem, as Naomi Goldenberg suggests, that Jung's life work and his resultant theory contribute not only to the psychological well-being of his clients, but to the maintenance of Jung's own mental health. Regarding synchronicity and its relation to the paranormal, the possibility that Jung's formulation of the concept - and the construction of his theory in general - abetted the preservation of his own sanity does not, however, immediately invalidate the claims forwarded by Jung about synchronicity, nor does it nullify the potential heuristic value of the concept.

Further to its heuristic value, another recent application of the concept of synchronicity is found in Marilyn Ferguson's, *The Aquarian Conspiracy*. Ferguson in fact uses synchronicity in much the same manner that Jung used forerunners such as the ancient idea of "correspondentia" and

viewed as a clever attempt to legitimize and indeed sell intellectual ideas to a larger public.

(b) Concerning the union of opposites and synchronicity, Anthony Storr, somewhat like Freud, says that "one rather odd consequence of Jung's preoccupation with the union of opposites is his notion of synchronicity." Storr, *C. G. Jung*, p. 99. Recall Freud's correspondence to Jung (16 April 1909), on the topic of synchronicity. *Supra*, p. 283.

*Many contemporary Jungians - i.e. Jungian analysts and followers of Jung -use this terminology to advertise books and to enlist clients for costly lectures and therapy workshops.

²Goldenberg, "Looking at Jung," pp. 404-405.

Marilyn Ferguson, *The Aquarian Conspiracy* (Los Angeles: J. P. Tarcher, Inc., 1980).

Leibniz's pre-established harmony in order to validate synchronicity; she attempts to legitimize the idea of "holographic supertheory" by using the already existing concept of synchronicity. As Ferguson points out, holographic supertheory is essentially a contemporary re-articulation of the Indian theory of Maya; that is, the idea that the physicality of the material world is illusory. She says,

In a nutshell, the holographic supertheory says that our brains mathematically construct "hard" reality by interpreting frequencies from a dimension transcending time and space. The brain is a hologram, interpreting a holographic universes

Because, she continues, individuals are an integral part of the larger holographic universe,

Synchronicity - the web of coincidence that seems to have some higher purpose or connectedness - also fits in with the holographic model. Such meaningful coincidences derive from the purposeful, patterned, organizing nature of the matrix.

Ferguson argues that a Kuhnian-style paradigm shift is taking place on the level of social theory in which the "intellectual concept"¹ of the materialistic, Newtonian world view will be superseded by the "direct knowing" of the new holographic model. Accordingly, she claims that this will entail a rapid global transformation. She further suggests that the awareness of synchronicity indicates that the paradigm shift is underway, and cites the "brain scientist"⁵ Karl Pribram who similarly uses the notion of synchronicity in order to further this claim:

¹bid., p. 182.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 373.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

It isn't that the world of appearances is wrong; it isn't that there aren't objects out there, at one level of reality. It's that if you penetrate through and look at the universe with a holographic system, you arrive at a different reality, one that can explain things that have hitherto remained scientifically inexplicable: paranormal phenomena...synchronicities, the apparently meaningful coincidence of events.

Stanislav Grof is another non-Jungian who expresses a similar view by employing synchronicity to make a case for the "transpersonal phenomena" of the "holotropic mind." By suggesting that synchronistic events are constellated around past life experiences, Grof also uses synchronicity in order to further the doctrine of reincarnation.

Ira Progoff argues that Jung himself said synchronicity was inadequate because it dealt only with time phenomena and not with "spatial clairvoyance. In the hope of extending synchronicity to include both

Ibid. A more recent and very popular variant of this idea is expressed by Deepak Chopra, who combines Hindu philosophy, subatomic physics and contemporary medicine to advance the notion that increased awareness reveals an eternal dimension and essential unity of all existence. See Deepak Chopra, *Ageless Body, Timeless Mind* (New York, Harmony Books, 1993). Prior to Ferguson, Jane Roberts advanced in the 1970's the idea that the relativity of time would imply that both the past and the future affect present events. And not unlike the popular 1990's television program, "Sliders," Roberts also suggests that not only past and future, but parallel realities interact with one's present reality. With this schema, Robert's works are replete with numerous personal accounts of synchronistic and precognitive experiences. See, for instance, Jane Roberts, *The Nature of Personal Reality* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974).

²Stanislav Grof with Hal Zina Bennett, *The Holotropic Mind: The Three Levels of Human Consciousness and How They Shape our Lives* (New York: Harper Collins, 1992), pp. 133, 175-179.

³Ira Progoff, *Jung, Synchronicity, and Human Destiny: C. G. Jung's Theory of Meaningful Coincidence* (New York, The Julian Press, 1973), pp. 159-160. It seems that Progoff overlooks Jung's mention of the letter Swedenborg wrote to Immanuel Kant in which Swedenborg describes his clairvoyant vision of the Stockholm fire, which would indicate a "spatial" instance of synchronicity.

temporal and spatial paranormal phenomena, Progoff offers a new metaphysical term to replace synchronicity: the "transcausal factor.'

F. David Peat uses synchronicity to give credence to his view that the universe is chaotic, discontinuous, and non-unitary:

Nonunitary transformations allow for the totally new to enter the universe and imply that the future is not entirely contained, or enfolded, within the present.

Peat's vision does not conflict with the postmodern stance concerning the discontinuity of human history. Peat continues:

Nonunitary transformations mean that knowing the entire past history of a system may not be sufficient to determine, absolutely, its next instant. Nonunitary processes allow freedom to enter the universe and limit the grip of determinism.

'Ibid., p. 165.

²F. David Peat, *The Philosopher's Stone*, p. 131. Peat provides an example of his own experience of synchronicity in which an artist showed him a painting of a star map that was based upon a map drawn by people of the Pacific Islands. Several days later Peat met with some indigenous people who were planning a canoe voyage around the Pacific Ocean. The trip was largely motivated by a interior "vision" which a Native Canadian woman had experienced, and which had been interpreted by indigenous elders as being of great importance. The vision, Peat says, "consisted in part of a map remarkably similar to the one I had seen only days earlier." Op. cit., p. 4.

³Ibid. In a review of *The Philosopher's Stone*, Gail Wood, says the book is "interesting and intriguing" for those who wish to unify the domains of "science and spirit." Gail Wood. "*The Philosopher's Stone: Chaos, Synchronicity, and the Hidden Order of the World*" (Book Review). *Library Journal*, Vol. 116, No. 13: 139, p. 139. Sean Kelly approves of Peat's efforts to popularize complex scientific theories, but argues that Peat's definition of an ultimate ontological ground is contradictory because Peat defines it as being static and "outside time" and yet a "creative source." Peat, *The Philosopher's Stone*, pp. 137, 138 cited in Sean Kelly, "*The Philosopher's Stone: Chaos, Synchronicity, and the Hidden Order of the World*" (Book Review). *Zygon*, Vol. 30, No. 4, 1995: 649-652, pp. 649-652. This is not a recent problem, but one which the Indian philosophers Sankara and Ramanuja attempted to address in their different analyses of the relation between the unmanifest *brahman* and manifest world of *may a*. For Sankara (788-820 A.D.), his absolute monism stipulates that only the eternal, unmanifest ground of ultimate essence which is without attributes (*brahman*) is truly real, making the temporal, manifest world of appearances (*maya*) real only until transcendental knowledge of the *brahman* renders it illusory. P. D. Devanandan says that the manifest aspect is "empirically real but transcendentally unreal."

In a book review of Allan Combs and Mark Holland's *Synchronicity:*

Science, Myth and the Trickster, Alfonso Montuori says that the authors are:

... "brave" for tackling this subject, since it is still widely regarded as unsuitable for polite (read stodgy) scientific discourse. But given this excellent work, within a few years I hope we will refer to them as brave, to be sure, given the narrow-mindedness of their time, but also as ground-breakers.

Montuori cites Combs and Holland's interpretation of Jung's view, couched in the metaphors of contemporary "New Age" discourse:

We must sacrifice the urgent, petty agendas of the ego to a larger field of participation. We must learn humility and own humour, finding guidance in intuition and making logic a servant rather than a master. Control is a personal experience, surrender a transpersonal one. Through surrender we learn to move with the rhythms that flow through our existence and in so doing open ourselves.. .And so we must learn to dance.

In the *Toronto Star* article "Ancient Chinese Philosophy seen as Religious Alternative," synchronicity is used by Robin Harvey to justify the use of the *I Ching* as a "tool for the subconscious."³ As with the National Film Board's treatment of Leonard Cohen's use of the *I Ching*, Harvey takes the converse of Jung's approach. We have seen that Jung used the *I Ching* to authenticate his idea of synchronicity. In Harvey's case, however, the

Whereas Ramanuja (approx. 938-1027 A.D.), proposed his qualified non-dualism in which the ground of *brahman*, existing as a Person with qualities, is united to the manifest world of *maya*, which itself is truly real as the "body" of the *brahman*. See P. D. Devanandan, *The Concept of Maya* (London: The Lutterworth Press, 1950), pp. 91-134, 102.

Alfonso Montuori, *Synchronicity: Science, Myth and the Trickster* (Book Review). *World Futures* Vol. 31, 1991, pp. 55-57.

²Allan Combs and Mark Holland, *Synchronicity: Science, Myth and the Trickster* (p. 121), cited in Montuori, *Synchronicity: Science, Myth and the Trickster* (Book Review), p. 56.

³Robin Harvey, "Ancient Chinese Philosophy seen as Religious Alternative" in *The Toronto Star* (June 8, 1996).

western concept of synchronicity is noted in order to enhance the acceptability of the eastern *I Ching*.

Last, in *The Quest for the Fourth Monkey* the popular writer Sylvia Fraser makes frequent reference to synchronicity in order to lend credence to her thesis that due to our cultural evolution, telepathy, precognition, the paranormal, and reincarnation should be regarded as actual rather than as imaginary or fantastic phenomena. In support of this claim, Fraser notes that the poet Robert Graves felt "directed," as if from a higher power, while he was researching pre-Christian literature about beliefs of a moon-goddess. Apparently Graves suddenly comprehended the meaning of several Welsh riddles and twelve Celtic letters which he previously had been unable to read; moreover, Fraser says the letters made reference to the motif of "the tree," a motif which held for Graves a personal "synchronistic" meaning.

Thus it seems that synchronicity has tentatively entered the so-called "mainstream" of intellectual ideas and is currently being used to legitimize paranormal and holistic models of reality—models of existence which otherwise might still be viewed as unacceptable within the dominant ethos of a western society which, as Fritjof Capra argues, "does not correspond with the world-view of emerging scientific thought."

Sylvia Fraser, *The Quest for the Fourth Monkey* (Toronto: Key/Porter Books, 1992).

²Ibid., pp. 189, 190, 191. Concerning the tree symbol, while Jung argues, quite correctly, that it figures prominently in various mythological and religious systems, its specific meaning varies within each system enough to place the notion of a universal "tree archetype" into question.

Fritjof Capra, cited in Ferguson, *The Aquarian Conspiracy*, p. 145.

5(b) Summary of the Thesis

In Part 1 of this thesis I suggested that studying Carl Jung's concept of synchronicity poses three main problems. The first, as mentioned by Victor Fane D'Lugin, is the problem of Jung's many revisions. Regarding synchronicity, Jung often adds to texts short footnotes which allude to, or specify the idea of, synchronicity several years after having first published the original text. In Parts 3(a) and 3(c) I illustrated that his revisions complicate matters because a former exposition on synchronicity was later reinvented. Recall the example in which Jung does not identify himself as the subject who experiences synchronicity in "On Synchronicity," and yet later, in *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle*, provides the same example of synchronicity and does indeed identify himself as the subject who experienced the phenomenon.

The second difficulty in studying synchronicity arises from statements Jung offers toward the close of his career concerning his perspective on psychiatry and how this relates to his life's work. Jung held an equivocal view of psychiatry at the time of his entrance into the field. He recalls his student days with "boredom and disgust." And he felt alienated from psychiatric colleagues whom he scientifically studied along with the patients in order to understand the "psychiatric mentality."² Jung did, however, become intensely excited about becoming a psychiatrist when he read the

Jung. *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 108.

Ibid., pp. 112-113.

preface to Krafft-Ebing's textbook on psychiatry¹, which recognized the "subjective character" of psychiatric textbooks.

In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* Jung states that much of his scientific theorizing was in fact a form of scientism. That is, he admits to having presented mythological material in a pseudo-scientific light in order to make it seem more legitimate to his professional peers. Speaking about the unconscious, for instance, Jung says:

The term, after all, was coined for scientific purposes __ I prefer the term "the unconscious," knowing that I might equally well speak of "God" or "daimon" if I wished to express myself in mythic language.

The third problem in studying Jung's implementation of synchronicity is related to the previous two. While we may concede, due to the facts that a) Jung continually modifies his work, and b) at the end of his career he admits a life of duplicity, that Jung truly acts as a poststructuralist decades before the term became popularized, this position leaves important unanswered questions. For instance, how are we to discern exactly where Jung *truly* stands on important issues that relate to synchronicity? In his discussions about synchronicity over a time period of 20 years, Jung contradicts himself on several major points. While every thinker is justified in developing, over the course of time, new ways of seeing the world, this usually is accompanied by a statement attesting to that fact. With Jung this often is not the case. The result is a baffling array of extremely strong and yet contradictory statements. This is especially so in his writings about synchronicity, in

¹*Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie*, 4th edn. (1890), cited in Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 108n.

²Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, pp. 108-109.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 336-337.

which, for instance, conflicting issues of "acausality" and "natural determination" stand uneasily side by side. Often Jung contradicts himself within the very same article, sometimes on the very same page.

It is suggested that Jung's thought may appear in a more favourable light when viewed from a poststructural perspective, and moreover, that Jung's conceptualization and implementation of the idea of synchronicity required an almost poststructural type of awareness on the part of Jung. Thus in the introduction a crucial distinction is made between Jung's theory and Jung's implementation of that theory.

The remainder of Part 1 illustrates how in the Zofingia Club Jung attempts to introduce to medical psychology the idea of a "soul." By citing the philosopher, Immanuel Kant, Jung argues that the soul transcends both space and time, and therefore attempts to bridge mundane ego consciousness with the realm of the eternal. Although he has not yet formulated the idea of synchronicity, this early notion that the ego relates to some greater framework which extends beyond the conventional boundaries of space and time is an important precursor to the concept of the archetype and how it relates to synchronicity. Moreover, his use of the philosopher Kant prefigures his later use of a wide variety of historical ideas in a bid to legitimize synchronicity and its seemingly unusual implications.

In Part 2 of the thesis I argued that Jung's strategy for legitimizing synchronicity reveals aspects of a postmodern type of awareness on the part of Jung. This is made evident when we examine the various asides Jung offers in works not specifically intended to address synchronicity. In this section, a linear chronological analysis of these asides from 1930-1951 seems to reveal two things: First, that Jung is fully aware of the contentious nature of

synchronicity and the concomitant need to present it cautiously. Second, that he indeed practices great discretion when discussing synchronicity. While numerous internal inconsistencies in Jung's thought on synchronicity are brought to light, it is argued that if viewed from the perspective of Foucauldian discourse analysis, these inconsistencies do not necessarily detract from Jung's overall aim of making the concept more accessible to modern readers.

A similar argument is made in Part 3 in which Jung's formal treatises are analyzed according to the themes which Jung uses to support synchronicity. As in Part 2, Jung's recurrent inconsistency is outlined as a measure of his ability to live up to the poststructuralist notion that truth is a uniquely human creation, grounded within social relations of power. In one instance, Jung actually attempts to convert his failed astrological experiment into supportive evidence for synchronicity—despite the fact that the synchronistic effects which he initially set out to discover in the experiment (a relation between sun-moon and moon-moon conjunctions and marriage) were not found to bear any statistical significance whatsoever. As with the remainder of his presentation, Jung's lack of scientific rigour is compensated by his abundant creativity. Synchronicity is made to appear exciting, scientific,

Salter Shelburne argues that despite Jung's use of pseudo science, "a legitimately scientific perspective can nonetheless be reconstructed from his thought." This new type of science, Shelburne says, has yet to be fully articulated. It will not be based upon the orthodox, Newtonian scientific method which is applied to the natural sciences, but on "the inspiration of relativity and quantum physics." He then notes the eminent subatomic physicist David Bohm, whose hypothesis of an invisible, "implicit order" (which is the unmanifest aspect of the visible, "explicit order") suggests that subatomic particles are acausally interconnected—an idea that supports synchronicity.

Why not, for example, assimilate Jung's theory of the archetypes to such speculative theses as [subatomic physicist] David Bohm's implicit and explicit orders...by way of acknowledging that this is

progressive and important. It is as if Jung wishes to reintroduce to western society a secret, lost form of knowledge that was almost banal to our ancient ancestors. At least, this is the timbre of Jung's argument.

Three main sources are used in this section. The first is "On Synchronicity," which is a translation of the lecture, "Ober Synchronizitat," presented at the Eranos conference at Ascona, Switzerland, and published in the *Eranos-Jahrbuch 1951* at Zurich in 1952.

The second source is the first version of "Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle," appearing in *The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche*, which in collaboration with the physicist, Wolfgang Pauli, was published in German as *Naturerklarung und Psyche* in 1952. Pauli's contribution to this book is the article, "The Influence of Archetypal Ideas on the Scientific Theories of Kepler." Therefore Jung's piece on synchronicity is analyzed within the scientific context in which it is found. Apparently Jung attempts to magnify his own scientific status in the hope of equalling Pauli's known authenticity as a scientist.

The third main source under analysis was *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle* in its English version of 1952. This is Jung's main publication on synchronicity. In order to appraise Jung's 100 pages of argumentation, I used the same sequential method of analysis as I did with my analysis of "On Synchronicity."

Following my examination of *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle*, I outlined Jung's treatment of synchronicity after his formal

the sort of thing that Jung was trying to say all along?

Shelburne, *Mythos and Logos in the Thought of Carl Jung*, pp. 10-11. For an account of Bohm's thought, see Zukav, *The Dancing Wu-Li Masters*, pp. 308-311.

presentation of the concept. My analysis of *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* and of *Man and His Symbols* (both written after synchronicity was firmly established in Jung's theory) reveals that, at this point, Jung is less anxious to legitimize synchronicity with copious supportive material.

In Part 4, I analyzed both Jung and Foucault's views on knowledge, power and subjectivity. Regarding Jung and the problem of knowledge, I pointed out that Jung contradicts himself by suggesting on the one hand that truth is relative to a social audience, and on the other hand, that the concept of synchronicity implies a metaphysic of absolute truth. As the notion of absolute truth transcends the notion of culturally relative truth, it is suggested that when not viewed from a poststructural perspective but from the level of critical analysis, synchronicity places Jung's theory of knowledge into a position of unanswerable paradox. May a relative truth also be an absolute truth?

Next, the implications which synchronicity holds for Jung's view of the concept of power is examined. It is argued that Jung's emphasis is psychological, but not exclusively so. With synchronicity, power is experienced as the numinous intensity which occurs when archetypal contents are activated in consciousness. Nevertheless, the concept of the shadow links a personal experience of power into a potentially collective one. The collective aspect of the numinous power that is experienced with synchronicity is discussed in regard to the activation of the Wotan archetype and the relation Jung says it had with the rise of Nazi Germany.

Jung's view of power is then compared to Foucault's mature understanding of power. In order to locate Foucault's later understanding of power, the work of Nietzsche, Marx and Barthes was outlined. These authors represent

imperfect precursors to Foucault's understanding of power. Foucault does not look at power in terms of forces of repression, but as a creative agent that generates discourses containing socially relative truth(s). This idea seems very close to Nietzsche's thought concerning the relation between social values and social truth. Although Foucault does not advance the notion of an Nietzschean eternal return.

The relation between knowledge and power in the work of Karl Marx was outlined in order to reveal Foucault's novel formulation regarding the distribution of power within the social body. The main innovation which Foucault offers is the critique of the concept of class-based oppression. Rather than representing oppression as a vertically based process of domination from above (Capitalist Landowners) to below (Proletariat Workers), Foucault says that power operates in a multivectorial manner. Moreover, resistance to power is not by necessity related to a large-scale historical revolution of oppressed workers; for Foucault, resistance immediately appears to each and every discourse of power present within the social system. Marx says that the owners of the means of production interfere with the unfolding of the workers' true human nature (the natural desire for ease and abundance) by virtue of "distorting" the true relation of oppression that exists between themselves and the proletariat. Foucault, however, argues that truth is always arbitrary and created. There is no absolute, true human nature which may be distorted. Rather, truths about human nature are socially constructed.

The second main innovation in Foucault's theory is his contestation of Marx's understanding of social teleology. For Foucault, the history of so-called truth is a discontinuous, non-determined history. Events occur not because they have to, but because they happen to. But this is not to imply

that events occur by chance in Foucault's schema. Rather, events occur not quite by chance but by the force of competing intentions. Unlike Marx, Foucault does not envision a natural and inexorable progression of historical events. For Foucault there is no natural law that determines just what competing intentions may or may not exist at a given moment in history. The neo-Marxist, Barthes, espouses a view about semiology and truth which appears quite Foucauldian, yet Barthes adheres to the single-minded Marxist notion of class-based oppression which Foucault challenges. In regard to power, I argue that Jung emphasizes the psychological, numinous, and transcendent aspects of power which are experienced through the symbol, whereas, Barthes and Foucault stress the social aspect of power—power in relation to signification and discourse.

Concerning Jung and subjectivity, I suggest that Foucault's notion of non-determination is at loggerheads with Jung's idea that the human subject undergoes a natural progression of psychological evolution throughout the course of life. Moreover, Jung's concept of synchronicity implies the existence of an eternal aspect of being that is fundamental to the archetype of the self. Foucault is interested in studying such claims, yet he would not consider them to be eternally valid nor does he posit within his poststructural schema a transhistorical dimension to subjectivity.

I conclude that Jung's notion of synchronicity was by necessity forwarded in a poststructural manner. The seemingly outlandish metaphysical claims which synchronicity held for western minds of the period between 1931 -1961 required Jung's careful selection and manipulation of the material he would use to support the concept. Regarding Jung's frequent inconsistencies, if viewed from a postmodern perspective, they do not pose a threat to the

argument of this thesis; on the contrary, they support the claim that Jung was willing to go to any extreme in order to render synchronicity more acceptable to his professional colleagues and to the general reading public. We have seen that he would even contradict his own thought within a single page of text.

My conclusion also recalls from Part 4 that Jung's analytical psychology emphasises the idea of power as something inherent to the transcendent symbol, while poststructural analyses of power focus on discourses that are located within - and perhaps reduced to - the categories of culture and history. Accordingly, Jung's concept of synchronicity implies a transhistorical component to the self, while postmodernism repudiates the idea of a transhistorical component to human subjectivity. This difference between the two theoretical perspectives reveals that the (a) ideological content and (b) presentation of the concept of synchronicity are precursory only to facets, and not to the totality, of postmodern thought. The conclusion does not suggest that the ideas explicit and implicit to Jung's concept of synchronicity, or that Jung's manner of presenting those ideas entirely represent postmodernism. Instead, I conclude that several of the ideas as well as the presentation of synchronicity *prefigure* postmodernism. By the term "prefigure" I mean to indicate the notion of an imperfect, or incomplete forerunner of something not yet fully manifested. A prefigurative idea or theory, in this sense, contains elements and displays salient tendencies of the idea or theory that it foreshadows, but the prefiguration itself is not identical to the subsequent idea or theory which it anticipates.

In the conclusion I also suggest that synchronicity encapsulates ideas present in subatomic physics, but which have yet to be fully embraced within

the larger social sphere. Because it invites us to consider the possibility that the relativity of space and time may be experienced on the psychological plane, I suggest that the heuristic value of the notion of synchronicity is high. To demonstrate this claim, I provided a survey of the applications of synchronicity which are made by Jungian analysts and by followers of Jung. Clearly, the concept is currently being extended in order to advance claims which normally would be assigned to the realms of the occult and the paranormal. Because of the existence of the concept of synchronicity, Jungian psychological theory and practice is able to embrace and foster the ideas of telepathy and empathetic healing. And popular psychologists and futurists are using synchronicity in order to advance the notion that our culture is in the midst of a grand paradigm shift—a shift toward an increased recognition of the idea of universal interconnectedness and, moreover, toward the enhancement of so-called spiritual values within contemporary culture.

It is said that around the time of his death, lightning struck Jung's favourite tree in his garden at Kusnacht. On the day before hearing of Jung's death, Jung's friend Laurens van der Post apparently dreamed that Jung waved to him, saying the words, "I'll be seeing you." If these legends are true, then it would seem that synchronicity figured prominently even in the final hours of Jung's life.²

Similarly, Victor Mansfield notes that the prominent physicists Max Planck and Niels Bohr have rejected the Newtonian understanding of causality, and that "Jung realized that physics cleared the way for considering acausal processes in other areas of human experience." Victor Mansfield, *Synchronicity, Science, and Soul-Making*, p. 78.

'Aniela Jaffe. *Jung's Last Years*, trans. R. F. C. Hull (Dallas: Spring Publications, 1984), p. 137; and Gordon, *Encyclopedia of Myths and Legends*, p. 385.

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ABSTRACT

The thesis argues that the ideological content of C. G. Jung's concept of synchronicity and particularly Jung's method of presenting synchronicity from 1928-1961 prefigure aspects of Michel Foucault's postmodern thought.

Part 1 discusses issues of theory and method. Part 2 analyzes the various asides which Jung makes about synchronicity from 1928-1951, prior to his three formal works about synchronicity: "On Synchronicity" (1951); *The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche* (with Wolfgang Pauli, 1952); and *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle* (1952). Part 3 analyzes these formal works about synchronicity, as well as Jung's comments on synchronicity from 1953 to the time of his death in 1961. The primary method of Parts 2 and 3 is Michel Foucault's discourse analysis, as outlined in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972).

Part 4 critically compares Jung's concept of synchronicity to Foucault's later understanding of discourse theory, as described in *Power/Knowledge* (1972). This comparison explores the truth claims forwarded by each theorist among the analytical categories of knowledge, power, and subjectivity.

I conclude that the concept of synchronicity and Jung's presentation of synchronicity prefigure a postmodern approach to theory and practice. Jung and Foucault both posit the ideas of 1) an intimate connection between the internal image and the external world 2) acausality and discontinuity 3) the relativity of truth, and 4) the fallacy of "objectivity." But Jung's contradictory belief in a transhistorical, absolute dimension to the self differs from Foucault's view that subjectivity is relative to the social discourses and discursive practices which create it.

I also infer that Jung purposely legitimizes synchronicity with a postmodern style of argumentation because he is aware of the need to implement a "new" truth in an unreceptive social environment. The idea of the relativity of space and time which is explicit to synchronicity is not widespread and, in fact, quite foreign to the *Weltanschauung* of the early to middle twentieth century—particularly in Jung's field of medicine.

Regarding the heuristic value of synchronicity, several theorists use the concept to advance ideas about 1) the paranormal and 2) an anticipated paradigm shift of global consciousness, characterized by beliefs about the relativity of space and time and particularly by the idea that all thoughts, actions, and objects are essentially interconnected.